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INTRODUCTION 
The justification grounds for a special right to religious freedom have 
been scrutinized in the public and the scholarly debates across liberal 
democracies. In the public debate, the legal admissibility of some religious 
manifestations has been challenged for reasons that suggest religious 
manifestations have been favored in law qua religious. In the scholarly 
debate, the focus has been on the “specialness” of religion and the 
justification grounds for singling out religion qua religion for a favored 
treatment in law. However, recent developments show that religion has 
also been singled out qua religion for a disfavored treatment. This project 
pays attention to both angles of the debate on law and religion. To this 
end, it combines the outcomes of six separate articles, each touching upon 
a different aspect of this debate. As such, it elaborates in the first four 
articles on the question whether religion qua religion deserves special 
legal solicitude. Subsequently, it explores in the last two articles on 
singling out religion qua religion for a disfavored treatment in law. This 
Introduction provides an overview of the main research question, the sub-
questions and the research methods per article as well as the overarching 
research methodology and the research output strategy. 
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  INTRODUCTION 
SINGLING OUT RELIGION QUA RELIGION IN LAW 
This project that commenced on September 1st, 2015 and completed 
on June 27th, 2019, contributes to the field of law and religion. Somehow, 
the relationship between law and religion seems to remain a major source 
of concern as well as inspiration to legal scholars, political philosophers, 
policymakers and participants in the public debate.1 This debate has 
been reinforced due to two developments across liberal democracies.  
First, because of immigration to liberal democracies. As such, over 
the recent decades Western legal systems have been confronted with 
problematic traditions of immigrants, such as ritual circumcisions of 
girls.2 Other “contentious” practices, such as wearing headscarves have 
reinforced the debate about state neutrality and religion in the public 
space.3 Second, the rise of “theoterrorism” has urged some scholars and 
politicians to scrutinize the toleration regime for “intolerant ideologies.”4  
These concerns about the presence of religion in the public space, 
religious toleration and the proper protection of the rights and freedoms 
of others are addressed in this project. The role of this Introduction is to 
show how this project aims to dispatch questions and concerns related to 
both aspects of the law and religion debate: religious toleration (favoring 
religion) and religious animus (disfavoring religion). Part I contains the 
main research question of this project. Part II includes the sub-questions 
and research methods that have been used to answer the main research 
question. Part III discusses the overarching research methodology. Part 
IV is dedicated to the research output strategy behind this project. The 
Conclusion contains a recap. 
I. MAIN RESEARCH QUESTION 
Over the past view years, there has been a lively debate among 
liberal political philosophers concerning the question what role religion 
should play in law (related to religious accommodation concerns) and 
 
1. Robert F. Cochran, Jr. & Michael A. Helfand, The Competing Claims of Law and 
Religion: Who Should Influence Whom?, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 1051, 1052 (2013) (claiming that the tension between law and religion will be permanently present, “given the potential for 
both law and religion to promote the most noble of human goods and the most depraved of human evils”).  
2. Cf. Renée Kool, The Dutch Approach to Female Genital Mutilation in View of the ECHR, 
6 UTRECHT L. REV. 51 (2010).  
3. Cf. Nehal Bhuta, Two Concepts of Religious Freedom in the European Court of Human 
Rights, 113 S. ATLANTIC Q. 9, 25 (2014) (criticizing the European Court of Human Rights 
jurisprudence on the admissibility of bans and restrictions on headscarves).  
4. PAUL CLITEUR, THEOTERRORISM V. FREEDOM OF SPEECH (2019) (on terrorism that has 
been justified and practiced on religious grounds). 
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politics (related to the justification of public decisions).5 This project aims 
to contribute to this debate. It focuses hereby on the specialness of 
religion for two different types of treatment in law.  
First, singling out religion qua religion for a favored treatment in 
law. Second, singling out religion qua religion for a disfavored treatment 
in law. The focus on the specialness of religion for either a favored or a 
disfavored treatment in law across liberal democracies, i.e. constitutional 
democracies that guarantee religious freedom, helps us in two important 
ways, both practically and normatively.  
First, it is a practical hint that helps us to design a research question 
that could keep together the six articles of this project. Second, it tells us 
something about the choice we need to make to develop a theoretical 
framework that helps us to solve questions concerning the specialness of 
religion in law. This is a normative suggestion about the paradigm we 
need to study for the purposes of developing the theoretical framework of 
this project.  
Thus, our academic focus helps us to design the main research 
question and it shapes tentatively the contours of the theoretical 
framework of this study. This framework is based on what the paradigm 
of liberal political philosophy tells us about religious freedom, religious 
accommodation (on the justification grounds for granting exemptions to 
religious groups for religious manifestations) and the justification of 
public decisions (among others on the admissibility of taking public 
decisions with an appeal to religious values).6 
Hence, the theoretical framework of this project should help us to 
solve the following two interrelated questions: what does liberal political 
philosophy tell us about the special legal solicitude toward religion? And, 
does the answer to this question help us to appraise the tendency of 
singling out religion qua religion in law for a disfavored treatment?  
To develop a theoretical framework that helps us to solve these two 
questions, this project focuses on the following main research question. 
 
“Should the law in liberal democracies single out religion qua 
religion for favored treatment? If not, what consequences does the answer 
to this question have for singling out religion qua religion in law for 
disfavored treatment?” 
 
This question has a twofold shape. First, it wonders whether religion 
qua religion deserves special protection in law. This part of the research 
question aims to find out what liberal political philosophy tells us about 
the special legal solicitude toward religion. But it also wants to inform us 
 
5. Sohail Wahedi, Abstraction from the Religious Dimension, 24 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1 
(2017-2018). 
6. Cf. Micah Schwartzman, What if Religion is Not Special?, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 1351 (2012). 
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about the justification grounds for granting religious exemptions (i.e. 
religious accommodation)? This means that we need to analyze the 
justification grounds for exemptions granted to religious manifestations 
that are at odds with generally applicable laws and social norms of liberal 
democracies.  
Thus, for a better understanding of religious accommodation and for 
a proper assessment of the justification grounds for granting exemptions 
to some people because of their beliefs, we need to incorporate examples 
of religious manifestations that are allowed despite the fact of being 
considered contrary to legal and social norms of liberal democracies.  
Examples of such cases are ritual circumcision of boys for religious 
purposes and wearing headscarves in public on religious grounds. To see 
whether there are differences in the legal assessment of comparable 
religious manifestations, we may analyze the legal approach to female 
circumcision that regardless of the way in which the intervention takes 
place, has been considered unlawful. Putting the differences in the legal 
approach to comparable religious manifestations under critical scrutiny, 
helps us to see whether religious manifestations have been singled out in 
law qua religious for a favored treatment. 
If that is the case, then we need to find out whether it is justified to 
single out religion qua religion for favored treatment in law. This brings 
us back to the first part of our research question. But focusing on the 
justification grounds for religious accommodation in relation to liberal 
political philosophy is helpful for another reason.  
The confrontation between legal philosophy and concrete cases helps 
us to find out whether challenging the legal admissibility of what have 
been considered “contentious” religious manifestations, e.g. ritual male 
circumcision, could be considered a paradigmatic expression of the way 
in which liberal political philosophy thinks about the specialness of 
religion for religious accommodation. Hence, this project does not contain 
a technical human rights analysis of cases that raise concerns about the 
human rights at stake. 
The second part of the main research question aims to find out how 
liberal political philosophy should react to the tendency in which religion 
has been singled out for disfavored treatment. Concrete examples that 
attest to this tendency are among others the Swiss ban on building 
minarets, the French ban on headscarves and the travel bans of president 
Trump targeting in particular the adherents of one faith: Muslims.  
Admittedly, over the recent years, the first part of our question has 
been discussed in depth by legal scholars and philosophers.7 However, we 
posit that there is still a gap in the existing body of knowledge. This gap 
concerns the question whether we could identify some commonality in 
 
7. Wahedi, Abstraction from the Religious Dimension, supra note 5 (providing an overview 
of different positions). 
4
Singling out Religion qua Religion in Law  
the way scholars within the paradigm of liberal political philosophy talk 
about the specialness of religion. Also, the rise of measures singling out 
religion qua religion in law for disfavored treatment challenges us to see 
whether we may discern similarities between the way religion has been 
discussed for a favored treatment in law within the paradigm of liberal 
political philosophy and the way in which religion has been discussed for 
the purposes of special bans and restrictions within the public and the 
political debate. Formulated in this way, this project has two aims. First, 
theorizing what liberal theories of religious freedom have in common. 
Second, scrutinizing policies that single out religion qua religion in law 
for disfavored treatment.  
II. RESEARCH ARTICLES AND RESEARCH METHODS 
To answer the main research question and to fulfill the scientific 
goals of this project—theorizing the binding characteristic of the liberal 
theories of religious freedom and putting politics of exclusion under 
critical scrutiny—this thesis combines six separate, though interrelated 
articles, each representing one Chapter. Each of these Chapters raises a 
concrete question and has its own methods. Moreover, the twofold shape 
of our main research question makes it possible to separate the thesis 
into two broader themes.  
One, and in line with the first part of our main research question: 
singling out religion qua religion for a favored treatment in law. Two, 
and in accordance with the second part of the main research question: 
singling out religion qua religion for a disfavored treatment in law. These 
two themes move back and forth between concrete debates (i.e. debates 
about religious accommodation and politics of exclusion) and legal theory 
(i.e. the scholarly debate about the specialness of religion for legal and 
political purposes). These two themes meander—from a methodological 
point of view—between doctrinal and normative research and a 
combination of these two. 
The first theme (Chapters One, Two, Three and Four) focuses on the 
question as to whether religion qua religion should be singled out for a 
favored treatment in law. Thus, does religion deserve special protection 
because it is religion. Also, it aims to find out whether religious practices 
should be singled out for favored treatment in law qua religious. The 
second theme (Chapters Five and Six) scrutinizes recent developments 
across liberal democracies that attest to singling out one faith for special 
restrictions. This theme aims to create awareness about singling out 
religion qua religion for disfavored treatment. In this respect, it reflects 
on how liberal political philosophy should deal with singling out religion 
qua religion for disfavored treatment in law.  
In fact, the second theme is the mirror image of the first theme that 
5
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mainly focuses on the justification grounds for singling out religion qua 
religion for favored treatment in law. Thus, the overarching theme of this 
project is the specialness of religion for legal and political purposes, 
focusing on the opportunities (to flourish) and risks (of exclusion).  
The two themes fit the research chronology in which this thesis has 
been prepared. This chronological order is justified from a methodological 
point of view. This argument rests on the method of reflective equilibrium 
and will be discussed in a separate section of this Introduction, justifying 
the overarching methodology of this project. The following entails a brief 
version of the rationale behind this chronological order.  
This project has started with an analysis of debates in law and 
society about the (un)lawfulness of ritual circumcisions of boys and girls. 
These manifestations of religion and culture are considered problematic 
for different reasons. In general, such interventions upon children’s body 
lack proper consent. They could cause serious harm (almost all types of 
female circumcision cause serious health complications). And in case of 
male circumcision, such interventions are irreversible in nature.  
Given the actual character of the debate about the (un)lawfulness of 
ritual circumcisions, and the question raised by some as to why different 
legal regimes apply to comparable rites, this project elaborates in 
Chapters One and Two on the narratives behind ritual circumcisions and 
the legal responses to these practices. It combines doctrinal and 
normative research to theorize tentatively the legal and political 
developments challenging the lawfulness of religious manifestations that 
are considered problematic.  
Chapter Three draws mainly on normative research. It elaborates 
on the theoretical direction that was set out briefly in Chapter One. The 
in-depth analysis of the debate in liberal political philosophy on the 
specialness of religion for legal and political purposes results in the 
development of the theoretical framework of this project. This normative 
framework rests on liberal theories of religious freedom and aims to 
inform us what these theories tell us about the special legal solicitude 
toward religion within the liberal tradition of political philosophy.  
Chapter Four draws on the normative theoretical framework of 
Chapter Three concerning the special legal solicitude toward religion qua 
religion to reflect on the (un)lawfulness of ritual circumcisions—i.e. the 
focus is on the specialness of religious manifestations qua religious. This 
Chapter combines doctrinal and normative research.  
The remaining Chapters Five and Six rely on the outcomes of the 
previous Chapters and aim to scrutinize recent developments across 
liberal democracies singling out one religion for special prohibitions and 
restrictions. The substantive division between these two Chapters is as 
follows. Whereas Chapter Five warns against the reinforcement of 
majoritarianism, resting mainly on European experiences, Chapter Six 
aims to create awareness about the rise of measures that single out 
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religion qua religion for a disfavored treatment in law, drawing thereby 
on examples from the United States.  
Chapter Six takes the form of a crescendo: the key-outcomes of 
previous Chapters come together. This convergence of findings extends 
the scope of the research in an important way. The main outcomes have 
been applied to another debate—immigration politics of the United
States—that however shares a lot with the conventional subject of this
project—the specialness of religion qua religion for legal and political
purposes. Chapter Six is a useful exercise for two reasons. First, it shows 
how the main research outcomes contribute to scholarly debates about 
related themes, such as—but not limited to—immigration, integration
and assimilation requirements for newcomers and other minority groups; 
and questions about diversity and segregation of groups in society. 
Second, Chapter Six provides some openings for new research. The rise 
of measures that single out some religious groups for disfavored 
treatment needs to be scrutinized further.  
This brief rationale behind the structure of this project argues in 
favor of the order in which the articles were prepared and submitted for 
publication purposes. This Part provides an overview of the methods 
used and the sub-questions answered in the Chapters below. 
Chapter One: 
Het Beoordelingskader van Rituele Jongensbesnijdenis [The 
Assessment Framework of Ritual Male Circumcision], 7 
TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR RELIGIE, RECHT EN BELEID [J. FOR RELIGION, 
L. AND POL’Y] 59 (2016).
Chapter Two: 
De Strafrechtelijke Aanpak van Meisjesbesnijdenis in een 
Rechtsvergelijkende Context [The Criminal Law Approach 
toward Female Circumcision: A Comparative Law Perspective], 7 
TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR RELIGIE, RECHT EN BELEID [J. FOR RELIGION, 
L. AND POL’Y] 36 (2016) (with Renée Kool).
Chapter Three: 
Abstraction from the Religious Dimension, 24 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. 
REV. 1 (2017-2018). 
Chapter Four: 
The Health Law Implications of Ritual Circumcisions, 22 
QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L. J. 209 (2019). 
Chapter Five: 
Freedom of Religion and Living Together, 49 CAL. W. INT’L. L. J. 
213 (2018-2019). 
Chapter Six: 
Muslims and the Myths in the Immigration Politics of the United 
States, 56 CAL. W. L. REV. ___ (2019-2020). 
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      A. Chapter One: The Assessment Framework of Ritual Male 
Circumcision  
Chapter One is a Dutch language article published in 2016 in the 
Tijdschrift voor Religie, Recht en Beleid [Journal for Religion, Law and 
Policy]. The first findings of this Chapter were discussed during an 
informal roundtable meeting at Utrecht University (Dec. 2015). The 
main outcomes of this Chapter were presented in Rotterdam (“Empirical 
legal studies: Fad, Feud or Fellowship?” Conference, Erasmus School of 
Law, Jan. 19-20, 2017).  
                      1. Theoretical Embedding in the PhD project   
The first Chapter of this project analyzes the debate regarding the 
(un)lawfulness of ritual male circumcision in order to reflect on the first 
theme, namely singling out religion qua religion for a favored treatment 
in law (i.e. granting religious exemptions). To this end, it underpins the 
arguments used in the Dutch case law and the broader political debate 
related to the lawfulness of ritual male circumcision in light of the debate 
that takes place within liberal political philosophy on the specialness of 
religion. As such, it anticipates on substantive research that needs to be 
carried out in the forthcoming Chapters.  
Chapter One explores the narratives behind male circumcision, i.e. 
the broader story behind this practice, focusing on the arguments used to 
continue with male circumcision.8 As such, this narrative gives meaning 
to this practice.9 But, Chapter One also elaborates on the way authorities 
have dealt with these narratives for exemption purposes. Finally, it 
investigates the justification grounds for this ancient practice.  
This Chapter paves the way to theorize in other parts of this project 
the way in which religious manifestations have been “repackaged” and 
“redescribed.”  
                      2. Sub-question One  
The focus of the first article is on singling out religion qua religion 
for a special favor, namely granting religious exemptions.  
 
8. See Lance N. Long, Is There Any Science behind the Art of Legal Writing, 16 WYO. L. REV. 
287 (2016); Peter Brooks, Narrative Transactions—Does the Law Need a Narratology, 18 
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1 (2006) (on the importance of “storytelling” in law). Cf. also Jane B. 
Baron & Julia Epstein, Is Law Narrative?, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 141 (1997). 
9. Using the word “narrative” does not mean that this project is searching for the official or 
the right narrative behind male circumcision. Cf. Robert M. Cover, Foreword: Nomos and 
Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983). 
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Based hereon, Chapter One aims to answer the following sub-
question: 
 
“What is the narrative behind ritual male circumcision and how can 
we understand the legal-political responses to this practice?” 
 
The focus of this question is on the narratives behind ritual male 
circumcision and how we could relate this narrative to the legal-political 
responses to the (un)lawfulness of ritual male circumcision (i.e. does the 
religious background of ritual male circumcision warrant a special legal 
solicitude toward this practice qua religious?)  
The term “legal-political response” has been used to confront the 
Dutch case law on this practice as well as the broader European political 
debate on the (un)lawfulness of ritual male circumcision with the ongoing 
debate in liberal political philosophy concerning the justification grounds 
for singling out religious manifestations in law qua religious. 
But the specific justification to answer sub-question one in an article 
has been the 2014 judgment of the Dutch Supreme Court about the legal 
admissibility of ritual male circumcision and the political debates within 
the Council of Europe about this practice. In the margins of these two 
developments, the question raised as to whether ritual male circumcision 
should be singled out in law for special protection qua ritual. Chapter 
One briefly highlights this question and gives some theoretical directions 
to conceptualize it.  
                      3. Research Method   
Chapter One combines doctrinal research with normative research. 
For its doctrinal part, Chapter One operates within the “legal field” and 
relies on the text of the Dutch law, on case law about male circumcision 
as well as on the legal scholarship debating the legal status of ritual male 
circumcision.10 Thus, it focuses on what the “doctrine” has to say about 
the (un)lawfulness of ritual male circumcision. Selected cases come from 
“rechtspraak.nl,” “Kluwer Navigator,” and “legal intelligence.”  
The databases of these sources were used to select relevant cases for 
the analysis of the legal admissibility of ritual male circumcision. The 
selection was based on cases argued in 2016 or before. In this context, six 
different (Dutch) keywords were used to delineate the research domain: 
 
10 Cf. Terry Hutchinson & Nigel Duncan, Defining and Describing What We Do: Doctrinal 
Legal Research, 17 DEAKIN L. REV. 83, 85 (2012). 
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“circumcision;”11 “ritual circumcision;”12 “male circumcision;”13 “boys’ 
circumcision;”14 “circumcised boy;”15 and “circumciser.”16 Eventually, 140 
judgments that contain the keyword “circumcision” were analyzed for the 
purposes of selecting relevant cases that deal with the legal admissibility 
of ritual male circumcision.  
The term “relevant cases” is in this context operationalized on the 
basis of the following three criteria: the (involuntary) non-medical (i),17 
circumcision of boys (ii),18 on the basis of religious or traditional beliefs 
(iii).19 Thus, all female circumcision cases in the context of asylum and 
criminal law were excluded from the analysis. The same is true for two 
medical liability cases. The use of the aforementioned criteria resulted in 
the selection of 9 relevant cases out of 140 court rulings. It should be 
noticed that the selected judgments cover mainly two areas of law: family 
law and substantive criminal law. 
The normative part of this Chapter draws on the debate in liberal 
political philosophy that deals with the justification grounds for singling 
out religious manifestations for a favored treatment in law. Thus, it 
focuses on the role religion plays for the justification of granting 
exemptions from laws that are otherwise generally applicable. The 
selection of sources is based on the work of scholars who operate within 
the same field of research that focuses on the specialness of religion, i.e. 
the justification grounds for singling out religion qua religion for a 
favored treatment in law. These scholars pay attention to how “the 
 
11. The Dutch keyword used, was “besnijdenis.” In the database of rechtspraak.nl the use 
of this keyword resulted in 140 cases, most of these rulings concern immigration law cases. 
Legal intelligence found 257 cases spread over different areas of law. Most of the cases 
overlapped with cases found in other databases, for instance some cases of rechtspraak.nl 
are published in specific law journals. Kluwer Navigator found 184 cases that contain the word “circumcision.” It should be noticed that these cases are publications of rechtspraak.nl 
judgments in specific law journals.  
12. The Dutch keyword used, was “rituele besnijdenis.” Outcomes: Rechtspraak.nl: 7 
overlapping cases; Legal intelligence: 14 overlapping cases; Kluwer Navigator: 15 
overlapping cases. 
13. The Dutch keyword used, was “mannenbesnijdenis.” Outcomes: no results. 
14. The Dutch keyword used, was “jongensbesnijdenis.” Outcomes: Rechtspraak.nl: 4 
overlapping cases; Legal intelligence: 14 overlapping cases; Kluwer Navigator: 9 
overlapping cases. 
15. The Dutch keyword used, was “besneden jongen” Outcomes: Rechtspraak.nl: 42 
overlapping cases; Legal intelligence: 45 overlapping cases; Kluwer Navigator: 53 
overlapping cases. 
16. The Dutch keyword used, was “besnijder.” Outcomes: no results. 
17. Some cases in the area of medical liability law, contract and tort law concern the claim 
that the circumcision was not performed correctly. See Ct. of Appeal ‘s-Hertogenbosch, 
ECLI:NL:GHSHE:2014:4784; Dist.Ct. Maastricht ECLI:NL:RBMAA:2010:BO7650 (Neth.). 
18. The case law in the area of migration law includes cases concerning the asylum ground for women who risk circumcision in their countries. The database of “legal intelligence,” 
which includes judgments from other databases (i.e. rechtspraak.nl and Kluwer Navigator) 
found 101 judgments.  
19. 9 judgments were found that deal with the admissibility of ritual male circumcision. 
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category of religion” should be understood in law, under what conditions 
“religious exemptions” are justified as well as the role “religion” could 
play for designing and justifying public decisions.  
The theories this part relies on have the following commonalities. 
They are not in search of “the best” definition of religion (non-semantic). 
Nor do these theories really engage with the sectarian justification of 
basic liberties, such as religious freedom. That is to say: liberal theorists 
of religious freedom do not argue that religion deserves special protection 
in law because of the specialness of God (non-sectarian). Finally, the 
theories Chapter One draws on emphasize the importance of equal 
treatment and equal access to basic liberties (egalitarian).20  
Chapter One takes an interdisciplinary perspective, due to its 
combination of the study of law with liberal political philosophy.21 It 
relies on a first scan of liberal theories of religious freedom to explore the 
way we could understand the debate about the (un)lawfulness of ritual 
male circumcision within the legal discourse. Also, it combines—from a 
methodological point of view—a normative conceptual perspective about 
the justification grounds for the special legal solicitude toward religion 
with classic doctrinal research concerning the (un)lawfulness of ritual 
male circumcision.22  
      B. Chapter Two: The Criminal Law Approach toward Female 
Circumcision: A Comparative Law Perspective  
Chapter Two is a 2016 Dutch language article that was published 
by the Tijdschrift voor Religie, Recht en Beleid [Journal for Religion, Law 
and Policy].  
                      1. Theoretical Embedding in the PhD project   
Chapter Two takes the form of an intermezzo. Both thematically and 
theoretically it is a bit isolated from the rest of the study, as it mainly 
provides a theoretical explanation for why criminal law enforcement 
against female circumcision fails, despite the clear ambitions to combat 
this practice. Nevertheless, this Chapter contains an important element 
that makes a comparison of narratives behind ritual circumcisions as 
well as a comparison of the legal responses to these narratives possible. 
Hence, this Chapter makes it possible to map potential inconsistencies 
within the legal approaches to ritual circumcisions—and we could rely on 
this outcome to raise the question where such a legal distinction comes 
 
20. Cf. CÉCILE LABORDE, LIBERALISM’S RELIGION (2017). 
21. Richard A. Posner, Legal Scholarship Today, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1314, 1316-17 (2002). 
22. Edward L. Rubin, Law and the Methodology of Law, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 521, 533 (1997). 
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from and whether that distinction is justified.  
Recall the first part of the main research question: does religion qua 
religion require special protection in law? Recall the main aim of Chapter 
One: finding out whether male circumcision deserves special protection. 
With this information in mind and anticipating on the forthcoming parts 
of the research, Chapter Two adds the narrative behind ritual female 
circumcision to the main body of this project.  
The cohesion between Chapters One and Two becomes very clear in 
Chapter Four that aims to answer whether religious manifestations, like 
the cases discussed in Chapters One and Two, deserve special legal 
protection qua religious. Thus: singling out religious manifestations qua 
religious for favored treatment in law. Hence, Chapter Two helps us 
eventually to solve the main research question, as this answer is partly 
based on a thorough analysis of both theory (conceptual analysis of 
liberal political philosophy about the role religion plays for singling out 
this specific category qua religion for favored treatment in law) and 
practice (the legal doctrine) regarding two very topical and questionable 
manifestations of religion.  
                      2. Sub-question Two   
Taking into account the narrative behind ritual male circumcision 
and the legal responses to this narrative, as well as having elaborated on 
the possible justification grounds for this practice, and bearing in mind 
the relevance of confronting the narratives of both male and female ritual 
circumcisions for answering the main research question, sub-question 
two is formulated as follows:  
 
“What is the narrative behind female circumcision and how can we 
understand the legal-political responses to this practice?” 
 
The justification to answer this sub-question in an article has been 
the presentation of a new study about the rise of female circumcision 
outside Africa for religious reasons. This specific circumstance urged a 
timely publication that makes the comparison with male circumcision 
later on in this project even more plausible.  
                      3. Research Method   
Chapter Two is based on a qualitative literature research of two 
matters. First, it aims to define female circumcision. To this end, it makes 
use of field research carried out by international organizations as well as 
academic researchers who have studied the reasons people usually rely 
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on to practice female circumcision. These studies have also mapped the 
main health consequences of this practice. Second, this Chapter aims to 
find out why—despite international calls to eliminate this practice—
there is still little progress in the legal fight against female circumcision.  
To deal with this issue, this research develops a hypothesis on the 
basis of the analysis carried out by Anouk Guiné and Francisco Fuentes. 
They have linked the empirical differences in the criminal enforcement 
against female circumcision in the United Kingdom and France to 
different models of citizenship. Chapter Two draws on this proposition 
and elaborates in the absence of adequate case law related to the criminal 
law enforcement against ritual female circumcision—except France—on 
political debates in the Netherlands, France and the United Kingdom.  
It focuses hereby on the question how over the past decades the 
debate on the (un)lawfulness of this practice has evolved. This Chapter 
links political debates to models of citizenship prevailing in the countries 
studied. The systematic comparison between notions of citizenship with 
political debates justifies the main claims of this article. In sum, Chapter 
Two draws on qualitative literature research and comparison of different 
models of citizenship with debates in the legal and political discourse on 
the (un)lawfulness of female circumcision. 
      C. Chapter Three: Abstraction from the Religious Dimension   
Chapter Three is a 2018 article published in Buffalo Human Rights 
Law Review. The main argument of this article was discussed in Lisbon 
(“XXVIII World Congress of the International Association for the 
Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy,” University of Lisbon, Jul. 20, 
2017); London (“Association of Transnational Law Schools” Agora, Queen 
Mary University of London, Jun. 20, 2017) and Malibu (“Religious 
Critiques of Law” Conference, Pepperdine School of Law, Mar. 8-9, 2017).  
                      1. Theoretical Embedding in the PhD project   
Chapter Three develops a theoretical framework for this study. This 
framework aims to inform us whether religion should be considered a 
protection worthy category in law qua religion. The theoretical relevance 
of this Chapter is that it helps us to understand the legal and political 
discourse concerning the legal admissibility of a wide range of religious 
manifestations. Based on this framework, we are able to theorize much 
of the arguments used within the legal and political discourse concerning 
religious freedom, religious accommodation and state neutrality toward 
religion.  
This theoretical framework helps us in a further way, it looks beyond 
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the argument suggesting that religion is special because of religious 
freedom; religious accommodation and people’s relationship with religion 
and God. The focus is much more on how liberal political philosophers 
have challenged this argument, drawing on a normative framework of 
conceptual arguments concerning the protection worthiness of religion in 
a special constitutional right.  
Hence, this theoretical framework has also consequences for how 
one should approach religious accommodation cases. However, it is not 
limited to accommodation questions in law. It also includes arguments 
related to the question how authorities should deal with religion as such. 
The theoretical connection between Chapters One, Two and Three 
becomes clear in the remaining three Chapters of this research. This 
follows from the following argumentative structure.  
The first two Chapters deal with two problematic manifestations of 
religion. Chapter Three refers in general to comparable cases. However, 
it provides a deeper normative-theoretical basis for the way religion and 
manifestations based hereon have been approached by liberal theorists 
of religious freedom. Chapter Four draws on the findings of the first three 
Chapters to find out whether religious manifestations deserve special 
legal protection qua religious. The same is true for the Chapters following 
Chapter Four. As such, Chapters Five and Six draw on the theoretical 
framework that has been developed in Chapter Three to link political and 
societal debates about religion and religious manifestations to the debate 
in legal political philosophy about the specialness of religion in law and 
politics.  
Against this backdrop, we can say that Chapter Three functions as 
the theoretical hub and axis of this project. Chapters One and Two 
anticipate on the theoretical direction this project needs to take. Chapter 
Three elaborates on this important suggestion and develops a theoretical 
framework. Chapter Four uses this framework to scrutinize the different 
legal responses to male and female circumcision. Chapters Five and Six 
do the same: both draw on the framework of Chapter Three to scrutinize 
measures that single out one religious group for disfavored treatment.  
But there is also another reason that explains to us why Chapter 
Three is the theoretical axis of this project: whereas the first four 
Chapters of this thesis focus on the specialness of religion and religious 
manifestations for a favored treatment in law (concluding that religion is 
only special via abstraction from the religious dimension), the last two 
Chapters of this study focus on the specialness of religion for a disfavored 
treatment (concluding that abstraction is a very useful tool to repackage 
religious manifestations, through drawing on facially neutral arguments 
that limit the free exercise in an unprecedented way). The usefulness of 
abstraction for both angles of the specialness debate, either a favored or 
a disfavored treatment of religion qua religion in law, emphasizes the 
theoretical importance and relevance of Chapter Three.  
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                      2. Sub-question Three   
Chapter Three aims to provide a theoretical basis for the arguments 
used in the public and legal discourse to challenge the legal admissibility 
of religious manifestations. Also, it aims to figure out how liberal political 
philosophy deals with religion in law. Hence, the theoretical framework 
we develop in this Chapter should help us in Chapter Four to provide a 
theoretical basis for the ongoing debate concerning the legal admissibility 
of ritual circumcisions.  
Also, it should help us in the remaining Chapters to find out whether 
politics based on feelings of anxiety toward newcomers and new religions 
and even toward lifestyles not rooted in the dominant cultures of liberal 
democracies are paradigmatic expressions of the role religion should play 
in law according to liberal theories of religious freedom.  
Against this backdrop, this Chapter answers the following question: 
 
“Does religion qua religion deserve special legal protection?” 
 
Although the formulation of sub-question three is very close to the 
first part of the main research question, it is mainly drafted for the 
purposes of developing the theoretical framework of this project. 
The justification to answer sub-question three in an article has been 
the lively debate among legal scholars and liberal political philosophers 
concerning the question whether religion qua religion should be singled 
out in law for special protection. Analyzing this specific debate given its 
theoretical relevance for the research project as a whole, justifies our 
choice to publish our meta-analysis on the special legal solicitude toward 
religion in a separate article.  
                      3. Research Method   
Chapter Three is based on a meta-analysis of the debate in liberal 
political philosophy concerning the justification grounds for the special 
legal solicitude toward religion. This meta-analysis is made possible by 
developing a matrix of positions and putting authors with a comparable 
position under the same category, and conceptualizing these categories 
as certain variants of liberal theories of religious freedom. This taxonomy 
of liberal theories of religious freedom is a very appropriate method to 
map the alternatives of each position and see what the main differences 
are between the positions.23  
Sources are mainly selected based on the condition that they engage 
 
23. Cf. W. COLE DURHAM, JR. & BRETT G. SCHARFFS, LAW AND RELIGION: NATIONAL, 
INTERNATIONAL, AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 45 (2010). 
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in the discussion on the protection worthiness of religion in a special 
right, such as the right to religious freedom. However, one disclaimer 
should be made.  
The selected publications have two important commonalities. One, 
they are not in search of the best definition of religion (non-semantic). 
Two, they do not draw on sectarian grounds to engage in the law and 
religion debate (non-sectarian). That is to say, the arguments discussing 
the specialness of religion are not based on exclusive religious grounds, 
meaning religion is special because of the metaphysics of religion. 
      D. Chapter Four: The Health Law Implications of Ritual 
Circumcisions   
Chapter Four is a 2019 article published in Quinnipiac Health Law 
Journal. Previous versions of this article were discussed in Bologna 
(“European Academy of Religion” Annual Conference 2019, Mar. 4-7, 
2019) and Rabat (“Religion, Law, and Security” Conference, The Fifth 
Annual Conference of the African Consortium for Law and Religion 
Studies, International University of Rabat, May 14-17, 2017). The Rabat 
conference proceeding version of this article was published as: Female 
circumcision as an African problem: double standards or harsh reality?, 
in CHRISTIAN GREEN, JEREMY GUNN & MARK HILL (EDS.), RELIGION, LAW 
AND SECURITY IN AFRICA (2018) (mainly focusing on the question 
whether female circumcision is still a unique problem of the African 
continent).  
                      1. Theoretical Embedding in the PhD project   
The theoretical relevance of Chapter Four is laid down into two 
specific grounds. First, it brings together the findings of Chapters One 
and Two through a comparative analysis of the narratives behind ritual 
circumcisions and the legal responses to such interventions. Second, it 
scrutinizes the (un)lawfulness of ritual male and female circumcisions in 
light of the phenomenon of abstraction from the religious dimension that 
is conceptualized in Chapter Three.  
This confrontation results into two important findings that help us 
to solve the main question of this project. First, the criticism of applying 
“double standards” in the legal assessment of ritual circumcisions can be 
understood in light of the liberal criticism of favoritism toward religious 
manifestations. This criticism rests on an egalitarian account of religious 
freedom. Second, the incorporation of abstraction to the analysis—as the 
binding element of the liberal theories of religious freedom—reveals that 
religious practices should not be tolerated qua religious.  
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It is specifically this second finding that challenges us to rethink the 
justification grounds for freedom of religion beyond the egalitarian and 
sectarian defense of this liberty. Thus, Chapter Four widens our law and 
religion perspective and paves the way to look beyond the conventional 
theoretical framework. This is a useful exercise for the remaining two 
Chapters of this project.  
As such, we are encouraged to reflect on the research problem from 
different—though interrelated—angles. Based hereon, Chapter Four 
introduces novel pragmatic arguments in defense of religious freedom. 
Chapter Five warns against the reinforcement of majoritarianism and 
Chapter Six draws hereon to warn against the rise of Islamophobia.  
                      2. Sub-question Four   
The comparison and confrontation of the narratives behind ritual 
circumcisions and the very different legal responses to similar practices 
raise naturally the following fourth sub-question to the main research 
question: 
 
“Does circumcision on religious grounds deserve special protection 
qua religious?” 
 
Sub-question four combines the rationales behind sub-questions one 
and two—what do ritual circumcisions entail and how can we understand 
legal and political responses to such interventions—and it takes into 
account the theoretical framework that has been set out in Chapter 
Three—does religion qua religion deserve special protection in law. Thus, 
sub-question four is in fact a variant to the main research question of this 
study, focusing on the protection worthiness of religious manifestations 
qua religious. At the same time, this sub-question is formulated in a way 
that allows us to think beyond positive law.  
Any response to this sub-question means that we should also think 
about the consequences of our response. This opening justifies our choice 
to put our preliminary response—based on the framework that we have 
developed in Chapter Three—under critical scrutiny and think of novel 
arguments that could fit a broader sense of justice when it comes to the 
legal admissibility of ritual circumcisions. 
The justification for answering sub-question four in an article has 
been the 2017 arrest and detention of some members of the Dawoodi 
Bohra Shiite sect in the United States on the grounds of circumcising 
girls for religious purposes. The news about the prevalence of female 
circumcision in the United States caused a broad wave of public outrage. 
Also, some critics of traditional practices concerning children challenged 
the lawfulness of ritual male circumcision, wondering why this practice 
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has been singled out for special protection. This concern shows important 
similarities with what this study aims to solve: should religion qua 
religion be singled out in law for favored treatment? But the main 
justification for answering sub-question four in an article has been the 
debate on the (un)lawfulness of ritual circumcisions following the 
detention of members of the Dawoodi Bohra community in the United 
States.  
                      3. Research Method   
Chapter Four draws on the findings of Chapters One to Three. Thus, 
from a methodological point of view, this Chapter relies on the methods 
applied in each of the first three preceding Chapters. Generally, this 
means that Chapter Four draws on a qualitative research method, 
reviewing the relevant literature on ritual circumcisions and the legality 
of these practices. More specifically, Chapter Four rests on a combination 
of doctrinal and philosophical research. The doctrinal research consists 
of a thorough analysis of the literature on ritual circumcisions and an 
analysis of legislation designed to regulate or restrict circumcisions. Also, 
it rests on an analysis of case law on ritual circumcisions. The literature 
review is made possible by a selection of the latest scholarly work that 
have provided a description of ritual circumcisions. These sources rest 
mainly on field research and provide empirical insights into the reasons 
people rely on to practice—a particular variant of—ritual circumcisions.  
The literature on the health consequences of ritual circumcisions 
consists primarily of sources used by international and domestic health 
organizations, such as, but not limited to, the World Health Organization 
and the Royal Dutch Medical Association. Also, literature is selected from 
databases of PubMed Central and U.S. National Institutes of Health’s 
National Library of Medicine, which provide full access to a wide range 
of studies about bio-ethics, medicine and human bodies. The selection of 
sources is based on the use of keywords, such as “circumcision;” “male 
circumcision;” “female circumcision;” and “female genital mutilation” in 
combination with “health consequences.” 
For its normative research, Chapter Four draws on the theoretical 
framework of Chapter Three. This framework rests on a meta-analysis of 
the scholarly debate concerning the question what role religion should 
play for the justification of granting religious exemptions and decisions 
that are generally applicable. Next, Chapter Four, puts its assumptions 
regarding the legality of ritual circumcisions in reflective equilibrium to 
develop a coherent justification for the development of its arguments and 
the conclusion it reaches based thereon. This is an appropriate method 
to solve questions of law and religion, which concern questions about 
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political philosophy and political morality.24 
The application of this method to the problem of Chapter Four 
entails a confrontation of our first intuitive response to the legal 
admissibility of ritual circumcisions, with the actual legal status of these 
practices (legal practice angle) and with the normative framework of 
abstraction (legal theory and philosophy angle). Moving back and forth 
between the current legal status of ritual circumcisions, which allows 
male circumcision and outlaws female circumcision, and the normative 
framework of abstraction, rejecting a toleration regime for religion qua 
religion, results in the identification of a serious gap in the justification 
and legal prohibition of comparable practices.  
If male circumcision is tolerated in law on religious grounds, then 
why are religious variants of female circumcision that are less invasive 
than male circumcision systematically outlawed?  
To bring harmony between what the law says about circumcisions—
allowing ritual male circumcision and outlawing female circumcision—
and legal theory—religion does not warrant special protection in law qua 
religion—Chapter Four searches for novel arguments that can explain to 
us the asymmetrical toleration regime for comparable practices. Testing 
the legality of ritual circumcisions in light of the abstraction framework 
unveils that the infringements such practices cause upon bodily integrity 
can only be justified in law on ecumenical grounds. This Chapter finds 
such a serious ground for ritual male circumcision in its potential health 
benefits. A similar argument cannot be made for female circumcision. 
However, the health benefits argument hangs like a sword of Damocles 
above the non-sectarian justification ground of ritual male circumcision.  
Hence, we need to think about other arguments that fit the actual 
debate: a ban on male circumcision would be ineffective and it will 
deprive minorities from their identity. On the other hand, allowing some 
variants of infant female circumcision will be considered a serious step 
back in time. This will also complicate the attempts of human rights 
organizations and health organizations to protect girls and women 
from—generally harmful—genital modifications. Therefore, reflecting on 
this problem from a religious freedom perspective—going back to the 
conventional design of this project—in light of our findings—moving 
forth toward legal theory and philosophy—and trying to underpin the 
asymmetrical toleration regime in a way that is coherent with how things 
work out in practice, legal theory and philosophy, has resulted in the 
introduction of two novel arguments that explain to us the asymmetry in 
the legal approach to ritual circumcisions. These arguments derive from 
a thought experiment on the consequences of banning male circumcision 
 
24. See NELSON TEBBE, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN AN EGALITARIAN AGE 9 (2017) (applying 
reflective equilibrium as a method to solve moral reasoning problems in a recent law and 
religion project). 
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and allowing some variants of female circumcision.  
      E. Chapter Five: Freedom of Religion and Living Together  
Chapter Five is a 2019 article that has appeared in the California 
Western International Law Journal. This Chapter began as a project for 
the “Religion and the Rule of Law” writing training fellowship in Oxford. 
This writing program was organized by the International Center for Law 
and Religion Studies at Brigham Young University and held at Christ 
Church, University of Oxford (Jul. 22-Aug.11, 2018).  
The main arguments of this Chapter were discussed in Bologna 
(“European Academy of Religion” Annual Conference 2019, Mar. 4-7, 
2019); Prague (“State Responses to Security Threats and Religious 
Diversity” Conference, Nov. 26-28, 2018) and Rio de Janeiro (the Fifth 
ICLARS Conference, “Living Together in Diversity: Strategies from Law 
and Religion,” Pontifical Catholic University, Sep. 12-14, 2018).  
                      1. Theoretical Embedding in the PhD project   
Whereas the first four Chapters of this PhD thesis—in conjunction—
are concerned with finding a proper theoretical base to understand the 
legal challenge many religious manifestations face in today’s liberal 
democracies—and elaborating in this regard on the specialness of 
religion in law qua religion, and the specialness of religious 
manifestations qua religious, Chapter Five identifies a barely scrutinized 
angle to the law and religion debate: the rise of measures that disfavor 
religion qua religion.  
Hence, Chapter Five conceptualizes the opposite side of favoring 
religion qua religion in law and politics. It illustrates and conceptualizes 
subsequently the tendency of singling out religion qua religion in law for 
a disfavored treatment. To theorize this phenomenon properly and bridge 
preceding work, Chapter Five draws on some recent developments across 
Europe that have targeted public manifestations of the Islamic faith as 
incompatible with the values of modern societies. This Chapter theorizes 
this specific development as the “reinforcement of majoritarianism.”  
To bridge the preceding Chapters, Chapter Five draws on concrete 
cases and public debates to anticipate on the theoretical direction we 
should follow to provide a theoretical basis for the indicated tendency of 
disfavoring religion. This formula of critically reflecting on concrete and 
actual discussions about the central theme of this project, has proved its 
usefulness in Chapters Three and Four. In order to critically reflect on 
the “reinforcement of majoritarianism,” Chapter Five raises the question 
as to why majoritarian sensitivities seem to prevail in important free 
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exercise cases. To solve this issue, this Chapter draws on the normative 
framework of Chapter Three.  
This confrontation helps us to find out whether the reinforcement of 
majoritarianism could be considered a paradigmatic expression of what 
liberal political philosophy tells us about the role religion should play for 
granting exemptions and justifying public decisions. On the basis of this, 
Chapter Five substantiates its suspicions against the problematic sides 
of abstraction from the religious dimension: the characteristic that keeps 
the studied liberal theories of religious freedom together.  
Chapter Five contributes to the main question of this study through 
identifying and theorizing a new phenomenon in the field of law and 
religion: disfavoring religion qua religion in law. Thus, whereas the first 
four Chapters have provided a variety of liberal alternatives to deal with 
religion in law—the opportunities side of the debate—Chapter Five aims 
to connect the tendency of reinforcing majoritarianism to argumentation 
patterns in liberal political philosophy that have “repackaged” religious 
manifestations as matters of conscience, expression and association. The 
attention paid in this Chapter to this facially neutral, though problematic 
refashioning covers the risks side of the debate on law and religion.  
                      2. Sub-question Five 
Chapter Five provides a theoretical basis for the rise of restrictions 
that target religion qua religion. In this respect, this Chapter relies on 
the findings of Chapter Three. Also, it relies on the findings of Chapter 
Four to reflect on the justification grounds of religious freedom.  
This merger of findings is expressed in the following sub-question: 
 
“How can we understand and face the rise of measures across liberal 
democracies that have targeted religion for special restrictions and 
prohibitions?” 
 
Sub-question five has a twofold design. First, it raises the following 
issue: is the rise of measures that single out religion qua religion in law 
for disfavored treatment a paradigmatic expression of developments in 
legal theory and liberal political philosophy about the role of “religion” 
for the justification of religious exemptions and public decisions?  
Second, sub-question five wonders how we could rethink freedom of 
religion so that this right can form a shield against the reinforcement of 
majoritarianism. This concern justifies to answer sub-question five in a 
separate article. As a matter of fact, new developments across liberal 
democracies attest to singling out the Islamic faith qua Islam for 
disfavored treatment.  
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                      3. Research Method   
To conceptualize the phenomenon of reinforcing majoritarianism 
that targets some religious minorities disproportionately, Chapter Five—
among other—makes use of the normative framework of abstraction. To 
reflect on the consequences this phenomenon might have for religious 
freedom, Chapter Five makes use of the arguments developed in Chapter 
Four. From a methodological point of view, the method of research that 
is used in Chapter Five is twofold.  
On the one hand, some parts rely on the outcomes of Chapters Three 
and Four. Thus, Chapter Five relies on doctrinal and normative research 
that has been carried out in those previous Chapters. On the other hand, 
and for a further understanding of the research subject, Chapter Five has 
carried out some additional doctrinal and normative research.  
The additional doctrinal research consists of reviewing literature, 
case law and legislative documents so we could scrutinize what our first 
intuitions suggest about the way liberal democracies deal with religious 
freedom. Our first intuitions in this respect suggest that free exercise of 
religion has been made dependent upon majoritarian sensitivities 
concerning the legal admissibility of manifestations that are considered 
at odds with the dominant and majoritarian cultural frame of reference.  
In this respect, the Chapter refers to recent developments across 
European countries that have singled out the Islamic faith qua Islam for 
special restrictions. Also, it rests on case law of the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR) that have decided in different judgments on the 
lawfulness of domestic restrictions on Islamic manifestations. As such, it 
elaborates on S.A.S., as in this judgment the Court allows the French ban 
on face-covering veils on the grounds of “living together.” Also, it refers 
to preceding judgments in Dahlab and Sahin, both about women who 
faced legal challenges in Switzerland and Turkey to cover their head on 
religious grounds.  
In these judgments, the ECtHR has set out the parameters for a 
strategy of reconciliation, reconciling “the interests of the various groups” 
in order to advance peaceful coexistence. The choice to add Dahlab and 
Sahin to the analysis is justified in light of the cross-reference system of 
the case law of the ECtHR. The analysis of the three cases points to a 
bias: norm-deviant religious manifestations of the Islamic minority are 
per se problematic.  
To conceptualize this point of criticism, the Chapter draws on the 
body of literature that accuses the Court of using double standards in its 
approach to religious freedom: being tolerant toward the Christian 
majority and intolerant toward the Muslim minority. The selection of 
sources is based on the references made to the literature by the authors 
first selected for an in-depth analysis. The selected works are written 
by—among others—Christian Joppke, Saba Mahmood and Nehal Bhuta. 
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Also, Chapter Five draws on the work of Ratna Kapur, showing how court 
rulings can reinforce majoritarianism.  
The shift toward majoritarianism has been conceptualized in light 
of the findings of Chapter Three. This enables us to answer the question 
as to whether the reinforcement of majoritarianism is a paradigmatic 
expression of recent developments in legal theory and liberal political 
philosophy concerning the role religion should play for the justification of 
accommodation and decisions in law and politics. These developments 
involve a growing support for a “religion-empty” and “God-empty” 
understanding of religion and religious freedom.  
In order to rethink religious freedom in a way that is “diversity-
friendly” and “sectarian-proof” and as such compatible with the 
egalitarian understating of this right that rejects religious toleration qua 
religion, Chapter Five puts its assumptions about the relationship 
between religious freedom and “living together” in reflective equilibrium. 
This part of Chapter Five draws on normative research, moving back and 
forth between concrete debates about propagated or enforced restrictions 
upon free exercise for some groups and legal theory and liberal political 
philosophy. 
This inquiry for a reflective equilibrium departs from the question 
whether our conclusions about the reinforcement of majoritarianism fit 
together with our conclusions about the role and place of religion in 
liberal political philosophy.  
A deeper search for coherence between our convictions reveals that 
there is a partial gap between our first conclusions about how things 
work out in practice—measures that single out some groups for special 
prohibitions—and legal theory and liberal political philosophy about the 
specialness of religion for legal and political purposes.  
This gap in the body of knowledge is partial as we can understand 
the shift toward majoritarianism in terms of abstraction. However, we 
can also criticize this shift on the basis of the abstraction framework. 
Based hereon, we can argue that equal access to fundamental rights as 
well as the egalitarian understanding of basic liberties, are among the 
most important principles we should foster. The rise of measures that 
target some groups in society disproportionately hard, suggests that the 
principle of equality is not always guaranteed. Hence, this principle is 
very fragile and we therefore need to search for arguments that can help 
us to deal properly with the endangered equality principle.  
      F. Chapter Six: Muslims and the Myths in the Immigration 
Politics of the United States   
Chapter Six will be published as part of the special Symposium Issue 
of California Western Law Review. This article was drafted for the 2019 
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Law Review and International Law Journal “Border Myths” Symposium 
in San Diego, CA.   
                      1. Theoretical Embedding in the PhD project   
The 2019 Law Review Symposium was organized to identify some of 
the myths that prevail in the immigration debate in the United States. 
Also, it aimed to conceptualize the process of mythologization in relation 
to immigration and immigrants living in the United States. This should 
help scholars to understand the broader context that shapes the right 
conditions for utilizing myths in the United States’ immigration debate. 
Next, the Symposium aimed to highlight the consequences of this process 
and think about ways to face the challenges in relation to unregulated 
immigration and integration of immigrant groups into the society. These 
goals of the Symposium correspond with an important gap that has been 
addressed in Chapter Five: the phenomenon of singling out religion qua 
religion for special restrictions.  
As we have discussed in the foregoing, the first four Chapters of this 
thesis have focused on the specialness of religion qua religion for the 
purposes of a favored treatment in law. The theoretical explanation for 
this focus is quite simple: a major part of the law and religion scholarship 
scrutinizes the justification grounds for singling out religion in law for a 
favored treatment qua religion. 
However, actual events overtake the process of theory building, also 
in the field of law and religion. Among the topical events that have 
reinforced the law and religion debate from a more novel perspective are 
the election of President Trump in the United States, the 2015 European 
“migration crisis” and more generally the rise of nationalism across many 
democracies from the far east—such as India—to the Middle East—such 
as Turkey and Israel—and Europe—from Hungary to Poland, to 
Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.  
The first and last-mentioned development are the most actual 
events that bring a barely discussed perspective into the law and religion 
scholarship. This concerns the phenomenon of singling out religion for 
special restrictions qua religion. So far, the focus of scholars in the field 
of law and religion has been on the specialness of religion and religious 
manifestations and the related question as to whether religion qua 
religion deserves special protection in law. 
Hence, the specialness of religion for the purposes of creating 
prohibitions and restrictions that target the category of religion or its 
exercise covers an entirely new field of research that is in full 
development. Literature that explicitly discusses this phenomenon is 
very rare. However, there are some U.S. scholars, like Khaled Beydoun 
and Asma T. Uddin, and more generally Martha C. Nussbaum, who have 
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critically elaborated on the rise of actual or propagated discriminatory 
legislation against Muslims qua Muslims.  
Chapter Six theorizes this phenomenon as singling out religion qua 
religion for disfavored treatment through designing and enforcing special 
restriction and prohibition laws and other regulations. The Law Review 
Symposium was a very welcome occasion for the purposes of introducing 
and further discussing this phenomenon.  
To theorize the phenomenon of disfavoring religion in law Chapter 
Six draws on the outcomes of preceding Chapters—that rest mainly on 
European cases and experiences—and it refers to similar developments 
in the United States.  
The most recent case in the United States that gives an appropriate 
illustration of restrictions that single out religion for special bans is 
Trump v. Hawaii, dealing with the so-called travel ban regime that was 
enforced days after the coming into power of President Trump, denying 
entry to citizens of mainly Muslim majority countries.  
However, the travel ban-case is not something unique. In the past, 
there was a debate about the so-called “Save Our State Amendment” in 
the state of Oklahoma. This state amendment aimed to prohibit Courts 
from the use of international law or the Sharia.  
Eventually, in Awad v. Ziriax, the Court Of Appeals for the Tenth 
Circuit ruled that the state amendment was discriminatory as it singled 
out one religion for special restrictions.  
In fact, both cases share an important point of criticism on 
migration, varying from the fear for “theoterrorism” to saving the 
mainstream culture from “over there” problems and “uncivilized” habits. 
A deeper reflection on these American cases for the purposes of theorizing 
the phenomenon of disfavoring religion in law does not only extend the 
scope of our study. It also shows how the separate Chapters cohere.  
Thus, the reference to previous Chapters does not only illustrate the 
interrelationship between the six articles—emphasizing the integrative
research design of this project. Making use of the key outcomes of 
preceding Chapters shows—from a methodological point of view—our
ability to guide ourselves through a new, but related topic: how 
immigration might affect the current state of knowledge in the law and 
religion scholarship.  
Thus, Chapter Six focuses in a similar way as Chapter Five does on 
the risk-sides of abstraction from the religious dimension. And whereas 
Chapter Five focuses on the reinforcement of majoritarianism, Chapter 
Six takes a step further and focuses on the phenomenon of singling out 
religion qua religion for special restrictions.  
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                      2. Sub-question Six 
Following the theoretical direction that was set out in Chapter Five 
about the reinforcement of majoritarianism, Chapter Six draws on some 
American cases to further scrutinize the tendency of singling out religion 
qua religion for special restrictions. Recall what the object of debate was 
in Trump v. Hawaii and Awad v. Ziriax. The travel ban in Trump was 
justified as a matter of security. The “Save Our State Amendment” was 
defended as a serious attempt to keep the “other” outside the country. 
Can we understand this way of “repackaging” religious discrimination in 
terms of abstraction from the religious dimension?  
However, as we have seen in Chapter Five, abstraction from the 
religious dimension is as such not a justification for singling out one 
specific faith (qua that faith) for special bans in liberal democracies. 
Therefore, we first of all need to conceptualize what cases like Trump v. 
Hawaii and Awad v. Ziriax are about. Subsequently, we need to 
contextualize what is behind such cases.  
Against this backdrop, Chapter Six deals with the following sub-
question: 
 
“What is the narrative behind the travel bans of President Trump 
and the “Save Our State Amendment,” and how can we understand the 
legal-political responses to these types of measures?” 
 
Sub-question Six has a twofold design. The “narrative-aspect” of this 
sub-question helps us to reconstruct what has truly driven politicians in 
the United States to design measures that effectively single out for 
disfavored treatment the adherents of one specific religion. The “how-to-
understand-aspect” of this sub-question matches with the normative 
framework we have developed in Chapter Three.  
The interplay between our analyses of the American cases (the 
narrative side of the sub-question) and the normative framework of 
abstraction as set out in Chapter Three might bring us some steps further 
in contextualizing what Chapter Six aims to raise awareness about: the 
rise of measures singling out religion qua religion in law for disfavored 
treatment. 
                      3. Research Method   
Similar to the methodology of Chapters Four and Five that mainly 
relies on the methods used in preceding Chapters, also this Chapter 
relies mainly on the methods used in Chapters Three, Four and Five. In 
order to expand the analysis toward singling out religion qua religion for 
disfavored treatment in law, Chapter Six draws on the research outcomes 
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of preceding Chapters. However, Chapter Six has also its own “unique” 
research methods, since it further scrutinizes a phenomenon that has not 
been discussed in-depth by its preceding Chapter: Chapter Five. As such, 
the outcomes of Chapter Six rest on legal doctrinal research, meaning 
that Chapter Six reviews and analyzes case law, legislative documents 
and literature related to immigration politics of the United States, and 
more specifically studies focusing on the rise of anti-Muslim measures in 
that country.  
The selection of case law has been based on the actual debate about 
restrictions that have targeted religion qua religion. This applies to the 
series of travel ban regimes as enacted by President Trump. The “Save 
Our State Amendment” case was added after reading the work of Martha 
C. Nussbaum concerning the rise of religious intolerance. Literature has 
been selected via using keywords, such as “travel ban” and “Save Our 
State Amendment.”  
In this respect, we have first scanned briefly the outcomes of the 
search process and subsequently looked at a combination of most recently 
published and most cited articles in order to make further selections. The 
works of authors such as Khaled Beydoun and Asma T. Uddin is analyzed 
because both represent the new generation of law and religion scholars 
who pay attention in their work to the rise of restrictions that single out 
Muslims qua Islam for special restrictions.25  
In order to deal properly with the question as to how we might face 
the rise of religious intolerance, Chapter Six draws on the work of Martha 
C. Nussbaum who has developed a strategy to “overcome the era of 
religious intolerance.”26 In fact, this part of Chapter Six aims to bring 
coherence between the conclusions we have reached at different points in 
this Chapter. Hence, also this Chapter draws on the method of reflective 
equilibrium to integrate the separate conclusions.  
As such, it starts with the travel ban cases and adds the “Save Our 
State Amendment” case to reaffirm the conclusion that the travel bans of 
President Trump fit a longer tradition of politics of exclusion. Then, it 
moves toward the abstraction framework to conceptualize the identified 
phenomenon of singling out religion for special restrictions qua religion.  
Again, it adjusts its conclusion about understating this phenomenon 
in terms of abstraction, as the abstraction framework does not allow 
disfavoring one particular lifestyle, simply because it does not fit 
majoritarian sensitivities. So, it concludes that the principle of equality 
is again in danger and to face this challenge, the Chapter makes use of 
the work of Martha C. Nussbaum and the outcomes of Chapter Four.  
 
25. Cf. ASMA T. UDDIN, WHEN ISLAM IS NOT A RELIGION (2019); Khaled A. Beydoun, Muslim 
Bans and the (Re)Making of Political Islamophobia, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 1733, 1735 (2017). 
26. MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, THE NEW RELIGIOUS INTOLERANCE: OVERCOMING THE POLITICS 
OF FEAR IN AN ANXIOUS AGE (2012) (discussing the contemporary fear toward religious 
minorities, particularly the Muslim minority, in the Western world).  
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III. THE OVERARCHING RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
This Part aims to shed light on how separate articles are connected 
to each other and form a coherent thesis from a methodological point of 
view. To put it differently, this Part aims to justify the choice to answer 
the sub-questions in separate articles and in the order in which these 
articles were written and submitted to law journals. Hence, this Part 
aims to justify the following four steps.  
First, the choice to start this project with a discussion of two specific 
cases of religious manifestations: Chapters One and Two (on how the law 
and politics deal with the (un)lawfulness of ritual circumcisions). Second, 
the choice to develop the theoretical framework after elaborating on two 
concrete cases of religious manifestations: Chapter Three (on singling out 
religion qua religion for a favored treatment in law). Third, the choice to 
confront concrete debates with our theoretical framework: Chapter Four 
(on the justification grounds for favoring religious manifestations in law 
qua religious). Fourth, the choice to draw attention on cases that attest 
to disfavoring religion in law: Chapters Five and Six. 
The methodological narrative behind these four steps and the six 
Chapters is working toward a conclusion that rests on coherence between 
the various sub-conclusions reached in each single Chapter of this 
project. The overarching methodology of this project is that of reaching a 
“reflective equilibrium” that integrates the conclusions we have reached 
at different stages.27 Hence, searching for the reflective equilibrium that 
integrates our “reasoned conclusions” is the overarching methodology in 
this research that helps to connect—methodologically—our six articles 
together.28 Although, we have discussed in extenso the research 
methodology per article, it is necessary to show how our search for a 
“reflective equilibrium” has taken form.  
To account for how this search has taken form we need to clarify first 
what role our first intuitions have played in carrying out this study. 
Thus, we start with accounting for how our initial insights and 
impressions in relation to the specialness of religion for either a favored 
or a disfavored treatment in law have stimulated us to conduct this 
research. That is to say: we reconstruct how moving back and forth 
between how things work out in practice—including for example public 
and political debates about religious accommodation, and analyzing 
measures that single out some groups for disfavored treatment—and 
legal theory and liberal political philosophy has contributed to our search 
 
27. See on the method of reflective equilibrium JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). 
28. See on “reasoned judgments” in relation to the debate on law and religion TEBBE, supra 
note 24, at 8. See also Nelson Tebbe, Religion and Social Coherentism, 91 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 363, 377 (2015) (speaking in terms of “considered convictions”). 
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for a reflective equilibrium.29 
The emphasis on the role our first intuitions have played in reaching 
“reasoned conclusion” that are not taken in an arbitrary way is important 
for two reasons. First, and at a macro level, we can reconstruct based on 
our first insights how the project has started and what directions we have 
taken in our search for a reflective equilibrium.  
Second, and at a micro level, thus at the level of thinking about each 
research step, our first intuitions have helped us to reach conclusions 
that are “backed by reasons.”30 This reconstruction gives insights in the 
transformation of our initial insights to initial considered judgments and 
to reasoned conclusions. So how did our first intuitions help us to carry 
out this project and to draft abstracts for paper presentations and 
discussions about our first ideas, preliminary considered judgments and 
later on considered conclusions with experts and peers at conferences and 
workshops? 
For the answer to both question we need to take a step back and look 
at the history behind this project. What circumstances have driven us to 
draft a proposal and carry out a study in the field of law and religion?  
In fact, this project was initiated as an academic response to concrete 
developments across liberal democracies allegedly singling out religious 
minorities for disfavored treatment. The two successive versions of our 
PhD project proposal that were designed to scrutinize this tendency were 
all concerned about the waning influence of religious freedom.31  
In this respect, one specific development in the legal, political and 
societal debates about religious manifestations and religion in the public 
sphere required further attention: the phenomenon of abstraction from 
the religious dimension.  
The proposals designed to carry out this research were all unified in 
expressing concerns about abstraction from the religious dimension. This 
phenomenon was initially seen as a rhetorical mechanism to marginalize 
religious freedom, bringing back religion to the margins of the society. 
 
29. See generally about the role “initial intuitions” play in the search for a reflective 
equilibrium: Jeff McMahan, Moral Intuition, in HUGH LAFOLLETTE & INGMAR PERSSON 
(EDS.), THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO ETHICAL THEORY, SECOND EDITION 103 (2013). Cf. for 
how intuitions form the starting point in the search for a reflective equilibrium: Douglas 
Husak, The Vindication of Good over Evil: Futile Self-Defense, 55 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 291 
(2018). 
30. TEBBE, supra note 24, at 9. 
31. SOHAIL WAHEDI, FREEDOM OF RELIGION UNDER PRESSURE (2015) (research proposal 
drafted for a PhD position at the European University Institute (EUI) in Florence, Italy. 
This proposal was accepted for a research position at the EUI) (on file with author); SOHAIL 
WAHEDI, THE CONSTITUTIONAL DYNAMICS OF RELIGIOUS EXPRESSION. ON THE MECHANISM 
OF ABSTRACTION FROM THE RELIGIOUS DIMENSION (2015) (research proposal drafted for a 
PhD position at Universidade Católica Portuguesa (UCP) in Lisbon, Portugal and Erasmus 
School of Law (ESL) in Rotterdam, the Netherlands. Both UCP and ESL offered full 
funding for this proposal) (on file with author). 
29
  INTRODUCTION 
Therefore, academic research was necessary to conceptualize abstraction 
and create awareness about this phenomenon in order to restore and 
defend freedom of religion.32 
Because we had serious concerns about the presence of something 
like abstraction and how this phenomenon affected negatively religious 
freedom. Our concerns were based on the outcomes of previous research 
we had carried out about the (un)lawfulness of face-covering veils, ritual 
male circumcision and ritual slaughter.33  
In our previous work about abstraction, we have said that the legal 
admissibility of what we called “authentic religious manifestations” was 
made dependent on secular norms that did not properly take into account 
the religious dimension of such manifestations. Moreover, we theorized 
this waning influence of religious freedom by drawing inspiration from 
debates in legal philosophy concerning the justification for the special 
legal solicitude toward religion.  
As such, and with reference to scholars who criticized singling out 
religion qua religion for a favored treatment in law, we defended the line 
that the category of religion does not deserve special legal solicitude.34  
Thus, our initial hypothesis was formulated in a way that considered 
abstraction as a mechanism that marginalized the religious dimension of 
manifestations of religion through redescribing and repackaging these 
practices in non-religious terms.35 
To find out whether abstraction is a problematic phenomenon in law, 
and thus to start with elaborating on what our first intuitions suggested 
in this respect, this project starts by analyzing a familiar case. Chapter 
One puts the debate on the legal admissibility of male circumcision under 
critical scrutiny. Our analysis reveals that much of the arguments used 
to attack the legal admissibility of ritual male circumcision qua ritual or 
 
32. Wahedi, Abstraction from the Religious Dimension, supra note 5, at 37 (see specifically 
note 144: explaining how previous research considered abstraction from the religious 
dimension as problematic, alleging that it marginalized the religious dimension of religious 
manifestations). 
33. Sohail Wahedi, Een Boerkaverbod [A Ban on Wearing Burqa’s], 87 NJB 1572 (2012); 
Sohail Wahedi, De Wederrechtelijkheid van Jongensbesnijdenis [The Unlawfulness of Male 
Circumcision], 87 NJB 3097 (2012); Sohail Wahedi, Geef de Ruimte aan Rituele 
Slachtpraktijken [Do Tolerate Ritual Slaughter], TROUW (Nov. 13, 2015), 
https://www.trouw.nl/home/geef-de-ruimte-aan-rituele-slachtpraktijken~a7e51928/ (last 
visited Jun. 27, 2019). 
34. See generally Sohail Wahedi, Marginaliseren van Godsdienstvrijheid door Abstraheren 
van de Religieuze Dimensie [Marginalizing Religious Freedom Through Abstraction from 
the Religious Dimension], 9 RELIGIE & SAMENLEVING [RELIGION & SOC’Y] 128, 134 (2014) 
(although this publication is critical of the mechanism of abstraction, it however does not 
posit that abstraction from the religious dimension is per se problematic, rather it considers 
abstraction as a useful method to assess the legality of religious manifestations that are at 
odds with general laws).  
35. The claim that abstraction from the religious dimension is a problematic phenomenon 
seen from a religious freedom lens is made explicitly in the two successive versions of our 
PhD research proposal. See WAHEDI, supra note 31. 
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religious find their roots in the legal philosophical debate concerning the 
specialness of religion for the purposes of religious freedom.  
The confrontation between the debate on the (un)lawfulness of ritual 
male circumcision in law and politics with our first intuitions about the 
phenomenon of abstraction and the debate on the specialness of religion 
in liberal political philosophy resulted in our first reasoned conclusion on 
the specialness of religious manifestations in law qua religious. Based on 
this conclusion, we nuanced the idea that abstraction is problematic qua 
abstraction.  
Chapter One concluded that within the paradigm of liberal political 
philosophy there is seemingly no support for the argument that religion 
qua religion warrants special legal solicitude.36 Neither is there support 
for the argument that religious manifestations should be tolerated in law 
qua religious. This conclusion has helped us to think about the steps we 
needed to take to proceed with the research.  
Hence, we decided to scrutinize the debate about the (un)lawfulness 
of female circumcision: a case similar to ritual male circumcision with an 
important difference. Male circumcision is allowed, while all variants of 
female circumcision are considered unlawful.  
The confrontation of the conclusions we have reached in the first two 
Chapters revealed that there are “double standards” in the way law deals 
with the (un)lawfulness of ritual circumcisions. But before putting this 
conclusion under critical scrutiny, we decided to look in Chapter Three 
at the specialness of religion in law. This was a useful exercise for the 
purpose of reaching a new reasoned conclusion about the specialness of 
religious manifestations. 
To find out whether religious manifestations warrant special legal 
protection qua religious, in Chapter Four we analyzed the legal status of 
ritual male and female circumcision in light of the theoretical framework 
we developed in Chapter Three.37 
Our analysis in the first four Chapters reveals that singling out 
religion qua religion for a favored treatment in law is problematic. In 
light of this important finding, a conclusion that is backed by strong 
reasons and convictions, we had to reconsider our first intuitions in this 
regard that considered abstraction a problematic phenomenon as such.  
Chapter Four has done much of the work in this respect. This 
Chapter sets out the arguments that explain (i) why abstraction from the 
religious dimension is inherently related to liberal theories of religious 
 
36. Sohail Wahedi, Het Beoordelingskader van Rituele Jongensbesnijdenis [The Assessment 
Framework of Ritual Male Circumcision], 7 TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR RELIGIE, RECHT EN BELEID 
[J. FOR RELIGION, L. AND POL’Y] 59 (2016). 
37. Sohail Wahedi, The Health Law Implications of Ritual Circumcisions, 22 QUINNIPIAC 
HEALTH L. J. 209 (2019). Cf. Sohail Wahedi & Renée Kool, De Strafrechtelijke Aanpak van 
Meisjesbesnijdenis in een Rechtsvergelijkende Context [The Criminal Law Approach toward 
Female Circumcision: A Comparative Law Perspective], 7 TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR RELIGIE, 
RECHT EN BELEID [J. FOR RELIGION, L. AND POL’Y] 36 (2016). 
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freedom and (ii) why this approach is not problematic per se. As such, we 
reached at this stage of the research a reasoned conclusion about the 
phenomenon of abstraction in relation to the debate in law and religion. 
However, the rise of concrete measures and bills that single out one 
religious minority for special disfavored treatment in law, like the French 
ban on face-covering veils, the Austrian Islam bill, and more recently the 
travel bans of President Trump, urged us to focus on the phenomenon of 
disfavoring religion qua religion in law. This focus revealed in Chapters 
Five and Six that abstraction from the religious dimension has played an 
important role in enforcing far reaching limitations upon free exercise of 
religion.38  
Thus, the remaining last two Chapters of this project elaborated on 
our first intuitions about abstraction that considered this phenomenon 
as problematic. With reference to actual restrictions these two Chapters 
have unveiled how the use of facially neutral grounds by authorities 
makes abstraction from the religious dimension possible.  
These two Chapters have illustrated how abstraction deprives some 
religious minorities from their basic rights, such as the right to free 
exercise of religion.  
This theoretical “turn” from nuancing the claim that abstraction is 
per se problematic (the first four Chapters) to creating awareness about 
abstraction (the last two Chapters) informs us about the way we have 
carried out this research: (i) scrutinizing the specialness of religion in law 
(the first four Chapters could be read together) and (ii) scrutinizing how 
religion has been singled out for disfavored treatment (the last Chapters 
could be read together). This specific research design corresponds with 
the two themes this project elaborates on.  
But the order in which we have carried out this project informs us 
also in a further way. It reveals that singling out religion qua religion is 
problematic for a favored treatment in law. Similarly, it is troublesome 
to single out religion qua religion for disfavored treatment in law.  
Whereas the order in which we have carried out this research and 
our reasoned conclusions in that respect have urged us to rethink our 
first intuitions that considered abstraction problematic qua abstraction, 
the final part of this project shows alignment with our concerns about 
abstraction, specifically when abstraction has been used rhetorically to 
reinforce majoritarianism and enforce far reaching measures that single 
out certain religious minorities (e.g. Muslims) for disfavored treatment 
(Chapters Five and Six).  
Hence, the search for a reflective equilibrium through moving back 
and forth between concrete debates, legal theory, legal philosophy as well 
 
38. See Sohail Wahedi, Freedom of Religion and Living Together, 49 CAL. W. INT’L. L. J. 213 
(2018-2019); Sohail Wahedi, Muslims and the Myths in the Immigration Politics of the 
United States, 56 CAL. W. L. REV. ___ (2019-2020). 
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as the conclusions we have reached at different stages of this project, has 
contributed to the identification and further theorization of a barely 
scrutinized phenomenon.  
This is an important achievement as the identification of this 
phenomenon can extend the current state of knowledge in the law and 
religion scholarship. This phenomenon concerns the tendency of singling 
out religion for special restrictions qua religion.  
The search for a reflective equilibrium has also helped us to identify 
the most important principle in this field of research: the principle of 
equality between all citizens. Finally, the search for a reflective 
equilibrium has helped us to develop novel argumentation patterns that 
justify religious freedom on pragmatic grounds. Hence, the process of 
moving back and forth (the zigzag as mentioned previously) has helped 
us to bring harmony between our first intuitions, preliminary conclusions 
and reasoned convictions, and integrate the six Chapters into one major 
project. 
VI. RESEARCH OUTPUT STRATEGY 
In the previous Part, we have provided some important insights into 
how our first impressions about the specialness of religion have guided 
us to reach reasoned conclusions, and from there carry out this study step 
by step. We also have provided a robust and explicit justification for the 
zigzag qua structure and content.  
But our insights and conclusions about the specialness of religion 
have also helped us to cut the research project into smaller, independent 
articles. Each of this smaller projects has its own identifiable academic 
value, but as discussed in the previous Parts, it also contributes to the 
completion of a broader thematic (sub-)project. This might be a promising 
approach for the purposes of carrying out a PhD research that combines 
separate articles into one thesis. 
This Part will account for the choice to conduct this project on the 
basis of six separate articles. Also, it will briefly highlight how our 
conclusions have helped us to cut the project into smaller projects. But 
before highlighting how our intuitions and conclusions have guided us to 
cut this project into smaller research projects, we need to dispatch two 
questions.  
First, and more generally the question as to why it is useful to draft 
a PhD manuscript that combines different articles? Second, and more 
specifically the question as to why American Law Reviews, meaning by 
this U.S. Law School Law Reviews (Law Reviews), are suitable for 
carrying out a PhD project on the basis of articles? As a matter of fact, 
four out of six articles of this PhD thesis have been published with or will 
appear in Law Reviews. The choice to cooperate with Law Reviews is not 
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impulsive but taken deliberately. Hence, this needs some further 
explanation.  
With regard to the first question: why is it valuable to carry out a 
PhD study that is based on a combination of articles? The answer to this 
question is threefold. First, writing articles as part of the PhD project 
provides a unique opportunity to get feedback at an early stage in the 
research phase from other researchers. This helps to improve the content 
of your work, but it also contributes to more visibility of the candidate 
who carries out research in certain field of study. Second, this approach 
increases research output and timely publications in a field of research 
contribute to the academic debate. Third, it is an appropriate opportunity 
to develop a professional network of scholars.39 
With regard to the second question: why opting for Law Reviews? 
Before providing an overview of the arguments we had to submit four 
Chapters of this PhD thesis exclusively to Law Reviews, it is important 
to notice that PhD regulations at Erasmus University Rotterdam do not 
prescribe a specific form for PhD theses that are based on a collection of 
academic articles. Moreover, it is not mandatory by these regulations to 
have published or even accepted a particular amount of articles. Having 
said this, we now briefly discuss three specific arguments that led us to 
submit our work to Law Reviews.  
First, with a very few exceptions, Law Reviews generally allow for 
multiple submissions at the same time. Thus, one is allowed to submit his 
work to a wide range of journals. This encourages authors to look at 
different Law Reviews that are potentially interested in the analysis of a 
paper. This is contrary to how European law journals generally work: 
each submission to these journals contains an exclusive submission until 
the board has taken a decision (which sometimes takes at least a couple 
of months or even a year, and in the worst case scenario longer than a 
year). 
Second, and closely related to the first argument, Law Reviews are 
relatively fast in notifying the author about their decision. Probably, 
because most Law Reviews accept submissions one or two times a year 
(accepting submissions is not the same as offering publication 
agreements). Third, once a piece is accepted for publication purposes, an 
excellent team of editors will guide the author through the publication 
process. The editors deliver useful comments on the content to make the 
arguments stronger. They also do grammar and citation check.  
These three arguments in combination with the more general 
arguments related to why one should seriously look at the option of 
carrying out a PhD study on the basis of several articles have driven us 
 
39. Cf. also the Leiden University note on the advantages of pursuing a PhD based on a 
number of research articles: http://media.leidenuniv.nl/legacy/promoveren-op-artikelen-
2010.pdf (last visited Jun. 27, 2019).  
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to focus on the opportunities Law Reviews provide. We believe strongly 
that a PhD thesis that consists of independent though interrelated 
articles should contain at least some published articles. To achieve this 
research goal, we posit that Law Reviews provide with distance the most 
suitable platform for PhD Candidates in the field of legal research who 
work on an English language PhD project.  
What needs to be emphasized in this respect is the opportunity to 
submit your work to multiple Law Reviews and the fact that editorial 
boards at Law Reviews approach submitted papers with dispatch. Hence, 
the author does not need to wait for the outcome of an editorial decision 
before submitting his work to other journals. The fast editorial process 
following the submission also encourage authors to review the 
argumentation pattern, if a submitted paper is rejected repeatedly by a 
number of Law Reviews. Hence, a PhD thesis in law that is designed to 
consist of articles—that are on one the hand identifiable as independent 
academic publications, though on the other hand contribute to the 
completion of a bigger research project—should take into account the 
opportunities Law Reviews provide.40 
Back to the relationship between our insights, reasoned conclusions 
and cutting this project into smaller and independent articles. How did 
our first intuitions and later on our reasoned conclusions and convictions 
guide us to cut this project into six independent articles that are closely 
connected to each other?  
This project has started with securitizing the (un)lawfulness of male 
and female circumcisions (Chapters One and Two). To understand what 
is at stake in these cases, namely drawing on a religion-empty approach 
to discuss the legal admissibility of ritual circumcisions, we have taken a 
step back and looked at legal theory and legal philosophy.  
What do they tell us about the role religion should play for granting 
exemptions and justifying public decisions? Does religion qua religion 
deserve special protection in law? Both questions have been answered in 
in Chapter Three. And in Chapter Four we have raised the question: how 
can we understand the differences in legal approaches to male and female 
circumcision that are in some respects comparable practices. Can we rely 
on the abstraction framework to understand the asymmetrical toleration 
regime: allowing male circumcision and outlawing female circumcision?  
 
40. Cf. also the PhD thesis of Aaron Petty who has successfully defended a combination of 
four Law Review articles as his PhD thesis at Leiden University. See AARON R. PETTY, THE 
LEGAL CONCEPTION OF “RELIGION” (2016). This thesis combines the following research 
articles: Aaron R. Petty, Faith, However Defined: Reassessing JFS and the Judicial 
Conception of Religion, 6 ELON L. REV. 117 (2014) (Chapter One of the thesis); Aaron R. 
Petty, The Concept of Religion in the Supreme Court of Israel, 26 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 211 
(2014) (Chapter Two of the thesis); Aaron R. Petty, Accommodating Religion, 83 TENN. L. 
REV. 529 (2016) (Chapter Three of the thesis); Aaron R. Petty, Religion, Conscience, and 
Belief in the European Court of Human Rights, 48 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 807 (2016) 
(Chapter Four of the thesis). 
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In Chapters Five and Six we have asked a similar question: does the 
framework of abstraction—the idea about redescribing and repackaging
religious practices—help us to rationalize and scrutinize the way religion
has been singled out for disfavored treatment across liberal democracies? 
CONCLUSION 
The main theme of this project has been the specialness of religion 
qua religion in law. Over the past four years, six separate articles were 
prepared to answer the main research question of this study. Although, 
each of this six articles has its own unique research question, we can say 
that the main research question is answered by two more general sub-
questions.  
This conclusion derives from the dichotomous understanding of the 
specialness of religion qua religion in law, as either a category that has 
been singled out for favored treatment or disfavored treatment.  
Hence, the general sub-questions read as follows: 
1. “Should the law in liberal democracies single out religion qua
religion for favored treatment?”
2. “How shall we appraise restrictions that single out religion qua
religion for a disfavored treatment?”
Sub-question one corresponds with the main purpose of our first four 
Chapters: putting the justification grounds for the special legal solicitude 
toward religion under critical scrutiny.  
Sub-question two corresponds with the main goal of Chapters Five 
and Six: scrutinizing the rise of measures across liberal democracies that 
attest to singling out religion qua religion for disfavored treatment.  
These two sub-questions will be answered in the Conclusion Chapter 
of this thesis. 
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Het beoordelingskader van rituele
jongensbesnijdenis*
Sohail Wahedi
Is rituele jongensbesnijdenis een toelaatbare praktijk? Zo ja, wat zijn de grondsla‐
gen van tolerantie voor deze praktijk? Op basis van rechtspraakanalyse en de
recente ontwikkelingen binnen de Raad van Europa wordt zowel in normatieve zin
als conform het positief recht antwoord gegeven op deze vraag.
Inleiding
Sinds een aantal jaren wordt er binnen westerse samenlevingen een discussie
gevoerd over de vraag of godsdienst bijzonder genoeg is om de uitoefening daar‐
van constitutioneel te beschermen.1 In deze discussie staat de vraag centraal of er
binnen een liberale democratie ruimte mag bestaan voor religieuze praktijken die
normafwijkend zijn.2 Niet zelden worden zulke praktijken binnen het dominante
discours gepresenteerd als schadelijk of simpelweg onverenigbaar met de beginse‐
len van een vrije samenleving. Denk hierbij aan maatschappelijke en politieke dis‐
cussies over de toelaatbaarheid van hoofddoek,3 gezichtsbedekkende kleding4 en
het ritueel slachten van dieren.5 Eenzelfde kritische discussie is gaande over de
toelaatbaarheid van het onderwerp van deze bijdrage: de rituele jongensbesnijde‐
nis. Zo is er de afgelopen jaren binnen verschillende fora aandacht besteed aan
het beoordelingskader van deze praktijk.6 Dat is niet zo verwonderlijk. Rituele
* De auteur is prof. Maurits Berger, prof. Wibren van der Burg, prof. Sanne Taekema, dr. Jeroen
Temperman en de redactie van het tijdschrift zeer dankbaar voor hun commentaar op de
conceptversie van deze bijdrage. Ook dankt de auteur de deelnemers aan het sectieseminar van
Sociology, Theory and Methodology van Erasmus School of Law, voor hun waardevolle commentaar
op de conceptversie.
1 C. Laborde, ‘Religion and the Law: the Disaggregation Approach’, Law and Philosophy 2015,
p. 581-600; Ch.L. Eisgruber & L.G. Sager, Religious Freedom and the Constitution, Cambridge enz.:
Harvard University Press 2007.
2 G. Stopler, ‘The Challenge of Strong Religion in the Liberal State’, Boston University International
Law Journal 2014, p. 411-448; E. Howard, ‘Protecting Freedom to Manifest One’s Religion or
Belief: Strasbourg or Luxembourg’, Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 2014, p. 159-182.
3 T. Loenen, ‘Framing headscarves and other multi-cultural issues as religious, cultural, racial or
gendered: the role of human rights law’, Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 2012, p. 472-488;
M. Saxena, ‘The French Headscarf Law and the Right to Manifest Religious Belief’, University of
Detroit Mercy Law Review 2007, p. 765-828.
4 M. Hunter-Henin, ‘Why the French Don’t Like the Burqa. Laicite, National Identity and Religious
Freedom’, International and Comparative Law Quarterly 2012, p. 613-640.
5 S. Wahedi, ‘Geef de ruimte aan rituele slachtpraktijken’, Trouw 13 november 2015, p. 21.
6 O.a. M. de Blois, ‘Jongensbesnijdenis en godsdienstvrijheid’, in: C. Cardol, T. Veerman & A. Wolt‐
huis (red.), Jongensbesnijdenis bezien vanuit mensenrechtelijk perspectief, Leiden: Stichting NJCM-
boekerij 2015, p. 39-52.
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jongensbesnijdenis maakt inbreuk op de fundamentele rechten van de jongen die
wordt besneden. Echter, een niet onaanzienlijk deel van de moslims en joden
hecht waarde aan het voortbestaan van deze praktijk en beroept zich op de grond‐
wettelijk en internationaalrechtelijk gewaarborgde vrijheid van godsdienst.7 Dit
geeft aanleiding om na te denken over de vraag wat binnen liberale democratieën
als legitieme uiting van godsdienst getolereerd kan worden. Toegespitst op jon‐
gensbesnijdenis gaat deze vraag over de voorwaarden en grondslagen van toleran‐
tie voor deze praktijk.8
Doel van deze bijdrage is om het beoordelingskader van rituele jongensbesnijde‐
nis helder in kaart te brengen aan de hand van de rechtspraak van onder meer de
Hoge Raad en de politieke ontwikkelingen binnen de Parlementaire Assemblee
van de Raad van Europa (hierna: de Parlementaire Assemblee). Immers, deze
instituties hebben recentelijk een oordeel gegeven over de toelaatbaarheid van
deze praktijk.9 Om te reflecteren over het beoordelingskader wordt in deze bij‐
drage gefocust op een aantal filosofische beschouwingen over de constitutionele
beschermwaardigheid van religieuze praktijken.
De opbouw van deze bijdrage is als volgt. Na een beknopte inleiding over de reli‐
gieuze achtergronden van jongensbesnijdenis volgt een kritische analyse van de
Nederlandse rechtspraak over de toelaatbaarheid van deze praktijk. Vervolgens
wordt aan de hand van de twee resoluties van de Parlementaire Assemblee aan‐
dacht besteed aan de politieke afwegingen omtrent de toelaatbaarheid van rituele
jongensbesnijdenis. De juridische en politieke beoordelingskaders worden hierna
geanalyseerd vanuit een breder theoretisch perspectief.
Achtergrond rituele jongensbesnijdenis
Zoals bekend, vindt jongensbesnijdenis niet alleen op religieuze gronden plaats,
maar ook op medische, culturele en etnische.10 Verreweg de meeste jongetjes die
worden besneden, ondergaan de zogenoemde eenvoudige circumcisie waarbij een
arts of een traditionele besnijder een stuk van de voorhuid wegneemt. De meeste
besnijdenissen vinden plaats binnen joodse en islamitische kringen. Voor joden
bevestigt besnijdenis de verbondenheid met God en voor moslims betreft dit het
7 S. Wahedi, ‘De wederrechtelijkheid van jongensbesnijdenis’, Nederlands Juristenblad 2012,
p. 3097-3105.
8 Zie in het bijzonder B. Leiter, Why Tolerate Religion?, Oxford/Princeton: Princeton University
Press 2013. Leiter besteedt uitvoerig aandacht aan de grondslagen van tolerantie voor gods‐
dienstuitoefening.
9 Zie wat betreft de voorwaarden die de Nederlandse rechter stelt M. van den Brink & J. Tigche‐
laar, ‘Over de schouders van ouders: Een interne vergelijking van het Nederlandse overheids‐
beleid ten aanzien van besnijdenis j/m’, in: K. Boele-Woelki & S. Burri (red.), De rol van de staat in
familierelaties: meer of minder?, Den Haag: Boom Juridische uitgevers 2015; A. Nieuwenhuis, ‘De
grondrechtelijke positie van de jongensbesnijdenis’, Tijdschrift voor Religie, Recht en Beleid 2014,
p. 18-33; M. Timmerman, ‘Religieuze jongensbesnijdenis als mishandeling. De benadering van de
Hoge Raad versus het oordeel van het Keulse Landgericht’, Strafblad 2012, p. 474-483.
10 WHO, Male circumcision: global trends and determinants of prevalence, safety and acceptability, Zwit‐
serland: UNAIDS 2007, p. 4.
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nakomen van de aanbeveling om de traditie van profeet Abraham in stand te hou‐
den. De leeftijd waarop deze handeling plaatsvindt, is zeer verschillend. Binnen
de joodse kringen is het uitgangspunt dat het jongetje op de achtste dag wordt
besneden door de mohel, de traditionele besnijder, en wel in een traditionele set‐
ting. Moslims besnijden hun zoontjes doorgaans op een oudere leeftijd, maar in
ieder geval voordat hij de volwassen leeftijd heeft bereikt. Binnen islamitische
kringen voeren zowel traditionele besnijders als medici de besnijdenis uit.11
De Nederlandse rechtspraak over jongensbesnijdenis: het juridische
beoordelingskader
De vraag of rituele jongensbesnijdenis grondrechtelijke bescherming geniet, is de
laatste jaren binnen verschillende westerse landen voorgelegd aan de rechter.12
Het Keulse Landgericht deed de meest radicale uitspraak: de besnijdenis dient uit‐
gesteld te worden tot het moment waarop de jongen daar zelf een oordeel over
kan vormen.13 In deze uitspraak werd geen betekenis toegekend aan de aanwezig‐
heid van relevante ouderlijke toestemming, of de brede aanvaarding van deze
praktijk binnen bepaalde religieuze kringen.14 Anders dan het Keulse Landgericht
kiest de Nederlandse rechter voor een voorzichtige ‘ja, mits-benadering’. Deze
benadering wordt hierna geconstrueerd. Daarbij zal aandacht worden besteed aan
twee kwesties die een bepalende rol spelen bij de juridische beoordeling van deze
praktijk: toestemming van de gezaghebbende ouder en de erkenning van een oud
religieus gebruik in de context van godsdienstvrijheid.
Toestemming versus erkenning oud religieus gebruik?
De strafkamer van de Hoge Raad heeft op twee momenten in dezelfde zaak uit‐
spraak gedaan over de strafwaardigheid van rituele jongensbesnijdenis. Deze
arresten hadden betrekking op de besnijdenis van twee jongens van wie de ouders
geen relatie meer hadden ten tijde van de besnijdenis. De vader had zijn zoontjes
wel erkend, maar hij oefende niet het ouderlijk gezag uit. Hij had tegen de uit‐
drukkelijke wens van zijn ex, die dus het ouderlijk gezag uitoefende, de beslissing
genomen om zijn zoontjes te laten besnijden in een kliniek. Tegen de moeder had
hij in het verleden gezegd dat besnijdenis vooral van hygiënisch belang is. Aan‐
vankelijk stond zijn ex positief tegenover jongensbesnijdenis. Later, na overleg
met de huisarts, die haar erop had gewezen dat hygiëne niet langer een doorslag‐
gevende reden kan zijn voor de besnijdenis, begon de moeder zich uitdrukkelijk te
verzetten tegen de besnijdeniswens van de vader. Zij vond dat de jongens zelf een
beslissing moesten nemen over deze kwestie.15 Ondanks deze bezwaren van de
moeder bracht de vader zijn zoontjes naar een kliniek om hen te laten besnijden.
11 Nieuwenhuis 2014, p. 18-33.
12 De Blois 2015, p. 39-52.
13 Landgericht Köln 5 mei 2012, 151 Ns 169/11.
14 Timmerman 2012, p. 474-483.
15 Dit blijkt in zoverre uit het vonnis van de rechtbank. Zie Rb. Amsterdam 6 mei 2008, NBSTRAF
2008, 233.
Tijdschrift voor Religie, Recht en Beleid 2016 (7) 1
doi: 10.5553/TvRRB/187977842016007001005
61
39
Sohail Wahedi
De moeder deed hierna aangifte wegens onder meer mishandeling met voor‐
bedachten rade, niet alleen tegen de vader, maar ook tegen de besnijder. De vader
verweerde zich met het argument dat hoewel hij niet streng gelovig was, hij toch
nog heel graag wenste dat zijn zoontjes ‘iets’ meekregen van zijn culturele achter‐
grond, die in dit geval de circumcisie impliceerde. Deze zou zelfs een ‘voorwaarde’
zijn geweest om een kind te krijgen met zijn toenmalige partner.16
Het Openbaar Ministerie achtte deze zaak opportuun genoeg om over te gaan tot
vervolging. De officier van justitie merkt in zijn requisitoir op dat er genoeg
bewijs is voor zwaar lichamelijk letsel. Immers, de besnijdenis betreft een ‘onom‐
keerbare medische ingreep (…) die zonder toestemming heeft plaatsgevonden’.17
De strafrechtelijke toon was gezet en het ‘zonder toestemming-betoog’ markeerde
over de hele linie genomen de rode draad in de bewijsvoering door de openbaar
aanklager.
De Rechtbank Amsterdam ging echter niet mee in het betoog van de officier van
justitie en sprak de verdachte vrij. Volgens de rechtbank was met de besnijdenis
geen zwaar lichamelijk letsel toegebracht. Doorslaggevend in dit kader was ‘het
lichamelijke en psychische functioneren van de besnedene na de ingreep’.18 In het
verlengde hiervan hechtte de feitenrechter waarde aan ‘de maatschappelijke
inbedding’ van dit ‘fenomeen’.19 Volgens de rechtbank leverde de beslissing van
de vader om zijn zoontjes te besnijden, in het licht van de heersende opvattingen
binnen de politiek, de medische wetenschap alsmede de samenleving, geen zwaar
lichamelijk letsel op. Er waren volgens de rechtbank geen aanwijzingen dat de
besneden jongetjes ‘als gevolg van de besnijdenis lichamelijke of psychische
beperkingen hebben ondervonden’.20 De rechtbank sprak de besnijder eveneens
vrij, omdat niet bewezen kon worden verklaard dat hij – al dan niet voorwaarde‐
lijk – opzet had gehad om de jongetjes te mishandelen.21
Hoge Raad 2011
Tegen het vonnis van de rechtbank ging het Openbaar Ministerie in beroep. Het
Amsterdamse hof sprak de vader eveneens vrij. Het hof overwoog dat hij niet de
opzet had gehad om zijn zoontjes te mishandelen. Het oordeel uit eerste aanleg
werd bovendien nader verfijnd door de toevoeging dat een ‘oordeelkundig’ uitge‐
voerde jongensbesnijdenis geen zware mishandeling oplevert. Het feit dat de
moeder geen toestemming had verleend, maakte dit oordeel niet anders, aldus
het hof in zijn arrest.22
In cassatie gooide het Openbaar Ministerie het over een andere boeg. Het ging
niet verder in op de mate van mishandeling, maar voerde aan dat de vaststelling
16 Rb. Amsterdam 6 mei 2008, NBSTRAF 2008, 233, onder het kopje ‘Het standpunt van de ver‐
dachte’.
17 Idem, onder het kopje ‘Het standpunt van de officier van justitie’.
18 Idem, onder het kopje ‘Het oordeel van de Rechtbank ten aanzien van feit 1’.
19 Idem.
20 Idem.
21 Idem.
22 Dit arrest is evenmin gepubliceerd op rechtspraak.nl. De relevante passages zijn weergegeven in
het arrest van de Hoge Raad uit 2011.
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van het hof dat het ontbreken van de toestemming niet relevant is voor het
bewijs van mishandeling, niet zonder meer is te begrijpen. Zo werd in het cassa‐
tiemiddel toegelicht dat noch mishandeling, noch het toebrengen van zwaar licha‐
melijk letsel een ‘neutraal’ begrip is. ‘Zij drukken de onrechtmatigheid uit.’23 Deze
onrechtmatigheid, of preciezer gezegd de wederrechtelijkheid, valt weg indien
voor de handeling die lichamelijk letsel veroorzaakt, toestemming is verleend.
Met andere woorden: de aanwezigheid van relevante toestemming is in dit ver‐
band de enige binnen het recht relevante factor ter beoordeling van de vraag of de
inbreuk die jongensbesnijdenis maakt op de lichamelijke integriteit van het kind
gerechtvaardigd kan worden.24 In een doorwrochte conclusie omarmde A-G Silvis
de gedachte dat de wederrechtelijkheid van mishandeling uitsluitend weggeno‐
men kan worden indien het toebrengen van lichamelijk letsel gerechtvaardigd kan
worden in het licht van een daarvoor verleende toestemming door een persoon
die zelf toestemming kan verlenen, of door degene(n) die het gezag uitoefent (uit‐
oefenen) over die persoon. Omdat relevante toestemming voor besnijdenis in
deze zaak nooit was verleend, dient het bestreden arrest te worden vernietigd
voor zover dat betrekking heeft op het vrijspreken van de vader voor het al dan
niet opzettelijk toebrengen van (zware) mishandeling.25
In de zomer van 2011 vernietigde de Hoge Raad het bestreden arrest en verwees
de zaak terug naar het Hof Amsterdam. De Hoge Raad overwoog daarbij dat:
‘(…) onder mishandeling in de zin van art. 300-301 WvSr moet worden ver‐
staan het aan een ander toebrengen van lichamelijk letsel of pijn zonder dat
daarvoor een rechtvaardigingsgrond bestaat. Gelet hierop heeft het Hof door
te overwegen dat niet ter zake doet “dat de besnijdenis heeft plaatsgevonden
zonder toestemming van de moeder die over de zoontjes het gezag uitoe‐
fende”, een onjuiste betekenis toegekend aan de in de tenlastelegging voorko‐
mende term “mishandeld” die aldaar is gebezigd in dezelfde betekenis als toe‐
komt aan de uitdrukking “mishandeling” in art. 301 Sr.’26
Hoge Raad 2014
In december 2012 boog het Hof Amsterdam, met inachtneming van het arrest
van de Hoge Raad uit 2011, zich wederom over de vraag of de beslissing van de
vader in deze zaak (zware) mishandeling opleverde. Het hof beantwoordde deze
vraag bevestigend en nam daarbij in aanmerking dat relevante toestemming voor
het handelen van de vader in dit geval volledig had ontbroken, omdat de enige
bevoegde persoon, namelijk de moeder die het gezag uitoefende over de zoontjes,
deze toestemming nadrukkelijk niet had gegeven. Dus, de vader mocht zijn zoon‐
tjes niet laten besnijden: hij werd daarom schuldig bevonden aan mishandeling
(overigens zonder oplegging van straf of maatregel, vanwege de lange duur van
het proces, de goede verstandhouding van de man met de moeder, de goede
23 HR 5 juli 2011, NJ 2011/466, onder het kopje ‘Cassatiemiddel’.
24 Idem, onder 5.2.
25 Idem, onder het kopje ‘Conclusie’, overweging 29.
26 Idem, r.o. 2.4.2.
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omgang met de kinderen en het feit dat hij niet eerder in aanraking was geweest
met politie en justitie).27 Tegen deze bewezenverklaring ging de verdediging in
cassatie en stelde onder meer dat het hof mishandeling, in de context van deze
zaak, verkeerd had uitgelegd.28 De verdediging herhaalde in cassatie dat rituele
jongensbesnijdenis, zoals annotator Keijzer had betoogd, een kwalificatie-uitslui‐
tingsgrond oplevert, omdat zij een ‘van oudsher aanvaard karakter’ zou dragen.
De A-G concludeert dat de maatschappelijke aanvaarding van jongensbesnijdenis
alleen een rechtvaardiging kan zijn voor de inbreuken die zij maakt, indien cumu‐
latief wordt voldaan aan twee andere voorwaarden: de inbreuk mag niet nadelig
zijn voor de persoon in kwestie, en deze moet hebben plaatsgevonden met rele‐
vante toestemming. Ter toelichting geeft de A-G het voorbeeld van ouders die
hun kind ‘welbewust onoordeelkundig op de keukentafel laten besnijden (…). Die
rituele jongensbesnijdenis strekt in dat geval wel degelijk tot benadeling, en zal
juist om die reden niet van oudsher zijn aanvaard.’29 Dit voorbeeld heeft zich in de
praktijk voorgedaan, met het verschil dat niet de ouders maar de besnijder in
kwestie is vervolgd voor (poging tot) zware mishandeling. In 2005 veroordeelde
de Rechtbank Utrecht een traditionele besnijder om die reden voor zware mishan‐
deling: de besnijdenis was niet helemaal correct uitgevoerd, en bovendien was de
besnijder in kwestie in Nederland niet bevoegd om een medische handeling zoals
jongensbesnijdenis uit te voeren.30 In hoger beroep is deze man overigens vrijge‐
sproken van het toebrengen van zwaar lichamelijk letsel, omdat niet vaststond of
hij de aanmerkelijke kans had geaccepteerd dat door zijn ingreep de besnijdenis
verkeerd zou aflopen. Het Hof Amsterdam veroordeelde hem uitsluitend voor de
overtreding van de culpoze variant van zware mishandeling.31
De strafkamer van de Hoge Raad hakte eind 2014 de knoop door en liet het arrest
van het Amsterdamse hof uit 2012 ongemoeid. Hierbij nam de hoogste rechter
het volgende in aanmerking:
‘Het Hof heeft vastgesteld dat de verdachte – die niet het gezag had over de
kinderen – de besnijdenis van zijn zoons welbewust heeft laten uitvoeren
zonder toestemming van hun moeder. Die vaststellingen dragen zelfstandig
het oordeel dat de verdachte wederrechtelijk heeft gehandeld. Het Hof heeft
daarom zonder blijk te geven van een onjuiste rechtsopvatting en toereikend
gemotiveerd geoordeeld dat sprake is geweest van mishandeling, waarbij het
Hof de juistheid van het beroep op een van oudsher aanvaard karakter van
jongensbesnijdenis in het midden heeft kunnen laten.’32
27 Hof Amsterdam 14 december 2012, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2012:BY6521.
28 Weergegeven in de conclusie van A-G Aben van 4 november 2014, ECLI:NL:PHR:2014:2255.
29 Idem, overweging 14.
30 Rb. Utrecht 1 december 2005, ECLI:NL:RBUTR:2005:AU7293.
31 Hof Amsterdam 2 juni 2006, NBSTRAF 2006, 266.
32 HR 9 december 2014, ECLI:NL:HR:2014:3538, r.o. 2.4.
64 Tijdschrift voor Religie, Recht en Beleid 2016 (7) 1
doi: 10.5553/TvRRB/187977842016007001005
42
Het beoordelingskader van rituele jongensbesnijdenis
Het juridische beoordelingskader
Uit de hiervoor besproken rechtspraak blijkt dat rituele jongensbesnijdenis onder
omstandigheden een toelaatbare praktijk is. Het gaat hier om de volgende twee
cumulatieve voorwaarden:
– Relevante toestemming: uit de twee arresten van de Hoge Raad kan worden
afgeleid dat toestemming, verleend door degene(n) die het gezag uitoefent
(uitoefenen) over het kind, de kernvoorwaarde is in de beoordeling van de
toelaatbaarheid van jongensbesnijdenis.
– Oordeelkundige besnijdenis: hoewel de Hoge Raad zich niet expliciet heeft uit‐
gelaten over de strafbaarheid van de aard van jongensbesnijdenis, het gaat
hier om de ‘technische aspecten’ van het besnijden, kan in lijn met andere uit‐
spraken worden aangenomen dat een besnijdenis die ernstige gevolgen heeft
voor de lichamelijke en psychische gesteldheid, niet gerechtvaardigd wordt
met een beroep op traditie of godsdienstvrijheid.33
Additionele voorwaarden?
Bij de beoordeling van de toelaatbaarheid van jongensbesnijdenis is het verdedig‐
baar om naast de besproken voorwaarden twee additionele voorwaarden te stel‐
len. Het gaat hier om de redelijkheidstoets en de duurzame band:
– In redelijkheid geen onaanvaardbare praktijk: betoogd kan worden dat relevante
toestemming, de eerste voorwaarde, alleen verleend kan worden voor praktij‐
ken die in redelijkheid niet als onaanvaardbaar kunnen worden gezien. De
aanvaardbaarheid van de praktijk valt hier uiteen in objectieve en intersubjec‐
tieve aanvaardbaarheid. Een praktijk is in redelijkheid aanvaard wanneer zij
objectief en intersubjectief gezien niet onaanvaardbaar is.
De objectieve, of feitelijke, aanvaardbaarheid van een praktijk heeft betrek‐
king op de wijze waarop men uitvoering geeft aan een praktijk. Het schade‐
beginsel is hierin leidend. Een besnijdenis die ‘zowel op vroege als latere leef‐
tijd een ernstige inbreuk maakt op het functioneren van het betreffende kind’
is feitelijk niet aanvaard.34 De vereiste oordeelkundige besnijdenis concreti‐
seert de objectieve aanvaardbaarheid van de praktijk.
Intersubjectieve aanvaardbaarheid heeft betrekking op de mate waarin de
praktijk binnen de relevante gemeenschappen wordt aanvaard. De enkele
wens om een traditie in stand te houden is niet voldoende. Bij de intersubjec‐
tieve aanvaardbaarheid gaat het om de aanvaarding van een verplichting bin‐
nen bepaalde groepen. Zo valt haast niet te ontkennen dat ritueel slachten
van dieren en jongensbesnijdenis een prominente plaats innemen binnen de
islam en het jodendom. Over de verplichting om meisjes te besnijden wordt
zeer verschillend gedacht. Er ontbreekt met andere woorden brede consensus
ten aanzien van de verplichting om meisjes te besnijden.35 Wat er bovendien
33 Vgl. Rb. Utrecht 1 december 2005, ECLI:NL:RBUTR:2005:AU7293.
34 Aanwijzing opsporing en vervolging inzake kindermishandeling (Stcrt. 2010, 16597).
35 R.S.B. Kool & S. Wahedi, ‘European Models of Citizenship and the Fight Against Female Genital
Mutilation’, in: S.N. Romaniuk & M. Marlin (red.), Development and the Politics of Human Rights,
Boca Raton: CRC Press 2015, p. 206-221.
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ook zij van de mogelijke intersubjectieve aanvaardbaarheid van meisjesbesnij‐
denis, de objectieve aanvaardbaarheid vormt een beletsel om deze in al haar
vormen schadelijke praktijk te aanvaarden in de samenleving.36 Meisjes‐
besnijdenis is met andere woorden een niet in redelijkheid te aanvaarden
praktijk.
– Duurzame band: als het gaat om een omstreden maar oude traditie, is het ver‐
dedigbaar om na te gaan of er een duurzame band bestaat tussen het kind en
degene die een traditie in stand wil houden. Dit additionele vereiste wordt
doorgaans impliciet aanwezig geacht. Alleen in bijzondere gevallen dient het
expliciet aanwezig te zijn. Het gaat hier om gevallen waarin gekeken wordt
naar de band die een kind heeft of kan hebben met de omstreden traditie van
zijn ouders, of degenen die het gezag over hem uitoefen. Zo oordeelde de
familierechter tegen de uitdrukkelijke wens van een moeder die formeel het
ouderlijk gezag uitoefende, dat zij haar uit huis geplaatste zoontje niet mocht
laten besnijden.37 In deze zaak had de moeder in lijn met de gebruikelijke tra‐
ditie binnen haar familie de jeugdzorg om medewerking aan de besnijdenis
van haar zoontje verzocht. Ter afwijzing van het verzoek van de moeder nam
de familierechter onder meer het volgende in aanmerking: ‘Er bestaat voor de
minderjarige geen uitzicht op opvoeding door zijn moeder. Zijn toekomst ligt
in het pleeggezin. De ingreep is in het gezin en de omgeving waarin de min‐
derjarige opgroeit niet gebruikelijk waardoor hij daarin zou afwijken van de
jongetjes om zich heen.’38
De Parlementaire Assemblee en jongensbesnijdenis: het politieke
beoordelingskader
De Parlementaire Assemblee van de Raad van Europa39 heeft op twee momenten
resoluties aangenomen over de toelaatbaarheid van jongensbesnijdenis binnen
Europese democratieën.40 Aangezien de lidstaten van de Raad van Europa tevens
lid zijn van de Europese Conventie voor de Rechten van de Mens, zijn deze poli‐
tieke ontwikkelingen van grote betekenis. Immers, de Parlementaire Assemblee
heeft een vertegenwoordigende functie binnen ‘de belangrijkste Europese inter‐
gouvernementele organisatie op het gebied van mensenrechten’.41
36 Vgl. Regeling inburgering, Bijlage 5, behorende bij art. 2.5, onder 7.4.2. (Stcrt. 2014, 33927).
37 Rb. Zutphen 31 juli 2007, ECLI:NL:RBZUT:2007:BB0833; Rb. Groningen 11 december 1996, KG
1997, 36.
38 Rb. Zutphen 31 juli 2007, ECLI:NL:RBZUT:2007:BB0833.
39 Niet te verwarren met het Europees Parlement van de Europese Unie: de Europese Raad omvat
ook landen als Rusland, Turkije en Azerbeidzjan.
40 Zie de Parlementaire Assemblee van de Raad van Europa, resolutie 1952 (2013), Children’s right
to physical integrity, en resolutie 2076 (2015), Freedom of religion and living together in a democratic
society.
41 De Blois 2015, p. 39.
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‘Children’s right to physical integrity’: de resolutie uit 2013
In 2013 riep de Parlementaire Assemblee de lidstaten van de Raad van Europa op
om maatregelen te nemen tegen rituele jongensbesnijdenis en andere praktijken
die schadelijk zijn voor de gezondheid van kinderen.42 De resolutie vergeleek jon‐
gensbesnijdenis met meisjesbesnijdenis en riep de lidstaten op om de dialoog aan
te gaan met groepen die vasthouden aan deze traditie en hen daarin te wijzen op
de risico’s van jongensbesnijdenis.43 In het verlengde hiervan riep zij lidstaten op
om maatregelen te nemen tegen dergelijke praktijken, waar het kind in kwestie
zelf geen oordeel over kan vormen.44 Kortom: deze resolutie stelde een verbod
voor op onder meer religieuze jongensbesnijdenis, omdat deze inbreuk maakt op
de lichamelijke integriteit van iemand die zelf geen toestemming kan verlenen
voor een dergelijke ingreep.
‘Freedom of religion and living together in a democratic society’: de resolutie uit 2015
Het Comité van Ministers van de Raad van Europa keerde zich nadrukkelijk tegen
de resolutie uit 2013. Zo stelde het Comité in een reactie op die resolutie dat ritu‐
ele jongensbesnijdenis ‘op geen enkele manier’ te vergelijken is met de genitale
verminking van vrouwen, die een schending is van diverse mensenrechten, en dat
rituele jongensbesnijdenis op verantwoorde wijze plaatsvindt.45 Bovendien kwam
de Parlementaire Assemblee eind september 2015 terug op haar eerdere ferme
oproep om jongensbesnijdenis te verbieden, dan wel uit te stellen tot een
moment waarop de jongen zelf toestemming kan geven voor deze ingreep.46
In de laatste resolutie, Freedom of religion and living together in a democratic society,
sprak de Assemblee haar wens uit om de ‘vicieuze cirkel’ van verdachtmakingen
en misverstanden te doorbreken.47 De resolutie merkte in het bijzonder op dat
religieuze entiteiten, zoals kerken en andere organisaties, ‘een integraal onder‐
deel’ vormen van het maatschappelijk middenveld binnen liberale
democratieën.48 Solidariteit en verdraagzaamheid vormen de sleutelbegrippen in
dit verband. De resolutie merkte nog expliciet op dat de band die burgers met hun
religie hebben en die mede vormgeeft aan hun identiteit, veelal tot uitdrukking
komt door participatie in religieuze tradities en naleving van religieuze voor‐
schriften.49
In de resolutie werd verder opgemerkt dat wetgevers en overheden zich ervan
bewust moeten zijn dat wetgeving die tot stand komt met een beroep op secularity
mogelijk leidt tot indirecte discriminatie (disguised discrimination) van religieuze
minderheidsgroepen. Dit is volgens de resolutie niet alleen in strijd met het recht
op godsdienstvrijheid, maar ook met het principe van de scheiding tussen kerk en
42 Kritisch hierover De Blois 2015, p. 39-41.
43 Idem, overweging 3 e.v.
44 Idem, overweging 7.7.
45 Comité van Ministers van de Raad van Europa, aanbeveling 2023 (2013).
46 Resolutie 2076 (2015).
47 Resolutie 2076 (2015), overweging 1.
48 Idem, overweging 3.
49 Idem, overweging 5.
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staat.50 Beperkingen van religieuze overtuigingen kunnen religieuze minderheids‐
groepen het gevoel geven dat zij niet volledig meetellen in de samenleving. Dit
laat echter onverlet dat gelovigen zich er bewust van moeten zijn dat religieuze
overtuigingen en praktijken die indruisen tegen fundamentele rechten, ontoelaat‐
baar zijn.51 Hoewel de resolutie beaamt dat een praktijk als religieuze jongens‐
besnijdenis ‘controversieel’ is, omdat binnen Europese samenlevingen heel divers
wordt gedacht over de toelaatbaarheid hiervan, roept zij de lidstaten op om deze
voor joden en moslims zo belangrijke ingreep niet te verbieden, zolang de besnij‐
denis oordeelkundig wordt uitgevoerd door een daartoe getrainde persoon.
Bovendien moeten de ouders die hun kind willen laten besnijden, geïnformeerd
worden over de risico’s die aan deze medisch niet-noodzakelijke ingreep kleven,
waarbij de belangen van het kind te allen tijde dienen te prevaleren boven de wen‐
sen van de ouders.52 Het belang van deze overweging wordt onderstreept in het
licht van de gedachte dat religieuze minderheden in vrijheid en zonder vrees voor
discriminatie blijk moeten kunnen geven van hun diepste overtuigingen.53
Het politieke beoordelingskader
Uit de laatste resolutie van de Parlementaire Assemblee blijkt dat zij veel waarde
hecht aan de mogelijkheid om in vrijheid blijk te geven van religieuze overtuigin‐
gen. Ook als deze omstreden zijn, zoals de rituele jongensbesnijdenis en het ritu‐
eel slachten van dieren. De resolutie bevat enkele concrete handvatten voor een
‘toelaatbare rituele jongensbesnijdenis’ volgens joodse en islamitische rites. Het
gaat hier om onder meer de plicht tot informeren van de ouders over de risico’s
die aan deze praktijk kleven en de vakkundige omstandigheden waaronder de
besnijdenis plaats gaat vinden.
Enkele kritische bespiegelingen
Tegen welke achtergrond kunnen we de uitspraak van de Hoge Raad en de ‘poli‐
tieke ommekeer’ binnen de Parlementaire Assemblee begrijpen? Is het mogelijk
om deze te koppelen aan het rechtsfilosofische debat over de constitutionele
beschermwaardigheid van religieuze praktijken?
Wanneer we kijken naar de gevolgde conclusie van de A-G en de twee resoluties
van de Parlementaire Assemblee, kunnen we drie benaderingen onderscheiden in
de beoordeling van de toelaatbaarheid van jongensbesnijdenis: de angst voor
favoritisme, rejectionisme en de neiging tot pragmatisme door middel van prakti‐
sche tolerantie.
50 Idem, overweging 7. Opmerking verdient dat de resolutie zelf over het principle of secularity
spreekt.
51 Idem.
52 Idem, overweging 9.
53 Idem, overweging 13.
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De angst voor ‘favoritisme’: de gevolgde conclusie van A-G Aben
De Hoge Raad laat zich in zijn arrest uit 2014 niet uit over de juistheid van de
stelling dat de relatieve aanvaardbaarheid van deze praktijk in de samenleving
een zelfstandige grond kan zijn voor de rechtvaardiging van rituele jongensbesnij‐
denis. Kennelijk heeft de Hoge Raad zijn vingers niet willen branden aan het
geven van een inhoudelijk oordeel over de juistheid van deze stelling van de ver‐
dediging.54 Interessant is wel de conclusie van de A-G op dit punt. Met annotator
Keijzer merkt hij op ‘dat de maatschappelijke aanvaarding c.q. verwerping van een
bepaalde wijze van toebrengen van lichamelijk letsel of pijn wel degelijk van bete‐
kenis is voor de vraag naar een grond voor rechtvaardiging van die gedraging’.55
De A-G geeft het voorbeeld van de ‘corrigerende tik’ of ‘pedagogische tik’, om te
betogen dat een verandering in het denken over de strafwaardigheid van een
voorheen ‘geaccepteerde’ handeling een relevante factor is in de beoordeling van
de vraag in welke mate die gewraakte handeling thans nog gerechtvaardigd kan
worden in het recht.56
De vergelijking tussen de pedagogische tik en de rituele jongensbesnijdenis staat
niet op zichzelf. Binnen de kritische beschouwingen over de beoordeling van de
toelaatbaarheid van rituele jongensbesnijdenis zijn vergelijkbare voorbeelden te
vinden die door de desbetreffende auteurs worden gebruikt om te betogen dat
besnijdenis van jongens niet zonder meer een toelaatbare praktijk is. Om de dis‐
cussie over een verbod op jongensbesnijdenis ‘in perspectief’ te plaatsen trekt Cli‐
teur een vergelijking met de religieuze verplichting uit de oudheid om mensenof‐
fers te brengen.57 Ter toelichting op zijn standpunt dat het recht dynamisch is en
ooit nog geaccepteerde praktijken geen ‘eeuwigheidswaarde’ hebben, geeft Jörg
het voorbeeld van kinderarbeid en verkrachting binnen het huwelijk.58
Het voorbeeld van de A-G geeft aanleiding om na te denken over de vraag of de
religieuze dimensie van rituele jongensbesnijdenis haar anders maakt dan de
pedagogische tik. Immers, het valt niet te ontkennen dat rituele jongensbesnijde‐
nis onlosmakelijk verbonden is met twee wereldgodsdiensten: het jodendom en
de islam. Echter, rechtvaardigt dit gegeven een ‘andere benadering’ van rituele
jongensbesnijdenis ten opzichte van de corrigerende tik? Zou dat niet grenzen
aan ‘favoritisme’ van gelovigen?59 Deze probleemstelling raakt de kern van een
filosofisch debat dat thans wordt gevoerd in de Amerikaanse literatuur over de
vraag of godsdienst als overtuigingsvorm, in het bijzonder, dat wil zeggen anders
54 Anders is het arrest van de Hoge Raad in de bekend geworden zaak ‘Baby-Kelly’, waarin de Hoge
Raad ‘ter voorkoming van misverstand’ zich wel een oordeel heeft gevormd over morele vraag‐
stukken, zie HR 18 maart 2005, ECLI:NL:HR:2005:AR5213.
55 Conclusie van A-G Aben van 4 november 2014, ECLI:NL:PHR:2014:2255, overweging 13.
56 Idem.
57 Cliteur 2014, p. 145 e.v.
58 N. Jörg, ‘Jongensbesnijdenis strafbaar?’, in: C. Kelk, F. Koenraadt & D. Siegel (red.), Veelzijdige
gedachten, Den Haag: Boom Juridische uitgevers 2013, p. 157-167, i.h.b. p. 162-163.
59 Zie column van Eisgruber en Sager op de website van de New York Times: www. nytimes. com/
roomfordebate/ 2012/ 05/ 09/ should -churches -get -tax -breaks/ religious -exemptions -can -verge -on -
favoritism.
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dan andere vormen van overtuiging, beschermd moet worden vanuit de constitu‐
tie.
Om te betogen dat vergelijkbare praktijken niet op grond van godsdienstvrijheid
anders benaderd mogen worden, geven Eisgruber en Sager het fictieve voorbeeld
van twee Thomassen. De ene Thomas is een Jehova’s getuige en mag op grond
van zijn religieuze overtuigingen geen tankkoepels vervaardigen. De andere Tho‐
mas is een seculiere pacifist die gewetensbezwaren heeft tegen de vervaardiging
van tankkoepels. Volgens Eisgruber en Sager zou het onacceptabel zijn om de
‘religieuze Thomas’ wel te accommoderen in zijn bezwaren tegen de vervaardiging
van bepaalde voorwerpen en de ‘seculiere Thomas’ niet. Immers, eenieder, religi‐
eus of niet, moet op voet van gelijkheid en dus ook in gelijke mate toegang heb‐
ben tot fundamentele rechten. Er is met andere woorden geen ruimte voor een
‘geprivilegieerde behandeling’ van gelovigen.60
De toepassing van het voorbeeld van de twee Thomassen op de vergelijking die de
A-G trekt tussen de afnemende steun voor de toelaatbaarheid van de pedagogi‐
sche tik en de rituele jongensbesnijdenis levert een aantal interessante gezichts‐
punten op. Het accepteren van de rituele jongensbesnijdenis, enkel op religieuze
gronden, en het blijven verbieden van de veel minder ingrijpende pedagogische
tik omdat hij niet langer breed wordt geaccepteerd, kunnen inderdaad duiden op
favoritisme van gelovigen. Immers, een veel minder ingrijpende praktijk wordt
wel ‘aangepakt’ en de rituele jongensbesnijdenis niet. Deze kritische reflectie laat
zien waarom de stelling van de verdediging, dat erkenning voor een oud religieus
gebruik als jongensbesnijdenis een beletsel vormt om haar onder het bereik van
het strafrecht te brengen, op zich niet doorslaggevend is in de beoordeling van de
toelaatbaarheid van die praktijk.61
Rejectionisme: de resolutie uit 2013
Staat de resolutie uit 2013 op zichzelf of kan zij begrepen worden tegen de achter‐
grond van een toenemende kritische houding ten opzichte van religieuze praktij‐
ken die niet langer toelaatbaar worden geacht binnen liberale democratieën?62 Zo
duidt het Europese Hof voor de Rechten van de Mens religieuze praktijken zoals
vasten en jongensbesnijdenis aan als ‘omstreden’ en mogelijk zelfs ‘schadelijk’
voor de gezondheid.63 Deze kritische benadering van een groeiende groep acade‐
mici, magistraten en andere juristen maakt onderdeel uit van een breder debat
binnen liberale democratieën over de publieke ruimte die godsdienst mag inne‐
60 Ch.L. Eisgruber & L.G. Sager, ‘The Vulnerability of Conscience: The Constitutional Basis for Pro‐
tecting Religious Conduct’, The University of Chicago Law Review 1994, p. 1245-1315, i.h.b.
p. 1285-1294.
61 Conclusie van A-G Aben van 4 november 2014, ECLI:NL:PHR:2014:2255, onder overweging 6.
62 Om maar bij de kwestie jongensbesnijdenis te blijven: zie bijv. P. Cliteur, ‘Morele en immorele
religieus gelegitimeerde praktijken in het gezondheidsrecht’, in: Preadvies voor de Vereniging
voor Gezondheidsrecht, Ethiek en Gezondheidsrecht, Den Haag: Sdu Uitgevers 2014, p. 141 e.v.
Cliteur ziet ‘babybesnijdenis’ als ‘morele chantage’. Zie i.h.b. p. 150 van zijn publicatie.
63 EHRM 10 juni 2010, nr. 302/02 (Jehovah’s Witnesses of Moscow and others//Russia), r.o. 144.
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men binnen samenlevingen die pluriformer zijn geworden dan een eeuw
geleden.64 Aanleiding voor dit debat is doorgaans het gedrag van een religieuze
minderheid dat niet langer als aanvaardbaar wordt geacht vanuit de
samenleving.65 Dit debat mondt niet zelden uit in de meer fundamentele vraag
naar de grondslagen van godsdienstvrijheid.66 Het is deze vaak constitutioneel
gewaarborgde vrijheid die het debat over de toelaatbaarheid van problematisch
geachte religieuze praktijken een andere dimensie geeft dan de discussie over cul‐
turele praktijken die als schadelijk worden beschouwd, zoals eerwraak en vrou‐
wenbesnijdenis.67 Immers, zoiets als het recht op ‘cultuurvrijheid’ is minder pro‐
minent beschermd dan godsdienstvrijheid.68 Dit laat onverlet dat er een verschui‐
ving plaatsvindt in het denken over de constitutionele waarde van godsdienstvrij‐
heid. Deze verschuiving werpt de vraag op of, en zo ja in welke mate, er ruimte
moet of kan bestaan voor religieuze praktijken die binnen het dominante secu‐
liere discours worden beschouwd als ontoelaatbaar, problematisch of om andere
redenen onwenselijk.69
De resolutie van de Parlementaire Assemblee uit 2013 kan worden begrepen
tegen de achtergrond van een fundamenteel debat over de ruimte die kan bestaan
voor een ‘geprivilegieerde behandeling’ van gelovigen. De daarin gekozen poli‐
tieke benadering impliceert een marginalisering van de religieuze dimensie van
rituele jongensbesnijdenis in de rechtvaardiging van haar voortbestaan en een
maximalisering van de vrije wil van het kind dat mogelijk wordt onderworpen aan
die praktijk. Immers, de resolutie stelde voor om de besnijdenis uit te stellen tot
het moment waarop het kind in kwestie daar zelf een oordeel over kan vormen.
Dit kan gezien worden als een kritische benadering van een religieuze praktijk:
een rejectionistische benadering die de lichamelijke integriteit in samenhang met
de vrije wil van het kind als enige en doorslaggevende factor rekent in de beoorde‐
ling van de toelaatbaarheid van jongensbesnijdenis.70 Deze rejectionistische bena‐
dering negeert in het geheel de religieuze dimensie van jongensbesnijdenis.
64 Vgl. R.T. Ahdar, ‘The Vulnerability of Religious Liberty in Liberal States’, Religion & Human Rights:
An International Journal 2009, p. 177-196. Zie voor de Nederlandse discussie hierover W. van der
Burg, Over religie, moraal en politiek, Kampen: Ten Have 2005, p. 32-42.
65 Vgl. D. Grimm, ‘Conflicts between General Laws and Religious Norms’, Cardozo Law Review 2009,
p. 2369-2382.
66 B. Leiter, ‘Foundations of Religious Liberty: Toleration or Respect’, San Diego Law Review 2010,
p. 935-960.
67 Vgl. A.D. Renteln, The Cultural Defense, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2004. Renteln ziet reli‐
gieuze gedragingen ook als een soort culturele handelingen, zie, p. 214 van haar boek. Ongetwij‐
feld heeft die zienswijze iets te maken met haar cultuurbegrip, maar vaststaat dat tegenwoordig
een scherper onderscheid wordt gemaakt tussen religieuze gedragingen en culturele handelingen.
68 De Blois 2015, p. 50-51.
69 S. Wahedi, ‘Marginaliseren van godsdienstvrijheid door abstraheren van de religieuze dimensie’,
Religie & Samenleving 2014, p. 128-147.
70 Zie over het concept van ‘politiek rejectionisme’: Wahedi 2015, p. 21: ‘Dat wil zeggen: het sterk
afwijzen, afkeuren en bagatelliseren van de legitieme gronden waarop een praktijk plaatsvindt in
de samenleving.’
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Pragmatisme via ‘praktische tolerantie’: de resolutie uit 2015
In haar resolutie uit 2015 bepleitte de Parlementaire Assemblee met een beroep
op solidariteit en het principe van verdraagzaamheid om de rituele jongensbesnij‐
denis toe te staan. Weliswaar raakt deze omstreden praktijk volgens de Assemblee
ook aan kinderrechten, maar onder omstandigheden, zoals de juiste uitvoering
door een bekwaam persoon, moet het mogelijk zijn voor ouders om hun religieuze
traditie in stand te houden. Het belang van religieuze manifestatie prevaleert hier
duidelijk boven het ontbreken van de toestemming van het kind voor zijn besnij‐
denis. Dit alles wordt, zoals gezegd, gerechtvaardigd met een beroep op weder‐
zijds begrip in een tijd waarin xenofobie en radicalisme de kop opsteken.71
De lijn van de Parlementaire Assemblee in de beoordeling van rituele jongens‐
besnijdenis lijkt op wat rechtsfilosoof Brian Leiter in zijn boek Why Tolerate Reli‐
gion? ‘praktische tolerantie’ noemt.72 De vraag of godsdienst in het bijzonder
dient te worden beschermd vanuit de constitutie, beantwoordt hij vanuit het
paradigma van tolerantie. Het niet toelaten van de onwelgevallige praktijken van
anderen zou volgens Leiter leiden tot een hobbesiaanse ‘oorlog van allen tegen
allen’.73 Om dit te voorkomen worden om puur instrumentele redenen verschil‐
lende praktijken toegelaten, zonder dat bekend is wat de morele grondslagen zijn
voor het laten voortbestaan van zulke praktijken. Niet zelden ontbreken deze
grondslagen, omdat kennelijk het bestaan van verschillende praktijken an sich
wordt beschouwd als een moreel recht, wat er ook zij van de heersende afkeuring
ten opzichte van een bepaalde praktijk. Tolerantie is volgens Leiter in dit soort
gevallen niet meer dan een pragmatisch compromis. Immers, het actief bestrijden
van de onwenselijk geachte praktijken van ‘die ander’ is niet in het belang van de
samenleving als geheel. Het uitbannen van zulke praktijken vraagt om grote
offers, omdat gelovigen niet snel zullen accepteren dat een praktijk niet langer is
toegestaan. Dat is onder meer aan de orde geweest bij de Duitse discussie over de
strafbaarheid van jongensbesnijdenis. Duitse joden zeiden massaal in Israël of
andere landen hun zonen te zullen besnijden als jongensbesnijdenis op religieuze
gronden zou worden verboden.74
Leiter meent dat er geen principiële gronden zijn voor tolerantie van godsdienst‐
uitoefening.75 Daarom dient deze op praktische gronden te worden getolereerd.76
Kennelijk meent Leiter dat het niet mogelijk is om gelovigen te overtuigen van de
schadelijkheid van bepaalde religieuze handelingen. De wijze waarop Leiter prak‐
tische tolerantie presenteert, lijkt op tolerantie uit onmacht: ‘men wil bepaalde
71 Resolutie 2076 (2015) van de Parlementaire Assemblee.
72 Leiter 2013.
73 Binnen de literatuur is dit argument al eens eerder genoemd om de afwijkende praktijken van
minderheden te tolereren. Zie K.M. Sullivan, ‘Religion and Liberal Democracy’, University of Chi‐
cago Law Review 1992, p. 195-223.
74 Zie voor de ‘bedenkelijke’ gevolgen van de strafbaarstelling van jongensbesnijdenis: Jörg 2013,
p. 166-167.
75 De discussie over de principiële gronden van tolerantie voor godsdienstuitoefening laat ik voor
wat het is. Zij is buiten het bereik van deze bijdrage.
76 Leiter 2013, p. 22-27. Zie verder B. Leiter, ‘Foundations of Religious Liberty: Toleration or Res‐
pect?’, San Diego Law Review 2010, p. 935-959, i.h.b. p. 941-951.
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praktijken liever niet zien, maar het is even niet anders’. Anders dan Leiter zou ik
willen bepleiten dat praktische tolerantie ook ruimte moet laten voor de mogelijk‐
heid dat gelovigen door middel van voorlichting en dialoog tot inkeer komen.
Inenting is een goed voorbeeld in dit kader. Hoewel een groot deel van de ortho‐
dox-gereformeerden in het verleden om religieuze gronden hier van afzag, vacci‐
neert een steeds grotere groep gereformeerden tegen mazelen, polio en andere
kwalen.77
Afronding
Een groot probleempunt in de beoordeling van de toelaatbaarheid van jongens‐
besnijdenis is dat iedere interventie van overheidswege die leidt tot fundamentele
aanpassingen rondom het besnijdenisproces, zoals het moment waarop de besnij‐
denis plaats mag vinden, door minderheidsgroepen uitgelegd zal worden als
ontoelaatbare bemoeienis in religieuze kwesties en privéaangelegenheden. De dis‐
cussie rondom de toelaatbaarheid van deze praktijk legt een conflict bloot tussen
verschillende waarden: adequate bescherming van godsdienstvrijheid en het
waarborgen van het recht op de lichamelijke integriteit. Tegen deze achtergrond
kan het beoordelingskader van rituele jongensbesnijdenis op drie verschillende
manieren worden weergegeven, zoals dat ook blijkt uit de analyse van de recht‐
spraak en de politieke ontwikkelingen binnen de Raad van Europa. De eerste
benadering is het voorkomen van favoritisme: de lijn van A-G Aben. De tweede
benadering is de omarming van het rejectionisme: de resolutie uit 2013. De derde
benadering is de neiging tot pragmatisme via praktische tolerantie: de resolutie
uit 2015.
Is er nog een vierde benadering in de beoordeling van rituele jongensbesnijdenis?
Het antwoord op deze vraag hangt samen met de twee fundamentele vragen die
in de introductie van deze bijdrage zijn opgeworpen: Is rituele jongensbesnijdenis
een toelaatbare praktijk? Zo ja, wat zijn de grondslagen van tolerantie voor deze
praktijk? Op basis van een reconstructie van het juridische en politieke beoorde‐
lingskader van deze praktijk blijkt dat zij onder bepaalde voorwaarden als toelaat‐
baar kan worden gekwalificeerd. Voor het antwoord op de tweede vraag zoek ik
geen aansluiting bij de principiële gronden voor tolerantie van religieuze praktij‐
ken. Dat vergt immers een andere analyse, die het bereik van deze bijdrage te bui‐
ten gaat. Ik beperk mij daarom tot de praktische gronden van tolerantie.
Deze vierde benadering biedt een werkbaar kader om de toelaatbaarheid van jon‐
gensbesnijdenis te beoordelen. Dit praktische beoordelingskader vloeit voort uit
het idee van actieve tolerantie waarin de dialoog ‘en dus soms [ook] de felle con‐
frontatie’ het vertrekpunt vormen om de samenleving te verrijken.78 Dit beoorde‐
lingskader stoelt op aandacht voor het idee van vreedzaam naast elkaar leven bin‐
nen liberale democratieën; de gedachte dat de praktijk die aan de orde is, in rede‐
lijkheid niet onaanvaardbaar is; en de verplichting tot voorlichting aan ouders
77 Zie in dit verband de doorwrochte analyse van G.H. Spruyt, ‘Politicians and epidemics in the
Biblebelt’, ingediend bij Utrecht Law Review.
78 Van der Burg 2005, p. 173.
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over de gevolgen van de traditie die zij willen praktiseren. Deze benadering in de
beoordeling van rituele jongensbesnijdenis is wat anders dan ‘favoritisme’ van
gelovigen.
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De strafrechtelijke aanpak van meisjes-
besnijdenis in een rechtsvergelijkende context**
Sohail Wahedi & Renée Kool
Meisjesbesnijdenis is in Nederland en andere Europese landen verboden. Ondanks
dit verbod is van succesvolle handhaving geen sprake. Frankrijk vormt in dit ver‐
band een uitzondering. Deze bijdrage analyseert en vergelijkt de strafrechtelijke
aanpak in Nederland, Frankrijk en Engeland. Het Franse ‘succes’ zal genuanceerd
worden in het licht van de heersende opvattingen over multiculturalisme en de
gedachten over de ruimte die het strafrecht zou moeten bieden voor afwijkende
praktijken van minderheidsgroepen.
Inleiding
Westerse democratieën worstelen sinds enkele decennia met de toelaatbaarheid
van praktijken die geen oorsprong hebben in hun samenlevingen. Het betreft hier
enkele controversiële praktijken die ernstig inbreuk maken op fundamentele
mensenrechten. Denk aan eergerelateerd geweld, huwelijksdwang en meisjesbe‐
snijdenis.1 De constatering dat deze praktijken op westerse bodem plaatsvinden,
leidt steevast tot maatschappelijke ophef en de roep om expliciete strafbaarstel‐
ling.2 De strafwaardigheid van dergelijke praktijken is hiermee doorgaans een
gegeven, waarmee de vraag naar de betekenis van de culturele context en de reli‐
gieuze dimensie voor de vaststelling van wederrechtelijkheid aan betekenis
inboet. In deze benadering schuilt het gevaar voor verlies van gezag voor de straf‐
rechtspleging. Strafbaarstelling en handhaving vereisen immers legitimiteit, te
* Deze bijdrage bouwt voort op R.S.B. Kool & S. Wahedi, ‘European Models of Citizenship and the
Fight Against Female Genital Mutilation’, in: S.N. Romaniuk & M. Marlin (red.), Development and
the Politics of Human Rights, Boca Raton: CRC Press (Taylor & Francis Group) 2015, p. 206-221;
R.S.B. Kool & S. Wahedi, ‘Criminal enforcement in the area of female genital mutilation in
France, England, and the Netherlands: a comparative law perspective’, International Law Research
2014, p. 1-15; R.S.B. Kool, ‘Strafrechtelijke handhaving van meisjesbesnijdenis in
rechtsvergelijkend perspectief’, in: E. Bleichrodt e.a., Onbegrensd strafrecht. Liber amicorum Hans
de Doelder, Nijmegen: Wolf Legal Publishers 2013, p. 23-35.
* De auteurs zijn prof. Maurits Berger, prof. Wibren van der Burg, dr. Jeroen Temperman en de
redactie van het tijdschrift zeer dankbaar voor hun commentaar op de conceptversie van deze
bijdrage.
1 Zie voor de Nederlandse discussie de dissertaties van M. Siesling, Multiculturaliteit en verdediging
in strafzaken, Deventer: Kluwer 2006; J. ten Voorde, Cultuur als verweer, Nijmegen: Wolf Legal
Publishers 2007; W.M. Limborgh, Culturele vrijheid en het strafrecht, Nijmegen: Wolf Legal
Publishers 2011. Zie verder de lezenswaardige bijdrage van S.W.E. Rutten, ‘Moslims in de Neder‐
landse rechtspraak’, Recht van de Islam 1986, 4, p. 55-74.
2 Kritisch: M. Dustin, ‘Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting in the UK’, European Journal of Women’s
Studies 2010, p. 1-31, i.h.b. p. 19.
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vinden in een zo breed mogelijk gedragen aanvaarding van de strafwaardigheid
van het handelen en de daaraan gekoppelde sanctionering. Binnen westerse
samenlevingen die gekenmerkt worden door immigratie en daarmee gepaarde
gaande import van omstreden culturele en religieuze praktijken, is het verwerven
van zo’n breed draagvlak niet eenvoudig.
Over de verhouding tussen de multiculturele samenleving en het strafrecht is de
afgelopen jaren veel geschreven.3 Dat geldt ook voor de problematiek van deze
bijdrage: meisjesbesnijdenis.4 Niettemin is er voldoende aanleiding om te schrij‐
ven over dit onderwerp. Op nationaal niveau speelt de afhandeling van de eerste
strafzaak waarin werd vervolgd voor meisjesbesnijdenis.5 Hiernaast zou een
tweede zaak op komst zijn,6 maar omdat niet kon worden vastgesteld of de
besnijdenis ná de komst naar Nederland of eerder had plaatsgevonden, bleef ver‐
volging voor meisjesbesnijdenis uit.7 Na 2014 is deze praktijk niet meer onder de
aandacht van de strafrechter gebracht.8 Dit toont wellicht aan hoe gecompliceerd
de strafrechtelijke aanpak ligt. Met het oog hierop heeft de wetgever de strafvor‐
derlijke bevoegdheden onlangs nog verruimd.9 Op de achtergrond speelt de toe‐
nemende internationale aandacht voor het praktiseren van meisjesbesnijdenis
buiten Afrika, waar deze praktijk van oudsher wijdverspreid is.10 Zo vindt meis‐
jesbesnijdenis plaats in onder meer Iran, Iraaks Koerdistan, Maleisië en Indone‐
sië.11
Wat verder ook zij van de nationale en internationale ontwikkelingen, vaststaat
dat in de theorievorming over de aanpak van dit verschijnsel geen eenduidige ver‐
klaring te vinden is voor het uitblijven van een succesvolle strafrechtelijke bestrij‐
ding daarvan.12 Tot op heden hebben enkel in Frankrijk strafvervolgingen ter
zake plaatsgevonden.13 Frankrijk kent een geheel eigen model van burgerschap
dat van invloed is op de multiculturele vraagstukken.14 Zou dit ook ‘het Franse
3 O.a. Siesling 2006; Ten Voorde 2007; Limborgh 2011.
4 We gebruiken de term ‘meisjesbesnijdenis’ vanwege het neutrale karakter daarvan.
5 Overigens resulteerde dit in eerste én tweede aanleg in vrijspraak: Rb. Haarlem 11 september
2009, ECLI:NL:RBHAA:2009:BJ7447; Hof Amsterdam 23 december 2010, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:
2010:BO8531.
6 ‘Somalisch echtpaar pas later berecht’, AD/Rotterdams Dagblad 18 januari 2013, p. 5. ‘Het koppel
(…) [wordt tevens vervolgd] voor de besnijdenis in het buitenland van de twee oudste dochters.’
7 Rb. Rotterdam 22 oktober 2014, ECLI:NL:RBROT:2014:9279.
8 Dat baseren we op de resultaten die zoektermen als ‘vrouwelijke genitale verminking’ en ‘meis‐
jesbesnijdenis’ opleveren op rechtspraak.nl.
9 Stb. 2013, 95.
10 UNICEF, Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting: A global concern, UNICEF: New York 2016.
11 K. Ahmady, ‘A Comprehensive Research Study on Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting (FGM/C) in
Iran’, 2015; Wadi, Female Genital Mutilation in Iraqi-Kurdistan, Frankfurt am Main: WADI e.V.
2010.
12 Vanuit de Verenigde Naties is herhaaldelijk gewezen op de gebrekkige (strafrechtelijke) aanpak
van meisjesbesnijdenis. Vgl. UNFPA, Implementation of the International and Regional Human
Rights Framework for the Elimination of Female Genital Mutilation, New York: UNFPA 2014.
13 Een overzicht van verschillen biedt: Kool & Wahedi 2015, p. 209-210.
14 A. Guiné & F.J. Moreno Fuentes, ‘Engendering Redistribution, Recognition, and Respresenta‐
tion: The case of Female Genital Mutilation (FGM) in the United Kingdom and France’, Politics
Society 2007, p. 477-519.
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succes’ in de strafrechtelijke aanpak van meisjesbesnijdenis kunnen verklaren?
Om deze relatie te onderzoeken is de centrale hypothese van deze bijdrage dat de
strafrechtelijke aanpak van meisjesbesnijdenis beïnvloed wordt door heersende
opvattingen over burgerschap en het multiculturalisme. Deze hypothese wordt
getoetst aan de hand van de Nederlandse, Engelse15 en Franse benadering inzake
de strafrechtelijke bestrijding van meisjesbesnijdenis. Deze laatste twee landen
zijn bewust gekozen vanwege hun onderling tegengestelde rechtsculturele opvat‐
tingen over de verhouding tussen het strafrecht en het multiculturalisme.16 De
focus op burgerschap en de doorwerking daarvan op de nationale besluitvorming
omtrent strafbaarstelling vormen een belangrijke afbakening binnen deze bij‐
drage.17
Tegen deze achtergrond heeft onze bijdrage de volgende opbouw. Eerst wordt
ingegaan op de internationaal gedeelde opvatting dat meisjesbesnijdenis nood‐
zaakt tot strafbaarstelling. Vervolgens wordt de aanpak van meisjesbesnijdenis in
Nederland, Frankrijk en Engeland geanalyseerd in het licht van de heersende
opvattingen over burgerschap.
Achtergrond
Meisjesbesnijdenis wordt door de World Health Organization (WHO) ofwel
Wereldgezondheidsorganisatie omschreven als ‘de gedeeltelijke of volledige ver‐
wijdering van de externe vrouwelijke genitaliën of elk ander letsel aan vrouwelijke
genitaliën om niet-medische redenen’.18 Wereldwijd zijn 130 tot 150 miljoen
meisjes en vrouwen besneden. Hiernaast riskeren jaarlijks nog ongeveer 3 miljoen
meisjes wereldwijd de besnijdenis.19 In Europa ligt dit aantal meisjes op jaarlijks
180.000.20
Hoewel meisjesbesnijdenis eerder regel is dan uitzondering in grote delen van
Afrika, kent zij geen uniforme toepassing. De WHO onderscheidt vier typen, die
naar ernst oplopen van relatief licht naar zwaar: clitoridectomie (type I), excisie
(type II), infibulatie (type III) en een restcategorie waar incisie onder valt (type
IV).21 In de juridische analyses over de toelaatbaarheid van deze praktijk wordt
doorgaans onderscheid gemaakt tussen de relatief lichte (type I en IV) en ernstige
15 Waar we spreken over Engeland doelen we op Engeland en Wales.
16 Vgl. W. Dekkers, C. Hoffer & J-P. Wils, Besnijdenis, lichamelijke integriteit en multiculturalisme,
Budel: Damon 2006, p. 19.
17 Onze bijdrage zal de toelaatbaarheid van meisjesbesnijdenis niet beoordelen in het licht van
godsdienstvrijheid.
18 World Health Organization, An update on WHO’s work on Female Genital Mutilation (FGM), New
York: WHO 2011, p. 1.
19 World Health Organization 2011.
20 A. Macfarlane e.a., Prevalence of Female Genital Mutilation in England and Wales: National and local
estimates, Londen: City University London 2015, p. 13.
21 World Health Organization 2011, p. 1.
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varianten (type II en III) van meisjesbesnijdenis.22 Deze belangrijke nuance wordt
in het maatschappelijke en politieke debat echter veelal genegeerd.23
Infibulatie en excisie gelden als relatief ingrijpende varianten. Bij deze ingrepen
wordt de vaginale opening verkleind door het verwijderen en dichtnaaien van de
grote of kleine schaamlippen; soms wordt ook de clitoris verwijderd.24 Clitoridec‐
tomie, waarbij de top of de voorhuid van de clitoris wordt weggehaald, wordt ver‐
geleken met jongensbesnijdenis.25 Sommige auteurs menen dat deze ingreep toe‐
laatbaar moet zijn.26 Maar ook het omgekeerde geldt. Zo werd door A-G Silvis
betoogd dat de strafbaarheid van de lichtste variant van meisjesbesnijdenis ‘op
voorhand niet [uitsluit] dat in een gelijkwaardig beoordelingsschema de circumci‐
sie bij jongens onder omstandigheden ook voor kwalificering als mishandeling in
aanmerking kan komen’.27 Tot slot bestaat er een restcategorie. Deze heeft
betrekking op uiteenlopende niet-medisch geïndiceerde, min of meer schadelijke
handelingen, uitgevoerd op vrouwelijke genitaliën, zoals incisie: een prikje in de
voorhoud van de clitoris.
Een eenduidige verklaring voor deze eeuwenoude praktijk is er niet.28 Er zijn
diverse islamitische, joodse en christelijke groepen die uit naam van het geloof
meisjes besnijden.29 Tegelijkertijd wordt in de literatuur en vanuit de geloofsge‐
meenschappen opgemerkt dat meisjesbesnijdenis niet zozeer een religieus maar
een traditioneel gebruik betreft.30
Een religieuze praktijk?
Er is de laatste tijd echter in toenemende mate aandacht voor de relatie tussen
meisjesbesnijdenis en de islam. Uit recente studies blijkt dat Iraniërs (vooral de
relatief lichte variant),31 Koerden (zowel de relatief lichte als ingrijpende varian‐
22 Vgl. Limborgh 2011, p. 179. Zie ook W.M. Limborgh, ‘Dient meisjesbesnijdenis op culturele gron‐
den te worden getolereerd?’, NJB 2008, p. 2514-2520; K. Bartels & I. Haaijer, ’s Lands wijs ’s lands
eer? Vrouwenbesnijdenis en Somalische vrouwen in Nederland, Rijswijk: Centrum Gezondheidszorg
Vluchtelingen 1992.
23 Illustrerend in dit verband is het antwoord op Kamervragen van de PVV, gesteld naar aanleiding
van het proefschrift van Limborgh, die de toelaatbaarheid bepleitte van de lichtste variant van
meisjesbesnijdenis. De minister schreef daarin dat meisjesbesnijdenis ongeacht haar vorm altijd
een strafbaar feit oplevert in Nederland. Zie Aanhangsel Handelingen II 2011/12, 511.
24 D. Dubourg & F. Richard, Studie over de prevalentie van vrouwelijke genitale verminkingen en van het
risico op vrouwelijke genitale verminkingen in België, Antwerpen: Instituut voor Tropische Genees‐
kunde 2010, p. 5.
25 Vgl. Siesling 2006, p. 36. Zie verder Dekkers, Hoffer & Wils (2006), die het verschil in strafrech‐
telijke benadering van de lichtste variant van meisjesbesnijdenis en rituele jongensbesnijdenis
uitleggen in het licht van de heersende opvattingen over wat wel en niet toelaatbaar is als (afwij‐
kende) culturele uiting.
26 Bartels & Haaijer 1992; Limborgh 2011 en 2008: hij bepleit uitsluitend de toelaatbaarheid van
incisie.
27 Conclusie van A-G Silvis bij HR 5 juli 2011, NJ 2011, 466, overweging 10.
28 We hanteren hier bewust de neutralere term ‘praktijk’ in plaats van ‘traditie’.
29 Duborg & Richard 2012, p. 6.
30 H.D. Kalev, ‘Cultural Rights or Human Rights: The Case of Female Genital Mutilation’, Sex Roles
2004, p. 340.
31 Ahmady 2015.
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ten, zoals infibulatie en clitoridectomie),32 Maleisiërs (de relatief lichte variant)33
en Indonesiërs (in het algemeen de relatief lichte variant)34 aan meisjesbesnijde‐
nis doen. Tegen deze achtergrond wordt binnen het politieke discours gesproken
over de ‘selectieve aandacht’ van mensenrechtenorganisaties, die deze praktijk
presenteren als een ‘Afrikaans probleem’.35
In 2006 heeft de gezaghebbende Egyptische Al-Azhar Universiteit een verklaring
naar buiten gebracht waarin wordt onderstreept dat meisjesbesnijdenis weliswaar
een oude traditie is die plaatsvindt binnen verschillende islamitische kringen,
maar dat de Koran en de Hadith geen solide grondslag bieden voor een rechtvaar‐
diging van deze praktijk.36 In de periode voor en na deze stellingname is vanuit de
Azhar kritiek geleverd op deze praktijk. Zo is in 2005 gezegd dat alle vormen van
meisjesbesnijdenis misdadig zijn en dat er geen verband bestaat tussen de islam
en deze praktijk.37 Dat laatste is ook herhaald door wijlen Sheikh Tantawi, die als
oud-grootmoefti en grootimam van de Azhar veel aanzien genoot onder moslims
wereldwijd.38
Tegen deze achtergrond kan worden gesteld dat de relatie tussen de islam en
meisjesbesnijdenis genuanceerder ligt dan soms wordt gepresenteerd in publieke
debatten.39 Dit geldt ook voor de relatie tussen deze praktijk en het christendom.
Zo is meisjesbesnijdenis wijdverspreid onder Egyptische Kopten, ondanks de ver‐
oordeling ervan vanuit de koptische kerk.40 Er is evenmin steun voor deze prak‐
tijk binnen de joodse gemeenschap, desalniettemin komt zij voor bij de Falasha’s
(een joodse gemeenschap uit Ethiopië).41
Een genderpraktijk?
Meer algemeen wordt aangenomen dat meisjesbesnijdenis ongeacht haar vorm
verband houdt met de status van de vrouw binnen de gemeenschap en als een ini‐
tiatieritueel moet worden gezien.42 Via de besnijdenis onderschrijft het meisje de
groepsnorm waarbinnen besneden zijn symbool staat voor kuisheid. Een kritische
interpretatie hiervan klinkt door in de internationaal gedeelde opvatting dat
32 Wadi 2010, p. 8.
33 Vgl. A. Rashid, S. Patil & A. Valimalar, ‘The Practice of Female Genital Mutilation among the
Rural Malays in North Malaysia’, The Internet Journal of Third World Medicine 2009, p. 4.
34 L. Octavia, ‘Circumcision and Muslim Women’s Identity in Indonesia’, Indonesian Journal for
Islamic Studies 2014, p. 419-457.
35 Zie Kamervragen van PVV-lid De Roon, Aanhangsel Handelingen II 2014/15, 2966.
36 N.M. Dessing, ‘Besnijdenis en recht’, Recht van de Islam 2010, p. 55.
37 S. Hassan, ‘Reclaiming Islam’, in: R.A.E. Hunt & G.C. Jenks (red.), Wisdom and Imagination: Reli‐
gious Progressives and the Search for Meaning, Morning Star Publishing 2014, p. 183.
38 A.A. Hadi, ‘A Community of Women Empowered: the Story of Deir El Barsha’, in: R.M. Abusharaf
(red.), Female Circumcision, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press 2006, p. 110.
39 J.M. Otto, ‘Besnijdenis en islam, het ligt ingewikkeld’, Trouw 27 februari 2014, Opinie, p. 21.
40 W.R. Elseesy, ‘Female circumcision in non-Muslim females in Africa’, African Journal of Urology
2014, p. 102-103.
41 I. El-Damanhoury, ‘The Jewish and Christian view on female genital mutilation’, African Journal
of Urology 2013, p. 127-129.
42 N. Berkovitch & K. Bradley, ‘The globalization of women’s status: Consensus/Dissensus in the
World Polity’, Sociological Perspectives 1999, p. 488.
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meisjesbesnijdenis een genderpraktijk is die tot doel heeft de vrouw aantrekkelijk
te maken voor de man en tevens haar seksuele gevoelens in toom te houden.43
Hoewel deze lezing wordt onderschreven door de internationale gemeenschap en
is terug te vinden in internationale regelgeving, zijn er ook auteurs die hier vraag‐
tekens bij zetten.44 Zo wordt terecht of onterecht een vergelijking gemaakt met
cosmetische ingrepen als schaamlipcorrecties en borstvergrotingen.45 Getuigt de
straffeloosheid van deze ‘westerse’ subculturele esthetische ingrepen niet van
‘meten met twee maten’? En wat te denken van de absolute strafbaarstelling van
oordeelkundig uitgevoerde besnijdenissen waarbij de toestemming van de vrouw
irrelevant is, als neergelegd in Belgische en Engelse wetgeving?46
Een kritische benadering werkt verhelderend doordat zodoende de politieke aard
van internationale regelgeving bloot wordt gelegd, alsook de daaraan ten grond‐
slag liggende beeldvorming over omstreden culturele en religieuze praktijken.
Zulke regels vormen immers de uitkomst van politieke onderhandelingen, waar‐
bij, wanneer het over mensenrechten gaat, het westers liberale discours dominant
lijkt te zijn.47 Niettemin kan men de vraag stellen of een politieke benadering de
kans op een effectieve aanpak van meisjesbesnijdenis beperkt. Er lijkt zodoende
immers ruimte te ontstaan voor een rechtvaardiging van (bijvoorbeeld de lichtste
variant van) meisjesbesnijdenis via een beroep op culturele en/of religieuze
motieven. Het zou immers gaan om het ‘religieuze voorschrift, waaraan de gelo‐
vige (…) zich niet wil onttrekken’.48
Het mensenrechtenperspectief
In 1952 werd voor het eerst in Resolutie 445C (XIV) van de Economic and Social
Council de lidstaten voorzichtig gevraagd om noodzakelijke maatregelen te tref‐
fen tegen praktijken die de fysieke integriteit van vrouwen aantasten.49 De WHO
weigerde destijds medewerking te verlenen.50 Het sociaal-culturele aspect van
meisjesbesnijdenis oversteeg kennelijk de individuele belangen van meisjes. Pas
in 1994 is meisjesbesnijdenis in al haar vormen veroordeeld als mensenrechten‐
schending vanuit de Verenigde Naties. Sindsdien hebben de Verenigde Naties sta‐
43 Berkovitch & Bradley 1999, p. 488; Dubourg & Richard 2010, p. 6.
44 Dustin 2010; M. van den Brink & J. Tigchelaar, ‘Shaping Genitals, Shaping Perceptions’, Nether‐
lands Quarterly of Human Rights 2012, p. 431-459.
45 Dustin 2010, p. 10-12. Zij zegt: ‘Like FGM/C, these are therapeutically unnecessary surgeries car‐
ried out with the intention of making women fit a cultural norm.’
46 Zie art. 409 §1 Belgisch Strafwetboek respectievelijk art. 1 lid 5 Female Genital Mutilation Act
2003.
47 E. Brems, ‘Enemies or allies? Feminism and Cultural Relativism as Dissident Voices in Human
Rights Discourse’, Human Rights Quarterly 1997, p. 136-164. Voorts: H. Lewis, ‘Between Irua and
“Female Genital Mutilation”: Feminist Human Rights Discourse and the Cultural Divide’, Har‐
vard Human Rights Journal 1995, p. 1-55; C. Smith, ‘Who defines “Mutilation”? Challenging Impe‐
rialism in the Discourse of Female Genital Cutting’, Feminist Formations 2011, p. 25-46.
48 Vgl. N. Jörg, ‘Jongensbesnijdenis strafbaar?’, in: C. Kelk, F. Koenraadt & D. Siegel (red.), Veelzij‐
dige gedachten, Den Haag: Boom Juridische uitgevers 2013, p. 157-167, i.h.b. p. 164.
49 United Nations, Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1952.
50 United Nations, Yearbook of the United Nations of the International Law Commission 1959.
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ten opgeroepen wetgeving te ontwikkelen die effectieve bescherming kan bieden
tegen deze praktijk.51 Ook in de literatuur is veel steun voor de opvatting dat
meisjesbesnijdenis inbreuk maakt op het recht op lichamelijke integriteit (van
belang bij alle vormen), het recht op leven, waaronder te begrijpen het recht op
reproductie, en het recht niet onderworpen te worden aan martelpraktijken (met
name van belang bij de zware varianten, zoals excisie).52 De culturele achtergrond
van meisjesbesnijdenis staat een veroordeling van al haar vormen niet in de weg.
Integendeel, binnen internationale verdragen is het beroep op traditie als recht‐
vaardiging voor gewelddadige praktijken uitdrukkelijk uitgesloten.53
Het EVRM en overige internationale regelgeving
Het Europees Hof voor de Rechten van de Mens (EHRM) heeft nog geen zaak
voorgelegd gekregen waarin werd geklaagd over een tekort aan geboden rechts‐
bescherming tegen meisjesbesnijdenis. Niettemin heeft dit hof in zijn uitspraken
in verband met het vreemdelingenrecht meermalen beslist dat meisjesbesnijde‐
nis, ongeacht haar vorm, in strijd is met het verbod op marteling en onmenselijke
of vernederende behandeling (artikel 3 van het Europees Verdrag voor de rechten
van de mens (EVRM)).54
Dit oordeel werpt zijn schaduw vooruit wanneer het gaat om de vraag welke
bescherming lidstaten hebben te bieden in het licht van artikel 2 EVRM (het recht
op leven) en meer in het bijzonder op grond van artikel 8 EVRM (het recht op pri‐
vacy, met de daarin besloten aanspraak op lichamelijke en psychische integriteit).
Voor beide bepalingen geldt dat het EHRM zich in die context niet heeft uitge‐
sproken over de vraag of meisjesbesnijdenis een inbreuk daarop impliceert. Op
grond van de uitspraken van het EHRM over andersoortige ernstige inbreuken op
het recht op leven respectievelijk het recht op lichamelijke en psychische integri‐
teit is echter zonder meer af te leiden dat lidstaten gehouden zijn een adequaat en
effectief niveau van bescherming te bieden. Dit impliceert ook een plicht tot ade‐
51 P. Wheeler, ‘Eliminating FGM: The Role of the Law’, The International Journal of Children’s Rights
2004, p. 257.
52 Wheeler 2004, p. 259 e.v.
53 Vgl. Verdrag van Istanbul (Verdrag van de Raad van Europa inzake het voorkomen en bestrijden
van geweld tegen vrouwen en huiselijk geweld), art. 12.
54 EHRM 20 september 2011, 8969/10 (Omeredo/Oostenrijk); EHRM 17 mei 2011, 43408/08
(Izevbekhai C.S./Ierland), par. 73; EHRM 8 maart 2007, 23944/05 (Collins & Akaziebie/Zweden).
Dit standpunt wordt overigens gedeeld door de Nederlandse bestuursrechter, die in zijn oordeel
niet differentieert naar de ernst van de ingreep. Zie ook: M. van den Brink & J. Tigchelaar, ‘Over
de schouders van ouders: Een interne vergelijking van het Nederlandse overheidsbeleid ten aan‐
zien van besnijdenis j/m’, in: Katharina Boele-Woelki & Susanne Burri (red.), De rol van de staat in
familierelaties: meer of minder?, Den Haag: Boom Juridische uitgevers 2015, p. 137-165, zie i.h.b.
p. 153-155.
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quate strafbaarstelling en handhaving.55 Deze positieve verplichting geldt temeer
wanneer het gaat om bescherming van kwetsbare individuen.56
Over de wijze waarop deze bescherming moet worden gecreëerd en geëffectueerd,
spreekt het Europese Hof zich niet uit. Het is aan de lidstaten om daar binnen de
context van het nationale recht uitvoering aan te geven. Vereist is wel dat de op
nationaal niveau geboden bescherming voldoet aan de hoge maatstaven die het
EHRM daaraan stelt. Het EHRM staat niet alleen in zijn opvatting. Ook andere
internationale normen verplichten staten om alle vormen van meisjesbesnijdenis
adequaat en effectief te bestrijden.57 Deze internationaal gedeelde opvatting, met
de daarin gelegen positieve verplichting van bescherming van kwetsbaren, werpt
haar schaduw vooruit op de door de nationale autoriteiten te treffen maatregelen.
De associatie van meisjesbesnijdenis met verminking versterkt dit en leidt ertoe
dat er weinig ruimte is voor differentiatie: bestrijding van al haar vormen via het
strafrecht ligt voor de hand. Dit wordt ook niet betwist door Europese wetgevers
die geconfronteerd worden met de problematiek rondom meisjesbesnijdenis.58 De
maatregelen zijn vooral gericht op bescherming van meisjes die in Europa wonen,
maar die een besnijdenis riskeren in hun land van herkomst.59
Echter, de strafrechtelijke bestrijding toont sterke verschillen in uitkomst. Dit
doet de vraag rijzen waarom de inzet van het strafrecht niet in alle gevallen een
effectief bestrijdingsmiddel blijkt te zijn.60 Een mogelijke verklaring is het ver‐
schil in opvatting over de culturele exceptie in het strafrecht en de grenzen van
erkenning voor culturele diversiteit.61 Dit punt wordt hierna verder uitgewerkt
aan de hand van het concept burgerschap.
Burgerschap en de aanpak van meisjesbesnijdenis
Republikeins, etnocentrisch of multicultureel?
De betekenis van burgerschap die centraal staat in deze bijdrage, heeft betrekking
op de formele (dat wil zeggen: het beleidsniveau) en materiële (dat is het politiek-
maatschappelijke niveau) ruimte die in een bepaalde samenleving bestaat voor
diversiteit. Deze ruimte ziet dus op de mogelijkheden die een samenleving biedt
voor het vertonen van gedragingen die in belangrijke opzichten afwijken van de
55 O.a. EHRM 26 maart 1985, 8978/80, par. 27 (X & Y/Nederland); EHRM 20 oktober 1998,
87/1997/871/1083, par. 115 (Osman/VK); EHRM 4 december 2003, 39272/98, par. 150 (M.C./
Bulgarije); EHRM 27 september 2011, 29032/04, par. 108 (M. & C./Roemenië); EHRM 26 juli
2011, 9718/03, par. 51 e.v. (Georgel & Georgia Stoicescu/Roemenië).
56 R.S.B. Kool, ‘The Dutch approach to female genital mutilation: the time for change has come’,
Utrecht Law Review 2010, 1, p. 51-71.
57 R.S.B. Kool, ‘Appropriate and Effective Measures against FGM? A Reflection on Dutch Policy in
Light of Article 5 CEDAW’, SIM special 2010, 32, p. 67-89.
58 Kool & Wahedi 2015.
59 Female genital mutilation in the European Union and Croatia, European Institute for Gender Equa‐
lity 2013, p. 25.
60 Voor een recent overzicht: S. Johnsdotter & R.M. Mestre i Mestre, Female Genotl Mutilation in
Europe: analysis of court cases, European Commission, Luxemburg: Office of the European Union
2015.
61 Guiné & Fuentes 2007, p. 479.
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dominante meerderheidsnorm.62 Afhankelijk van de omvang van deze ruimte
kent burgerschap drie verschillende modellen: republikeins, etnocentrisch en
multicultureel.63
In een republikeins model, zoals het Franse, wordt de samenleving beschouwd als
een ondeelbaar geheel waarin consensus bestaat over een aantal fundamentele
normen en waarden. Daarom is assimilatie van groot belang om toegelaten te
worden tot die samenleving. Nadrukkelijk afstand nemen van je oorspronkelijke
achtergrond is daarbij een voorwaarde. Het behoud van de eigen cultuur staat
geslaagd burgerschap in deze opvatting van burgerschap in de weg. Het behoud
van de eigen identiteit is beperkt tot het private domein.64 Maar ook een etnocen‐
trisch model biedt weinig ruimte voor diversiteit: het streeft naar een homogene
samenleving die zich vooral richt op culturele eenvormigheid.65 Het verschil tus‐
sen deze twee modellen is genuanceerder dan op het eerste gezicht lijkt. Waar een
natie binnen een republikeins model verenigd wordt door gedeelde waarden,
zoals gendergelijkheid en de scheiding tussen kerk en staat, vindt vereniging bin‐
nen een etnocentrisch model plaats door middel van culturele integratie en dus
culturele eenheid, waarbij de dominante meerderheidscultuur opgeld doet.66
Tot slot is er nog een multicultureel model. Dit model van burgerschap biedt veel
ruimte voor diversiteit en accepteert verschillen. Engeland was jarenlang het
boegbeeld van een multicultureel land. Ook voor Nederland gold lange tijd dat
men een multicultureel model van burgerschap voorstond, zij het op andere wijze
dan in Engeland.67 Inmiddels bevat het Nederlandse integratiebeleid steeds meer
etnocentrische aspecten.68 Denk aan de participatieverklaring die nieuwkomers
dienen te ondertekenen en waarin zij de basisprincipes van de Nederlandse
samenleving, zoals ‘vrijheid, gelijkwaardigheid en solidariteit’, actief dienen te
onderschrijven.69 De gedachte hierachter is dat de samenleving alleen kan functi‐
oneren ‘als iedereen die zich hier wil vestigen meedoet en de basisprincipes van de
Nederlandse samenleving respecteert’.70 Hoewel een dergelijke participatieverkla‐
ring begrijpelijk is, gezien de problematiek die samenhangt met de integratie van
nieuwkomers, roept zij wel de vraag op hoeveel ruimte de samenleving biedt voor
diversiteit.71
62 Guiné & Fuentes 2007, p. 480.
63 D. McCormick, ‘Multiculturalism and its Discontents’, Human Rights Law Review 2005, 1,
p. 27-56.
64 WRR, Identificatie met Nederland, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press 2006, par. 4.3.
65 S. Saharso, ‘Headscarves: A Comparison of Public Thought and Public Policy in Germany and the
Netherlands’, Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 2007, p. 513-530.
66 Vgl. D. Meyerson, ‘Multiculturalism, religion and equality’, Acta Juridica 2001, p. 104-120, i.h.b.
p. 104: ‘The kind of religious freedom at issue here is the kind sought by nineteenth century Ger‐
man Jews who wished to be German in the street, Jewish at home.’
67 R. Koopmans e.a., Contested Citizenship, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 2005.
68 Vgl. R.S.B. Kool, ‘Drassige gronden voor strafbaarstelling. Het wetsvoorstel ter verruiming van de
strafrechtelijke aanpak van huwelijksdwang’, Delikt en Delinkwent 2011, p. 21-36.
69 Kamerstukken II 2015/16, 115, p. 1-2 (Invoering participatieverklaring voor nieuwkomers).
70 Kamerstukken II 2015/16, 115, p. 1-2 (Invoering participatieverklaring voor nieuwkomers).
71 Vgl. Guiné & Fuentes 2007, p. 479.
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De strafrechtelijke aanpak van meisjesbesnijdenis wordt hierna geanalyseerd in
het licht van de Franse, Engelse en Nederlandse noties van burgerschap. Opmer‐
king verdient dat werken met theoretische modellen onvermijdelijk afbreuk doet
aan de nuances waarvan de omgang met culturele minderheidspraktijken op
nationaal niveau getuigt. Niettemin kan op deze hypothetische wijze inzichtelijk
worden gemaakt welke culturele aspecten een rol spelen bij de successen van een
nationale aanpak ter bestrijding van meisjesbesnijdenis.
Frankrijk: een republikeinse benadering
Na de Tweede Wereldoorlog bestond in Frankrijk een sterke behoefte aan arbei‐
ders.72 Lange tijd gold een ‘laissez-faire’ wervingsbeleid. Onder invloed van de
economische recessie maakte dit in de jaren zeventig plaats voor een ‘etnocen‐
trisch assimilatiebeleid’.73 De Franse voorkeur voor een centralistische aanpak
leidde tot een restrictiever assimilatiebeleid, gericht op het behoud van de Franse
eenheid. Culturele verschillen moesten worden geminimaliseerd en nieuwkomers
werden geacht zich aan te passen.74 Het accent kwam te liggen op de integratie ‘à
la française’, dat op tal van terreinen doorwerking vond, zo ook met betrekking
tot de aanpak van meisjesbesnijdenis75
Overigens was binnen dit nieuwe assimilatiebeleid niet van meet af aan aandacht
voor meisjesbesnijdenis. Integendeel, dankzij de overtuiging dat nieuwkomers
bereid waren zich te assimileren heeft lange tijd een blinde vlek bestaan voor cul‐
turele ongelijkheden, zeker waar het de positie van vrouwen betrof. Er was geen
steun voor de gedachte dat een zorgbeleid ontwikkeld zou moeten worden om
‘sociaal, etnisch of religieus particularisme’ binnen de minderheidsgroepen tegen
te gaan.76 Aanvankelijk werd meisjesbesnijdenis preventief aangepakt door inzet
van bestaande wetgeving op het gebied van kinderbescherming. Later werd duide‐
lijk dat met deze aanpak niet het gehoopte resultaat bereikt kon worden.
Het Franse publiek raakte in 1982 op indringende wijze bekend met meisjes‐
besnijdenis. In de media werd bericht over de dood van baby Bobo. Zij overleed als
gevolg van zware verwondingen, opgelopen bij haar besnijdenis.77 Deze baby was
niet het enige slachtoffer. Hulpverleners werkzaam binnen de zuigelingenzorg en
de jeugdgezondheidszorg (Protection Maternelle et Infantile (PMI)) waren vaker
geconfronteerd met de gevolgen van meisjesbesnijdenis.78 Die ontdekkingen
waren mogelijk door de verplichte medische controle van kinderen tot aan het
zesde levensjaar, waarbij als onderdeel van een algehele controle ook de genitaliën
worden gecontroleerd.
72 WRR, Immigratie- en integratieregimes in vier Europese landen, Den Haag: WRR 2001, p. 83.
73 Guiné & Fuentes 2007, p. 490.
74 WRR 2001, p. 93.
75 B. Winter, ‘Women, the Law and Cultural Relativism in France: the Case of Excision’, Journal of
Women in Culture and Society 1994, p. 939-973.
76 Guiné & Fuentes 2007, p. 491.
77 A. van der Kwaak & K. Bartels, ‘Meisjesbesnijdenis in justitieel perspectief’, PROCES 2002, p. 69.
78 Geschat wordt dat tussen de 42.000 en 61.000 vrouwen in Frankrijk zijn besneden. Ruim 4.000
andere meisjes lopen het risico te worden besneden; L ‘Institut national d’études démographiques
(INED) 2009, p. 3.
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Mocht de PMI-arts een besnijdenis of een andere vorm van mishandeling consta‐
teren, dan is hij verplicht de procureur de la République in te lichten.79 Zijn geheim‐
houdingsplicht staat deze melding niet in de weg.80 Hoewel niet alle PMI-artsen
en hulpverleners bereid zijn te voldoen aan deze meldplicht, werd deze vanaf de
jaren tachtig van de vorige eeuw actief nageleefd in de regio Parijs.81 Deze opstel‐
ling van de jeugdgezondheidszorg is uniek binnen West-Europa en zij is van cru‐
ciale betekenis geweest voor de ontsluiting van de problematiek aan justitie.82
Berechting en culturele verweren
Omdat meisjesbesnijdenis aanvankelijk niet was gekwalificeerd als een ernstig
misdrijf, waren de straffen echter relatief laag.83 Vrouwenrechtenorganisaties
benadrukten dat vervolging van meisjesbesnijdenis vooral ook in het teken moest
staan van preventie, en pleitten daarom voor zwaardere straffen en afdoening
door het Cour d’assises.84 Door zich als burgerlijke partij op te stellen in een aantal
strafzaken wisten zij te bewerkstelligen dat meisjesbesnijdenis voortaan door
deze hoogste feitenrechter wordt afgedaan.85 Al met al zijn in Frankrijk tot op
heden ongeveer veertig strafzaken afgedaan, waarin ongeveer negentig verdach‐
ten terechtstonden. In het merendeel van de zaken volgde een veroordeling, zij
het dat de strafmaten uiteenliepen.86
In deze strafzaken werd regelmatig een cultureel verweer gevoerd waarin een
beroep werd gedaan op de culturele achtergrond van de verdachte(n) om de
besnijdenis te rechtvaardigen of afwezigheid van schuld te bepleiten. In een aan‐
tal zaken constateerden deskundigen overmacht bij de verdachte, welk verweer
echter nimmer is gehonoreerd.87 In andere gevallen beriepen verdachten zich op
rechtsdwaling en stelden dat zij zich als immigrant niet bewust waren geweest
van de strafbaarheid van meisjesbesnijdenis in Frankrijk.88
In de literatuur is gesuggereerd dat deze verweren bedoeld waren om de straftoe‐
meting te beïnvloeden, niet om een vrijspraak of straffeloosheid te bewerkstelli‐
gen. Dat is ook deels gelukt. Ouders die vervolgd zijn voor meisjesbesnijdenis heb‐
ben betrekkelijk lage straffen gekregen. De culturele achtergrond van de ver‐
79 J.H. Nijboer, N.M.D. van der Aa & T. Buruma, Strafrechtelijke opsporing en vervolging van meisjes‐
besnijdenis, Den Haag: Boom Juridische uitgevers 2010, p. 115.
80 Art. 4 respectievelijk art. 44 van de Code de Déontologie Médicale; de verplichting geldt voor artsen
en hulpverleners.
81 In die regio is de concentratie van immigrantengroepen die meisjesbesnijdenis praktiseren hoog.
Echter ook elders in Frankrijk zijn concentraties van betrokken groepen te vinden; de justitiële
activiteit is daar lager. Zie: Nijboer e.a. 2010, p. 18.
82 Overigens lag de aanleiding tot het strafrechtelijk onderzoek in sommige zaken in ambtshalve
bekend geworden misstanden, bijvoorbeeld naar aanleiding van medische complicaties (Nijboer
e.a. 2010, p. 107).
83 Guiné & Fuentes 2007, p. 502.
84 Dit hof is belast met de afdoening van zware misdrijven (crime); het betreft juryrechtspraak.
85 Kool e.a. 2005, p. 66.
86 Nijboer e.a. 2010, p. 18.
87 Overigens is vanuit feministische hoek kritiek geleverd op zulke verweren; Winter 1994, p. 948.
Zie voorts voor een beroep op dwaling: Johnsdotter & Mestre i Mestre 2015, p. 22-23.
88 Kool e.a. 2005, p. 75.
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dachte en het niet willen doorbreken van het gezinsleven worden in dit verband
als redenen genoemd. Daarentegen zijn besnijders veroordeeld tot onvoorwaarde‐
lijke hoge gevangenisstraffen, zeker wanneer zij betrokken waren bij een reeks
besnijdenissen.89
Hoe de Franse aanpak te duiden?
In Frankijk hebben organisaties van uiteenlopende signatuur elkaar gevonden in
de overtuiging dat een actieve inzet van het strafrecht noodzakelijk is in de
bestrijding van meisjesbesnijdenis. Het is die eenheid die zichtbaar is naar buiten
en die de aandacht heeft getrokken van andere Europese landen.90 Echter, deze
Franse eenheid is betrekkelijk. Van specifieke aandacht op wetgevend niveau was
tot voor kort geen sprake, pleidooien vanuit vrouwenrechtenorganisaties om te
komen tot invoering van een specifieke strafbaarstelling ten spijt.91 Meisjes‐
besnijdenis valt onder commune delicten zoals (zware) mishandeling en, indien
geïndiceerd, onder de levensdelicten. Specifieke strafbaarstelling werd gezien als
symboolpolitiek die op gespannen voet zou staan met het legaliteitsbeginsel en
het non-discriminatiegebod.92 Niettemin is in 2010 een initiatiefwetsvoorstel
ingediend, strekkende tot specifieke strafbaarstelling van alle vormen van meis‐
jesbesnijdenis.93
Bovendien heeft het republikeins integratiebeleid met zijn nadruk op de gemeen‐
schappelijke waarden van de Franse samenleving en de overtuiging dat nieuwko‐
mers zouden assimileren, geresulteerd in ‘official blindness’ voor de gevolgen van
diversiteit.94 Deze beleidsmatige ‘verblinding’ is een struikelblok geweest voor
een effectieve bescherming van vrouwen die vanwege hun culturele achtergrond
terechtkomen in particularistische patronen waarin veel waarde wordt gehecht
aan het behoud van de eigen, ten opzichte van de Franse samenleving ‘afwij‐
kende’, praktijken, zoals de meisjesbesnijdenis.95 Dit laat onverlet dat het Franse
assimilatiebeleid aan de basis heeft gestaan van een gericht preventiebeleid van‐
uit de medische hoek. Ouders wordt door sommige PMI-artsen gevraagd een ver‐
klaring te ondertekenen waarin zij beloven hun dochters niet te zullen besnijden.
Ook worden zij gewezen op het feit dat een besnijdenis buiten Frankrijk eveneens
strafbaar is en dat de ouders bij ontdekking van dit feit vervolging riskeren. Niet
zelden wordt de ouders uit ‘risicogebieden’ meegedeeld dat justitie zal worden
ingelicht over de vakantieplannen naar hun land(en) van herkomst. Deze ‘inter‐
ventionistische’ benadering is bekritiseerd omdat zij de besnijdenis zou verplaat‐
89 Nijboer e.a. 2010, p. 141 e.v.
90 Op instigatie van de Tweede Kamer is een rechtsvergelijkend onderzoek uitgevoerd om te bezien
of de Franse aanpak navolging verdient: Kamerstukken II 2007/08, 28345/22894, 51; Kamerstuk‐
ken II 2008/09, 28345, 78 en 88. Voor het rapport: Nijboer e.a. 2010.
91 Waaronder de toonaangevende vrouwenrechtenorganisatie ‘Ligue pour le Droit des Femmes en
de Groupe pour l’Abolition des Mutilations Génitales Féminines’ (GAMS). 
92 Kool 2005, p. 5; Guiné & Fuentes 2007, p. 501; Nijboer e.a. 2010, p. 110. 
93 Assemblée Nationale 24 juni 2010, nr. 2658, p. 3.
94 Guiné & Fuentes 2007, p. 504.
95 Guiné & Fuentes 2007, p. 504.
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sen naar een moment waarop de controle door PMI-artsen komt te vervallen.96
Niettemin wordt door ouders opgemerkt dat zij vanwege deze op preventie
gerichte benadering van artsen beter in staat zijn om in hun land(en) van her‐
komst uit te leggen waarom zij hun dochters niet willen besnijden.97
Tegen deze achtergrond moet de betekenis van het strafrecht als wapen in de
strijd tegen meisjesbesnijdenis niet worden overschat. Het zijn vooral waarden als
laïcité en gendergelijkheid die een effectieve aanpak op lokaal niveau mogelijk
hebben gemaakt. Deze waarden vormen volgens Guiné en Fuentes ‘a double wea‐
pon that allows a more efficient fight against sexist cultural differences arising
from religion’.98 In het licht van deze relativering van het strafrecht wijzen deze
auteurs ook het onvoldoende problematiseren van meisjesbesnijdenis in termen
van gender aan als een belangrijke factor die afbreuk doet aan te behalen resulta‐
ten op landelijk niveau.99
Engeland: behoud diversiteit versus bescherming mensenrechten?
Engeland geldt in de regel als een land dat binnen het multiculturele model valt.
Binnen het bredere staatsrechtelijke verband van het Verenigd Koninkrijk wordt
Engeland als ‘moederland’ gezien, het deel van het statenverbond dat open zou
staan voor culturele diversiteit.100 Vanuit hun lange koloniale verleden gewend
aan immigratie en inbreng van ‘vreemde’ culturen zouden de Engelsen als het
ware beschikken over een multicultureel gen, dat hen onderscheidt van andere
Europeanen.101 Onder deze ogenschijnlijke multiculturele tolerantie gaat volgens
sommigen echter racisme schuil dat is gevoed en gegroeid in een historisch kli‐
maat waarin de Engelse waarden en normen als ‘superieur en geprivilegieerd’ wer‐
den beschouwd.102 Toen het Engelse moederland halverwege de vorige eeuw werd
geconfronteerd met toenemende immigratie als gevolg van dekolonisering was de
toon tegenover deze nieuwkomers regelmatig vijandig en openlijk racistisch.103
Geconfronteerd met de onvermijdelijkheid van immigratie koos Engeland destijds
voor een pluralistische aanpak.104 Multiculturalisme was ‘bon ton’, zij het dat
politieke en maatschappelijke tolerantie van multiculturele kwesties haar grens
vond waar dit geacht werd afbreuk te doen aan fundamentele normen en waar‐
den. Inmiddels is de Britse samenleving en politiek, zoals in de meeste Europese
staten, ten prooi gevallen aan opkomend populisme dat de nadruk legt op de
96 Guiné & Fuentes 2007, p. 503.
97 Guiné & Fuentes 2007, p. 504.
98 Guiné & Fuentes 2007, p. 505.
99 Guiné & Fuentes 2007, p. 505 e.v.
100 In de literatuur wordt regelmatig gerefereerd aan de ‘Britse’ cultuur. Die term ziet echter op het
bredere staatsrechtelijke verband van het Verenigd Koninkrijk, dat een amalgaam van culturen
kent.
101 A.M. Fortier, Multiculturality and the new face of Britain, Lancaster: Department of Sociology
2000; B. Parekh, The Future of Multi-ethnic Britain, Parekh Report 2000.
102 Deze kwalificaties zijn afkomstig uit het Parekh Report.
103 H.S. Mirza, ‘Multiculturalism and the gender gap: the visibility and invisibility of Muslim women
in Britain’, in: Waqar I.U. Ahmad & Ziauddin Sardar (red.), Muslims in Britain. Making social and
political space, Abingdon: Routlegde 2012, p. 120-139.
104 Mirza spreekt over een ‘hard won’ politieke ommekeer; Mirza 2012, p. 121-123.
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plicht van nieuwkomers om te assimileren.105 De Britse aanpak van meisjesbesnij‐
denis kenmerkt zich dan ook als overwegend etnocentrisch: gericht op bestrijding
van een afwijkende, niet binnen de Britse samenleving passende praktijk.106 In de
literatuur is deze benadering bekritiseerd als eenzijdig omdat zij blind zou zijn
voor de ‘eigen’ praktijken, die evenzeer als problematische ‘culturele genderkwes‐
tie’ kunnen gelden. Denk aan esthetische lichaamscorrecties.107 Gesteld wordt dat
de ruimte die etnische minderheden wordt gegund om culturele praktijken uit te
oefenen die op gespannen voet staan met Engelse normen en waarden, sterk is
afgenomen.108
De Engelse wetgeving
Kenmerkend voor de Engelse aanpak is de nadruk op de strafwaardigheid van
meisjesbesnijdenis en de noodzaak tot actieve strafrechtelijke handhaving ener‐
zijds, en het ontbreken van een coherent beleid anderzijds. Nu is dat laatste geen
exclusief Engels verschijnsel. Integendeel, ook elders geldt dat de complexiteit van
de problematiek met daarin gelegen conflicterende belangen coherente beleids‐
voering bemoeilijkt. Maar ook met inachtneming daarvan is geen sprake van een
‘ferme Engelse aanpak’. De voor het Engelse discours typerende vrees te worden
beticht van racisme speelt daarbij een rol. Want hoewel de autoriteiten traditio‐
neel genegen zijn om culturele minderheidsgroepen een zekere autonomie te gun‐
nen, noopt het schadelijke karakter van meisjesbesnijdenis tot actief optreden.
Niettemin is Engeland in wetgevend opzicht voorloper, want al in 1985 werd de
Prohibition of Female Circumcision Act ingevoerd. Naast een specifieke strafbaar‐
stelling bevat deze wet een uitzondering voor aanpassing van de staat van vrou‐
welijke genitaliën op medische gronden, bijvoorbeeld wanneer dat nodig is ter
voorkoming of bestrijding van kanker.109 De overtuiging van de vrouw dat besnij‐
denis juist is omdat de traditie deze zou voorschrijven, vormde hierbij geen recht‐
vaardiging voor een medisch ingrijpen.110 De medische uitzondering bleek echter
een maas in de wet te zijn. Er zijn gevallen bekend van meisjesbesnijdenis op
‘medische gronden’, uitgevoerd in privéklinieken.111
In de Female Genital Mutilation Act 2003 volgde een aanzienlijke verzwaring van
het strafmaximum van vijf naar veertien jaar gevangenisstraf en een uitbreiding
van de extraterritoriale rechtsmacht, zodat ook elders uitgevoerde besnijdenissen
door en op Engelse onderdanen en permanent ingezetenen kunnen worden ver‐
volgd. Opvallend is dat ook de besnijdenis van meerderjarigen die dat zelf wensen
een strafbaar feit oplevert. Naar aanleiding van oproepen vanuit vrouwenorgani‐
saties werden tussentijds in het parlement vragen gesteld over de prevalentie van
meisjesbesnijdenis. Het handhavingstekort werd bekritiseerd, maar bleef onopge‐
105 Fortier 2000.
106 Dustin 2010, p. 19.
107 Dustin 2010, p. 19.
108 Dustin 2010, p. 19.
109 Guiné & Fuentes 2007, p. 493.
110 Prohibition of Female Circumsion Act 1985, Section 2 (2).
111 Guiné & Fuentes 2007, p. 495.
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lost.112 Dat is overigens niet ingegeven door onwil vanuit de strafrechtelijke hoek.
Integendeel, vanuit de Crown Prosecution Service is de Female Genital Mutilation
Guidance opgesteld, waarin instructies worden gegeven ter vervolging van meis‐
jesbesnijdenis. Vermoedens van kindermishandeling, waartoe meisjesbesnijdenis
wordt gerekend, dienen te worden gemeld bij de politie of de lokale sociale instan‐
ties (Children Act 1989, sectie 47).113 De eventuele professionele geheimhoudings‐
plicht staat een melding niet in de weg. Lokale autoriteiten zijn bovendien
bevoegd preventieve maatregelen te nemen om de gezondheid van het kind te
beschermen, maar hiervan wordt slechts zelden gebruikgemaakt.114
Hoe de Engelse aanpak te duiden?
Het Engelse, overwegend multiculturele model van burgerschap waarin ruimte
voor culturele diversiteit centraal staat, heeft op gespannen voet gestaan met de
wens om meisjesbesnijdenis effectief te bestrijden. Het risico op stigmatisering en
discriminatoire benadering van een ‘zwarte traditie’ leidde tot een terughoudend
optreden; de nadruk binnen het beleid lag op de bescherming van collectieve
groepsbelangen.115 Deze benadering is niet effectief gebleken in de bescherming
van de individuele rechten van meisjes en vrouwen. Want ondanks specifieke
strafbaarstelling en belendende instructies is er nog geen sprake van actieve
handhaving.116 Het Engelse beleid is dan ook vooral gericht op preventie, te
bewerkstelligen door samenwerking tussen de gezondheidszorg, voorlichters,
sociale diensten, belangengroepen en contactpersonen van de desbetreffende
minderheidsgroepen.117
Nederland: multiculturele terughoudendheid versus etnocentrische bestrijding
In Nederland gold tot aan de eeuwwisseling het uitgangspunt: ‘integratie met
behoud van eigen cultuur’.118 Weliswaar was het burgerschapsmodel multicultu‐
reel,119 maar wat als culturele uiting aanvaardbaar werd geacht, was ook destijds
begrensd.120 In de periode na het jaar 2000 maakte het tot dan toe gevolgde inte‐
gratiebeleid van ‘aanpassen met behoud van eigen identiteit’ plaats voor het ‘aan‐
112 Het parlementaire debat blijft steken in een oproep aan de regering om de aanpak van meisjesbe‐
snijdenis aan te scherpen, www. parliament. uk/ lords. hansard, column 1282 (House of Lords), en
de met unanieme stemmen aangenomen motie van de House of Commons, www. parliament. uk/
edm/ 2010 -12/ 1219.
113 Home Office, Female Genital Mutilation. Multi Agency Practice Guidelines, www. homeoffice. gov. uk.
114 Kool & Wahedi 2015.
115 Guiné & Fuentes 2007, p. 506.
116 Vgl. J. Bindel, An Unpunished Crime: The lack of prosecutions for female genital mutilation in the UK,
Londen: New Culture Forum 2014. De schattingen uit dit rapport over de prevalentie van meis‐
jesbesnijdenis in het Verenigd Koninkrijk zijn kritisch ontvangen, zie: Macfarlane e.a. 2015.
117 Zie o.a. Her Majesty Government, Female Genital Mutilation: The Case for a National Action Plan,
Londen: HM Government 2014.
118 WRR 2006, p. 81.
119 Koopmans e.a. 2005. Voor een historisch perspectief op deze ‘Hollandse gastvrijheid’: WRR
2006.
120 O.a. A.C. ’t Hart, Hier gelden wetten!, Deventer: Gouda Quint 2000; Bartels & Haaijer 1992;
G. Nienhuis, Knagen aan een oude traditie, Den Haag: Pharos 2004.
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passen via omarming van de Nederlandse identiteit’.121 Vanaf die tijd doet een
etnocentrisch model van burgerschap opgeld, met nadruk op versterking van ‘de’
Nederlandse identiteit.122
Anders dan in Frankrijk, waar het burgerschapsmodel expliciet is toegesneden op
het lidmaatschap van de Republiek, heeft deze Nederlandse identiteit een wat
‘impliciet en verzonken karakter’ dat weinig ruimte laat tot reflectie op de daarin
gelegen normatieve uitgangspunten.123 Een verklaring voor deze ‘dikke’,124 als
homogeen gepresenteerde identiteit ligt in de voor Nederland kenmerkende ver‐
zuilde structuur die de samenleving lange tijd heeft geregeerd. Nederland gold
weliswaar als natiestaat, maar onder de oppervlakte van ogenschijnlijke nationale
eenheid ging politieke en maatschappelijke verdeeldheid tussen bevolkingsgroe‐
pen schuil. Het was binnen deze groepen waar individuele identiteiten werden
gevormd en waaraan men normen en waarden ontleende. Die politiek van ‘soeve‐
reiniteit in eigen kring’ heeft tot het midden van de jaren vijftig standgehouden,
waarna zij onder druk van interne en externe sociale ontwikkelingen plaats‐
maakte voor een gerichtheid naar buiten, over de landsgrenzen.125 Inmiddels is
daarvan geen sprake meer. Integendeel, de Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het
Regeringsbeleid (WRR) spreekt van ‘een naar binnen gekeerde opvatting van
nationale identiteit’, en voegt daaraan toe: ‘de angst is niet zozeer dat ze “onze”
banen inpikken, maar dat “ze” onze cultuur en identiteit bedreigen’.126
De strafrechtelijke aanpak in Nederland
Dat het huidige politieke en maatschappelijke klimaat geen ruimte biedt voor
rechtvaardiging van meisjesbesnijdenis op culturele gronden, is evident. Niette‐
min was Nederland, in vergelijking met andere Europese landen, laat met het op
de politieke agenda plaatsen van meisjesbesnijdenis.127 Deze praktijk werd bin‐
nen het politieke discours van de jaren negentig nog aangeduid als ‘een gevoelige’
kwestie.128 Ook het gegeven dat de genitaliën van sommige vrouwen na de beval‐
ling destijds nog werden ‘dichtgenaaid’, duidt erop dat van ferme stellingname in
die jaren nog geen sprake was.129 Men was overduidelijk ‘bang’ voor stigmatise‐
121 WRR 2006, p. 36 resp. 88-89. Vanaf 2004 wordt – in reactie op o.a. het rapport ‘Bruggen bouwen’
van de commissie-Blok (2004), parlementaire debatten en van regeringswege – officieel afstand
genomen van het ‘multiculturalisme als normatief ideaal’. Zie: M. van Meeteren, Discoursen van
integratie. De omslag in het politieke debat over integratie in Nederland (doctoraalscriptie Sociolo‐
gie), Rotterdam: EUR 2005.
122 WRR 2006, p. 83.
123 WRR 2006, p. 86-90.
124 H. Ghorashi, ‘Paradoxen van culturele erkenning’, Tijdschrift voor Genderstudies 2006, p. 47.
125 J. Kennedy, De deugden van een gidsland: Burgerschap en democratie In Nederland, Amsterdam: Bert
Bakker 2005.
126 WRR 2006, p.199 resp. p. 176. Opmerking behoeft dat de WRR de eerste kwalificatie gebruikt ter
duiding van de Nederlandse opstelling richting Europa. Wij menen dat deze kwalificatie breder
toegepast kan worden.
127 Voor een beschrijving van het beleid tot 2000: M. van der Liet-Senders, ‘Inbreuken op seksuele
en reproductieve rechten’, in: I. Boerefijn, M.M. van der Liet-Senders & T. Loenen (red.), Het
voorkomen en bestrijden van geweld tegen vrouwen, Den Haag: SZW 2000, par. 3.3.
128 Aanhangsel Kamerstukken II 1982/83, 964.
129 Handelingen II 1993/94, 6-310, bijdrage Sipkes.
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ring. Typerend is de stellingname van de toenmalige VVD-leider Hans Dijkstal:
‘Ter zake van [meisjesbesnijdenis] hebben wij de verplichting een en ander zorg‐
vuldig te wegen. (…) Wij praten alleen maar over de problemen. (…) In de totale
beeldvorming moeten wij bekijken, hoe wij de positieve ontwikkelingen, die er
ook zijn, in beeld kunnen brengen, zodat er meer evenwicht ontstaat.’130
Pas in 1993 heeft de overheid stelling genomen tegen alle vormen van meisjesbe‐
snijdenis.131 Een jaar eerder had namelijk een onderzoekscommissie gepleit om de
lichtste variant van deze praktijk toe te staan.132 In de jaren hierop volgend is
door politici, opiniemakers en juristen stevig gediscussieerd over de wenselijkheid
van specifieke strafbaarstelling van meisjesbesnijdenis.133 Er is echter nooit vol‐
doende draagvlak gevonden voor specifieke wetgeving.134 De Nederlandse wetsys‐
tematiek met de daarvoor karakteristieke voorkeur voor generieke bepalingen
staat daaraan in de weg. Wél is voorzien in de mogelijkheid tot strafverzwaring
indien de besnijdenis wordt (mede)gepleegd door (een van de) ouders.135
Het ontbreken van een actieve handhaving heeft eerder aanleiding gegeven tot
kritiek. De vraag werd gesteld of het Franse beleid navolging verdiende, waarop
een rechtsvergelijkend onderzoek werd geëntameerd.136 De conclusie was dat er
onvoldoende aanleiding was om het Franse voorbeeld te volgen. Dat berust
immers op specifieke omstandigheden, onder andere op de aanwezigheid van een
verplichte medische controle. Voor dat laatste was lange tijd geen draagvlak in
Nederland,137 maar er lijkt sprake te zijn van een kentering in het politieke den‐
ken. Zo werd onlangs de suggestie gedaan om een periodieke controle op de geni‐
taliën van meisjes uit zogenoemde risicolanden in te voeren.138 Dit voorstel werd
niet gevolgd. Volstaan is met het opstellen van een handelingsprotocol genitale
verminking, dat uiteenzet hoe professionals dienen te handelen bij vermoedens
van meisjesbesnijdenis, ongeacht de vorm.139
Er is immers gebleken dat het doorsluizen van meldingen van meisjesbesnijdenis
via de Algemene Meldpunten Kindermishandeling aan de strafrechtelijke autori‐
teiten niet goed werkte. De hoop is nu gericht op ontsluiting van de problematiek
via sleutelfiguren en zelforganisaties, die als ‘vooruitgeschoven posten’ toegang
130 Handelingen II 1992/93, 4-169.
131 Dit leiden wij af uit het rapport van Vluchtelingen-Organisaties Nederland, Meisjesbesnijdenis in
Nederland, een kwestie van mensenrechten?, Vluchtelingen-Organisaties Nederland 2007, p. 17.
132 Bartels & Haaijer 1992.
133 Zie rapport Kool e.a. 2005.
134 Zie o.a. Aanhangsel Kamerstukken 1990/91, 1125, p. 2, waar minister Hoogervorst in antwoord op
Kamervragen stelt dat meisjesbesnijdenis een ‘gevoelige kwestie’ is die zich niet leent voor een
nader onderzoek door het Openbaar Ministerie, zijn eerdere uitlating dat het zou gaan om een
geïmporteerd delict ondanks.
135 Art. 304 Sr.
136 Kamerstukken II 2008/09, 28345, 78, p. 4 (Verslag werkbezoek staatssecretaris Bussemaker aan
Frankrijk).
137 Een zwakke kant van dergelijke gerichte controles is overigens dat het leidt tot elders, op latere
leeftijd uitgevoerde besnijdenissen die zich onttrekken aan het zicht van de autoriteiten.
138 Handelingen II 2014/15, 91, item 9, p. 2.
139 Stb. 2013, 342 (Besluit verplichte meldcode huiselijk geweld en kindermishandeling). De term
meisjesbesnijdenis wordt in het besluit niet genoemd. Meisjesbesnijdenis wordt binnen het straf‐
rechtelijk beleid echter begrepen als kindermishandeling.
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hebben tot de betrokken gemeenschappen.140 Vanaf november 2011 ligt de ver‐
antwoordelijkheid daarvoor bij de gemeenten, in het kader van de Wet maat‐
schappelijke ondersteuning.141
Het voorgaande laat onverlet dat de toon vanuit het parlement na verloop van
tijd scherper is geworden. Sinds 2008 zijn diverse moties ingediend die zijn
gericht op een intensivering van de bestrijding van meisjesbesnijdenis. De meeste
ervan hebben betrekking op de strafrechtelijke aanpak. Zo is voorgesteld om de
politie tipgeld te laten uitloven voor het melden van meisjesbesnijdenis, om een
meldplicht in te voeren, het strafmaximum te verhogen en een minimumstraf in
te voeren. Daarnaast is een motie ingediend om bij vermoede betrokkenheid bij
meisjesbesnijdenis de asielprocedure stop te zetten, dan wel te komen tot intrek‐
king van de verblijfsvergunning. Eerder was van de zijde van GroenLinks
gevraagd om een gespecialiseerde officier van justitie aan te stellen.142
De recente toestroom van grote groepen migranten uit ‘risicogebieden’ vraagt vol‐
gens sommige politici om herwaardering van het strafrechtelijke apparaat bij de
bestrijding van meisjesbesnijdenis.143 Het feit dat in de afgelopen tijd weliswaar
veertien gevallen zijn geconstateerd, maar dat in geen daarvan vervolging is inge‐
steld, wordt als ‘zorgelijk’ beschouwd.144 Dit moge zo zijn, maar de bijdrage van
het strafrecht aan de bestrijding van meisjesbesnijdenis zal van ondergeschikte
aard blijven. Van de naar schatting vijftig zaken (zowel infibulatie als clitoridecto‐
mie en incisie) die zich per jaar in Nederland voordoen,145 is tot op heden immers
maar in één zaak (excisie, gezien de tenlastelegging) vervolgd.146 Die zaak is
bovendien niet ambtshalve bekend geworden, maar via een melding door de moe‐
der.147 Het enthousiasme voor intensivering van de strafrechtelijke aanpak lijkt
zich bovendien tot een bepaald deel van het parlement te beperken; de meerder‐
heid lijkt vooralsnog meer heil te zien in preventie.148 Niettemin is duidelijk dat
de huidige geest die door de parlementaire discussies waait van een andere orde is
dan traditioneel te doen gebruikelijk in Nederlandse contreien. Hierin weerspie‐
gelt zich een verharding van het maatschappelijke klimaat en verminderde ruimte
140 Zo wijst Pharos op het zogenoemde VETC-team, ofwel het team Voorlichting Eigen Taal en Cul‐
tuur, als ingangsmogelijkheid; Pharos, Jaarverslag 2011, Den Haag: Pharos 2011, p. 11.
141 Kamerstukken II 2011/12, 28345, 117.
142 Kool & Wahedi 2015.
143 Zie bijdrage van het Tweede Kamerlid Rebel (PvdA) tijdens het Algemeen Overleg over de aanpak
van geweld tegen vrouwen, Handelingen II 2014/15, 91, item 9, p. 2.
144 Zie bijdrage van het Tweede Kamerlid Rebel (PvdA) tijdens het Algemeen Overleg over de aanpak
van geweld tegen vrouwen, Handelingen II 2014/15, 91, item 9, p. 19.
145 Dit cijfer wordt genoemd in: M. Kramer e.a., ‘Vrouwelijke genitale verminking nader bekeken’,
TSG 2007, 8, p. 427-433.
146 Op grond van de Aanwijzing opsporing en vervolging kindermishandeling dient vervolging te
worden ingesteld wanneer voldoende bewijs voorhanden is; Stcrt. 2010, 19123, p. 6.
147 Rb. Haarlem 11 september 2009, ECLI:NL:RBHAA:2009:BJ7447; in hoger beroep: Hof Amster‐
dam 23 december 2012, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2010:BO8531.
148 Onlangs werd vanuit de PvDA-fractie een expertmeeting georganiseerd over de preventie van
meisjesbesnijdenis. M. Volp, ‘Actieplan tegen Vrouwelijke Genitale Verminking’, www. pvda. nl.
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voor culturele tolerantie, die blijk geeft van een veranderde opvatting over bur‐
gerschap en multiculturalisme.149
Afronding
Het maatschappelijke discours is eenduidig: meisjesbesnijdenis wordt in al haar
vormen afgewezen en dient onder andere langs strafrechtelijke weg te worden
bestreden. De praktijk leert echter dat strafrechtelijke handhaving eerder uitzon‐
dering is dan regel. De rechter krijgt slechts bij hoge uitzondering te maken met
deze vorm van mishandeling en ziet zich dan voor veelal onoverkomelijke bewijs‐
problemen gesteld. Niettemin leert de Franse aanpak dat strafrechtelijke hand‐
having mogelijk is, zij het op voorwaarde van ontsluiting vanuit de jeugdhulpver‐
lening. Het Franse ‘succes’ kan echter niet worden gegeneraliseerd en moet wor‐
den begrepen in het licht van de achterliggende rechtsculturele opvattingen in het
kader van de ruimte die het Franse republikeinse model van burgerschap biedt
aan diversiteit. De verhouding tussen burgerschap en diversiteit is bepalend voor
de toon in het politieke en juridische debat over de toelaatbaarheid van een
omstreden praktijk als meisjesbesnijdenis. Onze analyse van de relatie tussen
(een veranderd model van) burgerschap en strafrechtelijke bestrijding van meis‐
jesbesnijdenis leert dat nationale opvattingen over diversiteit aanleiding geven
tot verschil in aanpak en uitkomst. Het feit dat de internationale rechtsgemeen‐
schap meisjesbesnijdenis eenduidig afwijst en kwalificeert als mensenrechten‐
schending, biedt dan ook geen garantie voor een eenduidige en succesvolle aan‐
pak op nationaal niveau. Integendeel.
149 Dit logenstraft onzes inziens de positieve toonzetting van het WRR-rapport inzake de ontwikke‐
ling van Nederland als immigratiesamenleving; WRR 2001.
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INTRODUCTION
The recurring conflict between religious manifestations and existing
legal norms has resulted in a principled debate in legal theory and liberal
political philosophy regarding the role of religion in law and politics.' Ex-
t L.L.B. and L.L.M. Utrecht University, the Netherlands; PhD-Candidate, Eras-
mus School of Law, Rotterdam, the Netherlands. Draft versions of this article were
presented in Lisbon ('XXVIII World Congress of the International Association for the
Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy', University of Lisbon, 17-21 July 2017);
London ('Association of Transnational Law Schools' Agora, Queen Mary University of
London, 20 June 2017); Rabat ('Religion, Law, and Security' Conference, The Fifth
Annual Conference of the African Consortium for Law and Religion Studies, Interna-
tional University of Rabat, 14-17 May 2017); Rotterdam ('Section Seminar Sociology
Theory and Methodology', Erasmus School of Law, 8 May 2017); Malibu ('Religious
Critiques of Law' Conference, Pepperdine School of Law, 8-9 March 2017); Utrecht
('Winter meeting', The Netherlands Association for Philosophy of Law, 3 February
2017) and The Hague ('PhD-Seminar', International Institute of Social Studies, 10 Jan-
uary 2017). For the feedback on the presentation, I would like to thank the organization
committee and the participants of those events. Next, I am especially grateful for the
helpful comments of Wibren van der Burg, Jeroen Temperman, Ellen Hey, Kim Lane
Scheppele, Steven D. Smith, Joseph E. David, Yossi Nehushtan, M. Christian Green
and Iris van Domselaar. Also, I would like to express my sincere gratitude and appreci-
ation to Jessica Gill, Michael Loza, Tyleana Venable and the rest of the Buffalo Human
Rights Law Review staff for their valuable comments and fruitful suggestions. Errors
remain mine. Feedback, comments and criticism could be sent directly to
wahedi@law.eur.nl
1. Robert Cochran and Michael Helfand expect that "given the potential for both
law and religion to promote the most noble of human goods and the most depraved of
human evils, the endless jousting between the two-each continuously seeking to tame
the other-will undoubtedly remain a permanent feature of the human experience."
Robert F. Cochran, Jr. & Michael A. Helfand, The Competing Claims of Law and
Religion: Who Should Influence Whom?, 39 Pepp. L. Rev. 1051, 1052 (2013); see also
Cdcile Laborde, Liberalism's Religion (2017); Arif A. Jamal, Considering Freedom of
Religion in a Post-Secular Context: Hapless or Hopeful? 6 O.J.L.R. 433 (2017); Chris-
topher C. Lund, Religion is Special Enough, 103 Va. L. Rev. 481 (2017); Steven D.
Smith, The Tortuous Course of Religious Freedom, 91 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1553, 1556
(2016) (discussing three challenges the constitutional protection of religious freedom
faces); Micah Schwartzman, What if Religion is Not Special?, 79 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1351,
1353, 1427 (2012) (explaining that the "conflict between law and morality" is that relig-
ion is special for legal reasons (in the context of U.S. constitutional law) due to its
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amples of concrete cases that reveal this conflict of standards can be seen in
an increasing number of legislation and regulatory steps taken in liberal
democracies, 2 which target religious manifestations that have been labelled
as contentious in the public discourse because of their common characteris-
tic: deviation from the dominant norms. 3 Among the examples of "high
constitutional abilities (free exercise) and disabilities (non-establishment). However, re-
ligion is not special for normative reasons). (emphasis added).
2. The scope of the conflict of standards is broader than simply a conflict between
the rules of the state and competing religious norms. This conflict also covers the ten-
sion between religious beliefs and what the dominant norms of a society expect from its
citizens: e.g. the norm of having an open dialogue and being able to communicate. The
latter has been presented as an argument in favor of the ban on face-covering veils
among European states. Another example is the norm of shaking hands as a sign of
greeting, without making a distinction in gender. This norm has been used as an argu-
ment in the Netherlands to refuse an orthodox Muslim man, who refrained from shaking
hands with women, from a job as civil servant. See Rb. Rotterdam 6 August 2008,
ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD9643, ¶ 5.2.3 (Neth.).
3. In the legal discourse, some religious manifestations have been qualified as
contentious. See Jehovah's Witnesses of Moscow and Others v. Russia, App. No. 302/
02, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2010), ¶ 144, http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-99221 ("The rites
and rituals of many religions may harm believers' well-being, such as, for example, the
practice of fasting, which is particularly long and strict in Orthodox Christianity, or
circumcision practiced on Jewish or Muslim male babies. It does not appear that the
teachings of Jehovah's Witnesses include any such contentious practices."); see also
Sohail Wahedi, Marginaliseren van godsdienstvrijheid door abstraheren van de re-
ligieuze dimensie [Marginalizing Religious Freedom Through Abstraction from the Re-
ligious Dimension], 9 RELIGIE & SAMENLEVING [RELIGION & Soc'y] 128, 134-38
(2014). Not all religious manifestations that are considered contentious are immediately
abandoned. At least two recent court rulings on the legality of adopted local bans on
religious symbols show that an appeal to state neutrality and separation of Church and
State is not enough to justify legislation that bans publicly wearing religious symbols.
The Belgian Raad van State, Council of State ruled in October 2014, that a local ban on
wearing religious symbols at school that targeted Muslim veils was incompatible with
the right to religious freedom. Raad van State Oct. 14, 2014, No. 228.752, A.209.364/
IX-8089, ¶ 52, http://www.raadvst-consetat.be (BeIg.). Although the Raad van State
ruled that the outcome in this case does not imply that a ban on publicly wearing relig-
ious symbols is in general contrary to religious freedom, it held that the risk of future
disorder, which could justify such a ban, should be substantially present and not only
hypothetical. See Sohail Wahedi, Case no A.209.364/IX-8089, 5 O.J.L.R. 624 (2016).
Similarly, in 2015, the majority of the Bundesverfassungsgericht, the German Federal
Constitutional Court, held that the North Rhine-Westphalia's ban on wearing religious
symbols by school staff was not compatible with Germany's Basic Laws concerning
non-discrimination and the right to freedom of faith. The Court held that an interference
is only justified when there is proof of a concrete threat of public disorder or when the
state's neutrality is in danger. In this case, the ban was not designed to respond to such a
[Vol. 242
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profile" cases,4 which deal with the disputed legality of such contentious
religious manifestations, are legal initiatives taken in some European states
to prohibit the wearing of religious veils such as the Burqa and Niqab.5
Concerning the widely discussed French ban on face-covering veils, the
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) upheld this controversial piece
threat and it therefore constituted a breach of Basic Laws. See Bundesverfassungsger-
icht, BvR 471/10, 1181/10 Jan. 27, 2015. See also Sohail Wahedi, BVerfG 471/10 and
1181/10, 5 O.J.L.R. 368 (2016).
4. Although the cases this article refers to are predominantly European, this does
not mean that the debate on the role of religion in law and politics is exclusively a
European matter. Canadian and United States court rulings involve many cases that can
be seen as equivalents of the European case law on free exercise of religion. See
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby 573 U.S. (2014) (holding that the regulations promulgated by
the Department of Health and Human Services requiring employers to provide their
female employees with no-cost access to contraception, violated the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act); see also Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (holding
that "the Free Exercise Clause permits the State to prohibit sacramental peyote use, and
thus to deny unemployment benefits to persons discharged for such use."); Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (holding that the application of compulsory school-attend-
ance law interfered with other fundamental rights, such as the Free Exercise Clause
under the First Amendment); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (stating that this
case is a prime example of what "government may not do to an individual in violation
of his religious scruples."). Among the Canadian examples of court cases that have
ruled on the meaning and scope of religious freedom are Mouvement laiifue Qudbicois
& Alain Simoneau v. Saguenay [2015] S.C.R. 2 (Can.) (holding that states must not
interfere in religion and beliefs and must remain neutral. The mayor reciting a prayer at
the start and end of each municipal council meeting constitutes a breach of the state's
duty of neutrality) and Multani v. Commission scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys, [2006]
S.C.R. 256 (Can.) (holding that the school board's decision of prohibiting an orthodox
Sikh, whose religion requires him to wear a kirpan (religious object that resembles a
dagger and must be made of metal) infringed the plaintiff's freedom of religion. "This
infringement cannot be justified in a free and democratic society") Id. at 298.
5. See Armin Steinbach, Burqas and Bans: The Wearing of Religious Symbols
Under the European Convention of Human Rights, 4 CAMBRIDGE J. INT'L & COMP. L.
29 (2015); Myriam Hunter-Henin, Why the French Don't Like the Burqa: Larcit, Na-
tional Identity and Religious Freedom, 61 INT'L & Comp. L.Q. 613 (2012); Noemi Gal-
Or, Is the Law Empowering or Patronizing Women? The Dilemma in the French Burqa
Decision as the Tip of the Secular Iceberg, 6 RELIGION & Hum. RTS. 315 (2011);
Reuven Ziegler, The French Headscarves Ban: Intolerance or Necessity, 40 J. MAR-
SHALL L. REV. 235 (2006); see generally MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, THE NEW RELIGIOUS
INTOLERANCE: OVERCOMING THE POLITICS OF FEAR IN AN ANXIOUS AGE (2012); Jill
Marshall, The Legal Recognition of Personality: Full-Face Veils and Permissible
Choices, 10 INT'L J. OF L. IN CONTEXT 64 (2014) (criticizing the so-called Burqa bans).
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of legislation in S.A.S. v. France.6 The Court held that the public interest of
living together in peace exceeds an individual's belief, which prescribes
face-covering veils for women.7 A more recent example of adjustment to
the dominant norms is present in Osmanoklu & Kocabaf v. Switzerland.8 In
this case, the ECtHR held that the Swiss authorities' denial to exempt Mus-
6. S.A.S. v. France, App. No. 43835/11, Eur. Ct. H.R. %% 122, 137-59 (2014).
Although in S.A.S. the ECtHR considered wearing face-covering veils constituted a
manifestation of personal beliefs, it did not rule that the French ban was a violation of
religious freedom. In this fiercely criticized judgment, the Court held that the lack of
consensus among the party states, concerning the legal admissibility of wearing face-
covering veils in public, provides France with broad discretion on what types of norms
are incompatible with basic rules of an open democracy, such as social communication
and the idea of living together in peace. See also Jeffrey A. Brauch, The Margin of
Appreciation and the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights: Threat to
the Rule of Law, 11 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 113, 128 (2005) (describing the margin of
appreciation doctrine of the ECtHR and explaining how consensus among party states
influences the scope of the margin of appreciation party states have).
7. The French tradition of laicitd, which requires a strict separation between relig-
ious and state matters, has made the free exercise of religion a private matter. See Eva
Brems, S.A.S. v. France: A Reality Check, 25 NOrINGHAM L.J. 58 (2016); Hakeem
Yusuf, S.A.S. v France: Supporting Living Together or Forced Assimilation, 3 INT'L
Hum. RTs. L. REV. 277 (2014); Sally Pei, Unveiling Inequality: Burqa Bans and Non-
discrimination Jurisprudence at the European Court of Human Rights, 122 YALE L.J.
1089 (2013) (discussing the court ruling in S.A.S. v. France).
8. Osmanoglu & Kocabaf v. Switzerland, App. No. 29086/12, Eur. Ct. H.R.
(2017). The public call for adjustment to the dominant norms could influence the way
judges balance the interests at stake in a free exercise case. An example in this context
is the way judges have responded to the legality of the religious refusal to shake hands
as a sign of greeting. This contentious religious manifestation was debated extensively
in the Dutch society before reaching the courtrooms. In 2004, the Dutch Minister of
Immigration, Rita Verdonk, was denied a hand shake by an imam (the Islamic prayer
leader). This incident resulted in a heated debate about the acceptability of such behav-
ior with reference to religious freedom. The Minister wrote in response to parliamentary
questions that the refusal to shake hands is contrary to the Dutch standard of greeting
everyone through shaking hands, regardless of gender. See Tweede Kamer der Staten-
Generaal [The House of Representatives], Aanhangsel Handelingen II [Parliamentary
Proceedings II] 2004/2005, at 1457-58 (Neth.). The reasoning judges have used in deal-
ing with cases regarding refusal to shake hands on religious grounds shows analogies
with public opinions that have framed this practice as an act that attests to unequal
gender-treatment. See CRvB 7 May 2009, ECLI:NL:CRVB:2009:BI2440, 11 7.6, 7.10
(Neth.); Hof 's-Gravenhage 10 April 2012, ECLI:NL:GHSR:2012:BW1270, ¶ 13
(Neth.); Elma Drayer, Vrome praatjes [Pious talks], de Volkskrant (Neth.), July 15,
2015, at 2 (qualifying the convictions that shape the religious basis to refuse shaking
hands of the opposite gender as "measly views" that immediately affect the acquired
values within modern societies, such as gender equality).
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lim girls from taking part in mixed-school swimming does not violate the
right to religious freedom. The judges unanimously held that although de-
nial of the exemption request interfered with religious freedom, this inter-
ference was justified in light of the promotion of pupils' integration into
Swiss society.9 In a similar case, a Muslim pupil had asked the Federal
Constitutional Court of Germany, the Bundesverfassungsgericht (BVerfG),
to review a decision of the Federal Administrative Court, the
Bundesverwaltungsgericht (BVerwG). The BVerwG had ruled that the
school authorities' refusal to exempt applicant from joint swimming lessons
did not violate the right to religious freedom.' 0 The BVerfG did not accept
the complaint for adjudication, as the petitioner failed to explain convinc-
ingly why the Burkini could not qualify as a religious alternative for other
swimming clothes." Another typical example in this context is the ongoing
debate in many European countries regarding the legality behind the ritual
slaughtering of animals, such as the Halal and Kosher way of slaughter-
ing. 12 Hence, the recent court rulings are among the many examples of
cases that have challenged the legal admissibility of contentious religious
manifestations in liberal democracies.13
9. See Osmanoglu & Kocabay v. Switzerland, supra note 8, at ¶¶ 95-101 (holding
that a child's interest to assimilate into the Swiss society supersedes religious convic-
tions of parents).
10. See Bundesverfassungsgericht, BvR 3237/13, ¶ II.3.aa, Nov. 7, 2016, http://
www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/DE/2016/11 /rk201611
08_bvr323713.html (holding that the female applicant did not adequately substantiate
her constitutional complaint that her Burkini, which covered her whole body except for
her face, could not be considered an adequate substitute for swimming clothes that are
clearly disallowed by her religion).
11. Id.; See Sohail Wahedi, BVerfG 3237/13, 6 O.J.L.R. 426 (2017).
12. See Aleksandra Gliszczydiska-Grabias & Wojciech Sadurski, The Law of Rit-
ual Slaughter and the Principle of Religious Equality, 4 J.L. RELIGION & ST. 233, 237-
53 (2016) (outlining European approaches to the legal acceptability of ritual slaughter
of animals); Carla M. Zoethout, Ritual Slaughter and the Freedom of Religion: Some
Reflections on a Stunning Matter, 35 Hum. RTs. Q. 651 (2013); Markha Valenta, Plu-
ralist Democracy or Scientistic Monocracy? Debating Ritual Slaughter, 5 ERASMUS L.
REv. 27 (2012) (discussing the Dutch debate on this matter); Jeremy A. Rovinsky, The
Cutting Edge: The Debate over Regulation of Ritual Slaughter in the Western World, 45
CAL. W. INT'L. L.J. 79 (2014); Claudia E. Haupt, Free Exercise of Religion and Animal
Protection: A Comparative Perspective on Ritual Slaughter, 39 GEO. WASH. INT'L. L.
REV. 839 (2007) (discussing European case law on the admissibility of ritual slaughter).
13. With reference to either the lack of integration of migrant groups or by reli-
ance on the central values of "the society" many European politicians have started to
dispute the legal admissibility of a wide range of religious manifestations. As such, in
2014, -French politicians proposed a total ban on Muslim veils in universities referring
to the principles of French secularism. The Austrian parliament passed an "Islam bill"
2017-2018] 5
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Contentious religious manifestations that compete with legal and
majoritarian norms of liberal democracies have given rise to the question
whether "religion" should matter when one is thinking about the creation of
exemptions for particular beliefs and practices.1 4 Hence, the conflict of
norms that is present in contentious religious manifestation cases opens a
discussion about accommodation,' 5 which in this context deals with the
to prohibit Islamic organizations from receiving foreign funding. The bill has been
presented to be an effective tool to prevent Muslim radicalization. The Swiss referen-
dum on minarets and proposed or actual bans in various countries on ritual slaughter,
ritual male circumcision and different types of religious dress codes are among the other
examples of cases that have been regularly subjected to public debate. See RONALD
DWORKIN, RELIGION WITHOUT GOD, 145 (2013) (arguing against the Swiss minarets
referendum using a critical-normative theory). See also LABORDE, supra note 1, at 33
(doubting that majoritarian biases against contentious religious manifestations draw on
a "liberal philosophical bias in favor of belief-based and voluntarily chosen religious
practices.").
14. This article does not aim to provide an exhaustive description of religion.
Rather, it aims to theorize the way liberal political philosophers have conceptualized
religion for legal and political purposes. This approach fits C6cile Laborde's recent call
that legal theorists and political philosophers do not need "a semantic or a descriptive
notion of religion but, rather, an interpretive one." See LABORDE, supra note 1, at 1-3
(arguing that although "religion" has played a very important role in the development of
liberal political philosophy through the history, it has remained an "under-theorized"
concept). See also Lael Daniel Weinberger, Religion Undefined: Competing
Frameworks for Understanding Religion in the Establishment Clause, 86 U. DET.
MERCY L. REV. 735 (2009) (presenting two definition frameworks for "religion" and
discussing their relevance for the First Amendment's non-establishment clause). See
LABORDE, supra note 1 (elaborating on the role of religion in liberal political philoso-
phy). See also Yossi Nehushtan who has rightly pointed out: "[t]he central question is
whether the fact that religion is special in certain aspects justifies affording it a special
weight as a reason to grant or to refuse to grant a conscientious exemption." Yossi
Nehushtan, Religious Conscientious Exemptions, 30 L. & PHIL. 143, 149 (2011); Cf.
Paul B. Cliteur, Tolerantie en Theoterrorisme [Tolerance and Theoterrorism], in FRANS
KRAP & WILLEM SINNINGHE DAMSTE (EDS.), OVER TOLERANTIE GESPROKEN [SPEAK-
ING OF TOLERANCE] 157, 167-69 (2016) (criticizing the state of affairs in liberal democ-
racies by claiming that there is a "lack of tolerance." Radicalized religious people who
use violence, are intolerant towards social plurality. As such, they do not tolerate un-
pleasant messages about their Gods and prophets. On the other hand, there is "too much
tolerance," as liberal democracies do not take serious steps to prevent radicalization of
certain religious groups).
15. Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion: An Update and a Re-
sponse to the Critics, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV., 685, 686 (1992). A quick scan of the
scholarly debate about the "specialness of religion" informs us that liberal political phi-
losophers and legal theorists rely on legal judgments and public debates to develop
normative arguments that are meant to answer the question what the legal definition of
[Vol. 246
77
Abstraction from the Religious Dimension
possibility, feasibility and desirability of creating special exemptions for the
beliefs, practices and traditions of some citizens. 16 In the liberal and non-
sectarian,' 7 meaning, non-religious theories of religious freedom,'8 the
question of religious accommodation is put under critical scrutiny by legal
theorists and liberal political philosophers.1 9 As such, these scholars have
either challenged or defended the constitutional value of religion: the spe-
cial legal solicitude for religion.20 An essential part of the religious accom-
religion and religious freedom should be. Thus, the broad public debate on religious
manifestations has an indispensable heuristic value for the scholarly debate about the
role of religion in law and politics. See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY OF CON-
SCIENCE 348 (2008).
16. Cf Andrew Koppelman, Is it Fair to Give Religion Special Treatment?, 2006
U. ILL. L. REV. 571, 603 (2006) (believing that balancing the interests, which are prima-
rily at stake when religious norms are at odds with public rules, should be related to the
specific context of a particular case: it is not possible to provide a balancing formula).
The best we can do is to show that we have explicitly thought about the problem of
justice. One potential way to do so is to introduce a system that is focused on the
question of religious exemptions. Koppelman says that due to the impossibility to "pro-
tect all deeply valuable concerns, more specific rules are necessary. Accommodation of
religion is one of these." Id.
17. The term "sectarian" has a functional meaning in the literature on the role of
religion in law and politics. It conceptualizes theories using religious arguments (secta-
rian) to justify the special legal solicitude towards religion.
18. Generally, sectarian theories of religious freedom justify the legal protection
of free exercise with an appeal to the distinct value of religion. See Michael W. McCon-
nell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 Sue. CT. REv. 1, 15 (1985) (arguing that the
liberal state is not able to exclude ultimately the possibility that religious claims might
be true, which means that the transcendental authority of such claims has more value
than the claims of the state). McConnell states the following:
If there is a God, His authority necessarily transcends the authority of nations ....
For the state to maintain that its authority is in all matters supreme would be to
deny the possibility that a [transcendent] authority could exist. Religious claims
thus differ from secular moral claims both because the state is constitutionally
disabled from disputing the truth of the religious claim and because it cannot cate-
gorically deny the authority on which such a claim rests.
McConnell continued to defend this line in recent publications. See generally, Michael
W. McConnell, Why Protect Religious Freedom?, 123 YALE L.J. 770, 786-89 (2013);
Cf also Rafael Domingo, A New Global Paradigm for Religious Freedom, 56 J.
CHURCH & ST. 427, 432 (2014) (defending a similar argument); see also Lund, supra
note 1, at 490 (providing an overview of and discussing some of the religious arguments
in favor of religious freedom).
19. See generally CECILE LABORDE & AUR LIA BARDON, RELIGION IN LIBERAL
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY (2017).
20. See C6cile Laborde, Religion in the Law: The Disaggregation Approach, 34
LAW & PHIL. 581 (2015), for the theoretical distinction between sectarian and liberal
72017-2018]
78
BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW
modation debate has been marked by the following two questions:
accommodation for whom and for what reasons? 2 1 These are the two-al-
though roughly formulated-questions legal theorists and liberal political
philosophers focus on to reflect on the normative foundations of toleration
for and protection of religious beliefs and practices in liberal democracies. 22
This article argues that the scholarly debate in legal theory and liberal
political philosophy about the role of religion in law and politics has been
dominated by the following normative question: should liberal democracies
care about religion qua religion for the public justification of decisions
taken in law and politics? 23 This article consists of three substantive parts
and it focuses on the question whether the law in liberal democracies should
care about religion qua religion. In other words: does religion qua religion
deserve special legal protection?
To answer this question, Part I develops a conceptual framework of
normative positions, each theorizing a particular approach to religion in law
and religious claims for exemptions from general laws. 24 This Part elabo-
theories of religious freedom. Cf. Nehushtan, supra note 14, at 145-50. Nehushtan,
whose work is concerned with the liberal discussion of granting exemptions, speaks of
functionalist pro-religious approaches to deal with religious claims for exemptions from
general laws. See also Michael J. Perry, From Religious Freedom to Moral Freedom,
47 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 993, 996 (2010) (introducing and discussing the right to moral
freedom as an extended version of the rights to religious freedom and arguing that this
broadening is justified in light of the ecumenical and non-sectarian account of moral
freedom).
21. These two questions are helpful to deal in a more systematic way with the
controversies that arise out of free exercise. Brian Leiter compares an orthodox Sikh
boy to a Sikh boy from a traditional family. Both want to wear a dagger: the orthodox
Sikh boy for religious purposes (he wants to wear a kirpan, a religious object made of
metal that resembles a dagger) and the other boy for reasons of tradition. BRIAN LEITER,
WHY TOLERATE RELIGION? 1 (2013). This case questions what the justification would
be to treat the two differently. That is to say, Leiter asks, "[w]hy the state should have
to tolerate exemptions from generally applicable laws when they conflict with religious
obligations but not with any other equally serious obligations of conscience." Id. at 3.
22. See Micah Schwartzman, Religion, Equality and Anarchy, in CECILE LABORDE
& AURtLIA BARDON (EDS.), RELIGION IN LIBERAL POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 15 (2017)
(arguing that the current debate in liberal political philosophy about the role of religion
in law and politics consists of two more specific debates on the role of religion for the
purpose of state actions (public justification debate) and its relevance for granting ex-
emptions (the religious accommodation debate) to certain groups in society).
23. See id.
24. The concepts introduced and discussed in Part I stand for different theoretical
frameworks present in the liberal theories of religious freedom that include arguments
concerning the way liberal democracies could deal with religion in law and religious
claims for exemptions from laws. This way of conceptualizing extant liberal approaches
8 [Vol. 24
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rates on the body of arguments that has been developed by scholars in legal
theory and liberal political philosophy, to discuss the special legal solicitude
for religion. These influential liberal approaches are classified into rejec-
tion; substitution; generalization; equation and representation. This classi-
fication of extant liberal theories might look "oversimplified," but it is a
useful method to bring positions that use similar arguments under the same
category. 25
Part II draws on the framework of normative positions to answer the
question whether religion qua religion deserves special protection in law.
This Part provides a threefold answer to this question. First, it provides an
overview of the arguments that suggest why religion definitely does not
require special legal protection qua religion. Second, it provides insight into
the arguments used to claim that religion does not necessarily require spe-
cial legal protection. Third, it draws attention to some arguments that ex-
plain why religion qua religion deserves special protection. This threefold
response is used to introduce the synthesis of the normative positions that
are conceptualized in this article. This synthesis is called abstraction from.
the religious dimension.
The synthesis of the normative positions is further disentangled in Part
IHl, which claims that abstraction from the religious dimension is the bind-
ing characteristic of the normative framework developed in this article. This
Part explains how abstraction dismisses the special legal protection of relig-
ion qua religion and argues that abstraction renounces arguments justifying
religious freedom with an appeal to distinctly religious values. In addition,
it explains how abstraction draws on a general framework of values to jus-
tify free exercise. The main argument of this Part is that abstraction stands
for a non-sectarian and religion-empty understanding of religious freedom:
free from distinctly religious values, though not hostile to religion.26
towards the role religion could have for legal and political purposes elaborates on C&
cile Laborde's discussion of the substitution and proxy approaches. See Laborde, supra
note 20, at 583.
25. See Schwartzman, supra note 22 at 16 (explaining how the development of a
general theory about the role of religion for legal and political purposes helps to identify
the inconsistencies that are present in both, public justification theories and religious
accommodation theories). See also Smith, supra note, I at 1568 (criticizing the wave of
generalization in the scholarly debate about religious freedom).
26. Although the main purpose of this article is to introduce abstraction without
having a normative judgment about this binding feature of the liberal theories of relig-
ious freedom, the framework of argumentation patterns provides an appropriate base to
reflect critically on the contemporary direction of the law and religion debate in legal
theory and liberal political philosophy. See Michael W. McConnell, Why Protect Relig-
2017-2018] 9
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The main conclusion of this article is that the liberal theories of relig-
ious freedom have one important commonality: abstraction from the relig-
ious dimension. The central message of this shared feature is that for the
legal analysis of religious freedom or a clear case of religious manifesta-
tion, it is not possible, nor necessary to describe or understand the case at
stake in distinctly religious terms. Thus, abstraction covers and connects
arguments that oppose to justify the special legal protection of religious
freedom, religious beliefs and practices in light of any presumed religious
value. The argument is that liberal theories of religious freedom do not need
to value, understand or engage in a semantic discussion about "religion" to
talk about religious freedom. Abstraction also covers the normative re-
sponse to the question: should the law in a liberal democracy care about
religion, because it is religion? Allegedly, religious toleration should not
take place due to any distinctly religious value. Rather, a broader and less
specific (meaning in this context sectarian) framework of values should be
used to justify and explain free exercise of religion in liberal democracies. 27
I. THEORETICAL REFLECTIONS ON LAW AND RELIGION
What do current debates in legal theory and liberal political philosophy
tell us about the way modem liberal democracies interpret, value, protect
and thus deal with religious freedom? To answer this question, we must
focus on a broad set of religious freedom theories. The main distinction that
has been made in the literature on the role of religion for granting exemp-
tions and justifying decisions in law and politics concerns the one between
ious Freedom?, 10 CHRISTIAN L. 15 (2014) (warning of the "new whiff of intolerance"
towards religious freedom as a "bedrock value" of constitutional democracies).
27. The main research method of this article is a conceptual meta-analysis of posi-
tions defended in the "specialness-debate" of religion, with a particular focus on the
liberal theories of religious freedom. To identify the binding characteristic of the nor-
mative positions, this article has developed a matrix of positions. This matrix focuses on
the arguments developed to deal with the question whether religion qua religion needs
special legal protection. Based on the commonalities between the arguments present in
the liberal theories of religious freedom, the approaches are conceptualized and classi-
fied as rejection; substitution; generalization; equation and representation. This classi-
fication of positions is an appropriate method to develop a normative legal-
philosophical framework that theorizes the main claim of this article: abstraction from
the religious dimension as the binding characteristic of the liberal theories of religious
freedom. See also Schwartzman, supra note 22, at 28 (explaining how building up a
theory in a systematic way sharpens our mind to see the inconsistencies in the existing
body of knowledge).
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liberal and sectarian theories of religious freedom. 2 8 As such, sectarian the-
ories justify the special legal solicitude towards religion with an appeal to
some values that are presented as distinctly religious, 29 although this privi-
lege is usually limited to some officially recognized religions. 30 This Part
28. See LABORDE & BARDON, supra note 19, at 2-4 (explaining that the discussion
about religion in law is a sub-theme of the broader debate among liberal political phi-
losophers and legal theorists about the relationship between religion and the liberal
state); Schwartzman, supra note 22, at 15. See also Laborde, supra note 20, at 582
(explaining the distinction between liberal and sectarian theories of religious freedom
and arguing that the transcendental value of religion does not justify religious freedom).
The paradigmatic distinction between sectarian and liberal theories of religious freedom
is present within the paradigm of "religion" in liberal political philosophy. Therefore,
there are non-liberal, non-sectarian theories of religious freedom, such as communist
theories. See Paul B. Anderson, Religious Liberty under Communism, 6 J. CHURCH 
&
ST. 169 (1964). Also, there are hybrid theories of religious freedom, using a mixture of
liberal and sectarian arguments to justify religious freedom and the legality of certair
religious manifestation. Cf the Israeli approach to religious freedom. See Donna E.
Arzt, Religious Freedom in a Religious State: The Case of Israel in Comparative Con-
stitutional Perspective, 9 Wis. INT'L L.J. 1 (1990).
29. DAVID NOVAK, IN DEFENSE OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 116, 117 (2009) (using a
transcendental argument to justify the special legal protection of religion). See also
RAFAEL DOMINGO, GOD AND THE SECULAR LEGAL SYSTEM 79, 80-82 (2016) (consider-
ing the "protection of suprarationality" as the "ultimate justification" for protecting re-
ligion qua religion); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Priority of God: A Theory of
Religious Liberty, 39 PEPP. L. REv. 1159, 1183 (2013); JOHN H. GARVEY, WHAT ARE
FREEDOMs FOR? 57 (1996) (claiming that within the context of U.S. constitutional law,
the "split-level character" could only be clarified in light of an exclusive "religious
justification" of religious freedom).
30. Cf The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran that contains a sectarian
explanation of "religious freedom." Articles 12 and 13 of the Constitution exhaustively
enumerate religions that are allowed to practice their faiths within the legal framework
of the Islamic Republic. The "recognized" religions include Zoroastrianism, Judaism
and Christianity. The Shia Jafari school of beliefs is the "eternally immutable" state's
religion. See QANUNI AsSASSI JUMHURIT ISLAMAI IRAN [THE CONSTITUTION OF THE IS-
LAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN] (1980) (IRAN), http://www.divan-edalat.ir/show.php?page=
base, (translation) (last visited Apr. 3, 2018) http://www.alaviandassociates.com/docu
ments/constitution.pdf. Sectarian theories of religious freedom are also advocated
outside theocracies. The Dutch orthodox Christian political party, Staatkundig Ger-
eformeerde Partij [The Dutch Reformed Political Party] ("SGP") recently argued for a
sectarian explanation of religious freedom. In their manifest, the SGP defends the argu-
ment that the state should make a distinction between religions that have shaped the
Dutch tradition (including Christianity and Judaism and excluding Islam), to preserve
the Judeo-Christian character of the Dutch culture and society. SGP, Islam in Nederland
[Islam in the Netherlands] 3, 4 (2017), https://www.sgp.nl/actueel/manifest-islam-in
nederland/6125 (last visited Apr. 3, 2018).
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develops a conceptual framework of normative approaches to religion in
law. 3 1 This framework classifies the liberal positions into five categories.
First, principled rejection of arguments that justify the special legal protec-
tion of religion with an appeal to values that are presented as distinctly
religious. Rejection also involves arguments that reject to qualify specific
beliefs or manifestations as religious. Second, substitution that consists of
arguments explaining why religion is a subset of a broader human faculty,
namely conscience. Substitution also covers arguments that say religious
freedom has no distinct constitutional value, as other liberties, such as the
freedom of expression and association in combination with the right to non-
discrimination, in practice could guarantee free exercise of religion. Third,
generalization that opposes a sectarian interpretation of religion and relig-
ious freedom, arguing that religion stands for deep ethical commitments of
human beings and that religious freedom is the general right that gives
human beings access to ethical independence and moral freedom. Fourth,
equation, which says that equality of treatment should be the norm when
authorities are dealing with deep commitments of human beings who ask
for exemptions from the application of general laws. Fifth, representation,
which justifies the special legal protection of religion in light of values that
are not necessarily religious in nature. Religion represents in this position
certain values that let human beings flourish and this particular argument
justifies the special legal protection of religion.32
A. Rejection
The rejectionist position rejects arguments that justify religious free-
dom with an appeal to values that are considered distinctly religious. This
position consists of two broader categories: principled rejection and non-
principled rejection. Non-principled rejection claims that the concept of re-
ligion does not apply to certain beliefs, traditions or manifestations. 33 How-
ever, non-principled rejection does not exclude the option to use the term
"religion" to consider other manifestations as religious for reasons of con-
31. The term "principled" used to discuss the sub-categories of rejection and sub-
stitution does not refer to Ronald Dworkin's principles. Rather, the term is meant to
indicate that the principled sub-categories provide a deeper philosophical justification
for the argumentation pattern they defend. See generally DWORKIN, supra note 13.
32. The focus is on the appropriate interpretation of "the notion of religion in law
(regardless of whether the category of freedom of religion is upheld or not)." Laborde,
supra note 20, at 594.
33. See generally Amos N. GUIORA, FREEDOM FROM RELIGION 19 (2009); Wibren
van der Burg, Beliefs, Persons and Practices: Beyond Tolerance, 1 ETHICAL THEORY 
&
MORAL PRAC. 227, 233 (1998) (using a similar typology to discuss religious toleration).
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sensus and tradition. Thus, it preserves the term "religion" for particular
religions and excludes other religions, as those do not fall under the specific
definition of "religion." The appropriate example is the rhetorical approach
that is present in the political discourse to consider Islam not a religion, but
rather a totalitarian ideology with a closed internal system of rules that pre-
scribe in detail how one should live a life. Against this backdrop, it has
been argued that practices and beliefs that are based on Islam should not
have access to the privileges of religious freedom. 34 Principled rejection
draws primarily on the idea that there are no reasons, which could be con-
sidered principled, to tolerate religion qua religion within liberal
democracies."
1. Principled Rejection
The principled rejectionist position rejects, for principled reasons, to
tolerate religion qua religion. This position starts from the question what
the philosophical notion of pure toleration (i.e. toleration on principled,
grounds) says about the justification of the special legal protection of relig-
ion qua religion. Thus, it wonders whether the concept of toleration pro-
vides any room for arguments that justify religious toleration because of
any specialness of religion (i.e. distinctly religious values). This sub-posi-
tion defines pure toleration as the situation in which the dominant group
sees on moral or epistemic grounds a reason to allow (meaning tolerate on
principled grounds) another group of citizens to continue with manifesta-
tions that are considered objectionable by the dominant group. Principled
rejection draws on this particular definition of toleration and concludes that
the principle of toleration does not require special legal protection for relig-
ion qua religion.3 6
34. See infra Part II.
35. LEITER, supra note 21, at 7, 55, 67; see also Schwartzman, supra note 22, at
22; Kenneth Einar Himma, An Unjust Dogma: Why a Special Right to Religion
Wrongly Discriminates against Non-Religious Worldviews, 54 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 217
(2017); C6cile Laborde, Conclusion: Is Religion Special?, in JEAN LOUISE COHEN 
&
CECILE LABORDE (EDS.), RELIGION, SECULARISM, AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY
423 (2016); DWORKIN, supra note 13, at 111, 144; NUSSBAUM, supra note 15, at 164;
WINNIFRED FALLERS SULLIVAN, THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 138
(2005); James Nickel, Who Needs Freedom of Religion?, 76 U. COLo. L. REV. 941, 943
(2005); Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, The Vulnerability of Con-
science: The Constitutional Basis for Protecting Religious Conduct, 61 U. CHI. L. REV.
1245, 1248 (1994).
36. Toleration can be justified on two grounds: moral or epistemic grounds. Brian
Leiter concludes that there is nothing special, in terms of morality or epistemology, to
warrant toleration of religion qua religion. LEITER, supra note 21, at 7-13; see LORENZO
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The principled rejectionist questions whether one can identify more
principled reasons, i.e. reasons that find their origins in morality or episte-
mology that could justify a toleration regime for religion qua religion. To
answer this question, the principled rejectionist position makes a distinction
between two potentially distinctive characteristics of religion: "the cat-
egoricity of religious commands" and "insulation of religious beliefs from
evidence and reason."3 7 This particular feature is closely related to the argu-
ment that religious beliefs might be distinctive, due to their involvement in
a "metaphysics of ultimate reality." 38
a. No moral grounds to tolerate religion qua religion
According to the principled rejectionist position, the moral reasons for
toleration only justify the special legal protection of human conscience.
This moral justification of liberty of conscience does not simultaneously
single out religion and its categoricity of commands for special legal protec-
tion. Thus, no evidence could support the argument that people in the Rawl-
sian "original position" will opt for religious freedom, next to equal liberty
of conscience. 39 Hence, the emphasis on the need for liberty of conscience
does not make a distinction between the backgrounds of conscientious com-
mands: it does not single out religion.40 Leiter explains this argument as
follows: "Rawls repeatedly lumps religious and moral categoricity to-
gether, so that it is fair to say that the only thing individuals behind the veil
of ignorance know is that they will accept some categorical demands, not
they will accept distinctively religious ones, that is, ones whose grounding
is a matter of faith." 4 1 Similarly, the utilitarian moral arguments for tolera-
ZUCCA, A SECULAR EUROPE: LAw AND RELIGION IN THE EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LANDSCAPE 8, n. 17 (2012) (providing a broader definition of toleration).
37. LEITER, supra note 21, at 33-34.
38. Id. at 47. See also NUSSBAUM, supra note 15, at 168.
39. Rawlsian morality arguments in favor of toleration states that people in the
original position, when they perform behind the "veil of ignorance," will definitely
accept some categorical demands, though these are not of a religious nature per se. In
other words, this ground of toleration does not provide a principled argument to tolerate
"religion qua religion." See generally LEITER, supra note 21, at 55.
40. See Simon Cibulea May, Exemptions for Conscience, in CECILE LABORDE 
&
AURALIA BARDON (EDS.), RELIGION IN LIBERAL POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 191 (2017) (ar-
guing that accommodation of sincere conscientious objections to generally applicable
laws face the same criticism of unfair treatment as religious accommodation does).
41. LEITER, supra note 21, at 55; See Andrew Koppelman, A Rawlsian Defence of
Special Treatment for Religion, in CECILE LABORDE & AUR LIA BARDON (EDS.), RELIG-
ION IN LIBERAL POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 31 (2017) (presenting some Rawlsian argu-
ments in defense of religious freedom).
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tion, which focus on the maximization of human well-being that, among
others, depends on the ability of people to live by their conscience, do not
prescribe special protection of religion. Therefore, toleration on moral
grounds does not support the arguments that aim to single out religion as a
matter of principled toleration. 4 2
b. No epistemic grounds to tolerate religion qua religion
The other principled ground for toleration that has been found in the
epistemic, Millian arguments, draws on the relevance of principled tolera-
tion for knowledge expansion. This principled ground seems to be at odds
with the second potentially distinctive feature of religion: insulation of re-
ligious beliefs from evidence and reason. 43 As Leiter argues, it is far from
obvious "to think, after all, that tolerating the expression of beliefs that are
insulated from evidence and reasons-that is, insulated from epistemically
relevant considerations-will promote knowledge of the truth." 4 4 Although
this argument does not say anything about the relevance of religious mani-
festations for knowledge expansion, it is conceivable to say that principled
rejection equally rejects arguments that aim to justify on epistemic grounds
toleration for religious conduct, because of religion. The argument at this
point is that, after all, there is no reason to deny that religious practices are,
like religious beliefs, equally insulated from evidence.
c. Conclusion
The principled rejectionist position claims that there are no principled
reasons (i.e. reasons that are grounded in morality or epistemology) to toler-
ate religion in law qua religion.45 Principled toleration only requires equal
protection of liberty of conscience and it does not require, on the same
principled grounds, the special protection of religion. Toleration of con-
science via liberty of conscience also provides protection to religious con-
42. LEITER, supra note 21, at 55, 61.
43. Leiter argues that reliance on Mill's perspective on what is "true for the right
reasons" will not make a strong case to tolerate religion qua religion for epistemic
reasons; religious faith excludes the idea that there might be some uncovered truth. Id.
at 58.
44. Id. at 55-56.
45. See also Kimberley Brownlee, Is Religious Conviction Special?, in CECILE
LABORDE & AURELIA BARDON (EDS.), RELIGION IN LIBERAL POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY
309 (2017) (arguing that religious convictions cannot be singled out for special legal
treatment on moral or epistemic grounds and that religious and non-religious moral
convictions that are protection-worthy should receive the same amount of protection, if
they meet certain conditions).
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science. There is no principled reason to make a legal distinction between
human conscience in general and religious conscience in particular.46 This
position results in the conclusion that a distinct protection of religious
claims of conscience is undesirable for principled reasons. Thus, no moral
reason could justify a legal regime that only grants exemptions to religious
claims of conscience. As Leiter says: "a selective application to the con-
science of only religious believers is not morally defensible." 4 7
2. Non-Principled Rejection
Non-principled rejection rejects the qualification of certain beliefs,
speeches or conducts as religious and it is mainly present in the political
and legal discourse. As such, one can refer to the political approach of the
Dutch right-wing party, Partif voor de Vrijheid, the Party for Freedom, to-
wards Islam. 4 8 This political party has repeatedly argued that Islam is not a
religion, but a totalitarian ideology that should not have access to the privi-
leges of religious freedom. 4 9 Consequently, it has proposed an immigration
ban from Islamic countries, the legal prohibition of the Koran and the clo-
sure of all mosques and Islamic schools in the Netherlands.5 o Non-princi-
pled rejection in the legal discourse occurs when someone asks for
permission to perform a practice that is portrayed as religious but not appar-
ently allowed by authorities. In some of these cases that deal with the legal
admissibility of norm-deviant practices, the court or other parties involved,
refuse to say that the practice at stake has, at least potentially, a religious
dimension.
As such, the Dutch Nijmegen municipality did not allow a Pastafarian
female, a follower of the Church of the Flying Spaghetti Monster, to keep a
pasta strainer on her head for her driver's license photograph.51 According
to the authorities, this Church does not belong to any religion.52 It is rather a
parody of religion and its manifestations are expressions of the freedom of
speech.53 Among other examples of Dutch court cases that contain argu-
46. Religion is a subset of the human conscience. Therefore, its free exercise
should be protected through liberty of conscience.
47. LEITER, supra note 21, at 133. See also Himma, supra note 35, at 219.
48. Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal [The House of Representatives], Aan-
hangsel Handelingen II [Parliamentary Proceedings II], 2016/2017, at 2-6-61 and 2-6-
62 (Neth.).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Rb. Gelderland 17 January 2017, ECLI:NL:RBGEL:2017:275, ¶ 6 (Neth.).
52. Id.
53. Id.
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ments that fall under the scope of non-principled rejection, one could refer
to tax exemption litigations of the Scientology Church 54 and the Church of
Satan case.55
B. Subsitution
The substitution position claims that both religion and religious free-
dom have adequate substitutes. 56 As the rejectionist position, substitution
consists of principled substitution and non-principled substitution. 57 The
sub-category of principled substitution draws on arguments that say religion
is a subset of a particular faculty that is worthy of special legal protection.
This protection-worthy faculty concerns human conscience. 8 The argument
is that free exercise of religion and the admissibility of religious claims for
exemptions could be adequately ensured via freedom of conscience. 59 Non-
principled substitution says that basic liberties, such as the right to free
54. Hof. Den Haag 21 October 2015, ECLI:NL:GHDHA:2015:2875, [ 8.16 (hold-
ing that the activities of the Scientology Church-in particular, Auditing and Train-
ing-are commercial in nature and not religious, serving primarily private interests.
Thus, the Church is being ineligible for tax exemptions).
55. The case of Saint-Walburga, which focused on sisters forming the Church of
Satan, turned on the question whether a brothel could be considered a religious institu-
tion. HR 31 October 1986, ECLI:NL:HR:1986:AC9553 (Neth.); Cf Religion Based on
Sex Gets a Judicial Review, N.Y. TIMES, http://www.nytimes.com/1990/05/02/us/re-
ligion-based-on-sex-gets-a-judicial-review.html (last visited March 3, 2018) (discussing
a case in which a couple charged for pimping and prostitution claimed that the activities
that took place in the Church were part of their sacred religion).
56. See generally Laborde, supra note 1; Michah Schwartzman, Religion as a Le-
gal Proxy, 51 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1085, 1099 (2014) (discussing the "substitution"
position).
57. The philosophical grounding for principled substitution clarifies the distinc-
tion: see supra note 31 (explaining the relevance of the terms principled v. non-princi-
pled in the conceptual framework this article has developed).
58. This article will not engage in the discussion about the different conceptions of
conscience, nor will it discuss the argument that there is a difference between human
conscience and religious conscience. See Lund, supra note 1, at 503, 504. For the argu-
ment that this article aims to develop, it is sufficient to indicate that some liberal theo-
rists of religious freedom argue that religion and religious freedom have certain
substitutes.
59. See JOCELYN MACLURE & CHARLES TAYLOR, SECULARISM AND FREEDOM OF
CONSCIENCE 89 (2011) (arguing that given "the context of contemporary societies
marked by moral and religious diversity, it is not religious convictions in themselves
that must enjoy a special status but rather, all core beliefs that allow individuals to
structure their moral identity."). See also LABORDE, supra note 1, at 66, 67 (critical of
the position defended by Jocelyn Maclure and Charles Taylor).
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speech and the freedom of association, in conjunction with non-discrimina-
tion and some security rights, such as the general ban on rape and murder,
are in practice enough to guarantee the free exercise of religion. Thus, as
Nickel has rightly asked: "who needs freedom of religion," when this right
turns out to be superfluous? 60
1. Principled Subsitution
Principled substitution says that religion is a subset of a broader pro-
tection-worthy category, the conscience. 61 With reference to the work of
Roger Williams, Nussbaum argues:
The faculty with which each person searches for the ultimate
meaning of life is of intrinsic worth and value, and is worthy of re-
spect whether the person is using it well or badly. The faculty is iden-
tified in part by what it does-it reasons, searches, and experiences
emotions of longing connected to that search-and in part by its sub-
ject matter-it deals with ultimate questions, questions of ultimate
meaning. It is the faculty, not its goal, that is the basis of political
respect, and thus we can agree to respect the faculty without prejudic-
ing the question whether there is a meaning to be found, or what it
might be like. From the respect we have for the person's conscience,
that faculty of inquiring and searching, it follows that we ought to
respect the space required by any activity that has the general shape
of searching for the ultimate meaning of life, except when that search
violates the right of others or comes up against some compelling state
interest.62
According to Nussbaum, this way of reasoning helps us "to make
sense of our feeling that there really is something about religion or quasi-
religion that calls for special protection and delicacy." 63 And this protec-
60. Nickel, supra note 35, at 943.
61. See also Koppelman, supra note 41, at 38 (rejecting the claim that religion is a
subset of human conscience and arguing that the latter "is at best a complement, not a
substitute, for teleologically loaded terms such as religion.").
62. NUSSBAUM, supra note 15, at 168-69. Nussbaum's conception of religion as a
protection-worthy sub-category of human conscience fits her work developing a univer-
sally applicable framework for social justice. Nussbaum's normative framework-
which is closely linked to political liberalism-elaborates on Aristotelian Essentialism
and focuses on identifying the main characteristics of a human life. See Martha C.
Nussbaum, Human Functioning and Social Justice. In Defense of Aristotelian Essen-
tialism, 30 POL. THEORY 202 (1992).
63. See NUSSBAUM, supra note 15, at 169 (arguing that the search for meaningful
answers to ultimate questions of life helps us to keep our special solicitude for religion,
as a matter of respect for a broader human faculty, separated from "silly" faculties. That
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tion-worthy "something" is the human conscience, which is part of the ina-
lienable dignity people possess, regardless of their educational background,
the state of richness, health, religiosity and so on.64 Thus, no principled
reason to single out religion because it is religion, but a principled argument
to justify the special protection of a broad liberty of conscience that encom-
passes and protects the religious conscience as a matter of respect for
human dignity. 6 5 Therefore, the reason as to why religious claims for ex-
emptions are sometimes granted is "because they involve matters of con-
science, not matters of religion." 66
2. Non-Principled Subsitution
The purport of non-principled substitution is that the right application
of the existing framework of basic liberties, such as the freedom of speech
and association, in combination with rights that prohibit discrimination and
violence, makes a separate right to religious freedom fairly unnecessary. 67
In other words: freedom of religion has, not to say many, but at least some
very "adequate substitute[s]." 68 Arguments that support the replacement of
religious freedom consider this right "dispensable," 69 as other basic liberties
ensure the free exercise of religion. The argument suggests that religious
manifestations in the core cover a broad range of areas people are involved
in, such as business, politics and association. Hence, free exercise of relig-
ion could be seen as a derivate of other basic liberties. Non-principled sub-
stitution understands religious freedom in light of the argument "that the
sorts of activities it involves are covered by the most important general
liberties." 70 However, the argument that says "we can adequately enumerate
is to say, "faculties used by my car lover, who isn't engaged in a search for meaning, or
the person who feels called to dress like a chicken when going to work, which is (proba-
bly) just too silly to count as a genuine search for meaning.").
64. Id.
65. Id. at 164-74; see also NUSSBAUM, supra note 5, at 61-66; Cf LEITER, supra
note 21 (discussing the line that liberty of conscience is an appropriate substitute for
religious freedom). In the theoretical framework that Leiter uses to develop his argu-
ment, principled substitution arises out of what the liberal concept of toleration consid-
ers protection-worthy for principled reasons: equal liberty of conscience.
66. LEITER, supra note 21, at 64.
67. See Nickel, supra note 35, for a further discussion of this position; see also
Mark Tushnet, Redundant of Free Exercise Clause?, 33 Loy. U. Cm. L. J. 71, 73, 94
(2001).
68. Tushnet, supra note 67, at 94.
69. Nickel, supra note 35, at 941.
70. Id. at 950.
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the basic liberties without referring to religion" 7' and that this will ensure
the free exercise of religion, has consequences for the question as to how
we should understand religious freedom.
As such, non-principled substitution expects that the idea that religious
freedom rests on the same basics like other basic liberties will gain ground.
Thus, there is no reason to think that religion is something unique that could
justify the protection of religion qua religion. Also, the expectation is that
understanding the need for the free exercise of religion in light of the ex-
isting set of basic liberties could help to eliminate the idea that religious
beliefs are privileged in society. Therefore, the granted exemptions are the
outcome of a right application of basic liberties and not due to the presumed
distinct value of religious beliefs. Finally, the emphasis on the protection of
religious beliefs via the application of basic liberties ensures that people
have a real choice to engage in or disapprove certain convictions. 72
C. Generalization
Generalization advocates a broader, ecumenical and non-sectarian def-
inition of religion and religious freedom. Against this normative backdrop,
it defends the position that religious freedom should not be considered a
special right-such as the right to freedom of speech-protecting only a
selected group of people: the believers, but rather a general right to ethical
and moral independence. 73 This position is ecumenical for the reason that it
looks beyond the sectarian, meaning theistic account of religion and it is
non-sectarian for the reason that it does not make a distinction between
theistic and non-theistic convictions about the good. 74
Generalization looks for reasons of liberal neutrality beyond the nar-
row, theistic conception of "religion." The argument is that God-believers
and non-believers could be seen as "religious," as both could have the same
deep feelings about fundamental questions.75 The generalist position sees in
the deep commitment that religious and non-religious people share an "in-
trinsic and inescapable ethical responsibility" to succeed in life.7 6 Therefore,
71. Id. at 943.
72. Id. at 943-51.
73. DWORKIN, supra note 13, at 132 (discussing religious freedom as a general
right to ethical independence); see also Perry, supra note 20, at 996 (stating how broad-
ening religious freedom will encompass moral freedom).
74. Perry, supra note 20, at 996; see Roland Pierik & Wibren van der Burg, What
is Neutrality?, 27 RATIO JURIs 496, 507 (2014).
75. DWORKIN, supra note 13, at 5.
76. Id. at 114. I am grateful to M. Christian Green who came up with the sugges-
tion to look at Paul Tillich's idea of "ultimate concerns" used by scholars to interpret
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this position says that religious freedom should be considered the general
right to ethical independence that opens the doors to moral freedom. Dwor-
kin states:
Ethical independence, that is, stops government from restricting
freedom only for certain reasons and not for others. Special rights, on
the other hand, place much more powerful and general constraints on
government. Freedom of speech is a special right: government may
not infringe that special freedom unless it has what American lawyers
have come to call a "compelling" justification. Speakers may not be
censored even when what they say may well have bad consequences
for other people: because they campaign for forest despoliation or
because it would be expensive to protect them from an outraged
crowd. The right to free speech can be abridged only in
emergencies. . ..
The generalist position considers religious freedom the right that gives
human beings full access to ethical independence. Thus, the generalist ac-
count of religious freedom emphasises the opportunities people have to
make independent decisions about how to live their lives by their deeply,
held ethical commitments. This approach apparently extends the definition
of religion. 78 The main justification for this extension is rooted in the idea
that we need a deeper (meaning non-sectarian) understanding of religious
freedom since the free exercise of religion cannot be protected on sectarian
grounds, for distinctly religious reasons. 79 The leading normative argument
behind generalization and its emphasis on rethinking religious beliefs as
religion beyond its theistic definition. See James McBride, Paul Tillich and the Su-
preme Court: Tillich's Ultimate Concern as a Standard in Judicial Interpretation, 30 J.
CHURCH & ST. 245, 260 (1988) (discussing this development).
77. DWORKIN, supra note 13, at 131.
78. The advocated extension of the definition of "religion," as defended by the
generalist school of thought, falls under the so-called "inclusive non-accommodation"
theories of religious freedom. The "inclusiveness" is related to the public justification
debate, implying that "religion" is not something special for the justification of legal
and political decisions. Thus, no limitation on the addition of "religion" to the body of
categories that can be used by legal and political authorities to justify their decisions.
Similarly, "religion" is not special for the accommodation question: religions and non-
religions should be treated equally by granting exemptions. See Schwartzman, supra
note 22, at 22. A serious concern of this "symmetrical theory" of religious freedom-on
both sides (public justification and religious accommodation) religion is not something
special-is the huge risk of anarchy. See generally DWORKIN, supra note 13, at 117;
LEITER, supra note 21, at 94; NusSBAUM, supra note 15, at 173 (drawing attention to
the side-constraints of an all-inclusive term religion).
79. DWORKIN, supra note 13, at 17, 129. See also Matthew Clayton, Is Ethical
Independence Enough?, in CECILE LABORDE & AURELIA BARDON (EDS.), RELIGION IN
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deep ethical commitments, and religious freedom as a general right to moral
and ethical independence, is the assumption that public authorities are not
in the position, nor able, to judge what should count as moral or religious
truth. Perry says the following:
[government], including a political majority, is not to be trusted
as an arbiter of moral truth-when no legitimate government interest
is at stake; moreover, the coercive imposition of moral uniformity,
when no legitimate government interest is at stake, is more likely to
corrode than to nurture the strength of a democracy. Religious believ-
ers do not have less reason than nonbelievers-instead, religious be-
lievers and nonbelievers have the same basic reason-to insist that
government not ban or otherwise regulate or impede a moral
practice.80
Ethical independence is presented as a normative value of the political
liberty paradigm. Hence, it restricts authorities' opportunities to disfavor a
particular view on what deserves attention in life. Dworkin states:
In a state that prizes freedom, it must be left to individual citi-
zens, one by one, to decide such questions for themselves, not up to
government to impose one view on everyone. So, government may
not forbid drug use just because it deems drug use shameful, for ex-
ample; it may not forbid logging just because it thinks that people
who do not value great forests are despicable; it may not levy highly
progressive taxes just because it thinks that materialism is evil. But of
course, ethical independence does not prevent government from in-
terfering with people's chosen ways of life for other reasons: to pro-
tect other people from harm.8s
Thus, understanding religion in terms of access to ethical indepen-
dence pursues an ideal of liberal neutrality, 82 towards what Nussbaum has
called, the "ultimate questions" of life. 83 The call for liberal neutrality to-
wards deep human commitments has been strengthened by the claim that
ethical independence in the core "requires that government not restrict citi-
LIBERAL POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 132 (2017) (a recent defense of Dworkin's approach to
religious freedom).
80. Perry, supra note 20, at 1012. This concerns a Lockean criticism on govern-
mental interference in matters of morality and religion. Locke states that the main pur-
pose of the law "is not to provide for the truth of opinions, but for the safety and
security of the commonwealth and of every particular man's goods and person." Id. at
1003.
81. DWORKIN, supra note 13, at 130.
82. Cicile Laborde, Dworkin's Freedom of Religion Without God, 94 B.U. L.
REV. 125, 1258 (2014).
83. NUSSBAUM, supra note 15, at 168.
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zens' freedom when its justification assumes that one conception of how to
live, of what makes a successful life, is superior to others. It is often an
interpretive question, and sometimes a difficult one, whether a policy does
reflect that assumption." 84
To clarify why we should endorse liberal neutrality as a matter of prin-
ciple, the generalist position divides basic liberties into special and general
rights. The difference between these two variants is rooted in the threshold
authorities have to step over when they aim to restrict a right. Special rights
focus on the "subject matter" and it is complicated to limit these rights
legitimately, except in cases of emergency. The focus of a general right is
on the relation between authorities and people. General rights restrict the
scope of arguments authorities can provide to legitimately limit the exercise
of a general right.85
The specific distinction between general (restrict arguments to limit
free exercise) and special (focus is on a protection-worthy subject) rights
gives generalists a reason to argue that religious freedom should be seen a
general right as the category of "religion" remains a complicated subject to
interpret. Thus, the definition problem of religion that according to the
generalist position is intertwined with freedom of religion is an important
argument to oppose granting religious freedom a special status, or consider-
ing religious freedom a special right. The semantic criticism at this point
states that a special right would explicitly focus on the definition of religion
and it would not be able to solve the definition problem of this right.8 6 Also,
a special right requires high demands on restrictions that aim to limit the
exercise of such a right.
Instead, the generalist position argues that approaching religious free-
dom as a general right to ethical independence will provide protection to the
free exercise of religion. The generalist position explains that the right to
ethical independence "condemns any explicit discrimination . . . that as-
sumes . . . that one variety of religious faith is superior to others in truth or
virtue or that a political majority is entitled to favor one faith over others or
84. DWORKIN, supra note 13, at 141-42; see also Pierik & Van der Burg, supra
note 74, at 507 (stating "equal respect for autonomous citizens means that the state
should not only refrain from interfering with the exercise of this freedom, but also that
it should equally protect and, if necessary, support it.").
85. DWORKIN, supra note 13, at 132-33 (stating that "a special right of religion
declares that government must not constrain religious exercise in any way, absent an
extraordinary emergency. The general right to ethical independence, on the contrary ...
limits the reasons government may offer for any constraint on a citizen's freedom at
all.").
86. Id; see generally LABORDE, supra note 1, at 30-33; SULLIVAN, supra note 35,
at 1-4 (discussing the definition problem of religion).
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that atheism is father to immorality."87 It "protects religious conviction in a
more subtle way as well: by outlawing any constraint neutral on its face but
whose design covertly assumes some direct or indirect subordination." 8
However, understanding religious freedom as a general right to ethical inde-
pendence might force people to adjust their religious conduct in a way that
fits the rationale of laws that are not per se directed to them.89 Therefore,
the generalist position argues that authorities should take into account
whether the bans and other restrictions on a particular practice they propose
or impose, are in fact targeting what one group might consider "a sacred
duty" to comply with.90 If that is the case, "then the legislature must con-
sider whether equal concern . . . requires an exemption or other ameliora-
tion. If an exception can be managed with no significant damage to the
policy in play, then it might be unreasonable not to grant that exception." 91
However, the generalist says that when a religious practice "would put
people at a serious risk that it is the purpose of the law to avoid, refusing an
exemption does not deny equal concern. That priority of non-discriminatory
collective government over private religious exercise seems inevitable and
right." 92 Thus, there is no principled reason to exempt the followers of the
Santo-Daime Church who drink ayahuasca tea that contains DMT. The jus-
tification to deny exemption is rooted in public health grounds. 93 Neverthe-
less, there is a principled reason to provide equal financial grants to
religious organizations that reject same-sex couples and organizations that
accept them. Dworkin equally explains the reason as to why we should
finance these by stating:
87. DWORKIN, supra note 13, at 133-34.
88. Id. at 134.
89. Ronald Dworkin stated, "[i]f we deny a special right to free exercise of relig-
ious practice, and rely only on the general right to ethical independence, then religions
may be forced to restrict their practices so as to obey rational, non-discriminatory laws
that do not display less than equal concern for them." Id. at 135-36.
90. Id. at 136.
9 1. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 136-37. In the Netherlands, some members of the Santo-Daime Church,
who have been prosecuted for the import or possession of ayahuasca tea were dis-
charged from prosecution. See also Wahedi, supra note 3, at 134-35. The lack "of any
significant risks to public health" is the main reason for discharge. The ECtHR reached
another conclusion on this matter and declared the applicants inadmissible as "the pro-
hibition of the possession for use of DMT was necessary in a democratic society for the
protection of health." Frinklin-Beentjes and Ceflu-Luz Da Floresta v. The Netherlands,
App. No. 28167/07, 3 Eur. Ct. H.R. [ 48 (2014).
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Financing Catholic adoption agencies that do not accept same-
sex couples as candidates, on the same terms as financing agencies
that do, might be justified in that way, provided that enough of the
latter are available so that neither babies nor same-sex couples seek-
ing a baby are injured. 94
D. Equation
Equation requires equal respect for all deep concerns of people. Thus,
in effect religious beliefs and practices, as they concern deep human con-
cerns, should not be favored over similar deep concerns of other citizens.
Religious freedom should ensure this equal treatment of people. 95 Against
this backdrop, equation opposes arguments that justify religious freedom in
light of any "distinct value" of religious manifestations. Rather, it argues
that believers' vulnerability to discrimination should be considered the main
justification for religious freedom. In addition, equation opposes a "relig-
ious" understanding of religious freedom. In this sense, equation is very
close to generalization. However, there are two main differences. First, it is
not indifference or neutrality as such that requires principled equation.96 It
is rather the idea of equality of treatment of all acts and thoughts that have
an intrinsic value. 97 Second, equation does not generalize religious freedom
to something like the general right to ethical independence and moral free-
dom.9 8 It rather approaches religious freedom from the principle of equality
of treatment, which is considered the main constitutional value of a liberal
democracy. 99 Therefore, the equation approach is part of what has been
94. DWORKIN, supra note 13, at 136.
95. Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Does It Matter What Religion
Is? 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 807, 834-35 (2009) (stating that "the point of the Religion
Clauses is not to affirm (or deny) the value of religious practices, any more than the
point of the Free Speech Clause is to affirm (or deny) the value of flag burning.").
96. See Bret Boyce, Equality and the Free Exercise of Religion, 57 CLEv. ST. L.
REV. 493, 496-97, 520 (2009).
97. See Christopher C. Lund, Exploring Free Exercise Doctrine: Equal Liberty
and Religious Exemptions, 77 TENN. L. REV. 351, at 352 (2010) (arguing that some
liberal theorists of religious freedom have "[attacked] religious exemptions on the gen-
eral premise that they are fundamentally unfair to nonreligious people.").
98. CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE G. SAGER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
AND THE CONSTITUTION 51-77 (2007); see generally LABORDE, supra note 1, at 55-57;
Lund, supra note 97, at 360 (critical of the theory developed by Eisgruber and Sager).
See also Boyce, supra note 96, at 496-97 (differentiating between equality in treatment
and equality in effect) (emphasis added).
99. LABORDE, supra note 1, at 29 (arguing that egalitarian theorists of religious
freedom advocate a regime in which "all citizens-traditionally religious or not-are
treated with equal concern and respect, as free and equal citizens of a democratic soci-
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called the egalitarian theories of religious freedom.100 The question is, how-
ever, equation of what?10 1 At the outset, this position is anti-favoritism, 102
and it advocates equal treatment of all conscientious manifestations and be-
liefs that contain an intrinsic value.1 03
Recall the recent case of the Pastafarian who was denied by a local
municipality in the Netherlands to submit a photograph with a pasta strainer
on her head. Another Pastafarian who was similarly rejected by the local
authorities, referred to the possibility of Muslims and Jews to submit photo-
graphs on which they have covered their heads. 104
This case reminds us of a theoretical example about two people who
do not share the same religion but share similar objections that give them a
reason to ask for accommodation. A is a Jehovah's Witness and B is a
ety."). See also Boyce, supra note 96, at 520 (stating that "[e]quality of treatment is the
central principle of our constitutional order . . . [and] [t]o require or permit exemptions
only for religious but not secular individuals profoundly violates that constitutional
principle. Because the free exercise of religion necessarily entails the freedom to be-
lieve as well as disbelieve, granting exemptions only to believers also violates the core
values underlying the Free Exercise Clause.").
100. See C6cile Laborde, Liberal Neutrality, Religion and the Good?, in JEAN
LOUISE COHEN & CECILE LABORDE (Eas.), RELIGION, SECULARISM, AND CONSTITU-
TIONAL DEMOCRACY 249 (2016) (discussing egalitarian theories of religious freedom).
101. See LABORDE, supra note 1, at 89 (explaining what equation aims to realize.
"On the one hand, people's ability to act in accordance with their deep commitments
should not be subjected to unequal state burdens; on the other hand, the state should not
endorse the symbols and rituals of dominant religions because they could be disparag-
ing to racial-like minorities.").
102. SULLIVAN, supra note 35, at 149; see also LABORDE, supra note 1, at 42
(elaborating on the egalitarian criticism towards religious accommodation, considering
this as unfair and contrary to the liberal commitment "to neutrality about the good and
equality between citizens"); Boyce, supra note 96, at 551 (arguing that in today's era of
secularization a favored treatment of religious beliefs and acts is very problematic).
103. EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 98, at 51-77; see also Nehushtan, supra
note 14, at 149 (commenting on the position of Eisgruber and Sager: "[i]t is possible to
give a certain priority to religious reasons, not because of their content but rather for
largely neutral reasons. Eisgruber and Sager, for example, take this line in suggesting
that religion is distinctive rather than unique. They claim that religion, much like race
and gender, justifies subjecting government's decisions to greater scrutiny than many
other topics or policies receive."); LABORDE, supra note 1, at 51 (arguing that an egali-
tarian theory of religious freedom, as conceptualized by Eisgruber and Sager, is an
"attractive" alternative for "those who worry that formal legal equality leaves minority
interests at the mercy of majoritarian preferences yet see little justification for a [secta-
rian] privileging of religious interests qua religious.").
104. Rb. Noord-Nederland 28 July 2016, ECLI:NL:RBNNE:2016:3626, ¶ 5.1
(Neth.).
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pacifist. A and B have objections to manufacture tank components.10 This
example has been used by the proponents of the equation approach to argue
that a legal regime that exempts A and not B is quite problematic. 106 This
objection of improper distinction is present in the Pastafarian case. The
equation position will ask why some believers, such as Muslims and Jews,
are allowed to cover their heads on the driver's license photograph they
submit, while Pastafarian believers are denied the same opportunity. 0 7
Another appropriate example in this context is the ongoing debate in
legal theory and society about the legal acceptability of ritual male circum-
cision. As such, several European courts have ruled about the legality of
this practice. In this regard, one could refer to the German and Finnish court
judgements. In both cases, the circumcision of young boys was followed by
medical complications. Although the Finnish Supreme Court held that male
circumcision, under particular circumstances, was an acceptable practice, 08
the German district court in Cologne held that the irreversible character of
this practice violated the boy's rights to religious freedom, as they were
unable to give their consent. Next, the judges argued that the parental right
to religious freedom and their right to raise their children by their convic-
tions, do not justify the practice of ritual male circumcision.1 09 The recur-
ring question is: what is the justification to keep on considering this practice
permissible? The criticism is that all forms of female circumcision, better
known as genital mutilation are prohibited. Even incision, which is less
violable than ritual infant male circumcision. The difference in legal ap-
proaches has been criticized as discriminatory.110 The equation position,
which advocates for a similar approach to religious and non-religious argu-
105. Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 35, at 1292.
106. Id.
107. However, the question remains: what kind of beliefs, convictions and prac-
tices should be equalized? In addition, how can the comparative framework be shaped
in this respect? See also LABORDE, supra note 1, at 53 (arguing that "[the] category of
non-religion is too loose and imprecise to serve as a comparator to that of religion.").
108. Heli Askola, Cut-Off Point? Regulating Male Circumcision in Finland, 25
INT'L J.L. POL'Y & FAM. 100, 106 (2011).
109. Landgericht Koln [The District Court of Cologne], 7 May 2012, 151 Ns 169/
11, 1 III. In applying the court's reasoning, the parental right to raise their children in
accordance with their Islamic faith does not justify ritual male circumcision, which is
considered an irreversible intervention that lacks consent and violates bodily integrity.
Circumcision does not provide children with an opportunity to make independent deci-
sions regarding the religion they choose to adopt. Therefore, the decision to be circum-
cised must be postponed.
110. Sohail Wahedi, Het beoordelingskader van rituele jongensbesnijdenis [The
assessment framework of ritual male circumcision], 7 TUDSCHRIFr VooR RELIGIE,
RECHT EN BELEID [J. FOR RELIGION, L. AND POL'Y] 59 (2016).
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ments concerning the way people want to live their lives, theoretically
strengthens the criticism of "a double standard on the part of [those] who
fail to challenge other unnecessary surgical interventions-such as male
circumcision or cosmetic surgery-in their own communities and
cultures.""'
Thus, equation "requires simply that government treat the deep, relig-
iously inspired concerns of minority religious believers with the same re-
gard as that enjoyed by the deep concerns of citizens generally.""1 2 Meaning
there is no principled reason to differentiate between deep human commit-
ments. The norm should be an equal approach to non-religious and religious
perspectives on the ultimate questions of life. This argument rests on a defi-
nition of religious freedom that does not provide religion with a base for
reproduction. The equation approach rethinks religious freedom as "the
right of the individual . . . to life outside the state-the right to live as a self
on which many given, as well as chosen, demands are made. Such a right
may not be best realized through laws guaranteeing religious freedom but
by laws guaranteeing equality."' '3 Therefore, the regime of religious tolera-
tion should be understood against the backdrop of human vulnerability to
discrimination. Eisgruber and Sager states:
[what] properly motivates constitutional solicitude for religious
practices is their distinct vulnerability to discrimination, not their dis-
tinct value; and what is called for, in turn, is protection against dis-
crimination, not privilege against legitimate governmental concerns.
When we have replaced value with vulnerability, and the paradigm of
privilege with that of protection, then it will be possible both to make
sense of our constitutional past in this area and to chart an appealing
constitutional future.' 14
This position allows us to claim that there are two main differences
between generalization and equation. The first focuses on how we should
understand religious freedom as a liberty. The second approaches religious
freedom from the ideal of equality.
E. Representation
The main claim of representation is that the theory it has developed is
not narrow in the sense of exclusively protecting one group. Hence, it is not
111. Moira Dustin, Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting in the UK, 17 EUR J. OF
WOMEN'S STUD. 1, 8-23 (2010).
112. Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 35, at 1283.
113. SULLIVAN, supra note 35, at 159.
114. Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 35, at 1248.
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a sectarian theory of religious freedom. It is rooted, as Laborde says: "in the
ecumenical value of ethical integrity, and in the normative justifications for
generic liberal rights such as speech and association."" 5 Representation un-
derstands religion as a concept that stands for a set of protection-worthy
values that are not necessarily "religious" in the core. 116 These values jus-
tify according to the representation position the codification of a special
right to religious freedom." 7 As such, it has been argued that religion, like
respect, stands for a "hypergood:" a particular category of higher goods.'s
Koppelman argues that:
[religion] . . . has a value that can override many other goods
and preferences. But religion is one among many hypergoods. It
should not be privileged over the rest of them. This fundamental
problem of modernity should not be adjudicated by the state. The
problem of determining the appropriate hypergood, if any, and its
reconciliation with the broad range of ordinary goods, is a question
that occupies the same existential territory as religion. If the state is
incompetent to resolve religious questions, it is likewise incompetent
to resolve this one.19
115. The position this article qualifies as "representation" elaborates on the
"proxy" and "disaggregation" approaches. See LABORDE, supra note 1; Laborde, supra
note 20.
116. See Ronan McCrea, The Consequences of Disaggregation and the Impossi-
bility of a Third Way, in CECILE LABORDE & AURELIA BARDON (EDS.), RELIGION IN
LIBERAL POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 69 (2017) (criticizing Laborde's disaggregation
approach).
117. Jane Rutherford, Religion, Rationality, and Special Treatment, 9 Wm. 
&
MARY BILL RTs. J. 303, 332 (2001) Rutherford argues that religion, within the context
of U.S. constitutional law has a special status, not on sectarian grounds, but for the
reason that religion serves very important functions. Rutherford identifies "four related
functions that religion serves: (1) religion helps balance power and limit the power of
both the government and organized faith; (2) religion sometimes enables disempowered
groups to organize and increase their power; (3) religion produces values that are
neither market-driven nor controlled by the government; and (4) religion provides a
source of spirituality and personal identity that enables individuals to live with purpose
and dignity."). See also Jamal, supra note 1, at 439 (defending religious freedom as the
right that gives protection to the minority views); Lund, supra note 1, at 515 (arguing
that "the way to protect all deep-and-valuable human commitments is by naming certain
specific deep-and-valuable commitments. There is no other way. We start with the ones
we know, and we keep an open mind about the rest. Religion is not the only deep-and-
valuable human commitment. But it is one of them, and that is enough.").
118. Koppelman, supra note 16, at 594.
119. Id. In his later publications, Andrew Koppelman has elaborated on consider-
ing religion a legal proxy. See e.g. Koppelman, How Shall I Praise Thee? Brian Leiter
on Respect for Religion, 47 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 961, 981 (2010) (stating "it is not
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More specifically and to identify the relevant legal values religion
stands for, the representation position reflects on the potential matches be-
tween the "different parts of the law" and "different dimensions of religion
for the protection of different normative values."l 20 Examples of such
matches are the presentation of religion as: a conception of the good life; a
conscientious moral obligation; the key feature of identity; mode of human
association; a vulnerability class; a totalizing institution and an inaccessible
doctrine.121 According to the representation position, some of these
matches, such as the presentation of religion as a conception of the good
life, a matter of conscience, identity and association, are more "relevant to
the notion of freedom of religion" than other overlapping areas.1 22 Hence,
the representation position could be defined as "religion-blind without be-
ing religion-insensitive, because it sees religion, not as a specialised and
self-contained area of human belief and activity, but as a richly diverse
expression of life itself."1 23
II. SHOULD THE LAW IN LIBERAL DEMOCRACIES
CARE ABOUT RELIGION?
Should the law in liberal democracies care about religion qua religion?
What does the classification of the normative positions tell us about the
"specialness" of religion? Thus, the question is: does religion qua religion
possible to offer a unitary account of what religion is good for. Like a knife or a rock, it
is something that people find already existing in the world, which they then put to a
huge variety of uses. Religion denotes a cluster of goods."). This position has been
defended more recently in ANDREw KOPPELMAN, DEFENDING AMERICAN RELIGIOUS
NEUTRALITY 124 (2013). See also Koppelman, supra note 41, at 37 (repeating the view
that religion encompasses many goods that people aim to purse and religious freedom
enables them to do that).
120. Laborde, supra note 20, at 594.
121. Id. at 594-95.
122. Id. at 595-97. The argument is that the values behind the identified matches
are as such worthy of special legal solicitude. Thus, the representation position draws
on the idea that the values behind a broad set of matches provide an appropriate base to
justify the legal protection of religious beliefs and practices.
123. Id. at 600. Formulated in this way, a religious way of life is just one way
human beings could give moral substance to their lives. The normative argument behind
this position is the classical liberal idea that authorities should refrain from dictating the
right way of life. Citizens should find in freedom their desirable path to live their lives.
Therefore, representation advocates "strong evaluations" to examine whether believers
could be exempted from the application of laws that are at odds with their convictions,
such as the prohibition of wearing headscarves and yarmulkes in public. The representa-
tion position claims that "the value of integrity" is the right interpretative value to deal
with such "strongly valued practices" of the free exercise.
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deserve special legal protection? At the outset there is no one right answer
to this question. The classification of the normative approaches is an appro-
priate method to look beyond theoretical differences and figure out whether
we can identify and subsequently theorize a binding element in the liberal
theories of religious freedom. Thus, the focus is on the binding characteris-
tic of the argumentation patterns this article has conceptualized.
A. Does Religion Qua Religion Require Special Legal Protection?
This section classifies the types of responses that answer this question.
This classification is based on how the normative positions this article has
conceptualized in the development of its theoretical framework answer this
question. The similarities between the responses uncover three categories of
responses. First, a Strong No, religion does definitely not qualify for special
legal protection qua religion. Second, a Soft No, religion does not necessa-
rily deserve special legal protection qua religion. Third, a Soft Yes, it is
eligible for special legal protection, though not for distinctly religious rea-
sons.124 This section elaborates on these three responses and answers the
more general question whether the law in liberal democracies should care
about religion simply because it is religion?
1. No, Definitely Not: The Strong No
One potential answer suggests definitely not. The argument of this
Strong No is that the concept of religion is on principled grounds not eligi-
ble for special legal protection qua religion. Thus, according to this answer,
the concept of religion does not provide any room to support arguments that
justify the special legal protection of religion with an appeal to the distinct
values of religion. Therefore, this response rejects arguments as defended in
the sectarian theories of religious freedom, justifying this liberty with an
explicit appeal to values that can be considered distinctly religious, i.e. the
transcendental value of religion 2 5 or what a particular religious dogma
prescribes as protection-worthy.1 26 As such, the Strong No corresponds with
the principled rejectionist answer to the question whether religion qua relig-
ion requires special legal protection. The rejectionist position understands
124. I am grateful to Professor Steven D. Smith who challenged me to figure out
what theoretical responses are possible to the question as to whether religion qua relig-
ion deserves special legal protection. The threefold response (the Strong No, the Soft No
and the Soft Yes) is based upon his suggestion.
125. McConnell, supra note 15.
126. QANUNI AssAsSI JUMHURII ISLAMAI IRAN [THE CONSTITUTION OF THE IS-
LAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN], supra note 30.
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"religion" as the combination of categorical commands that are insulated
from evidence.
Does this conception of religion make a strong case to tolerate religion
qua religion? The principled rejectionist position suggests not. The argu-
mentation pattern to deny special legal protection to religion qua religion
starts by defining what the notion of pure toleration requires. The principle
of toleration requires that a belief or practice that is objectionable and that
can be stopped by the dominant group in society, is nevertheless tolerated
for principled reasons. These principled reasons of toleration find their ori-
gins in what morality and epistemology consider protection-worthy. Princi-
pled rejection says that toleration on moral or epistemic grounds does not
require special toleration of categorical commands that are insulated from
evidence (i.e. religion does not require special legal protection qua relig-
ion). In sum, the principled grounds for toleration do not provide a fruitful
basis to argue that religion needs special legal protection qua religion. 1 2 7
2. No, Not Necessarily: The Soft No
Another possible response to the question whether religion qua relig-
ion requires special legal solicitude concerns the Soft No. The Soft No re-
sponse entails that religion as such does not necessarily require special
legal protection, nor is an explicit right to religious freedom required to
guarantee the free exercise of religion. Reflecting on the justification
grounds of the special legal solicitude towards religion uncovers that
"other" broader faculties, liberties and vulnerabilities (i.e. the believers'
vulnerability to discrimination due to their specific habits) require special
attention and protection. This response considers religion a subset of these
other broader faculties (e.g. conscience, ethical integrity and deep commit-
ments) that justify a distinct legal protection regime because of their partic-
ular specialness. In the same manner, religious freedom has been rethought
as the right that provides protection to beliefs and practices that are not
necessarily rooted in a theistic understanding of religion. As such, religious
freedom has been presented as the right to ethical independence and moral
freedom.1 28 Finally, religious freedom has been considered a subcategory of
other constitutional freedoms that, without any doubt need codification and
127. The position that religion qua religion does not require special legal protec-
tion corresponds with the position of Brian Leiter, who has stated that Kantian and
utilitarian moral grounds as well as Millian epistemic grounds of toleration only make a
strong case to protect equal liberty of conscience that encompasses the religious con-
science. Thus, there are no principled reasons to tolerate religious conscience
separately.
128. DWORKIN, supra note 13.
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legal protection in liberal democracies (e.g. basic liberties, such as the free-
dom of conscience, thought, association and expression). Thus, for the justi-
fication of the right to free exercise of religion, the Soft No response does
not necessarily rely on distinctly religious values. 129 Rather, it approaches
religion and religious freedom from a broader framework of faculties and
liberties. This response paves the way for the suggestion that there is no
need for a constitutionally protected religious freedom that gives protection
only to religious beliefs and practices. The conflicts between law and relig-
ion are manageable, even without an appeal to the distinct values of relig-
ion. The main message of this response is that although religion does not
necessarily require special protection simply because it is religion, it de-
serves special legal attention under some other general and apparently non-
religious faculties, categories and rights, e.g. conscience, ethical indepen-
dence, moral freedom and a combination of basic liberties, such as the free-
dom of speech, association and expression.
3. Yes, Though Not For Distinctly Religious Reasons:
The Soft Yes
The Soft Yes concerns the final possible response to the question
whether-according to the liberal theories of religious freedom-religion
qua religion deserves special legal solicitude. This response does not justify
religious freedom with an explicit appeal to distinctly religious values. It
implies a "yes" as it says that religion deserves special legal protection qua
religion. However, it takes a "soft" turn immediately, as it is a liberal an-
swer that for principled reasons refrains from the adoption of an argumenta-
tion pattern that justifies the special legal protection of religion on the
grounds that are perceived distinctly religious. Against this backdrop, the
Soft Yes response corresponds with the representation position. The "yes"
of this response suggests that religion is eligible for special legal solicitude
as it represents a set of values and functions that are worthy of legal atten-
tion and protection. However, in correspondence with the "soft" nature of
this response, these values are not necessarily religious. Recall the represen-
tation argument suggesting that religion stands for a proxy of goods, social
functions and the pursuit of non-profit values that as such, justify the spe-
cial legal solicitude for religion. Thus, the Soft Yes response entails that
religion deserves special protection in law, though not necessarily for rea-
sons that find their origins in the distinct value of religion.
129. The Soft No response corresponds with the substitution, generalization and
equation positions.
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B. The Synthesis of Abstraction From The Religious Dimension
This article has focussed on the liberal theories of religious freedom
and their main contribution to the debate on the role and place of religion in
law. Based on this, Part I has developed a conceptual framework that con-
sists of normative positions, each theorizing a particular approach towards
religion and religious claims for exemptions from laws. The argumentation
patterns of this conceptual framework have proved to be useful in answer-
ing the question whether religion qua religion deserves special legal protec-
tion in liberal democracies. The question remains however, whether the
threefold response to the special legal solicitude towards religion (the
Strong No, the Soft No and the Soft Yes), provides a fruitful base to identify
and subsequently theorize a particular feature that can serve as the binding
element of the liberal theories of religious freedom. To this end, it is impor-
tant to figure out what the overall message of the threefold response may be
concerning the question whether religion qua religion requires special pro-
tection in law.
The clear message across the three types of responses is that distinctly
religious values are not considered eligible to justify the special legal solici-
tude towards religion. Thus, the synthesis of this threefold response is the
dismissal of the special legal protection of religion qua religion. Moreover,
this synthesis renounces arguments that justify religious freedom with an
appeal to any distinct value of religion. What clarifies and justifies the spe-
cial legal attention for religion is a broader and apparently religion-empty
(i.e. free from distinctly religious values) framework of faculties, liberties
and vulnerabilities.1 3 0 The question is, what does this predominantly nega-
tive answer to the question as to whether religion qua religion requires spe-
cial legal protection suggest about the binding feature of the liberal theories
of religious freedom? Can we say that the threefold response that we have
given is an illustration of "decoupling religion from a god?"1'3 Alterna-
tively, does the synthesis of our threefold response fit the "tendency, among
legal practitioners, to re-describe" religious matters in non-religious
terms? 132
130. LABORDE, supra note 1, at 42 (criticizing the "vague" broader framework that
is adopted by egalitarian theorists of religious freedom to justify the special legal solici-
tude towards religion).
131. DWORKIN, supra note 13, at 132 (stating that "the problems we encountered
in defining freedom of religion flow from trying to retain that right as a special right
while also decoupling religion from a god.").
132. Laborde, supra note 20, at 590 (arguing that "there has been a tendency,
among legal practitioners, to re-describe [particular religious] practices in the language
34 [Vol. 24
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The synthesis of our negative response encompasses both when it re-
acts to the justification grounds of the special legal solicitude towards relig-
ion. It decouples religion from any God. Essentially, it presents religion as
one subcategory in the more general and apparently non-religious catego-
ries of human conscience and the conceptions of the good life. It decouples
religion from any God in a further sense. The threefold response conceptu-
alizes religion in a God-empty way, free from distinctly religious values.
An appropriate example of a God-empty conception of religion is the defi-
nition of religion as the combination of categorical demands that are insu-
lated from evidence and reason. 133 Other God-empty conceptions of religion
are concerned with the identification of general and apparently non-relig-
ious values that are as such worthy of legal protection. Examples of such
intrinsic and valuable aspects of religion are the values behind human con-
science, 134 ethical integrity,1 35 deep ethical commitments, 136 hope,1 37 vulner-
ability to injustice,1 38 and so on. These valuable-though not specifically or
distinctly religious-aspects to religion justify as such the special legal pro-
tection of religious beliefs and manifestations.
The synthesis of our threefold response fits similarly the tendency of
re-description, which suggests that for the legal analysis of a case of relig
of conscientious obligation, so as to accommodate them under the label of freedom of
religion.").
133. LEITER, supra note 21, at 33-34. Koppelman is critical of Brian Leiter's con-
ception of religion, referring to it as "a radically impoverished conception." Koppel-
man, supra note 119, at 962; see McConnell, supra note 18, at 784 (suggesting, "it is
futile to draw up a list of features descriptive of religion and only of religion. What
makes religion distinctive is its unique combination of features, as well as the place it
holds in real human lives and human history.") See also Frangois Boucher & Cicile
Laborde, Why Tolerate Conscience?, 10 CRIM. L. & P-m. 493, 496 (2016) (stating
"Leiter fails to establish insulation from reasons and evidence as the demarcating fea-
ture of religion. This is because he draws on incompatible interpretations of 'insulation
from reasons and evidence' to reply to different challenges regarding either the under-
inclusiveness or the over-inclusiveness of his definition of religion.").
134. NUSSBAUM, supra note 15, at 168-69. But see KOPPELMAN, supra note 119, at
153 (arguing that "[i]t is not clear how Nussbaum can maintain the distinction between
her position and a libertarian view in which any regulation of anyone's conduct is pre-
sumptively invalid . . . [As such], [t]he boundaries of protection in Nussbaum are thus
uncertain."). See also Laborde, supra note 20, at 589 (arguing that the substitution posi-
tion is not able to provide equal protection to all religious practices that are valuable,
though not always on conscientious grounds).
135. Laborde, supra note 20, at 589.
136. DwoRKIN, supra note 13, at 5.
137. KOPPELMAN, supra note 119, at 122.
138. Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 35, at 1248.
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ious manifestation, it is neither necessary, nor useful to define or understand
that case in specific and distinct religious terms. This tendency of re-
description arises from projects that aim to rethink religious freedom in a
religion-empty way that is not only protecting theistic beliefs and manifes-
tations. The normative argument is that both theistic and non-theistic beliefs
and manifestations that have an intrinsic value, which attaches to valuable
aspects of a human life, should be treated with the same amount of respect
and concern. For this reason, religious freedom has been rethought, ap-
proached and defended as the liberty of conscience, 1 3 9 the right to moral
freedom,1 40 the right to ethical independence'41 and the citizens' equal right
to live outside the state.1 42
So far, we have argued that the synthesis of our threefold response
decouples religion from any God and relies mainly on a non-religious lan-
guage to re-describe religious matters.1 43 The question is whether we could
provide a more coherent description of our synthesis that encompasses both
the decoupling side as well as the re-description aspect of the debate in
jurisprudence about law and religion. In other words, is it possible to iden-
tify and subsequently define in a more systematic way the feature that
serves as the binding characteristic of the liberal theories of religious free-
dom? This feature looks beyond the varieties of normative positions and
connects these perspectives from their common point of focus: the justifica-
tion grounds for the special legal protection of religion. With this presump-
tion in mind, we can say that the starting point of our reflections for the
identification of the potential binding element of the liberal theories of re-
ligious freedom is the interpretative concern of these theories about the
proper legal definition of religion and religious freedom and the fair appli-
cation of this specific definition in practice. This interpretative concern
guides us to define the binding characteristic of the liberal theories of relig-
ious freedom. First, we have seen that these theories aim to provide the
most appropriate definition of religion in law. Second, they have one impor-
tant concern: the egalitarian attention to fair treatment of deep human com-
139. MACLURE & TAYLOR, supra note 59, at 89; NUSSBAUM, supra note 15, at
169.
140. Perry, supra note 20, at 996.
141. DWORKIN, supra note 13, at 130.
142. SULLIVAN, supra note 35, at 159.
143. Cf McCrea, supra note 116, at 71 (arguing that religion does not exist in the
disaggregated form); Peter Jones, Religious Exemptions and Distributive Justice, in Ct-
CILE LABORDE & AURPLIA BARDON (EDS.), RELIGION IN LIBERAL POLITICAL PHILOSO-
PHY 162 (2017) (explaining that the non-religious description of religious exemptions,
such as the use of a cultural frame, fits the egalitarian strategy to defend religious ex-
emptions on non-sectarian grounds).
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mitments and beliefs. Hence, the binding characteristic we aim to theorize
is a normative response to the question: how should liberal democracies
understand and accordingly deal with the concept of religion in law? This
binding feature of the liberal theories of religious freedom encompasses the
entire body of arguments that pave the way to deal with the indicated inter-
pretative concern of the debate about the role of religion in law within the
paradigm of liberal political philosophy. The binding characteristic we aim
to define takes the form of an interpretative shield: it is embedded in philo-
sophical arguments that can resist the justification of religious freedom with
an appeal to distinctly religious values. In addition, it draws on a non-secta-
rian language to conceptualize religion and religious manifestations.
What does this interpretative shield suggest about the binding feature
of the liberal theories of religious freedom? DoeA it help us to provide a
more coherent definition of our synthesis that covers the decoupling and the
re-description aspects of the law and religion debate in jurisprudence? Yes,
it does. The negative answer to the question as to whether religion qua
religion requires special legal protection stands for abstraction from the re-
ligious dimension. Thus, abstraction is the binding element of the various
normative positions discussed in this article. Abstraction dismisses argu-
ments that justify the special legal solicitude towards religion qua religion.
Moreover, it renounces arguments that justify religious freedom with an
appeal to any distinct value of religion. Subsequently, abstraction proposes
a general framework of ecumenical values that justify free exercise of relig-
ion and it rethinks religious claims for exemptions from laws, from that
general framework of ecumenical values. 4
144. See Wahedi, supra note 3, at 134. In earlier research that aimed to provide a
better understanding of how contentious religious manifestations were presented and
framed in contemporary legal, political and societal debates, abstraction was introduced
as a mechanism that, by the use of different rhetorical means and arguments, marginal-
ized or even disregarded the specific religious dimension of a particular religious mani-
festation. This research suggested that the mechanism of abstraction covered at least
three different approaches to deal with contentious religious practices: marginalization,
neutralization and reframing of the religious dimension.
Marginalization conceptualized the entire body of arguments suggesting that the
religious dimension is not sufficiently distinctive or important for understanding a relig-
ious manifestation and therefore this particular dimension could be ignored largely in
the legal assessment of the religious manifestation at stake. For example, the former
Dutch Minister of Justice compared face-covering veils to nudists, leaving aside the
religious significance of covering the whole body. Cf also the suggestion of Professor
Ellen Hey on a draft version of my PhD proposal: "[a]bstraction is an omnipresent but
little noticed phenomenon in the marginalization of religious values." (available upon
request). See also Wibren van der Burg, Homogeniteit versus diversiteit - schuivende
verhoudingen [Homogeneity versus diversity - sliding relationships], 5 RELIGIE 
&
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III. ABSTRACTIONS FROM THE RELIGIOUS DIMENSION
DISENTANGLED
The dismissal of the arguments that aim to justify the special legal
protection of religion qua religion, which is the origin of abstraction, takes
place at different levels. As such, abstraction dispenses with philosophical
arguments in mind the special legal protection of religion qua religion, at
the conceptual level of religion, religious values, constitutional value of
religion and finally at a practical level-the protection of the free exercise
of religion in practice. The overall claim is that for the analysis of a clear
case of religious manifestation, such as ritual male circumcision or wearing
headscarves and yarmulkes, it is neither possible, necessary, nor useful to
SAMENLEVING [RELIGION & Soc'v] 103 (2010) (discussing the marginalization of the
religious dimension).
Neutralization conceptualized the body of arguments suggesting that religious
freedom is superfluous, as other fundamental rights-e.g. free speech and the freedom
of association-provide enough protection to religious manifestations. As such, this
approach aimed to "neutralize" the religious dimension of a manifestation as a matter of
speech or association. An example is considering a Church's decision to ban female
priests as a matter of freedom of association. See EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 98,
at 63; Lawrence Sager, Why Churches (and, Possibly, the Tarpon Bay Women's Blue
Water Fishing Club) Can Discriminate, in MICAH SCHWARTZMAN, CHAD FLANDERS 
&
ZoE ROBINSON (EDS.), THE RISE OF CORPORATE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 77, 88 (2016)
(stating that "[the] group-centered right of close association, like the dyadic version of
the right, offers a justification for the right of the Catholic Church to discriminate in its
choice of priests. And . . . the group-centered right is in principle available outside the
realm of religion. Here there are numerous possibilities. The Thursday Club is an obvi-
ous candidate; so too might well be the Tarpon Bay Women's Blue Water Fishing
Club.").
Reframing conceptualized the body of arguments suggesting that there is a shift
away from the traditional frame that a particular religious manifestation is supposed to
be protected, based on religious freedom, unless there are strong reasons (e.g. violation
of other fundamental rights) to restrict it. The new alternative frame starts from the
description of a contentious manifestation as prima facie unacceptable and merely asks
whether it might nevertheless be tolerated on the basis of religious freedom. Thus, the
burden of proof is completely reversed. An appropriate example is male circumcision.
The legal permissibility of this practice was rarely questioned in the past as it concerned
an admissible religious manifestation. Today, a shift is visible towards the idea that
ritual infant male circumcision is unacceptable as it concerns a harmful manifestation
that violates fundamental rights. See DONALD A. SCHON & MARTIN REIN, FRAME RE-
FLECTION. TOWARD THE RESOLUTION OF INTRACTABLE POLICY CONTROVERSIES (1994);
See also Abbie J. Chessler, Justifying the Unjustifiable: Rite v. Wrong, 45 BUFF. L.
REV. 555 (1997). But cf. Rhona Schuz, The Dangers of Children's Rights' Discourse in
the Political Arena: The Issue of Religious Male Circumcision as a Test Case, 21 CAR-
DOZO J.L. & GENDER 347 (2015).
38 [Vol. 24
109
Abstraction from the Religious Dimension
describe or understand such type of cases in specific and distinct religious
terms. 145
A. The Concept of Religion
Abstraction focuses at this level on the interpretative concept of relig-
ion.14 6 In general, it does not describe religion in distinctly religious terms,
but instead it defines religion broadly, that is to say in non-religious
terms.14 7 The argumentation pattern of this step of abstraction focuses on
what religion entails and identifies the characteristics that follow from that
question in non-religious terms. Recall, the conception of religion as a com-
bination of categorical demands to act and beliefs insulated from evidence
and reason. These features of religion do not justify singling out religion
qua religion. 148 Hence, in the case of conflict of norms, the concept of
human conscience provides a fruitful base to solve that conflict. Thus, relig-
ion is a subset of human conscience. That faculty, conscience, is worthy of
protection and not religion as such.1 49 Another non-religious and general
definition of religion is embedded in the philosophical idea that says, the
category of religion stands for deeply held ethical commitments of human
beings to succeed in life.' 50 In these definitions of religion, there is abstrac-
tion from the religious dimension, as for the description of religion they do
not refer to distinctly religious values.'5 ' Accordingly, religion has been
defined religion-empty,1 52 and the language that has been used to talk about
religious manifestations is merely religion-empty.15 3
145. The interplay and confrontation between theories of religious freedom and
debates about concrete cases of free exercise will have an indispensable theoretical
value in defining the latitude of abstraction.
146. LABORDE, supra note 1, at 30 (arguing that egalitarian theorists of religious
freedom elaborate on "an interpretative, not a semantic, conception of religion.").
147. Id. at 31 (stating that egalitarian theorists of religious freedom focus mainly
on what is potentially "protection-worthy" about religion).
148. Id. at 28 (stating that "religion may be paradigmatic of beliefs, identifica-
tions, and practices that people have a particular interest in pursuing in their own way,
individually or collectively. But . . . while religion is a paradigm of those valuable
concerns, it does not uniquely capture them.").
149. LEITER, supra note 21, at 33-34.
150. DwORKIN, supra note 13, at 114.
151. LABORDE, supra note 1, at 32 (arguing that the category of religion has been
defined less specific, "ethnocentric and biased" by the egalitarian theorists of religious
freedom).
152. This part points to the de-coupling process of religion from God.
153. This aspect refers to the re-description process of religious matters in non-
religious terms. See LABORDE, supra note 1, at 14 (criticizing the liberal religion-empty
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B. The Distinct Value of Religion
The argumentation pattern of this step of abstraction focuses on the
question whether religion is a valuable category in law. Although the argu-
mentation framework does not doubt that the category of religion can have
particular values, such as balancing the power and mobilizing people to do
non-profit work,1 54 it shifts from these values towards a more general and
broad (i.e. less sectarian) framework of values when it aims to justify the
special legal solicitude towards religion. This shift results in the claim that
religion as such does not have a distinct value and the values attached to
religion are general of nature. Thus, there is abstraction from values that are
considered distinctly religious, such as the transcendental and suprarational
values of religion,'55 towards a more general framework of values, such as
those concerning the human conscience,1 56 ethical integrity'57 and ethical
commitments. 58 Hence, what has been presented as a distinct value of re-
ligion fits more general values. Therefore, the argument to justify the dis-
tinct value of religion and accommodate accordingly a particular religious
manifestation applies simultaneously to comparable non-religious practices,
arguments and projects that ask for exemptions.'5 9 One might think of the
desire to become a vegetarian and the desire of not eating pork meat for
religious reasons. 60 The value of both cases at this level of abstraction is
similar, as being a vegetarian or refraining from eating pork can be under-
stood in terms of acting in accordance with deeply held ethical commit-
ments about how to live a life.
The argumentation pattern at this level of abstraction entails that it is
not necessary to rely on transcendental (meaning sectarian) grounds to jus-
tify the free exercise of religion.'6 1
concept of religion and stating "that the analogy between religion and "conceptions of
the good" (or similarly loose terms) is unsatisfactory, and that the slogan "equal liberty"
sometimes obfuscates what is being equalized.").
154. Rutherford, supra note 117, at 332.
155. See generally McConnell, supra note 15.
156. See generally McConnell, supra note 26.
157. See NUSSBAUM, supra note 15, at 168-69; KOPPELMAN, supra nOte 119, at
153; Larbode, supra note 20, at 589.
158. See Laborde, supra note 20, at 589-90.
159. See May, supra note 40, at 191 (arguing that non-religious moral projects
could be worthy of legal protection, as some religious moral projects require
exemptions).
160. See MACLURE & TAYLOR, supra note 59, at 77.
161. LABORDE, supra note 1, at 28 (rejecting the idea that religion is special,
meaning "that religious citizens should receive uniquely privileged treatment in the
law-say, in the form of exclusive exemptions on the ground of religious belief. Relig-
40 [Vol. 24
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C. The Consitutional Value of Religion
The argumentation pattern of this level of abstraction draws on the
conclusion that religion does not have any distinct value that might justify
the special protection of religion qua religion.1 6 2 Instead, a broader category
that encompasses religion is worthy of legal protection, which could be the
liberty of conscience, the right to ethical independence or the right to moral
freedom. Also, the constitutional value of religion is defined in non-relig-
ious terms of liberal neutrality, which entails that free exercise of religion
prohibits authorities from favoring or disfavoring a particular way of life,
except in cases of harm prevention. Another constitutional value of religion
is found in the way religious groups are vulnerable to discrimination. For-
mulated in this way, religious freedom covers the right that gives protection
to general values, such as the ability to search for ultimate questions of life
and the independence to have an attachment to ethical commitments and
moral decisions about right and wrong. Therefore, for the legality of a relig-
ious manifestation, religious arguments do not count.163 One might think of
the justification given to allow headscarves: it is not because of the special-
ness of your Gods that 'we' allow headscarves. It follows rather from our
political commitment to respect human conscience. In this particular case,
the constitutional value that justifies the allowance of headscarves is not
found in religious arguments, but rather found in our respect for human
conscience that is protection-worthy qua conscience. 6
D. The Protection of the Free Exercise of Religion in Practice
The argumentation pattern suggests at this level of abstraction that for
the free exercise of religion a special right to religious freedom is not neces-
sary in practice. It is rather superfluous. The main argument is that the free
ious beliefs and activities might be specially protected, but not uniquely so: if and when
they are, it is as a subset of a broader category of respect-worthy beliefs and
activities.").
162. See Lund, supra note 1, at 494 (engaging in the debate on the constitutional
value of religion inside secular states).
163. LABORDE, supra note 1, at 31 (stating that egalitarians theorists of religious
freedom do not ask "whether the law adequately captures what is ordinarily meant by
religion. From a normative perspective, [they ask:] what is it about religion that is pro-
tection-worthy? What deeper normative values underpin protection of freedom of
religion?").
164. See George Letsas, The Irrelevance of Religion to Law, in CECILE LABORDE
& AURELIA BARDON (EDs.), RELIGION IN LIBERAL POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 44, 49
(2017) (arguing that the concept of fairness could be used to explain and justify grant-
ing exemptions to religious manifestations).
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exercise of religion is in fact guaranteed by a combination of different
rights, such as the freedom of speech and association and the non-discrimi-
nation norm. The claim is that religious freedom does not add anything new
to the existing body of basic liberties and human security rights.1 65 As some
theorists of religious freedom have asked: do we need religious freedom to
tolerate practices of gender discrimination that are clearly present in relig-
ious institutions? To argue why we do not need religious freedom in this
context, they refer to a combination of basic liberties, such as freedom of
expression, association and the more basic rule that says: in a free society,
everyone should have the right to make choices regarding the establishment
or disestablishment of relationships.
This framework of general liberties helps us to understand why a clear
case of gender discrimination in religious institutions that is considered a
"contentious" religious manifestation, could be tolerated without any refer-
ence to religious freedom. The argumentation pattern at this level of ab-
straction entails that liberal democracies do not need religious freedom to
deal properly with the legal admissibility of religious manifestations that
are at odds with some basic liberties, such as the non-discrimination
right.1 66
E. Again: Any Reason to Care About Religion Because it in Religion?
The theoretical suggestion that draws on the interpretative shield of
abstraction says that it is not necessary to care in law about religion qua
religion. Abstraction suggests that for the involvement in the law and relig-
ion debate, it is not necessary to be aware of what religion in the core en-
tails.'6 7 Thus, there is no need to take the sectarian transcendental or
suprarational aspects of religion into account when we are dealing with
questions of law and religion.1 68 Abstraction is in this sense religion-eva-
165. LABORDE, supra note 1, at 32 (drawing attention to a particular concern
raised by some egalitarian theorists of religious freedom who argue that "freedom of
religion protects a generic capacity, it can be adequately guaranteed through basic lib-
eral freedoms such as freedom of thought, speech, and association.").
166. Cf. EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 98, at 63.
167. See John R. Munich, Comment, Religious Activity in Public Schools: A Pro-
posed Standard, 24 ST. Louis. U. L.J. 379, 388 (1980) ("This definition does not con-
sider the content of the belief nor is it concerned with the institutional manifestations of
a belief.").
168. Traces of abstraction are visible in many debates about religious practices
that are considered contentious, harmful or for different reasons just inappropriate to the
ideals of liberal democracies. One example is the approach of some politicians to ban
face-covering veils as a matter of security, emancipation and the social norm of being
visible. Another example is the way courts have defined ritual male circumcision in
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sive, which makes it abstractionfrom the religious dimension.1 69 The inter-
pretative shield of abstraction that suggests there is no need in law to care
about religion simply because it is religion, is embedded in two philosophi-
cal premises. First, there is no distinctly religious-that is to say a transcen-
dental-justification for religious freedom (the opposition premise).170
Second, the justification for free exercise arises from a framework of non-
sectarian values (the proposition premise).171 In other words, there is no
principled reason to adopt or to provide a sectarian understanding of relig-
ion to deal with questions concerning the free exercise of religion. Thus, the
law in liberal democracies does not need to care about religion simply be-
cause it is religion.
CONCLUSION
Liberal theories of religious freedom have one important feature in
common: abstraction from the religious dimension. Abstraction involves
terms of bodily integrity, public health and the right to self-determination. Similarly, the
proposed bans on ritual slaughter have been defended as a matter of "animal well-
being." Even though it is undisputed that ritual slaughter and male circumcision are
inherently related to Judaism and Islam, abstraction largely leaves aside the religious
dimension of these acts and almost only secular values, presented as universal and gen-
eral, are decisive in the assessment of the legality of such manifestations. The Dutch
debate on the relationship between law and religion should be understood against the
backdrop of two factors. First, the Dutch history of multi-religious minorities has never
meant a total freedom to religious manifestations in public (e.g. the partial prohibition
of religious processions until the late eighties of the last centuries). Second, the situation
of relative religious toleration based on the presence of a multitude of seemingly perma-
nent religious minorities has substantially changed over the last five decades. See
Wahedi, supra note 3, at 134; Geurt Henk Spruyt, Politicians and Epidemics in the
Bible Belt, 12 UTRECHT L. REv. 114, 124 (2016); Marjolein van den Brink & Jet
Tigchelaar, Shaping Genitals, Shaping Perceptions: A Frame Analysis of Male and Fe-
male Circumcision, 30 NETH. Q. Hum. RTS. 417 (2012) (utilizing different frames to
discuss the legal admissibility of male and female circumcision).
169. It is reasonable to argue that when the religious dimension of a contentious
manifestation is translated to a framework of general legal terms, such as, bodily integ-
rity or gender equality, the original religious dimension (e.g. the Jewish Covenant the-
ory that is of importance for circumcision) becomes completely superfluous. Thus, a
very particular dimension that is considered special by a particular group of people
(believers) is abstracted from that area and subsequently discussed in abstract terms.
170. This premise corresponds with the suggestion that abstraction dismisses ar-
guments that aim to justify the special legal protection of religion qua religion.
171. This premise corresponds with the suggestion that abstraction proposes a
more general framework to justify free exercise and it rethinks religious claims for
exemptions from general laws, from that particular framework of general values.
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arguments that advocate the adoption of a non-sectarian, God-empty and
religion-empty understanding of religion in law. This common feature of
the liberal theories of religious freedom dismisses arguments justifying the
special legal protection of religion qua religion. Moreover, abstraction re-
nounces arguments that justify religious freedom with an appeal to any dis-
tinct value of religion. Subsequently, abstraction proposes a general
framework of ecumenical values in order to justify the free exercise and it
rethinks religious claims for exemptions from general laws, from that
framework of non-sectarian values.
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THE HEALTH LAW IMPLICATIONS OF 
RITUAL CIRCUMCISIONS 
Sohail Wahedit 
Many countries around the globe, including liberal democracies, have 
forbidden ritual female circumcision, better known as female genital mutilation in 
all its variants, while ritual circumcision of young boys and female genital modi-
fications for esthetic reasons are allowed. This difference in the legal treatment of 
comparable practices, such as male circumcision, the least invasive version of 
female circumcision and female genital cosmetic surgeries, receives criticism for 
the "double standards" that favors religious believers and the cosmetic surgery 
industry. To address properly the "double standards" criticism, this article focus-
es mainly on the legality of ritual male and female circumcision. It adopts a 
health law perspective to put the legality of both types of circumcision under crit-
ical scrutiny. This is a fruitful approach to explain why ritual male circumcision 
is generally allowed as an exception in law. That is not because of its religious 
narratives, but, because it has been considered a medical intervention that seems 
in the best interest of the child. The health law perspective also posits why female 
circumcision in its most severe variants should remain a crime. These variants of 
female circumcision have no health benefits and harm young female bodies signif-
icantly. The final part of this article reiterates that the health law perspective re-
jects convincingly exemptions for female circumcision and allows ritual male cir-
cumcision conditionally and temporarily. This conclusion gives an unsatisfactory 
feeling as the ban on male circumcision hangs like a Damocles sword above this 
traditional practice. To face the "Damocles sword" criticism and to develop an 
argumentation pattern that would fit a broader sense of justice concerning the 
legality of male circumcision, this article introduces two novel pragmatic argu-
ments that explain the "double standards" regime beyond the health law perspec-
tive. 
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I. Introduction 
The 201 7 arrest and detention of some members of the 
Dawoodi Bohra sect in Detroit, 1 caused a broad wave of public in-
t PhD Candidate, Erasmus School of Law. L.L.B., 2012 and L.L.M., 2015 Utrecht Universi-
ty, the Netherlands. Writing fellow, International Center of Law and Religion Studies' inaugural Ox-
ford Program, "Religion and the Rule of Law," University of Oxford (Jul.-Aug. 2018). Visiting fellow 
Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto (Apr. 2018). Deputy Court Clerk, Rotterdam 
District Court (2012-2015). Intern, Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in Tel Aviv, Israel 
(Jul.-Dec. 2011). Research for this article is made possible by the Erasmus School of Law Innovation 
Programme Research, Erasmus Trustfonds and the International Center of Law and Religion Studies at 
Brigham Young University. Previous versions of this article were presented in Bologna ("European 
Academy of Religion" Annual Conference 2019, March 4-7, 2019); Rabat ("Religion, Law, and Secu-
rity" Conference, The Fifth Annual Conference of the African Consortium for Law and Religion Stud-
ies (AC LARS), International University of Rabat, May 14-17, 2017) and Rotterdam ("Empirical legal 
studies: Fad, Feud or Fellowship?" Conference, Erasmus School of Law, January 19-20, 2017). The 
Rabat AC LARS Conference proceeding version of this article has been published under the title: Fe-
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dignation over the alleged performance of female circumcision (FC) 
in the United States (U.S.).2 As a result, some in the U.S. claimed, 
FC was no longer an "over there" concern. 3 In the upcoming and 
first federal landmark trial on FC in the U.S., the defendants have 
been accused of performing this practice on the genitals of "count-
less" girls and of assisting the circumciser.4 The most striking 
male Circumcision as an African Problem: Double Standards or Harsh Reality?, in M. Christian 
Green, T. Jeremy Gunn & Mark Hill (Eds.), Religion, Law And Security in Africa 385 (2018). (mainly 
focusing on the question as to whether female circumcision is still a unique problem of the African 
continent). I would like to thank M. Christian Green, Wibren van der Burg and Jeroen Temperman for 
their helpful comments on the previous version of this article. For the current version of the article, l 
have benefited tremendously from the talks with Frank Ravitch, Benjamin Berger, Anna Su, Kinnari 
Bhatt, Brett G. Scharffs, Mary Jensen, Jane Wise, and Lance N. Long. Also, I would like to express 
my sincere gratitude and appreciation to Katherine Lovallo, and the rest of the QUINNIPIAC HEALTH 
LA w JOURNAL staff for their tireless editorial efforts, helpful comments and fruitful suggestions. Er-
rors remain mine. Feedback, comments and criticism could be sent directly to wahedi@law.eur.nl. 
1 The Dawoodi Bohra is a branch of the Shia Ismaili sect. The majority of the members of 
this community live in India. Other members of this sect live in Africa, the United Kingdom (U.K.) 
and the United States of America (U.S.). See INNES BOWEN, MEDINA IN BIRMINGHAM, NAJAF IN 
BRENT: INSIDE BRITISH ISLAM 175 (2014) (providing background information about the members of 
the Dawoodi Bohra sect who live in the U.K.). 
2 The use of the more "neutral" term "female circumcision" instead of "female genital muti-
lation" is not meant to breach the broad consensus that the modification of female genitals without any 
medical need is a problematic practice. Rather, it aims to answer the question as to whether it is justi-
fied to treat religious male circumcision differently in law than the least invasive variants of female 
circumcision. In addition, the use of the term "genital mutilation" suggests in advance the inadmissi-
bility of the practice in all its variants, while that is an issue this article aims to put under critical scru-
tiny. See Marjolein Van den Brink & Jet Tigchelaar, Shaping Genitals, Shaping Perceptions: A Frame 
Analysis of Male and Female Circumcision, 30 NETH. Q. HUM. RTS. 417, 422 (2012) (discussing the 
sensitivities concerning the use of the term circumcision instead of genital mutilation). However, the 
use of the term "female circumcision" is quite controversial. See Lynne Marie Kohm, A Brief Assess-
ment of the 25-Year Effect of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 23 CARDOZO J. INT'L & 
COMP. L. 323,338 (2015) (criticizing the use of the term female circumcision instead of female genital 
mutilation and referring in this regards to the negative health consequences of this practice). Cf Obi-
ajulu Nnamuchi, Hands off My Pudendum: A Critique of the Human Rights Approach to Female Geni-
tal Ritual, 15 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L. J. 243, 253 (201 I) (raising the question why female circumci-
sion for traditional reasons is generally associated with harm and mutilation, while the same language 
and approach is not applied to discuss cosmetic interventions upon female bodies). 
3 Shireen Qudosi, Why Freedom of Religion is an Illegitimate Defense for Doctor Accused of 
Performing FGM on 2 Young Girls, WOMEN IN THE WORLD (Apr. I 2, 2017), 
https:/ /womenintheworld.com/20 I 7 /04/21 /why-freedom-of-religion-is-an-illegitimate-defense-for-
doctor-accused-of-performing-fgm-on-2-young-girls/ (arguing that for a long time, female circumci-
sion has been considered an "over there" issue, "confined to dirt-floor shacks in third-world countries 
and carried out by the uneducated and ignorant. We don't imagine it happening in America, in clinics 
run by American-born U.S. citizens."). This is a remarkable denial of the history of female circumci-
sion in the U.S., which was carried out by professional practitioners to encourage the "married, hetero-
sexual, vaginal intercourse," see SARAH B. RODRIGUEZ, FEMALE CIRCUMCISION AND 
CLITORIDECTOMY IN THE UNITED STATES 3 (2014). 
4 Robert Snell, Doctor in Genital Mutilation Case Freed on $4.5M Bond, DET. NEWS (Sept. 
19, 20 I 7), https://eu.detroitnews.com/story/news/Iocal/detroit-city/2017 /09/19/doctor-female-genital-
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charge is against the emergency room physician, Juamana Nagarwa-
la, 5 charged for the circumcision of at least two minor girls from 
Minnesota. In addition, the prosecutor has accused her of circumcis-
ing a larger number of other girls from across the U.S. over a 
twelve-year period. The defense team has disputed the unlawfulness 
of what it has called a harmless "benign religious procedure" that 
consisted of separating the mucous membrane from the genitalia. 6 
As such, the defense team has questioned the applicability of the 
term "genital mutilation" that suggests a priori the unlawfulness of 
any medically unnecessary modification of female genitals. 7 
Parallel to the public outrage in the U.S. and abroad about 
FC for seemingly religious purposes, some have criticized the im-
punity of ritual male circumcision (MC). The critics have raised the 
question why young boys who are at risk of being circumcised for 
non-therapeutic reasons are not protected against this practice. 8 In 
muti lation-case-freed-bond/105 782924/. 
5 Mayra Cuevas, Michigan Doctors Charged in First Federal Genital Mutilation Case in 
U.S., CNN (Apr. 25, 2017), https://edition.cnn.com/2017/04/22/health/detroit-genital-mutilation-
charges/index.html (reporting on the charges against Nagarwala); See also Complaint, United States of 
America v. Jumana Nagarwala (E.D. Mich. Apr. 12, 2017). In January 2018 the Michigan District 
Court dismissed the charge of "conspiracy to transport minor with intent to engage in criminal sexual 
activity," the Court ruled that "[the] facts alleged in the indictment do not support this charge because, 
as a matter of law, FGM, while a prohibited criminal act, is not "criminal sexual activity."" See United 
States of America v. Jumana Nagarwala and Fakhruddin Attar (E.D. Mich. Jan. 14, 2018). 
6 Robert Snell, Judge Keeps Doctor Jailed in Mutilation Case, DET. NEWS (Jul. 19, 2017), 
https://eu.detroi tnews.com/story/news/local/detroit-city/2017 /07 /19/nagarwala-genital-muti lation-
case/103828160/. Cf Lori Ann Larson, Female Genital Mutilation in the United States: Child Abuse 
or Constitutional Freedom, 17 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 237,242 (1996) (discussing the usefulness of 
"cultural defenses" in avoiding criminal liability). Indeed, if the Dawoodi Bohra only separates the 
membrane, it is very hard to prove that such a minor intervention would harm gender equality (what 
about male circumcision?), the right to reproduction (what about cosmetic surgeries?) and the women's 
capability of sexual pleasure. 
7 In the U.S., female circumcision has explicitly been prohibited since 1997. See 18 U.S.C. § 
116, (prohibiting the medicinally unnecessary circumcision, excision or infibulation of any part of the 
genitalia of girls under the age of eighteen). Cf Larson, supra note 6, at 251 (arguing that criminaliza-
tion of female circumcision is not at odds with the right to free exercise, as guaranteed in the First 
Amendment); See also Allen E. White, Female Genital Mutilation in America: The Federal Dilemma, 
10 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 129 (2001); Gregory A. Kelson, Female Circumcision in the Modem Age: 
Should Female Circumcision now be Considered Grounds for Asylum in the United States, 4 BUFF. 
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 185 (1998) (discussing female circumcision from the migration law angle). How-
ever, recently in United States v. Nagarwala, 350 F. Supp. 3d 613 (E.D. Mich. 2018) Judge Bernard A. 
Friedman held that the Federal law banning this practice is unconstitutional because "Congress had no 
authority to pass this statute under either the Necessary and Proper Clause or the Commerce Clause." 
8 Tresa Baldas, Protesters in Detroit Say Male Circumcision Should Also be Outlawed, DET. 
FREE PRESS (Apr. 19, 2017), https://eu.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/detroit/2017/04/17/genita 
I-mutilation-circumcision-protest/I 00562504/. 
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this context, some critics have implicitly pointed to the presence of 
favoritism towards religious groups.9 The legal distinction implies 
allowing some extant religious rituals, such as MC, while outlawing 
other rites, such as FC, as contrary to the norms of civilized socie-
ties, even though some FC variants are quite comparable to MC. 10 
The 2017 Detroit criminal case involving "horrifying acts of 
brutality" fits in two ways with the most recent developments facing 
the area of FC. 11 First, the prevalence of this "over there" problem 
in the U.S. and other countries around the globe challenges the still 
9 The normative criticism asks whether authorities should make distinctions among compara-
ble religious practices. Cf Eugene Volokh, Religious Exemptions and the Detroit Female Genital Mu-
tilation Prosecution, WASH. POST (May 29, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-
conspiracy/wp/2017 /05/23/religious-exemptions-and-the-detroi t-female-genital-mutilation-
prosecution/?noredirect=on&utm _ term=.654dd l 10f4b2 (doubting whether the federal government can 
rely on the argument that there is a compelling state interest "in preventing any cutting of children's 
bodies," arguing that "it's hard to see how the government can label such an interest as compelling 
when a wide range of cutting of children at their parents' behalf is allowed. One obvious example is 
male circumcision; to be sure, there are plausible (but contested) arguments that male circumcision is 
medically beneficial, but many parents have it performed for entirely nonmedical reasons."); See gen-
erally Kenneth Einar Himma, An Uryust Dogma: Why a Special Right to Religion Wrongly Discrimi-
nates against Non-Religious Worldviews, 54 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 217 (2017); Christopher C. Lund, 
Religion is Special Enough, I 03 VA. L. REV. 481 (2017); NELSON TEBBE, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN AN 
EGALITARIAN AGE (2017); CECILE LABORDE, LIBERALISM'S RELIGION (2017); STEVEN D. SMITH, 
THE RISE AND DECLINE OF AMERICAN RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (2014); BRIAN LEITER, WHY TOLERATE 
RELIGION? (2014); RONALD DWORKIN, RELIGION WITHOUT GOD (2013); ANDREW KOPPELMAN, 
DEFENDING AMERICAN RELIGIOUS NEUTRALITY (2013); Micah Schwartzman, What if Religion is Not 
Special?, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 1351 (2012); Michael J. Perry, From Religious Freedom to Moral Free-
dom, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 993 (2010); MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE (2008); 
CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE G. SAGER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE CONSTITUTION 
(2007); WINNIFRED FALLERS SULLIVAN, THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (2005) (engag-
ing in the ongoing debate within liberal political philosophy on the role of religion for the purposes of 
religious accommodation and paying in this regard attention to the criticism of favoritism). 
10 Sohail Wahedi & Renee Kool, De Strafrechtelijke aanpak van meisjesbesnijdenis in een 
rechtsvergelijkende context [The Criminal Law Approach Towards Female Circumcision: A 
Comparative Law Perspective], 7 TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR RELIGIE, RECHT EN BELEID [J. FOR 
RELIGION, L. AND POL'Y], 36 (2016); See generally Nnamuchi, supra note 2, at 253; Moira Dustin, 
Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting in the U.K., 17 EUR J. OF WOMEN'S STUD. I, 8-23 (2010); Ab-
dulmumini A. Oba, Female Circumcision as Female Genital Mutilation: Human Rights or Cultural 
Imperialism, 8 GLOBAL JURIST 1 (2008); Jacquelyn Shaw, Sacred Rites, Sacred Rights: Balancing 
Respect for Culture and the Health Rights of Women and Girls in Islamic Canadian Communities 
Seeking to Practise Female Genital Mutilation, 3 J. L. & EQUALITY 31, 54 (2004) (paying attention to 
the use of different legal regimes within liberal democracies to assess the legality of cultural practices, 
such as male circumcision, female circumcision and cosmetic surgery). 
11 Jacey Fortin, Michigan Doctor Is Accused of Genital Cutting of2 Girls, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 
13, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/13/us/michigan-doctor-fgm-cutting.html. The use of 
such heroic.language to talk about this case complicates a fair trial, as this strategy may result in a "tri-
al by media" situation. 
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prevailing view that FC is above all a major concern of Africa. 12 
Second, the application of seemingly different legal regimes regard-
ing ritual circumcisions fits the criticism of using "double stand-
ards" in the legal assessment of comparable practices. 13 The close 
link between religion and the rise of FC outside Africa challenges us 
to reflect on and question the legal assessment framework of this 
practice. This challenge draws on the question whether FC, at least 
the variants comparable to or less invasive than MC, could be ac-
cepted as religious exemptions in law. The main aim of this article 
is to engage in the current debate in legal theory that questions the 
justification grounds for the different approaches in the law and pol-
itics of liberal democracies towards ritual circumcisions and other 
comparable practices, such as intersex and cosmetic surgeries. 
However, in order to address properly the "double standards" criti-
cism in this context, this article focuses mainly on the different legal 
regimes that apply to ritual male and female circumcision.14 To this 
12 The rise of female circumcision on religious grounds outside Africa and the fall or de-
crease of toleration for male circumcision in liberal democracies may have implications for the legal 
assessment frameworks of ritual circumcisions. See Wahedi & Kool, supra note 10, at 40 (discussing 
that within the Dutch political discourse some have criticized the presentation of female circumcision 
as a unique problem of Africa). A counter-narrative approach is a useful and promising method to 
challenge the dominant perspective, resulting in new insights that give room for discussion. Cf Can-
dace N. Hill, Selling Sex: The Costs of Criminalization, 21 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L. J. 131, 133 (2018) 
(challenging the dominant view that relates prostitution to abuse, human trafficking and drugs and 
arguing that this perspective neglects completely the circumstance that many sex workers "are often 
willing participants in the work that they do."); See also on the relevance of developing a narrative 
Lance N. Long, ls There Any Science Behind the Art of Legal Writing, 16 WYO. L. REV. 287, 288 
(2016). 
13 Dustin, supra note 10, at 12 ("A double standard is visible when comparing attitudes to 
FGM/C with those to various surgeries routinely carried out in the West. It is often pointed out that 
FGM/C bears little relation to male circumcision, hence the rejection of the terrn female circumcision. 
But while male circumcision is less invasive than clitoridectomy or incision, there are similarities be-
tween the circumcision of girls and boys"). Cf also Melinda Jones, lntersex Genital Mutilation - A 
Western Version of FGM, 25 LNT'L J. CHILD. RTS. 396 (2017); Ekaterina Yahyaoui Krivenko, Rethink-
ing Human Rights and Culture through Female Genital Surgeries, 37 HUM. RTS. Q. 107 (2015); The-
odore Bennett, Beauty and the Beast: Analogising Between Cosmetic Surgery and Female Genital 
Mutilation, 14 FLINDERS L.J. 49 (2012); Nancy Ehrenreich & Mark Barr, lntersex Surgery, Female 
Genital Cutting, and the Selective Condemnation of Cultural Practices, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 
71 (2005); Hope Lewis & Isabelle R. Gunning, Cleaning Our Own House: Exotic and Familial Hu-
man Rights Violations, 4 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 123, 132 (1998); Isabelle R. Gunning, Arrogant 
Perception, World-Travelling and Multicultural Feminism: The Case of Female Genital Surgeries, 23 
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 189,213 (1992) (all criticizing the fact that the law in Western democra-
cies generally singles out all types of female circumcision for special prohibitions, leaving completely 
unpunished comparable practices). 
14 Cf Marie Fox & Michael Thomson, Short Changed? The Law and Ethics of Male Circum-
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end, it describes in Part I what male and female circumcision entail, 
as well as their geographical prevalence and the main reasons be-
hind these two major types of circumcision. This Part also discusses 
how both major types of circumcision affect human bodies. In addi-
tion, it gives an overview of the legal status of ritual circumcisions. 
Part II discusses the criticism of "double standards". The 
main claim of this Part is that the criticism of "double standards" 
arises out of the liberal approach to extant religious practices that 
are protected qua religious. This approach draws primarily on a 
non-sectarian, religion-empty language to discuss the legality of 
contentious religious manifestations, such as ritual circumcisions of 
young boys and girls. 15 This Part briefly highlights this approach as 
abstraction from the religious dimension. The liberal approach of 
abstraction dismisses arguments that justify religious practices qua 
religious. The liberal argument's justification for a religious ac-
commodation identifies a framework of general and non-sectarian 
values that are ecumenical in nature. To put the legality of both 
types of circumcision under critical scrutiny, the liberal perspective 
adopted in this article, gives rise to draw on a health law perspec-
tive, which is clearly non-sectarian of nature. This is a fruitful ap-
proach to explain why ritual MC is generally allowed as an excep-
tion in law. That is not because of its religious narratives, but, be-
because it has been considered a medical intervention that seems to 
be in the best interest of the child. The health law perspective also 
posits why FC in its most severe variants should remain a crime. 
These types of FC harm young female bodies without any medical 
need. 
cision, 13 INT'L J. CHILD. RTS. 161 (2005) ("while female circumcision is constructed as morally and 
legally unacceptable within a civilised society, male circumcision is characterised as a standard and 
benign medical practice."); Cf also Johan D. Van der Vyver, International Standards for the Promo-
tion and Protection of Children's Rights: American and South African Dimensions, 15 BUFF. HUM. 
RTS. L. REV. 81, 105 (2009) (arguing that within the South-Afiican legal regime all variants offemale 
circumcision are prohibited. The same is true for cultural male circumcision, while religious male cir-
cumcision is not prohibited). 
15 Refusing child vaccinations on religious grounds concerns another appropriate example of 
a contentious religious manifestation. Cf Stephanie A. Ferraiolo, Justice for Injured Children: A Look 
into Possible Criminal Liability of Parents Whose Unvaccinated Children Infect Others, 19 
QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L. J. 29 (2016); Geurt Henk Spruyt, Politicians and Epidemics in the Bible Belt, 
12 UTRECHT L. REV. 114, 124 (2016). 
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This Part also illustrates how the health law perspective re-
jects exemptions for FC and allows ritual MC conditionally and 
temporarily. This conclusion gives an unsatisfactory feeling as the 
ban on MC hangs like a Damocles sword above this traditional prac-
tice. To face the "Damocles sword" criticism and to develop an ar-
gumentation pattern that would fit a broader sense of justice con-
cerning the legality of MC, this article introduces two novel 
pragmatic arguments that explain the "double standards" regime be-
yond the health law perspective. 
This article concludes with the argument that FC is no longer 
a unique problem of Africa. The rise and presence of the relatively 
less invasive versions of this practice outside Africa for religious 
reasons and the decreasing toleration for MC challenge us to rethink 
the legal assessment frameworks of FC and MC. Such reflection, 
based on a liberal framework of rights and liberties, and a health law 
perspective results in the conclusion that the religious dimension of 
ritual circumcisions does not justify legal exemptions for medically 
unnecessary interventions that irreversibly modify the human 
body. 16 Moreover, the health law perspective adopted by this article 
supports the argument that any liberal justification for exemptions 
that allow serious interventions upon human bodies should rest on 
grounds that are comprehensible to a broad public of believers and 
non-believers. The health law perspective is a very useful approach 
in this regard. 
II. Ritual Circumcisions 
The legal admissibility of female circumcision and that of 
young boys for ritual and religious reasons is put under critical scru-
tiny by a growing number of legal scholars, politicians, human 
rights organizations and other internationals institutions. The broad 
consensus among human rights scholars, some politicians and regu-
latory authorities to eliminate and combat the circumcision of girls 
and women, is lacking, or at least not to the same extent present re-
16 This argument rests in particular on the role of religion for the purposes of justifying reli-
gious exemptions within the paradigm of liberal political philosophy. See Micah Schwartzman, Reli-
gion, Equality and Anarchy, in CECILE LABORDE & AURELIA BARDON (EDS.), RELIGION IN LIBERAL 
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY (2017). 
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garding the legal admissibility of ritual male circumcision. Never-
theless, over the recent years, a growing number of scholars and 
predominantly European courts have questioned the legality of the 
so-called irreversible practice of infant male circumcision. 17 This 
Part describes from different angles the practices of ritual male and 
female circumcision. First, it defines female circumcision. Second, 
it provides a description of male circumcision. 
A. Female Circumcision 
The description of female circumcision includes the scope of 
this practice; the types of circumcision; the health effects of differ-
ent types of circumcision; the grounds people usually rely on to cir-
cumcise and finally the legal status of this type of intervention upon 
the human body. 
i. Scope and Prevalence 
The scope of female circumcision concerns the estimated 
scale on which young girls and women are at risk of circumcision, 
or have been subjected to this practice. In a recent study, the World 
Health Organization (WHO) has estimated that on a global level, 
approximately 200 million young girls and women have undergone 
one of the variants ofFC, varying from very serious to relatively 
light. Moreover, this leading source on the scope ofFC has estimat-
ed that three million girls are annually at the risk of FC. 18 Over the 
last decade, in most of the practicing countries, girls and women 
undergo circumcision before the age of five. Research reveals that 
up to 90%, and even close to 100% of girls and women undergoes 
circumcision. This list of countries where a large number of girls 
and women in the age category from fifteen to forty-nine years old 
17 This fits a broader tendency in which the legal admissibility of a wide range of traditional 
religious manifestations are questioned. This tendency to challenge the legality of religious manifesta-
tions that are considered 'contentious' because of their 'norm-deviant' character is mainly present in 
liberal democracies. See Sohail Wahedi, Abstraction from the Religious Dimension, 24 Buff. Hum. 
Rts. L. Rev. I (2017-2018). See also Robert F. Cochran, Jr. & Michael A. Helfand, The Competing 
Claims of Law and Religion: Who Should Influence Whom?, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 1051, 1052 (2013) (ex-
pecting that "the endless jousting" between law and religion "will undoubtedly remain a permanent 
feature of the human experience."). 
18 WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION (WHO), (2016). 
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experienced one of the variants of FC is led by African countries, 
such as Somalia (98%), Guinea (97%), Djibouti (93%) and Sierra 
Leone (90%). 19 In other FC practicing countries, about or nearly 
half of the girls have been circumcised in the period immediately af-
ter the birth, but before the age of fifteen. The African countries 
with more than or approximately 50% of girls circumcised are led 
by Gambia (56%), Mauritania (54%) and Guinea (46%). 20 Given the 
very high percentages young girls and women who have been cir-
cumcised, it should be clear that the case of female circumcision 
does not stand for some small or marginal problem. Circumcision of 
female genitals directly affects the health and lives of millions of 
women. 
Therefore, it is at least very remarkable that for a very long 
time FC was not considered a specific health concern of internation-
al organizations.21 Rather, the practice received particular concern in 
Africa. 22 Hence, the main focus was on helping African countries to 
19 UNICEF, FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION/CUTTING: A GLOBAL CONCERN (2016). Including 
nations with percentages just below 90% such as: Mali (89%) Egypt (87%) and Sudan (87%) makes 
the list of countries practicing female circumcision even greater. 
20 id. 
21 Initially, female circumcision fell under practices "that had been firmly established for cen-
turies" and for this reason, practices such as female circumcision should be approached step by step. 
Against this "cultural" backdrop, the World Health Organization ("WHO") initially declined to study 
the health consequences of female circumcision. See Nitza Berkovitch & Karen Bradley, The Globali-
zation of Women's Status: Consensus/Dissensus in the World Polity, 42 Soc. PERSP. 481, 489 (1999) 
(referring to Resolution 680 B II (XXVI) of the Economic and Social Council that had called upon the 
WHO "to undertake a study of the persistence of customs which subject girls to ritual operations." 
However, the WHO rejected this and said in response "that the ritual operations in question are based 
on social and cultural backgrounds, the study of which is outside the competence of the [WHO]."); See 
also Obiajulu Nnamuchi, "Circumcision" or "Mutilation"? Voluntary or Forced Excision? Extricat-
ing the Ethical and Legal Issues in Female Genital Ritual, 25 J.L. & HEALTH 85, 87 (2012) (referring 
to the "consensus that the influx of Africans and Arabs into Western countries contributed to interna-
tional involvement in what, heretofore, was generally regarded as a legitimate cultural practice worthy 
of deference and respect."). 
22 Cf. Van den Brink & Tigchelaar, supra note 2, at 427 (developing a typology for male and 
female circumcision: African, American and Abrahamic and arguing that while female circumcision 
only fits the African category, male circumcision seems to fit all the three categories). Critical of pre-
senting female circumcision as an African issue: Wairimu Ngaruiya Njambi, 'One Vagina to Go', 24 
Aus. FEMINIST STUD. 167, 169 (2009) (arguing that "[by] framing female genital practices as the only 
theme that defines the presence of African vaginas,( ... ) African women now become the example of 
the 'problem/practice' and the Western women the 'solution/theory'. It is in such reductive representa-
tions that some postcolonial feminists( ... ) have recognised the legacy of colonialist discourse hidden 
well beneath the (often well intended) universalising rhetoric of women's common experience."); 
Makau wa Mutua, Limitations on Religious Rights: Problematizing Religious Freedom in the African 
Context, 5 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 75, 89 (1999); See also RODRIGUEZ, supra note 3 (on the pres-
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combat this practice. 23 Today, the international community uses an 
entirely different language to discuss FC. It considers this practice a 
"global concem."24 The shift of focus from local to global gains un-
derstanding against the backdrop of recent studies revealing that 
many girls and women from outside Africa have been subjected to 
FC. As such, there are reports of FC in Iran, Iraqi Kurdistan, Indo-
nesia, and Malaysia. 25 The same is true for countries across Europe, 
the United States and Australia.26 Therefore, FC is not a unique 
problem of the African continent. It is rather an omnipresent phe-
nomenon that is practiced from North America to Europe, Asia and 
Oceania. The Detroit case in the U.S. is recent proof of the "global 
presence" of FC. 
ii. Variants 
The practice of FC or genital mutilation refers to any non-
therapeutic interventions on female genitalia. The literature on this 
practice categorizes FC, in accordance with the classification made 
by the WHO, into four types, which gradually vary from serious 
(Types I to III) to relatively less invasive interventions (generally 
Type IV) on the female genitalia. These four types concern clitori-
ence of female circumcision in the U.S.). 
23 See WHO, FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION: PROGRAMMES TO DATE (1999) ( demonstrating 
the first WHO publication on programs meant to combat female circumcision). 
24 UNICEF, supra note 19. 
25 KAMEEL AHMADY, A COMPREHENSIVE RESEARCH STUDY ON FEMALE GENITAL 
MUTILATION/CUTTING (FGM/C) IN IRAN 26 (2015) (reporting on the prevalence of female circumci-
sion in Iran amongst the Sunni Shafi 'i minority in the western and southern provinces of Iran); WADI, 
FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION IN IRAQI-KURDISTAN (2010) (reporting on the prevalence of female 
circumcision in the northern part of Iraq that is home to a large Kurdish population). In 2013, WADI 
has reported that in certain areas of Iraq a significant decrease in practicing female circumcision exists. 
See Significant Decrease of Female Genital Mutilation (FGM) in Iraqi-Kurdistan, New Survey Data 
Shows, Stop FGM in Kurdistan (Oct. 21, 2013), 
http://www.stopfgmkurdistan.org/html/english/updates/update018e.htm.; See also Alissa Koski & 
Jody Heymann, Thirty-year Trends in the Prevalence and Severity of Female Genital Mutilation: A 
Comparison of 22 Countries, 2 BMJ GLOB. HEALTH 1 (2017) (reporting on the prevalence of female 
circumcision in Indonesia, Malaysia and India). 
26 SARA JOHNSDOTTER & RUTH M. MESTRE, FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION IN EUROPE: AN 
ANALYSIS OF COURT CASES (2015) (reporting on the legal enforcement against female circumcision in 
Europe); Howard Goldberg, et al, Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting in the United States: Updated 
Estimates of Women and Girls at Risk, 2012, 131 PUB. HEALTH REP. 340 (2016) (estimating the 
amount of girls and women who are at risk of circumcision in the U. S.); Juliet Brough Rogers, The 
First Case Addressing Female Genital Mutilation in Australia, 41 ALTERNATIVE L.J. 235 (2016) (re-
porting on the first case about female circumcision in Australia). 
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dectomy (Type I), excision (Type 11), infibulation (Type III) and a 
rest category (Type IV). The WHO defines Type I as the removal of 
the clitoris, either partly or completely. It also makes a distinction 
between the removal of the clitoral hood that has been called cir-
cumcision and clitoridectomy that involves the removal of both the 
clitoris and the clitoral hood. Type II is the removal of the clitoris 
and the labia minora, either partly or completely and either in com-
bination with or independently of excising the labia majora. The 
WHO distinguishes Type II in three specific interventions. First, is 
the complete removal of the labia minora. Second, is the removal of 
the clitoris in combination with the labia minora, either partly or 
completely. Third, is the removal of the clitoris, the labia minora 
and majora, either partly or completely. 27 Type III is the most severe 
intervention on female genitalia, as it almost closes the vaginal 
opening and subsequently creates "a covering seal by cutting and 
appositioning the labia minora and/or the labia majora, with or 
without excision of the clitoris."28 The rest of the categories ofFC 
included in Type IV cover a wide range of interventions, varying 
from pricking and piercing to incision and cauterization.29 The De-
troit case is an example of Type IV circumcision. 
According to the WHO, the vast majority of circumcised 
girls and women have undergone one of the variants of T~e I, II 
and IV. Only 10% of circumcision cases concern Type III. 0 How-
ever, in some countries, such as Somalia,31 and previously Djibouti 
and Sudan, 32 a large number of girls and women experienced the 
most severe circumcision, Type III, infibulation. The same is true 
for particular ethnic minorities in Eritrea who practice FC. Almost 
all circumcision cases within these minority groups include sewn 
closure of the vaginal opening. 33 However, in a 2013 report, the 
27 WHO, supra note 18, at 1-4. 
28 Id. at 4. 
29 Id. 
30 WHO, ELIMINATING FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION: AN lNTERAGENCY STATEMENT 
(2008). 
31 UNICEF, FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION/CUTTING: A STATISTICAL OVERVIEW AND 
EXPLORATION OF THE DYNAMICS OF CHANGE 47 (2013). 
32 WHO, FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION: AN OVERVIEW 8 (1998). 
33 UNICEF, supra note 31, at 48 ( estimating that the vast majority of girls who belong to the 
following ethnic minorities have undergone infibulation: Hedarib (100%); Afar (96%); Nara (92%); 
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United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund 
(UNICEF) has indicated that infibulation is less common among 
groups that practiced this type of circumcision. 34 Outside the FC 
hotspot in Africa, for example, in Indonesia and Malaysia, girls and 
women are subjected to the relatively lighter variants of FC, such as 
Types I and IV. 35 However, in Iraqi Kurdistan both the relatively 
lighter and the more severe variants prevail. 36 
iii. Health Risks of Female Circumcision 
There is consensus amongst researchers that FC, if practiced 
on non-therapeutic grounds, there is consensus amongst researchers 
that FC, if practiced on non-therapeutic grounds, such as, for tradi-
tional and religious purposes, provides generally no health bene-
fits. 37 On the contrary, its consequences for bodily integrity and 
health could be very devastating. This is due to the fact that most 
girls and women are circumcised in an unsterilized setting by tradi-
tional circumcisers who are generally not aware of the complexities 
of the female body.38 Depending on the type of circumcision, FC af-
Bilen (88%); Saho (83%); Tigre (75%). Only two practicing ethnic minorities seem to choose for the 
less invasive variants of female circumcision: Kunama (31 % practices infibulation) and Tigrigna ( only 
2% practices the most severe type of female circumcision). 
34 Id. at 114. 
35 Abdul Khan Rashid, Sapna S. Patil & Anita S. Valimalar, The Practice of Female Genital 
Mutilation Among the Rural Malays in North Malaysia, 9 INTERNET J. OF THIRD WORLD MED. 1, 4 
(2009); Lanny Octavia, Circumcision and Muslim Women's Identity in Indonesia, 21 INDONESJA J. 
FOR ISLAMIC STUD. 419,423 (2014) (reporting on the presence of symbolic nicking and cutting in Ma-
laysia and Indonesia). See also Jennifer Baumgardner, A Multi-Level, Integrated Approach to Ending 
Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting in Indonesia, 1 J. GLOB. JUST. & PUB. POL'Y 267, 272 (2015) (fe-
male circumcision "in Indonesia is divided between "symbolic only" circumcision, where there is no 
incision or excision, and "harmful" forms, which can include both incision and excision."). Cf. 
Valeska David & Julie Fraser, A Legal Pluralist Approach to the Use of Cultural Perspectives in the 
Implementation and Adjudication of Human Rights Norms, 23 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 75, 94 (2016-
2017) (describing the challenge Indonesia faces to combat female circumcision.) 
36 Cf Berivan A Yasin et al., Female Genital Mutilation Among Iraqi Kurdish Women: A 
Cross-sectional Study from Erbil City, 13 BMC PUB. HEALTH 809 (2013) (reporting that in the Iraqi 
city of Erbil the most common type of circumcision concerns clitoridectomy (Type I in the WHO clas-
sification). 
37 WHO, supra note 18, at 1. Although, it has been reported that in the past some groups be-
lieved that circumcision is necessary to save lives, see WHO, supra note 23, at 6 (reporting that "in 
Nigeria some people believe that if the head of the baby touches the clitoris, the baby will die."). 
38 WHO, supra note 18, at I. However, the WHO has rejected the "medicalization" of female 
circumcision. See WHO, GLOBAL STRATEGY TO STOP HEALTH-CARE PROVIDERS FROM PERFORMING 
FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION 9 (2010) ("The involvement of health-care providers in the perfor-
mance of FGM is likely to create a sense of legitimacy for the practice. It gives the impression that the 
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fects female bodies in different ways. The WHO has categorized the 
health risks of female circumcision into five categories, varying 
from immediate risks to long-term consequences. Other risks that 
might significantly affect female bodies concern obstetric dangers, 
sexual functioning complications and psychological damages. 
As such, pain, shocks, infections, and death caused by severe 
bleedings after circumcision are all qualified as the immediate risks 
of FC. 39 Caesarean, episiotomy and resuscitation of a new born baby 
are amongst the obstetric dangers of practicing FC that are not only 
threatening to females but also their newborn babies.40 The removal 
of some parts of the genitals that influence the sexual satisfaction 
experience of females, such as the practice of a clitoridectomy, 
causes sexual functioning complexities, such as dyspareunia: pain 
during sexual intercou,rse. Girls and women who have been subject-
ed to infibulation face a much higher risk of dyspareunia. Less sex-
ual pleasure and orgasms are some other serious negative conse-
quences that FC might cause upon the sexual functioning of 
females. 41 The psychological risks of this practice include various 
mental disorders such as depression, post-traumatic stress syndrome 
and anxiety disorders. 42 In the long-term, FC might cause, amongst 
procedure is good for health, or at least that it is harmless."). See also G.I. Serour, Medicalization of 
Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting, 19 AFR. J. OF UROLOGY 145 (reporting on the rise of health care 
professionals who circumcise females); Bettina Shell-Duncan, The Medicalization of Female "Cir-
cumcision": Harm Reduction or Promotion of a Dangerous Practice? 52 Soc. SCI. & MED. 1013 
(2001) (outlining the ethical debate on the "medicalization" of female circumcision). 
39 WHO, supra note 18, at 6. Additional immediate risks include: hemorrhage, genital tissue 
swelling, high risk ofHlV transmission, and various urinary infections and complexities. Furthermore, 
circumcision could have fatal consequences., see Bronwyn Winter, Women, the Law, and Cultural 
Relativism in France: The Case of Excision, 1. OF WOMEN rN CULTURE AND Soc'Y 939, 944 (1994) 
(discussing the death of several babies in France due to female circumcision and its effects on the 
criminal enforcement against practicing circumcision upon female genitals). 
40 WHO, supra note 18, at 5-6. 
41 WHO, supra note 18, at 6. Cf Abo Bakr A. Mitwaly et al., A Recent Look for the Implica-
tion and Attitude of Practicing Female Genital Mutilation in Upper Egypt: a Cross Sectional Study, 6 
TNT. J. REPROD. CONTRACEPT. OBSTET. GYNECOL. 4224, 4226 (2017) (describing that over 40% of the 
circumcised women participating in this project faced complications in the field of sexual function-
ing); See also Rodriguez, supra note 3, at 3 (doubting whether practicing clitoridectomy in the U.S., a 
few decades ago, was meant to restrain sexual pleasure or rather increase satisfaction during sexual 
intercourse. Rodriguez concludes that the ultimate goal of female circumcision was to move "female 
sexual behavior to married, heterosexual, vaginal intercourse."). 
42 WHO, supra note 18, at 7; See also Jeroen Knipscheer et al., Mental Health Problems As-
sociated with Female Genital Mutilation, 39 PSYCH. BULL. 273, 276 (2015) ("Circumcised immigrant 
women in this study are likely to report emotional disturbances that relate to FGM, with about a sixth 
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others, chronic vaginal complexities, such as vaginal discharge and 
itching, urination problems and menstrual difficulties.43 
Although there are many studies confirming these negative 
health consequences of FC, a big challenge remains according to the 
WHO to create awareness amongst professionals who deal with FC. 
Unfortunately, they "are still often unaware of the many negative 
health consequences and remain inadequately trained to recognize 
and treat them properly."44 
iv. Justification Grounds 
Groups rely on no single specific ground to justify practicing 
FC. Therefore, no single explanation accounts for the continued 
practice of FC. Rather, a combination of grounds and circumstances 
are mentioned as rationales for FC. The most common: that the cir-
cumcision of girls and women is meant to stress femininity, chastity, 
the transition to adulthood and cultural expectations about the role 
and identity of the women in society.45 Against this backdrop, some 
have argued that FC constitutes a "gendered practice."46 FC has also 
been practiced on religious grounds within particular Islamic, Jew-
of them reporting scores above the threshold for [post-traumatic stress disorder] and a third reporting 
severe levels of depression or anxiety."). 
43 WHO, supra note 18, at 7. Also, the WHO mentions reproductive tract infections, painful 
urinations and recurring urinary tract infections as some other long-term risks of undergoing female 
circumcision. See also Renee Kool, The Dutch Approach to Female Genital Mutilation in View of the 
ECHR. The Time for Change Has Come, 6 UTRECHT L. REV. 51, 54 (2010) (evaluating the legal 
approach in the Netherlands to female circumcision in light of the European Convention on Human 
Rights and the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, arguing that "[ notwithstanding] the 
'good intentions' underlying the cultural tradition, FGM expresses a gendered image of female sexual-
ity, resulting in serious damage to the reproductive rights of women."). 
44 WHO, supra note 18, at 5. 
45 Id. at 1. Cf Preston D. Mitchum, Slapping the Hand of Cultural Relativism: Female Geni-
tal Mutilation, Male Dominance, and Health as a Human Rights Framework, 19 WILLIAM & MARY J. 
WOMEN & L. 585, 590-91 (2013); Christina Sibian, Female Genital Mutilation/Circumcision: Recon-
ciling the Ongoing Universalistl Cultural Relativist Debate to Promote a Cross-Cultural Dialogue, 33 
WlNDSOR REv. L. & Soc. ISSUES 72, 74 (2013); Patricia A. Broussard, The Importation of Female 
Genital Mutilation to the West: The Cruelest Cut of All, 44 U.S.F. L. REV. 787, 790 (2010) (generally 
confirming that female circumcision has been justified for a wide range of reasons, varying from reli-
gious to more cultural meant to stress femininity). 
46 Kool, supra note 43, at 54 (claiming that female circumcision "expresses a gendered image 
of female sexuality"); See also Patricia A. Broussard, Female Genital Mutilation: Exploring Strategies 
for Ending Ritualized Torture; Shaming, Blaming, and Utilizing the Convention against Torture, 15 
DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 19, 32-33 (2008) (providing an overview of arguments claiming that 
female circumcision aims to reaffirm the superiority of men). 
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ish and Christian traditions.
47 
Recent studies reveal that in Iran, Ma-
laysia, Indonesia and Iraqi Kurdistan, female circumcision has been 
justified on religious grounds in a significant number of cases. 48 The 
high-ranked Al-Azhar University in Egypt has repeatedly empha-
sized that the relationship between Islam and FC is very complicat-
ed.49 More specifically, in 2006, the Al-Azhar declared that neither 
the Quran, nor the Hadith support the "violent" practice of FC, de-
spite the fact that some girls and women undergo circumcision with-
in particular Islamic traditions.
50 
Jewish and Christian scholars have 
adopted the same critical approach towards the religious justifica-
. f h . 51 hon o t e practice. 
v. The Legal Response 
Today, FC is considered a serious concern and violation of 
human rights. 
52 
However, this human rights perspective on FC has 
47 Mitchum, supra note 45, at 593; Cf I. El-Damanhoury, The Jewish and Christian View on 
Female Genital Mutilation, 19 AFR. J. OF UROLOGY 127 (2013); Lyda Favali, What is Missing: (Fe-
male Genital Surgeries Jnfibulation, Excision, C/itoridectomy - in Eritrea), I GLOBAL JURIST I, 38 
(2001). 
48 AHMADY, supra note 25, at 14. See also Rashid, Patil & Valimalar, supra note 35, at 3; 
Baumgardner, supra note 35, at 268; Rozhgar A. Saleem et al., Female Genital Mutilation in Iraqi 
Kurdistan: Description and Associated Factors 53 WOMEN & HEALTH, 537, 543 (2013). 
49 Wahedi & Kool, supra note 10, at 40; See Maurits S. Berger, Understanding Sharia in the 
West, 6 J. L., RELIGION & ST. 236, 253 (2018) (regarding the complexity of this relationship, arguing 
that the broadly supported call amongst religious leaders concerning the fragile relationship between 
Islam and female circumcision, does not refrain Sudanese and Egyptian communities from performing 
female circumcision as a religious practice). 
50 See also Urfan Khaliq, Beyond the Veil: An Analysis of the Provisions of the Women's 
Convention in the Law as Stipulated in Shari'ah, 2 BUFF. J. lNT'L L. I, 18 (1995) (arguing that the 
practice of female circumcision cannot rest on religious grounds). Cf Hend El-Behary, Female Geni-
tal Mutilation is Forbidden in Islam: Dar Al-Jfta, EGYPT INDEP. (Jun. 5, 2018), 
https://www.egyptindependent.com/female-genital-mutilation-is-not-islamic-dar-al-ifta-says/; Amira 
El Ahl, Theologians Battle Female Circumcision, SPIEGEL (Dec. 6, 2006), 
http://www.spiegel.de/intemational/spiegel/a-small-revolution-in-cairo-theologians-battle-female-
circumcision-a-452790.html. 
51 Wahedi & Kool, supra note 10, at 40. 
52 WHO, supra note 18, at 5; See also Anouk Guine & Francisco Javier Moreno Fuentes, 
Engendering Redistribution, Recognition, and Representation: The Case of Female Genital Mutilation 
(FGM) in the United Kingdom and France, 35 POL & Soc'Y 477, 505 (2007) (arguing that in the 
French context, the process of secularization and pursuing gender equality pave the way to combat 
female circumcision "but only if secularization does not become arrogant and oppressive universal-
ism."); Amy Bartholomew, Human Rights and Post-imperialism: Arguing for a Deliberative Legiti-
mation of Human Rights, 9 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 25, 37 (2003) (criticizing Michael Walzer's posi-
tion regarding female circumcision by some scholars as "culturally intolerant," "because it is based 
simply on conventional or social acceptance of the relevant rights and the hegemonic objections" of 
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been adopted relatively recently. 53 After all, FC in all its variants 
has been considered a human rights violation only since 1994,54 de-
spite earlier international calls to combat all practices that are harm-
ful to women. Indeed, the Economic and Social Council urged back 
in 1952 that all of its member states take necessary steps to prevent 
practices that violate the physical integrity of women. In 1958, the 
Council called upon the WHO to provide an overview of the harm-
ful practices that girls around the globe face and to consider how 
such acts could be eliminated. However, given the traditional and 
cultural sensitivity over problematic rituals, the WHO declined to 
carry out this study, arguing that it lacked jurisdiction to focus on 
practices that have primarily a cultural nature and not a medical 
one. 55 Thus, for a long time, it was not self-evident that FC fell into 
the context of a human rights issue. Nevertheless, in the aftermath 
of the 1994 international recognition ofFC as a serious violation of 
fundamental rights, a quick shift was visible toward the adoption of 
concrete measures.56 
Today, many states around the globe, including African 
states, have developed specific legal provisions that explicitly ban 
circumcision of girls and women for non-therapeutic reasons57 . 
Some states, such as Belgium, have even criminalized circumcision 
of adults. This approach has been criticized fiercely as applying 
"double standards," since cosmetic surgeries and other medically 
complex cultural practices of minority groups.). Cf Saul Levmore, Can Wrinkles be Glamorous? in 
Saul Levmore & Martha C. Nussbaum, Aging Thoughtfully: Conversations About Retirement, Ro-
mance, Wrinkles, And Regret 104 (2017) (pointing out that criticizing the practice of female circumci-
sion is considered as "cultural colonialism", but these critics of the opponents of female circumcision 
are considered "moral relativists"); Van den Brink & Tigchelaar, supra note 2, at 430 (clarifying why 
some communities prefer a more neutral medical frame to discuss female circumcision instead of the 
normative and sensitive human rights frame); Nnamuchi, supra note 21, at 91; Njambi, supra note 22, 
at 172; Gunning, supra note 13, at 198 ( criticizing the universalistic human rights discourse in combat-
ting the traditional practice of female circumcision). 
53 Nnamuchi, supra note 21, at 87. 
54 United Nations, Economic and Social Council, "Plan of Action for the Elimination of 
Harmful Traditional Practices Affecting the Health of Women and Children," 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/10/Add.1 (1994). 
55 Berkovitch & Bradley, supra note 21, at 489. 
56 Renee Kool & Sohail Wahedi, European Models of Citizenship and the Fight Against Fe-
male Genital Mutilation, in Scott N. Romaniuk & Marguerite Marlin (Eds.), Development and the 
Politics of Human Rights 205-221 (2015). 
57 Bettina Shell-Duncan et al., Legislating Change? Responses to Criminalizing Female Gen-
ital Cutting in Senegal, 47 L. & Soc'Y REV. 803,806 (2013). 
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non-necessary interventions are not prohibited equally. 58 Countries 
that have not adopted specific provisions to combat this practice 
within the European Union, for instance, rely on general criminal 
law provisions that ban, for example, bodily injury and removal of 
body parts. 59 Despite these firm condemnations and legislation de-
signed to eliminate the practice of female circumcision, serious con-
cerns about the lack of "successes" in the criminal law approach to-
wards this practice persist. 60 
The complexity of successfully enforcing criminal laws to 
combat FC is exacerbated in part by a lack of coherence in the legis-
latu.re 's approach towards banning it. In countries where FC is con-
ducted on a large scale, such as some African states, the criminal 
laws implemented and condemnations of the practice are often in-
sufficient to eliminate it.61 For example, in Mauritania, it is not for-
bidden by law to circumcise girls and women at certified healthcare 
centers. In South Africa, the circumcision of female adults is not 
explicitly criminalized. 62 Further complicating the legal fight against 
FC is the large-scale support for circumcision within the practicing 
groups as well as the fear of making circumcision an "underground" 
intervention. Therefore, some argue that criminalizing a practice 
that is so widely supported is not only ineffective, but also problem-
58 Wahedi & Kool, supra note 10. Cf Nnamuchi, supra note 21, at 102 (relying on a compar-
ison between the lighter version of female circumcision, clitoridotomy, and ritual male circumcision 
and developing the following argumentation pattern: "[circumcised] males throughout the ages have 
lived normal and fulfilling lives and have not suffered any of the consequences associated with FGM. 
Because there is no evidence that the lives of circumcised men became intolerable as a consequence of 
having lost penile prepuces (foreskin), it is reasonable to assume that circumcised females would be 
similarly situated. Therefore, though it may be a moral wrong, we cannot label as evil subjecting non-
consenting women to a clitoridotomy unless we are prepared to also ascribe evil to male circumci-
sion."). 
59 European Inst. for Gender Equal., Female Genital Mutilation in the European Union and 
Croatia 43 (2013). 
60 See Christopher T. Paresi, Symbolic Rites: Examining the Adequacy of Federal Legislation 
Addressing the Problem of Female Excision in the United States, 8 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 163 
(2002); Holly Maguigan, Will Prosecutions for Female Genital Mutilation Stop the Practice in the 
U.S.?, 8 TEMP. POL & C!V. RTS. L. REV. 391 (1999) (questioning the positive effects of criminalizing 
female circumcisions has on the elimination of this practice). 
61 See Lwamwe Muzima, Towards a Sensitive Approach lo Ending Female Genital Mutila-
tion/Cutting in Africa, 3 SOAS L.J. 73, 92 (2016) (arguing that criminalization is not per se an appro-
priate instrument to eliminate female circumcision. Governments need to support non-profit organiza-
tions in order to bring the concerns about female circumcision under the attention of a broader public). 
62 Meda Couzens, The Prosecution of Female Genital Mutilation: A Discussion of its Impli-
cations for South Africa in the Light of a Recent Australian Case, 134 S. AFR. L. J. 116 (2017). 
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atic as it practically implies criminal liability for large groups of 
people.63 
To date, France is the only country that has enforced crimi-
nal law on a relatively large scale in the fight against this practice. 
The French's "success" in this regard may be explained by the 
French republican model of citizenship that is strongly intertwined 
with national assimilation policies toward ethnic minorities and 
"newcomers." The French ethnocentric policies provide hardly any 
room for minority groups' practices that are considered contrary to 
the majoritarian perspective. Additionally, the French systematically 
control the medical health of children under the age of six, which 
also includes control of the genitalia. Because of this, a number of 
cases of pertaining to circumcision of children have come before the 
criminal court. 64 
63 Muzima, supra note 61, at 91. 
64 Wahedi & Kool, supra note 10. However, the French duty to "report" cases of female cir-
cumcision to the public prosecutor, based on Art. 434-3 CODE PENAL [PENAL CODE] (Fran.), causes an 
ethical dilemma for many professional practitioners. The question is whether such a reporting does not 
conflict with the duty of confidentiality, especially since this duty does not only relate to what a pa-
tient confides to the professional, but also to matters that the professional may observe. This rule has 
been explicitly codified in Art.4 of [CODE DE DEONTOLOGIE MEDICALE] CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS 
(Fran.): 
"Le secret couvre tout ce qui est venu a la connaissance du medecin dans l'exercice de sa profession, 
c'est-a-dire non seulement ce qui lui a ete confie, mais aussi ce qu'il a vu, entendu ou compris." 
However, Art. 44 of CODE DE DEONTOLOGIE MEDICALE (Fran.) requires professionals to report cases 
of child abuse to the authorities. This rule states: 
Lorsqu'un medecin disceme qu'une personne aupres de laquelle ii est appele est victime de 
sevices ou de privations, ii doit mettre en oeuvre les moyens les plus adequats pour la pro-
teger en faisant preuve de prudence et de circonspection. Lorsqu'il s'agit d'un mineur ou 
d'une personne qui n 'est pas en mesure de se proteger en raison de son iige ou de son etat 
physique ou psychique, ii alerte les autorites judiciaires ou administratives, sauf circons-
tances particulieres qu'il apprecie en conscience. 
Despite these clear regulations on the reporting duty of professionals, it appears from vari-
ous studies that French professionals are either not aware of the duty, or they have serious 
troubles with this duty. 
See Hans Nijboer, Neyah Van Der AA & Tamara Buruma, Strafrechtelijke Opsporing En Vervlging 
Van Vrouwelijke Genitale Verminking: De Franse Praktik [Criminal Investigation and Prosecution of 
Female Genital Mutilation: The French Approach] 115 (2010). 
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B. Male Circumcision 
The description of male circumcision ("MC") consists of the 
scope and prevalence of this practice, the types of circumcision, its 
health consequences, the grounds relied on for circumcision, and fi-
nally the legal status of this practice. 
i. Scope and Prevalence 
According to a 2010 major study by the WHO, one in three 
males around the globe experiences circumcision.65 The WHO fur-
ther estimates that just under 70% of all circumcised males are Mus-
lim. Thus, Muslims are by far the largest group who (still) practice 
MC. As such, in countries with a Muslim majority, like Turkey, the 
states in the Gulfregion and North Africa, over 95%ofboys are cir-
cumcised.66 Like Muslims, Jews form another religious group that 
practices MC on a global level. A 2007 WHO study indicates that in 
Israel, the United Kingdom and the U.S., up to 99% of Jewish ba-
bies were circumcised. 67 
The circumcision of boys occurs in North America, Europe, 
the Middle East, Central and Southeast Asia and major parts of Af-
rica. 68 In some countries, boys are circumcised by "traditional cir-
cumcisers," such as the mohel (Israel), the motaher (Middle East) 
and the sunnatji (Turkey).69 In other states, like the U.S., Egypt, 
Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States, physicians, or at least medically 
skilled personnel, are in charge ofMC.70 
65 WHO, Neonatal and Child Male Circumcision: A Global Review 25 (2010). 
66 Id. at 8. 
67 WHO, Male Circumcision: Global Trends and Determinants of Prevalence, Safety, and 
Acceptability 3 (2007). 
68 Id. at 9-12. 
69 WHO, supra note 65, at 22; See also Jacob Ben Chaim et al., Complications of Circumci-
sion in Israel: A One Year Multicenter Survey, 7 ISR. MED. AsS'N J. 368 (2005) (reporting that alt-
hough traditionally mohe/im were in charge of Jewish male circumcision in Israel, a growing number 
of parents choose to circumcise their child in a therapeutic session). 
70 Id. at 5. See Laura M. Carpenter, On Remedica/isation: Male Circumcision in the United 
States and Great Britain, 32 Soc. OF HEALTH & ILLNESS 613,617 (2010) (regarding the medicaliza-
tion of male circumcision; See also M.G. Pang & D.S. Kim, Extraordinarily High Rates of Male Cir-
cumcision in South Korea: History and Underlying Causes, 89 BJU INT'L 48 (2002) (providing in-
sights in the culture of male circumcision in South Korea and arguing that while this is to a high extent 
influenced by the practice in the United States, it is not practiced in the period immediately after the 
birth). 
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The age at which a boy is circumcised varies by region. For 
example, in Israel, the U.K. and the U.S.,71 almost all male babies of 
Jewish parents are circumcised shortly after birth. 72 Similarly, in 
some parts of West Africa and the Gulf region, male babies are cir-
cumcised soon after birth.73 Conversely, in states such as North Af-
rica, the Middle East and parts of Asia, MC is not carried out at a 
fixed age. 74 
ii. Variants 
The practice of MC is considered one of the most ancient 
surgical procedures in the history of mankind.75 MC is generally de-
fined as the (partial) removal of the foreskin. 76 However, the litera-
ture surrounding MC has categorized this practice into four types. 
The less contentious variant is simple circumcision: the partial re-
moval of the foreskin. 77 Sub-incision, another variant of MC, that 
has been practiced among Bedouins and aborigines, combines sim-
ple circumcision with "slitting of the penis to expose the glans."78 
The third category concerns salkh, which "[ flays the skin] from just 
below the navel to the upper thigh."79 Super-incision that is prac-
ticed in Polynesia is the fourth category ofMC.80 It entails "longitu-
71 Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, Male Circumcision, 130 PEDIATRICS 757 (2012). 
72 WHO, supra note 67, at 3. 
73 WHO, supra note 65, at 6. According to the WHO, circumcision at a younger age reduces 
risks of health complication. However, circumcision of"younger boys" causes ethical dilemmas con-
cerning the lack of consent for the ritual intervention. Cf Marie Fox & Michael Thomson, Older Mi-
nors and Circumcision: Questioning the Limits of Religious Actions, 9 MED. L. INT'L 283 (2008). 
74 WHO, supra note 67, at 3-4. There are some exceptions, including the Jewish community 
in Israel and Iran. The same is true for many Muslims who circumcise their sons traditionally on the 
seventh day of their birth, following the prophetical tradition, according to which the prophet had cir-
cumcised his sons seven days after their birth. However, there are also Muslim communities that prac-
tice circumcision at a later stage. As such, Turkish Muslims generally circumcise when the boy is be-
tween three and seven years old. Indonesian Muslims circumcise boys who have passed the age of five 
years, but are still under eighteen. 
75 WHO, supra note 65, at 7. 
76 id., at 9-10 ("The goal of circumcision is to remove enough shaft skin and inner foreskin to 
uncover the glans."). 
(1997). 
77 Abbie J. Chessler, Justifying the Unjustifiable: Rite v. Wrong, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 555, 564 
78 Id. at 564. 
79 Id. 
80 See also William E. Brigman, Circumcision as Child Abuse: The Legal and Constitutional 
issues, 23 J. FAM. L. 337 (I 984) (reporting on the presence of super-incision in Polynesia). 
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dinally cutting the preputium from the upper surface and extending 
the cut to the pubic region."81 
Jews generally circumcise in a traditional celebratory setting. 
During the ceremony, the mohel uses instruments that are sterilized 
to insert the boy's foreskin into a metal shield in order to protect the 
glans. Hereafter, "[a] scalpel is run across the face of the shield, re-
moving the foreskin. The remaining inner foreskin is subsequently 
pulled back away from the glans and excised with small scissors, 
and the wound is bandaged without the use of stitches. "82 Some Ha-
sidic Jews perform another ritual, known as metzitzah b 'peh. The 
mohel orally suctions the blood that is released after the circumci-
sion. 83 This practice is quite controversial as it can transmit serious 
diseases, such as herpes. 84 In New York, the legality of metzitzah 
b 'peh was challenged, after the city had decided to regulate this tra-
dition. 85 In 2015, the city reversed the policy that was designed to 
warn against the health risks of the metzitzah b 'peh tradition. 86 
Unlike Jewish circumcision by the mohel, Muslims, the larg-
est group practicing MC, may choose to circumcise by either the 
traditional circumciser or medically skilled circumcisers. 87 The lat-
ter often use a device called Plastibell to control bleeding after cir-
cumcision. The WHO writes that "[by the use of] the Plastibell, 
bleeding is controlled by using a ligature device which acts as a 
tourniquet, interrupting the blood supply to the foreskin and causing 
it to separate over time. Wound healing is usually complete within a 
week. A disadvantage of the Plastibell' s ring and ligature must stay 
81 Chessler, supra note 77, at 564. 
82 WHO, supra note 65, at 25. 
83 Id. 
84 Hanoch Ben-Yami, Circumcision: What Should be Done?, 39 J. OF MED. ETHICS 459 
(2013). See also Brian F. Leas & Craig A. Umscheid, Neonatal Herpes Simplex Virus Type I Infec-
tion and Jewish Ritual Circumcision with Oral Suction: A Systematic Review, 4 J. OF THE PEDIATRIC 
INFECTIOUS DISEASES Soc'Y 126 (2015). 
85 Central Rabbinical Congress v. New York City Department of Health & Mental Hygiene, 
763 F.3d 183 (2d Cir. 2014) (overruling the district court on appeal, stating that the city regulation was 
not neutral). 
86 Jessica Firger, New York City Eliminates Restrictions on Orthodox Circumcision Ritual, 
NEWSWEEK (Oct. 9, 2015), http:/ /www.newsweek.com/new-york-city-eliminates-restrictions-
orthodox-circumcision-ritual-3 70934 (last visited I 0/2018). 
87 Ayesha Ahmad, Do Motives Matter in Male Circumcision?, 28 BIOETHlCS 68 (2014). 
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in place for several days before the skin separates. During this time 
complications can occur related to the retained ring."88 
iii. Health Risks of Male Circumcision 
MC's health consequences consists of immediate and long-
term risks affecting the human body depending on the particular 
type of circumcision, the circumciser and the age at which the cir-
cumcision takes place. The immediate consequences of this practice 
are pain, bleeding and swelling. These health complications are 
generally not life-threatening. However, there are exceptions to this 
"rosy" presentation of the MC intervention. Similar to some types of 
FC, MC could have fatal consequences due to bleeding, wrong cir-
cumcisions, and amputations. 89 The long term consequences vary 
from urination complexities to problems regarding sexual function-
ing.90 Whether or not health complexities occur depends on the type 
of circumcision and the circumciser. As such, less risk of serious 
health consequences exists when the circumcision is carried out by a 
professional practitioner who uses, for example, a Plastibell. On the 
other hand, "freehand" circumcisions bear a higher risk of com-
plexities.91 The same is true for circumcisions carried out at "an old-
er age," rather than neonatal. 92 
88 WHO, supra note 65, at 13. 
89 id. at 35. In Germany and the Netherlands health complications due to unfortunate circum-
cisions have led to criminal investigations and court cases; See Bijan Fateh-Moghadam, Criminalizing 
Male Circumcision, 13 GERMAN L.J. 1131 (2012); See also District Court of Utrecht, 
ECLI:NL:RBUTR:2005:AU7293 (Dec. 1, 2005) (Neth.). In December 2005, the District Court of 
Utrecht sentenced a traditional circumciser for serious assault. The circumcision caused health com-
plexities for the child, due to the removal of too much skin from the foreskin and hitting thereby an 
artery. The court rules that male circumcision, whether or not practiced on religious grounds, concerns 
a "medical practice" that according to Dutch law should be practiced by a professional. 
90 WHO, supra note 65, at 35. Other "postoperative" consequences of male circumcision in-
clude infections, meatal ulcer, impetigo, decrease of penile sensitivity, edema of the glans and "the 
formation of a skin bridge between the penile shaft and the glans." Also, some studies have claimed 
that male circumcision will cause psychological damages. See KONINKLIJKE NEDERLANDSCHE 
MAATSCHAPPIJ TOT BEYORDERING DER GENEESKUNST (KNMG), NON-THERAPEUTIC 
CIRCUMCISION OF MALE MINORS 8 (2010) (referring to a study carried out by Boyle concerning 
the mental health risks of male circumcision); See Gregory J. Boyle, Male Circumcision: Pain, Trau-
ma and Psychosexual Sequelae, 7 J. OF HEALTH PSYCH. 329 (2002). 
91 WHO, supra note 65, at 36. 
92 id. at 46 ("complications occur less frequently among neonates and infants than among 
older boys, with the majority of prospective studies in neonates and infants finding no serious compli-
cations and relatively few other adverse events, which were minor and treatable. The prospective stud-
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iv. Justification Grounds 
For Abrahamic religions, circumcision has a special mean-
ing. 93 Within Judaism, the practice of MC has both a religious and a 
cultural meaning. In line with the text of Genesis 17: 10, where God 
requested Abraham to remove his foreskin,94 Jews circumcise (brit 
milah in Hebrew) a boy on the eighth day after the birth. 95 MC has 
also a cultural dimension for many Jews. It marks their identity and 
enables the circumcised boy to integrate into the Jewish communi-
ty.96 Unlike Judaism, the practice of MC is not explicitly mentioned 
in the Quran. Circumcision confirms within the Islamic faith the ex-
istence of a believer's relationship with God. Circumcision, which is 
called tahera in Arabic, occurs in accordance with the instructions 
the Prophet Mohammed received to continue the rites of Abraham. 97 
Only the Shafi'i Sunni School of jurisprudence considers MC as 
wajib, a religious commitment that must be obeyed. Other Islamic 
schools of jurisprudence strongly recommend this ~ractice as a con-
cordant with the prophetic tradition of the Sunnah. 8 
Although most of the circumcisions have a religious 
ground,99 various studies suggest that non-religious grounds also 
ies in older boys also found virtually no serious adverse events, but a higher frequency of complica-
tions.") 
93 Van den Brink & Tigchelaar, supra note 2, at 427-428 (calling the religious variant of male 
circumcision, the "Abrahamic" circumcision, that is to say: "[religious, more or less ritualistic, pre-
dominantly in Judaism and Islam, but also among Christians, particularly in Africa."). 
94 Genesis 17: IO (King James): "This is my covenant, which ye shall keep, between me and 
you and thy seed after thee: every male among you shall be circumcised". 
95 There are some exceptions: illness or the presence of other immediate health risks. Nick 
Wyatt, Circumcision and Circumstance: Male Genital Mutilation in Ancient Israel and Ugarit, 33 J. 
FOR STUDY OF THE OLD TESTAMENT 405,411 (2009) (arguing that although "[the] norm in Jewish 
circumcision is a rite performed on the eighth day after birth ( ... ), much of the evidence we have noted 
suggests that this was not the original pattern of observance."); See also MARY VAN VEEN-
VlETOR, HET VERBONDSTEKEN [THE COVENANT OF CIRCUMCISION] 163-164 (2000) 
(studying the covenant theory from a cultural-sociological perspective and concluding that male cir-
cumcision plays a very important cultural role within the Jewish tradition). 
96 Yoram Bilu, From Mi/ah (Circumcision) to Mi/ah (Word): Male Identity and Rituals of 
Childhood in the Jewish Ultraorthodox Community, 31 ETHOS 172 (2003) The religious importance of 
this practice is reaffirmed by the fact that babies and other members of the Jewish community who die 
uncircumcised, are subjected to circumcision before the burial ceremony takes place.; See Ari Z. Zivo-
tofsky & Alan Jotkowitz, In Defense of Circumcision, 15 ISR. MED. Ass'N J. 39 (2013). 
97 WHO, supra note 65, at 7. 
98 WHO, supra note 67, at 3. 
99 Elmar W. Gerharz & Claudia Haarmann, The First Cut is the Deepest? Medicolegal As-
pects of Male Circumcision, 86 BJU INT'L 332 (2000). 
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play an important role in the justification of MC. For example, MC 
is considered a cultural practice that is justified for ethnic reasons, 100 
as well as a rite de passage and a sign of adulthood. 101 Additionally, 
medical reasons are sometimes used to justify MC, since some re-
ports indicate that circumcision of bo(cs reduces the risks of prostate 
cancer or infection by the HIV-virus. 02 However, some authors 
have suggested that further research is absolutely necessary to indi-
cate the risks and benefits of this practice, since most of the results 
concerning the benefits MC are based on studies that have been car-
ried out outside North America. 103 
v. The Legal Response 
In an unprecedented step, Denmark has recently recognized MC as a 
human right: the right of the parents to circumcise as a manifesta-
tion of religious beliefs. 104 Other states and regions, such as South 
Africa, 105 Sweden, 106 Germany, 107 and some states in the U.S., such 
as California, 108 have specific laws concerning the legality of 
'
00 See WHO, supra note 65. 
'
0
' WHO, supra note 65, at 7. 
102 Brian J. Morris et al., CDC's Male Circumcision Recommendations Represent a Key Pub-
lic Health Measure, 5 GLOBAL HEAL TH: SCI & PRAC. 15(2017). 
103 Jennifer A. Bossio et al., A Review of the Current State of the Male Circumcision Litera-
ture, 11 J. OF SEXUAL MED. 2847 (2014) (claiming that the current state of art shows important gaps 
that makes the applicability of studies reaffirming the health benefits of male circumcision questiona-
ble. "Such gaps include a need for rigorous, empirically based methodologies to address questions 
about circumcision and sexual functioning, penile sensitivity, the effect of circumcision on men's sex-
ual partners, and reasons for circumcision. Additional factors that should be addressed in future re-
search include the effects of age at circumcision (with an emphasis on neonatal circumcision) and the 
need for objective research outcomes."). 
'
04 Vilhelm Carlstrom, Denmark Defends Circumcision as a Human Right - Even Though 
7 5% are Against it" NORDIC BUSINESS INSIDER (Jun. 16, 2016), 
https://nordic.businessinsider.corn/the-danish-govemment-defends-circumcision-as-a-human-right---
even-though-75-are-against-it-2016-6/ (last visited Oct. 12, 2018). 
'
05 Julia Sloth-Nielsen, A Foreskin Too Far: Religious, Medical and Customary Circumcision 
and the Children's Act 38 of2005 in the Context of HIV/Aids, 16 LAW, DEMOCRACY & DEV. 69, 75 
(2012). 
106 Kimberley A. Greenfield, Cutting Away Religious Freedom: The Global and National 
Debate Surrounding Male Circumcision, 15 RUTGERS J. L. & RELIGION 353,362 (2014). 
'
07 Stephen R. Munzer, Secularization, Anti-Minority Sentiment, and Cultural Norms in the 
German Circumcision Controversy, 37 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 503, 545 (2015). 
108 Eric Rassbach, Coming Soon to a Court Near You: Religious Male Circumcision, 2016 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 1347 (2016). 
140
234 QUINNIPIAC HEAL TH LAW [Vol. 22:209 
MC. 109 Case law on MC is a bit more unsettled. Over recent years, 
litigation across Europe and the U.S. has established diverse criteria 
for determining the legality ofMC. 110 These cases concern ques-
tions about civil damages, criminal liability and parental disputes 
about the necessity of male circumcision at a young age. 111 To date, 
the practice of MC has not been completely forbidden. Although the 
Dutch Supreme Court was challenged in 2014 to address the legality 
of MC, the judges declined to rule on that matter. 112 In short, MC 
for religious purposes has not been outlawed yet, nor is this practice 
limited to individuals who are of sufficient age to decide for them-
selves the status of their foreskin. 113 
However, there are judgments, for example in Germany and 
Finland, which have banned ritual MC or postponed the age at 
which this practice should take place. Following heated and emo-
tional debates, these rulings have been either overruled by higher 
courts, or by the national parliaments. 114 
The existing legal rulings clarify the circumstances under 
which MC can be carried out legally. These legal decisions fall 
within the human rights framework embraced by the United Nations 
and the Council of Europe, which considers MC with parental per-
mission a legitimate religious manifestation. However, a few "ex-
ceptional judgements" mirror the growing public calls across West-
ern societies to stop MC. These decisions consider the current legal 
109 See also TASMANIA LAW REFORM INSTITUTE, NON-THERAPEUTIC MALE 
CIRCUMCISION (2012). 
110 Rassbach, supra note 108 (criticizing these specific criteria). 
111 Id. See also Sohail Wahedi, Het Beoordelingskader Van Rituele Jongensbesnijdenis [The 
Assessment Framework of Ritual Male Circumcision], 7 TIJDSCHRlFT VOOR RELIGIE, RECHT 
EN BELEID [J. FOR RELIGION, L. AND POL'Y] 59 (2016). 
112 Id. (holding that the presence or absence of a proper permission for circumcision is the 
decisive factor to prove serious assault in court). 
113 Id. (judges have used the specific circumstances of the case, such as disputes between par-
ents with different cultural backgrounds; no view of return to the parental home where ritual circumci-
sion is a tradition, to rule that the circumcision decision should be postponed for the best interests of 
the child, given the irreversible nature of the practice); See also Van der Vyver, supra note 14, at 105 
(discussing the South African "Children's Act 38 of2005" that explicitly prohibits male circumcisions 
for non-religious or non-therapeutic reasons on minors under the age of 16). Iceland designed bill to 
outlaw ritual male circumcision. Harriet Sherwood, Iceland Law to Outlaw Male Circumcision Sparks 
Row Over Religious Freedom, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 18, 2018), 
https://www.theguardian.com/society/2018/feb/18/iceland-ban-male-circumcision-first-european-
country. 
114 Wahedi & Kool, supra note 10. 
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approach to MC balanced against the best interests of the child. Due 
to the high health risks of MC, including the risk of developing sex-
ual and mental health problems, the non-therapeutic ritual circumci-
sion of boys should be postponed until the child is of an age that he 
can competently consent to the procedure. 115 
The most outspoken court ruling embracing this line of rea-
soning is the 2012 German Cologne Landgericht ruling. 116 A similar 
decision was reached a few years earlier in Finland. 117 
111. Rethinking The Legal Framework 
International human rights law, as well as the domestic law 
of many countries around the globe, is clear about the unlawfulness 
of FC. It condemns all the variants of this "harmful and violent" 
practice. Furthermore, it obliges states to eliminate this practice. 
Thus, FC cannot be legally practiced even for traditional or religious 
reasons, but while MC has been legally challenged in a number of 
jurisdictions, this practice is not yet banned completely. Instead, 
courts have clarified the circumstances under which parents are al-
lowed to practice MC. These different legal approaches to male and 
female circumcision have been criticized as using "double stand-
ards", without clarifying convincin~ly why ritual MC should be 
treated differently from ritual FC. 11 This Part claims that the "dou-
ble standards" criticism is rooted in the equality ideal that is promi-
nently present within liberal democracies and the liberal theories of 
justice. 119 Based on this anti-favoritism ideal that supports the equal 
treatment of similar cases, it becomes much easier to question the 
115 Peter W. Adler, Is Circumcision Legal?, 16 RICH. J. L. & PUB. INT. 439 (2013). Cf also 
KNMG, supra note 90, (warning against the negative health risks of male circumcision, saying this 
practice should be banned like female circumcision, however expressing concerns about such a ban). 
116 The court ruled that a parents' right to religious freedom generally does not justify an irre-
versible practice, like MC, if the intervention is not medically required. The child should have the op-
portunity to decide himself in freedom upon the status of his foreskin and the religion he wants to ad-
here. See for a detailed discussion of this ruling: Fateh-Moghadam, supra note 89. 
117 The Tampere District Court held that religious freedom does not justify the violation of 
bodily integrity. The court referred to the ban on female circumcision and argued that toleration of 
male circumcision would result in discrimination. See Heli Askola, Cut-Off Point? Regulating Male 
Circumcision in Finland, 25 INT'LJ.L. POL'Y & FAM. 100 (2011). 
118 Adler, supra note 115; Dustin, supra note 10. 
119 Bret Boyce, Equality and the Free Exercise of Religion, 57 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 493, 496-
97, 520 (2009); EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 9. 
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different legal approaches to ritual male and female circumcision. It 
also helps us to reconstruct in a critical way the argumentation pat-
tern that is used to single out MC for special protection in law. The 
criticism challenges this special status of MC in light of the fact that 
all variants of FC are prohibited, even the types that are less inva-
sive than MC, like "symbolic circumcision". 
A. The Law and Ritual Circumcisions: Using "Double 
Standards "? 
To address this fundamental "double standards" criticism, 
this Part examines the liberal framework of rights ( e.g. religious 
freedom) and obligations ( e.g. respecting the right to physical integ-
rity) that challenges the legality of FC and MC. 120 It is especially the 
legal obligation of respecting bodily integrity that challenges within 
the liberal tradition of equal rights any protection regime for ritual 
circumcisions qua ritual or religious. The main argument is that 
both ritual male and female circumcision lack health benefits. 
Moreover, these ritual and religious interventions upon human bod-
ies could cause serious health consequences either immediately or 
on a long term base, such as sexual functioning problems and men-
tal health issues. However, the empirical argument suggests that re-
ligious MC is allowed not merely on medial grounds, but even qua 
religious within some jurisdictions.121 The question remains whether 
a jurisprudence that allows one type of circumcision on religious 
grounds, e.g. MC, 122 while outlawing all other kinds of circumci-
120 Adler, supra note 115. 
121 A similar toleration regime lacks usually for the lightest version of female circumcision, 
which has also been practiced on religious grounds. Cf The South African Children's Act 38 of 2005, 
§ 12 (3) (outlawing female circumcision) and§ 12 (8) (allowing religious male circumcision, while the 
non-religious variant is prohibited for boys under the age of 16). Cf also STRAFGESETZBUCH [STGB] 
[CRIMINAL CODE], §226 (a) (Ger.) (outlawing female genital mutilation) and BORGERLICHES 
GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE], § 1631 (d)(2), (Ger.) (allowing religious male circumcision, on the 
condition that the circumciser is a well-trained person). 
122 The same is to a certain extent true for some non-religious rites that violate the bodily 
integrity of children, such as ear piercings. Cf Levrnore, supra note 52, at I 05 ( discussing the lack of 
criticism on the practice of "ear piercings": "[ ear piercings, at least in the United States, are inflicted 
(or gifted or celebrated) predominantly on girls, and so it might be surprising that mutilation of this 
kind is not also protested. But piercings are generally reversible, or at most leave a small scar. lfthey 
were difficult to reverse, then law would likely require children to await maturity, or even the age of 
majority, before being pierced."). 
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sion, e.g. FC, even the ones that are less invasive than all other types 
of circumcision, such as pricking and "symbolic circumcision" of 
females is acceptable?123 Thus, the normative question is whether 
the reli~ious dimension of circumcisions requires special legal solic-
itude? 1 4 To ask this question differently, are exemptions for ritual 
modification of genitals qua ritual or religious acceptable in law? 125 
Thus, does religion qua religion deserve special legal solicitude? 
To answer these questions, this Part draws on the liberal the-
ories of religious freedom. Within the paradigm of liberal political 
philosophy no consensus exists about the specialness of religion, 
meaning singling out religion qua religion for favored treatment in 
law. 126 Nevertheless, all liberal theories ofreligious freedom pre-
suppose, of abstraction from the religious dimension. In short, ab-
straction entails that religion does not deserve special protection in 
law qua religion. Religion receives only a special treatment via ab-
straction, meaning via the non-sectarian, protection-worthy catego-
ries that serve as proper liberal substitutes for the category of reli-
gion, such as, for example conscience. 127 This is due to the 
egalitarian approach of the liberal theories of religious freedom to 
theistic and non-theistic beliefs and the emphasis of these theories 
on neutrality toward any particular worldview. 128 
123 Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, The Vulnerability of Conscience: The 
Constitutional Basis for Protecting Religious Conduct, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1245, 1292 (1994) (discuss-
ing the cases of two persons who are asking for exemptions from general laws: "The first involves 
( ... )a Jehovah's Witness whose religious scruples make it impossible for him to manufacture tank 
turrets. The second involves( ... ) a pacifist who is in all respects identical to the (Jehovah's Witness], 
except that his pacifism is secular in character. A constitutional jurisprudence that permitted interven-
tion on behalf of one( ... ) but not the other would be unacceptable."). 
124 In fact this question aims to find out whether the justification grounds people rely on to 
circumcise, could also be used as grounds for exemptions in law. 
125 In other words: do religion, culture and possibly conscience justify the creation of exemp-
tions for ritual circumcisions? Cf MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, THE NEW RELIGIOUS INTOLERANCE: 
OVERCOMfNG THE POLITICS OF FEAR IN AN ANXIOUS AGE 125 (2012) ( discussing ritual circumcisions 
from a cultural perspective). 
126 Schwartzman, supra note 16. 
127 For the development of this particular argument, 1 have benefited tremendously from the 
feedback of professor Bejamin Berger on the presence of abstraction from the religious dimension 
within liberal theories ofreligious freedom. 
128 Cecile Laborde, Liberal Neutrality, Religion and the Good, in JEAN LoUISE COHEN & 
CECLLE LABORDE (EDS.), RELIGION, SECULARISM AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 249 (2016). 
(for a discussion of the egalitarian theories of religious freedom). 
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Abstraction manifests itself by refusing to justify religious 
freedom through appeals to religious values, thus rejecting the toler-
ation of religion qua religion (i), justifying free exercise by appeal-
ing to a more general framework of values that are not theistic per 
se (ii), and insisting that justifications for religious exceptions, like 
for any other type of legal exception, need to be ecumenical-not in 
the religious meaning of the word, but rather in the sense of being 
widely accessible to a broad public (iii). 129 As with ritual dietary re-
strictions, the liberal argument suggests that exemptions are granted 
not because of any religious narrative, but because of the commit-
ment that says we should respect human conscience equally. 130 The 
liberal approach to what justifies free exercise could help to put the 
current state of art regarding the legality of male and female cir-
cumcision under critical scrutiny. Abstraction is helpful because it 
favors the use of a religion-empty language, meaning religiously 
neutral, to discuss the legality of religious manifestations. In other 
words, it opposes strongly the discussion of religious exemptions on 
sectarian grounds, meaning exclusive religious grounds. Therefore, 
we need to find out whether we could identify liberal grounds in or-
der to justify exemptions for ritual circumcisions. 
B. Female Circumcision, Law and Religion 
We start with FC. Through abstraction, which means at this 
point rethinking ritual FC in a religion-empty way, two aspects of 
FC emerge that suggest strongly why justifying exemptions for FC 
is problematic. First, given the very high risks of health complexi-
ties following the severe types of circumcision, there is a problem of 
proper consent if the intervention takes places on young girls. Sec-
ond, clitoridectomy, excision and infibulation cause as such serious 
health problems varying from psychological problems to chronic 
problems regarding urination, menstruation and reproduction. 131 
Therefore, the immediate and long-term health risks, in combination 
129 Wahedi, supra note 17, at 19. 
130 JOCELYN MACLURE & CHARLES TAYLOR, SECULARISM AND FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE 77. 
131 WHO, supra note 18 at 3-7. 
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with the lack of proper consent in cases of infant FC, 132 provide 
strong arguments afainst creating religious exemptions for these se-
vere types of FC. 13 This conclusion gives rise to two questions. 
The first question is whether we can justify the ban on geni-
tal modifications in cases where women themselves want to adjust 
the status of their body, as is the case with cosmetic surgeries, such 
as labiaplasty and breast augmentation?134 Liberal theories ofreli-
gious freedom strongly oppose laws that favor or disfavor people's 
life choices, given that those choices do not violate the rights of oth-
ers.135 Therefore, arguably all women should have equal access to 
the genital modification services that are provided by the cosmetic 
industry, even if that preference is for FC. 136Make no misunder-
standing that this argument does not suggest the acceptance of in-
fibulation and other harmful variants of FC if proper consent is pre-
sent.137 It appears from various studies that such interventions have 
serious and chronic long-term health consequences, varying from 
sexual functioning problems to urinary and vaginal complexities. 
The second question regards how to deal with the least invasive var-
iants of FC, such as incision or the slight cut in the clitoris? This 
question will be answered in light of the implications abstraction 
from the religious dimension has for the legality of MC. 
132 See Wahedi & Kool, supra note 10, (the European Court of Human Rights considers fe-
male circumcision an inhumane act, the lack or presence of consent in this respect, would not lead to 
another conclusion). 
133 See Martha C. Nussbaum, Women's Bodies: Violence, Security, Capabilities, 6 J. OF HUM. 
DEV.167 (2005) (a liberal rejection of the serious types of female circumcision). 
134 Wahedi & Kool, supra note I 0, (referring to the fact that legislation in Belgium and the U. 
K. even prohibit female circumcision of women who are able to give their consent). 
135 See Dworkin supra note 9, at 130 (arguing that a liberal state should not abandon a particu-
lar lifestyle because another lifestyle is "intrinsically better". It should be left to citizens to decide 
which way of life better suits them); Perry, supra note 9 (arguing that the state should not prescribe 
how people should live their Jives). 
136 Wahedi & Kool, supra note 10; Nnamuchi, supra note 21, at 118. Cf also Natalie Rezek, Is 
Self-Harm by Cutting a Constitutionality Protected Right?, 12 QUINNIPIAC HEAL TH L. J. 303 (2008) (arguing that "the government should not be allowed to civilly commit someone who cuts without fur-
ther evidence that the person is a danger to themselves or others."). 
137 Cf Nnamuchi, supra note 21 (defending a similar position). 
146
240 QUINNIPIAC HEAL TH LAW [Vol. 22:209 
C. Male Circumcision, Law and Religion 
Liberal democracies allow MC as a medical treatment if cer-
tain criteria are met. 138 This religion-empty allowance of MC fits 
abstraction from the religious dimension. Accepting MC as a medi-
cal practice has some serious implications for the long term legality 
of this practice. In theory, it is possible that an influential health or-
ganization, such as the WHO, could conclude that MC has not only 
no significant health benefits, 139 MC is moreover a harmful inter-
vention that lacks proper permission and medical need. 140 The atten-
tion shifts from the presence of parental permission and sterilized 
conditions for the circumcision to the potential and serious health 
risks of this practice and therefore the possibility the child should 
get to decide upon his foreskin. This conditional and religion-empty 
acceptance of MC, that is to say no reliance on religious grounds to 
debate the legality of religious practices, has implications for the 
"double standards" criticism. As such, it suggests why it is justified 
to keep on banning the most severe types of ritual FC: the immedi-
ate risk of harm and the lack of the permission. It also provides an 
important argument to oppose the lighter versions of FC when adult 
consent is lacking: no health benefit to bring a slight cut on the clit-
oris. 141 
However, it is very hard within this liberal framework to 
keep on arguing that even "symbolic" circumcision of rational and 
consenting women should be prohibited, as many other and even 
more severe and risky interventions upon female bodies are allowed 
under the umbrella of "cosmetic surgeries". Furthermore, since 
some legal regimes explicitly allow religious infant male circumci-
138 Wahedi & Kool, supra note 10. However, there are some exceptions on this medicalized 
approach to ritual male circumcision: the law in South Africa and Germany allows religious male cir-
cumcision qua religious. 
139 The WHO rejected in the past to study the health implications of female circumcision, 
today it is the most prominent champion in the rejection of this practice. See Berkovitch & Bradley, 
supra note 21 at 491. Thus, a same approach could be adopted towards MC. 
140 KNMG, supra note 90. 
141 Nussbaum, supra note 52, at 104 (arguing that the "asymmetrical objection to female cir-
cumcision may reflect not simply the shifting sands of medical opinion about male circumcision, but 
the absence of any known medical advantage to female circumcision and the association, in a subset of 
cultures that traditionally practiced female circumcision, between circumcision and views about fe-
male modesty and sexual suppression."). 
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sion qua religious, which is from a normative point of view a very 
objectionable position in law, it becomes -from an egalitarian per-
spective- very hard to keep on defending the ban on the lightest ver-
sion of FC, such as "symbolic circumcision" upon the genitals of 
both rational and consenting adults and youngers. 142 Indeed, if the 
slight cut upon the genitalia of a young girl will be reversible and 
would not cause serious health risks on a long-term base, such as, 
for example, sexual functioning problems, then it is hardly impossi-
ble to defend the "double standards" regime. So far, the liberal justi-
fication of allowing ritual MC has been based upon the argument 
that this intervention is serving medical purposes, regardless its reli-
gious significance for many Jews and Muslims. However, when the 
empirical argument suggests that ritual MC has been tolerated qua 
ritual and religious within some liberal jurisdictions, the question 
arises why the law does not single out -similarly- for a favored 
treatment infant religious and ritual variants of FC that are reversi-
ble and not harmful on a long-term. Thus, why lumping all variants 
of ritual FC together for a special ban, while allowing ritual MC qua 
ritual and religious? The defense team of Jumana Nagarwala could 
point to this favored treatment of ritual MC to raise a religious es-
tablishment question before the Court. 143 
142 Nnamuchi, supra note 21, at I 02; Nussbaum, supra note 125, at 125 ( developing an argu-
mentation pattern similar to the one this article has developed based on the abstraction theory and de-
fending the following regarding the legality of ritual circumcisions: 
it is reasonable to argue that female genital mutilation practiced on minors should be ille-
gal if it is a form that impairs sexual pleasure or other bodily functions. (A symbolic 
prick is a different story.) Male circumcision seems to me all right, however, because I do 
not see solid evidence that it interferes with adult sexual functioning; indeed, it is now 
known to reduce susceptibility to HIV/AIDS. Other forms of bodily alteration of chil-
dren--ear piercing, for example, or orthodonture, or plastic surgery repairing an ear that 
is alleged to stick out too much-are not legally regulable because they do not impair a 
major functioning.) 
143 This favorable treatment of one specific religious practice qua religious, e.g. ritual MC, is 
very hard to reconcile with the non-establishment clause of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitu-
tion. Cf Dworkin, supra note 9, at 115. See also Faizan Mustafa & Jagteshwar Singh Sohi, Freedom 
of Religion in India: Current issues and Supreme Court Acting as Clergy, 2017 BYU L. REV. 915,953 
(2017) (criticizing the Indian Supreme Court's introduction ofan "essentiality" test that aims to exam-
ine which practices do belong to a faith,"[ elevating] the judiciary to the status of clergy."). 
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D. Ritual Circumcisions and Minorities 
The liberal framework we have developed rejects convinc-
ingly exemptions for variants of FC that cause serious harm imme-
diately and on a long term base. Also, it points to the presence of a 
legal regime that favors ritual MC qua ritual and disfavors the less 
significant type of ritual and religious FC qua ritual, regardless the 
fact that this light version of ritual FC is reversible and little risky in 
terms of causing serious and chronic health complications. The re-
jection for the most severe types of FC is based on the following ar-
gumentation pattern that targets this rite because of it serious health 
consequences. It lacks medical need and health benefits. It is harm-
ful as its affects female bodies immediately and seriously on a long-
term base. Moreover, if practiced on young girls, it lacks proper 
consent. Thus, to protect girls and women, as a vulnerable group 
and for reasons of health, bodily security and integrity, there is no 
justification to allow the most severe types of FC. 
The situation is different regarding MC. Our liberal frame-
work accepts this practice conditionally and probably temporarily. 
Conditionally, as its allowance depends on the fulfilment of certain 
criteria, such as parental consent and sterilized circumcision circum-
stances. This strategy is temporary, as the framework here does not 
exclude the option to ban MC, if the medical benefits are at a future 
time determined to be non-existent. This gives an unsatisfactory 
feeling, as the ban hangs like a Damocles sword above MC. To ad-
dress the "Damocles sword critique" of the liberal approach to the 
legality of MC, we need to develop argumentation patterns that are 
closer to reality. That is to say argumentation patterns that can ex-
plain the "double standards" regime. This requires the development 
of arguments that look beyond the sectarian and liberal justifications 
of ritual circumcisions and suggest both why we should refrain from 
the acceptance of FC in law and why we should restrain from the 
creation of further restrictions upon MC at this moment. 
How can we develop argumentation patterns that would fit a 
broad sense of justice when we talk about the legality of ritual cir-
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cumcisions?144 Reflecting on the implications a potential ban on MC 
would have internally and externally helps us to develop the sort ar-
guments we need to explain the "double standards" legal regime. 
Regarding the internal effects, we can say that a total ban on this 
practice would give Jews and Muslims the impression that they do 
not enjoy equal respect from authorities. 145 Liberal democracies 
must encourage mutual understanding between different groups of 
citizens. This "anti-alienation" argument helps to maintain the legal 
status quo of MC, not because of its sectarian nature, but rather be-
cause a total ban on this practice would potentially further alienate 
marginalized groups that attach great importance to continue MC. 146 
This enormous and global sensitivity about a potential ban is lacking 
in the area ofFC. 147 
Next to the anti-alienation argument, we can also think about 
the external effects of a ban on MC. The question asks about the 
implications a ban on MC would have for the foreign policies of lib-
eral democracies. Such policies are, among other matters, concerned 
with the protection of the rights of non-believers, atheists, proselytes 
and critics of religion in countries that lack fundamental rights, such 
as the freedoms of speech, conscience and association. 148 Not to 
mention in this regard the absence of religious freedom that within 
the human rights discourse is understood as the right to believe, to 
144 Brett G. Scharffs, Why Religious Freedom? Why the Religiously Committed, the Reli-
giously Indifferent, and Those Hostile to Religion Should Care, 2017 BYU L. REV. 957 (2017). 
145 Specifically, because a ban on MC wouldprimafacie deprive Jewish and Muslim par-
ents from their right to raise their child in accordance with their own beliefs. However, given the irre-
versible nature of MC, this non-sectarian argument in favor of allowing MC is problematic and loses 
persuasiveness. See also the Cologne decision at this point, supra note 116 (the child should have the 
right to decide himself which religion, if any, he wants to adopt). See also Yaser Ali, Shariah and Citi-
zenshi~How lslamophobia is Creating a Second-Class Citizenry in America, 100 Calif. L. Rev. 
1027 (2012) (on how law singling out Muslims for disfavored treatment reinforce alienation of this 
group in the American society). 
146 U .N. Docs., Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report 
of the Special Rapporteur of Religion and Belief on His Mission to Denmark (2016). 
147 Levmore, supra note 52, at 104-5 ("the fact that so many thoughtful people find female 
but not male circumcision abhorrent, suggests that a critical difference is that one is practiced on a 
group that is, at least to Western eyes, seriously constrained and subjugated by a variety of practic-
es."). 
148 The European Union has even a Special Envoy, Jan Figel, former Slovak diplomat, who 
promotes religious freedom as part of the European Union's foreign policy. See also Jan Figel, The 
European Union and Freedom of Religion or Belief A New Momentum, 2017 BYU L. REV. 895 
(2017). 
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not believe, to change religion and to be able to criticize religion. 
Therefore, a complete ban on MC, which has also been practiced in 
countries that do not have a strong human rights record, would fur-
ther complicate and narrow down our possibilities to ask attention 
for the rights of vulnerable groups around the globe. In other words, 
such a policy would send the wrong signal about religion and relat-
ed freedoms. 149 
This "wrong signal" argument accepts that within liberal 
democracies, religious freedom has no intrinsic liberal value. It un-
derstands this freedom as a religion-empty liberty that provides pro-
tection to a wide range of beliefs and practices, without making a 
distinction between the theistic and non-theistic beliefs people may 
have. However, in line with the political commitment to draw atten-
tion to the human rights situation of vulnerable groups, such as athe-
ists, adherents of new religions and critics of religion, in countries 
that lack religious freedom, we need this freedom to discuss their 
vulnerable human rights situations. We need to draw attention to the 
insecurity that threatens these groups in countries that do not recog-
nize the right to religious freedom. Therefore, any serious re-
striction, such as a total ban, on important religious practices, such 
as MC, which is so relevant to Muslims and Jews, regardless of 
where they live, creates a complex situation for liberal democracies. 
The "anti-alienation" and "wrong signal" arguments are 
pragmatic arguments that could explain the "double standards" re-
gime. The use of these arguments reveals that acceptance of FC 
would call for resistance internally and externally. After all, local, 
national and international efforts are focused on the elimination of 
this practice. Concerning the legality of MC, these pragmatic argu-
ments warn us for the implications of a ban internally and external-
ly. As such, they help us to face properly the "Damocles sword" 
criticism of a liberal approach to MC. Thus, we could understand on 
pragmatic grounds the "double standards" regime and the im-
149 Hakeem Yusuf, S.A.S. v France: Supporting Living Together of Forced Assimilation, 3 
INT'L HUM. RTS. L. REV. 277,293 (2014) (comparing the French ban on face-covering veils based on 
the French "living together" ideal to the assimilation policies that are enforced in China against the 
Muslim minority, leaving barely no ["any" Instead of "no"?] room for free exercise of religion). 
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portance to maintain it. It protects us from creating exemptions for 
FC and it imposes restraints on a further restriction regime of MC. 
IV Conclusion 
This article has put the use of different legal standards to as-
sess the legality of ritual male and female circumcision under criti-
cal scrutiny. In this respect, it has developed a normative framework 
of liberal rights to address this criticism of using "double stand-
ards." The liberal perspective rejects convincingly exemptions for 
the most severe types of FC. These variants lack any health benefit. 
The normative framework has also pointed to the existence of a 
problematic and objectionable toleration regime in favor ofreligious 
MC qua religious. The liberal argument is that this practice can only 
be tolerated in law as a medical exemption. Otherwise, it ·is not pos-
sible to keep on defending the ban on the less significant of FC, 
which is, like ritual MC, also practiced on religious grounds. To re-
affirm the "double standards" regime this article has developed two 
novel pragmatic arguments that look beyond the sectarian and med-
ical justification of ritual circumcisions. 
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ABSTRACT 
Despite the international recognition of religious freedom as a 
fundamental human right, recent developments in the United States and 
Europe reveal that the Islamic faith has been singled out qua Islam for 
special prohibitions.  The question is whether this sectarian approach is 
compatible with the normative liberal approach to religious freedom 
that emphasizes egalitarianism and neutrality.  The answer to this 
question is, no.  Although religion within the paradigm of liberal 
political philosophy does not warrant special legal protection qua 
religion, this article contends that it is equally troublesome to single out 
religion qua religion for special disfavored treatment, even if the 
justification is facially neutral.  This article uses facially neutral 
examples, such as: the French burqa-ban case, the Travel Ban project 
of President Trump, and the anti-Sharia debacle in the state of 
Oklahoma.  This article draws on the dichotomous approach of liberal 
political philosophy to religion and develops a non-sectarian framework 
of arguments to defend religious liberty. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In June 2018, the Austrian government decided in an 
unprecedented step to close seven mosques and expel dozens of 
imams.1  The closure was based on the 2015 “Islam-bill” that singles 
out Islamic organizations for a special ban: the prohibition on receiving 
foreign funding.2  The government reasoned the closure would protect 
1.  Tom Barnes, Austria to close seven mosques and deport imams in crackdown 
on ‘political Islam’, INDEPENDENT (June 8, 2018), 
https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/austria-close-mosques-expel-
imams-crackdown-55742091. 
2. Section 6. (2) of the Austrian Islam Bill prohibits Islamic Organizations from 
accepting foreign funding: “The procurement of funds for the usual activity to satisfy 
religious needs of [the] members [of the Islamic Religious Society] has to be 
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diversity by standing against the spread of political Islam and thus 
prevent radicalization and the creation of parallel societies in Austria.3  
At the same time, regarding the same issue, and by reference to the same 
concerns, an overwhelming majority of the Dutch Tweede Kamer 
(House of Representatives) has urged the government to intensely 
monitor the sources of funding for Dutch mosques.4  The majoritarian 
concern is that foreign money has been used as a tool to create support 
for a message opposing the dominant standards of the Dutch society. 
Under the guise of combatting the “undesirable influence” from “unfree 
states,” the Tweede Kamer adopted eight resolutions.5  These 
resolutions varied from the call for a new study about the financial 
sources of Dutch mosques to the ban on government subsidies for 
Islamic organizations that disturb the integration process of 
immigrants.6  The European concern about the unwanted influences 
from the “unfree states,” referring to states in the Gulf region, has also 
manifested itself in another way.  In the aftermath of the theoterrorist 
attacks, meaning terrorism justified on religious grounds,7 and in 
undertaken inland by the Religious Society, the local communities respectively their 
members.”  Islamgesetz 2015, StF: BGBl. I Nr. 39/2015 (Austria), translated in: 
Federal Law on the External Legal Relationships of Islamic Societies – Islam Law 
2015 https://www.bmeia.gv.at/fileadmin/user_upload/Zentrale/Integration/ 
Islamgesetz/Islam_Law.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2019). 
3. Nadine Schmidt & Judith Vonberg, Austria to close seven mosques, expel
imams, CNN (June 8, 2018), https://edition.cnn.com/2018/06/08/europe/austria-
mosques-imams-intl/index.html. 
4. See Agenda Tweede Kamer der Staten Generaal, vergaderjaar 2017–2018,
ag-tk-2018-06-01, nr. 11, at 3 (Neth.) (discussing the amount of resolutions submitted 
during the parliamentary debate about the funding of mosques in the Netherlands). 
5. Kamerstukken II 2017/18, 29 614, nr. 82 (resolution Sjoerdsma/Segers);
Kamerstukken II 2017/18, 29 614, nr. 82 (resolution Becker/Segers) (Neth.) (on file 
with author); see generally Tamar de Waal, “Make Sure You Belong!” A Critical 
Assessment of Integration Requirements for Residential and Citizenship Rights in 
Europe, 25 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (on file with author) 
(discussing the “integration debate” in Europe). 
6. Id
7. See Paul B. Cliteur, Tolerantie en Theoterrorisme [Tolerance and
Theoterrorism], in FRANS KRAP & WILLEM SINNINGHE DAMSTE (EDS.), OVER 
TOLERANTIE GESPROKEN [SPEAKING OF TOLERANCE] 167-69 (2016); see also Paul 
Cliteur, BARDOT, FALLACI, HOUELLEBECQ EN WILDERS [BARDOT, FALLACI, 
HOUELLEBECQ EN WILDERS] 2016 (on file with author); Donna E. Arzi, The Role of 
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reaction to the political developments in the Middle-East,8 some 
European authorities decided to critically scrutinize the work of Islamic 
preachers.9  A minimally noticed and criticized instrument that is 
widely used in this context concerns the policy of targeting a particular 
category of Islamic preachers for special restrictions.10  This category 
of religious leaders is usually accused of spreading messages of hatred 
and violence.11  This approach of targeting Islamic extremism manifests 
itself in multiple ways and on different levels.  As such, on the level of 
public and political debate, the language used to address Muslim 
radicalization is quite aggressive in tone.12  The concepts of “hate 
Compulsion in Islamic Conversion: Jihad, Dhimma and Ridda, 8 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 15 (2002) (exploring the content of Islamic dogmas, such as Jihad and apostasy). 
8. See KARIN VEEGENS, A DISRUPTED BALANCE? (2011) (discussing the
criminal law developments in reaction to terrorist attacks under the flag of religion); 
see also Mark D. Kielsgard, A Human Rights Approach to Counter-Terrorism, 36 
CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 249 (2006). 
9. Alexander Tsesis, Terrorist Speech on Social Media, 70 VAND. L. REV. 651
(2017) (discussing the debate in the U.S.); Michiel Bot, The Right to Offend: 
Contested Speech Acts and Critical Democratic Practice, 24 LAW & LITERATURE 232, 
238 (2012) (paying attention to the Dutch debate on reducing the influence of radical 
Imams).  
10. See generally Khaled A. Beydoun, Muslim Bans and the (Re)Making of
Political Islamophobia, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 1733 (2017) (providing some insights in 
the background of targeting Muslims in the U.S.); Jeroen Temperman, Freedom of 
Expression and Religious Sensitivities in Pluralist Societies: Facing the Challenge of 
Extreme Speech, 2011 BYU L. REV. 729 (2011) (discussing the challenges of religious 
sensitivity to free speech and how this right to free expression has been affected by 
those sensitives); see also Robin Edger, Are Hate Speech Provisions Anti-
Democratic: An International Perspective, 26 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 119 (2010) 
(assessing the Canadian attempts to deal with “hate speeches” from an international 
law perspective); Helen Ginger Berrigan, “Speaking Out” about Hate Speech, 48 
LOY. L. REV. 1 (2002) (defining hate speech). 
11. This article does not aim to challenge the positive obligation states have
under international law to protect minorities from hate speech.  However, it aims to 
create awareness about framing the followers of one particular religious faith as 
potential terrorists and thus singling out that religion for special bans.  See Nazila 
Ghanea, Minorities and Hatred: Protections and Implications, 17 INT’L J. ON 
MINORITY & GROUP RTS. 423, 425 (2010); Robert A. Kahn, Flemming Rose, the 
Danish Cartoon Controversy, and the New European Freedom of Speech, 40 CAL. W.
INT’L L.J. 253 (2010) (discussing the clash between free speech and religious 
freedom). 
12. The anti-radicalization policies developed in this regard fit the propagated
idea of tolerating only those versions of the Islam that fit European values.  See 
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Imams” and “hate preachers” seem to be completely integrated in this 
debate.13  On the level of anti-radicalization policies, the instruments 
addressing Muslim-extremism appear to be as severe as the tone of the 
anti-radicalization debate.  These policies include the following: (1) 
indefinitely and “without delay” shutting down mosques and Islamic 
institutes;14 (2) frustrating the broadcast of TV channels;15 (3) explicit 
refusal of permissions to build mosques;16 (4) withdrawal of residence 
permits;17 (5) imposition of area bans;18 (6) invalidating issued travel 
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, DRAFT REPORT ON FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF 
THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON TERRORISM recommendation 15 (2018). 
13. See Beydoun, supra note 10 (critiquing this development in the U.S.
context). 
14. Cf. EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, supra note 12 (explicitly calling upon its
member-states to close “without delay” mosques and other Islamic institutes that 
violate EU values); Susanne Schröter, Debating Salafism, Traditionalism and 
Liberalism: Muslims and the State in Germany, in MOHA ENNAJI (ED.) NEW 
HORIZONS OF MUSLIM DIASPORA IN EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA 215 (2016) (on 
file with author); see also Harriet Agerholm, Muslims stage mass prayer in protest 
over closure of mosques in Italy, INDEPENDENT (Oct. 23, 2016), 
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/muslims-stage-mass-prayer-
protest-over-closure-mosques-italy-rome-demonstration-islamophobia-
a7376286.html (reporting that Italian authorities have closed mosques on remarkable 
“administrative grounds” and highlighting that politicians have expressed their 
concerns about the existence of unofficial “garage mosques”).  
15. EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, supra note 12 (without providing a clear
definition of “hate preacher,” the European Parliament urges the committee in its draft 
report to take legislative steps meant to measure the effectiveness of knocking down 
foreign TV channels spreading messages contrary to EU values). 
16.  Cf. Giorgio Ghiglione in Sesto San Giovann, The fall of ‘Italy’s Stalingrad’:
symbol of left wages war on migrants and poor, GUARDIAN (May 22, 2018), 
https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2018/may/22/fall-italy-stalingrad-sesto-san-
giovanni-milan-symbol-of-the-left-wages-war-on-migrants-and-the-poor (reporting 
on how the presence of a terrorist in a small Italian town unfairly played a role in not 
granting construction permission for the building of a mosque). 
17. Cf. Human Rights Without Frontiers, Belgian court decision blocking
deportation of Brussels grand mosque imam appealed to the council of state, (Nov. 
30, 2017), http://hrwf.eu/belgian-court-decision-blocking-deportation-of-brussels-
grand-mosque-imam-appealed-to-the-council-of-state/ (paying attention to the highly 
controversial deportation case of the Egyptian imam Abdelhadi Sewif who lived for 
13 years in Belgium and was accused of spreading radicalism.  Eventually, a Belgium 
court stopped the deportation process). 
18. The Dutch Raad van State, Council of State May 30, 2018, no.
201709324/1/A3, ECLI:NL:RVS:2018:1763 (Neth.) (ruling that the imposed area ban 
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visas to attend conferences and symposia;19 and (7) proposals aimed at 
amending criminal law enforcing the law against the “hate Imams” and 
takfiri Islamists,20 who label other Muslims as apostates.21 
on a Muslim preacher was justified in light of the risk of radicalizing believers in those 
particular neighborhoods of The Hague, leaving aside the argument of the preacher 
that he is manifesting his religion). 
19. See Teis Jensen, Denmark bans six ‘hate preachers’ from entering the
country, REUTERS (May 2, 2017), https://ca.reuters.com/article/topNews/ 
idCAKBN17Y1MV-OCATP (last visited Feb. 27, 2019); see also 
https://www.rtlnieuws.nl/nieuws/binnenland/stichting-verbijsterd-over-intrekking-
visa-imams (in 2015 the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs invalidated the issued 
travel visas of three controversial Islamic preachers that aimed to attend a money 
raising “gala” in the Dutch city of Rijswijk); cf. Regional Court of Oost-Brabant 
December 23, 2015, no. SHE 15/6861, ECLI:NL:RBOBR:2015:7607 (Neth.) (the 
mayor of Eindhoven banned the organizers of an Islamic conference); see also 
Regional Court of Oost-Brabant January 30, 2017, no. SHE 16/2650, 
ECLI:NL:RBOBR:2017:415 (Neth.) (the court overturned the 2015 interim judgment 
and ruled that the ban was an inadmissible violation of the right to religious freedom 
and the freedom of association).  
20. See Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal [The House of Representatives],
Aanhangsel Handelingen II [Parliamentary Proceedings II] 2017/2018, at 68-35-12 
(Neth.) (showcasing a recent debate in the Netherlands).  Amending criminal law for 
this purpose is highly controversial. The liberal criticism is of Ayaan Hirsi Ali, a 
former member of the Dutch House of Representatives, saying that according to our 
modern standards, the Islamic Prophet is a warlord.  If he is allowed to say this then 
why should a local conservative imam not be left room for saying that the mayor of 
Rotterdam is an apostate, however shocking and objectionable the content of both 
statements may be. Cf. Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, The 
Vulnerability of Conscience: The Constitutional Basis for Protecting Religious 
Conduct, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1245, 1292 (1994) (arguing that it would be 
“unacceptable” from a normative point of view to give a different treatment to very 
similar cases).  
21. Eli Alshech, The Doctrinal Crisis within the Salafi-Jihado Ranks and the
Emergence of Neo-Takfirism, 21 ISLAMIC L. & SOC’Y 419, 437 (2014) (explaining 
what the takfiri ideology entails and providing an overview of the recent 
developments regarding the thinking of this sect).  
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These recent developments have two key commonalities.  First, a 
latent presence of Islamophobia,22 a kind of Islam and Muslim fear.23  
As highlighted by Justice Sotomayor in her dissenting opinion in Trump 
v. Hawaii,24 this fear is gradually growing and institutionalizing.
Second, the deep commitment to undo beliefs, expressions, and
manifestations that deviate from the required and dominant standards
to save mainstream culture fuels the façade of the anti-terrorism and
anti-radicalization agenda.  One example of attempting to preserve
mainstream culture is highlighted in the case of Awad v. Ziriax, which
was brought before the Court in the aftermath of the so-called “Save
Our State” Amendment.25
22. Sohail Wahedi, EU wil islam anders behandelen [EU wants to treat Islam
differently], ND (July 31, 2018), https://www.nd.nl/nieuws/opinie/eu-wil-islam-
anders-behandelen.3082450.lynkx (last visited Feb. 27, 2019) (defining Islamophobia 
as fear for the Islam and Muslims and warning for the institutionalization of 
Islamophobia); see also ENES BAYRAKLI & FARID HAFEZ, EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA 
REPORT 2017 (2018); cf. Yaseen Eldik & Monica C. Bell, The Establishment Clause 
and Public Education in an Islamophobic Era, 8 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 245 (2012). 
23. Christian Joppke, Pluralism vs. Pluralism: Islam and Christianity in the
European Court of Human Rights, in RELIGION, SECULARISM, AND CONSTITUTIONAL
DEMOCRACY 88 (Jean Louise Cohen & Cécile Laborde eds., 2016) (analyzing the case 
law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in religious freedom cases and 
claiming that the Court interprets pluralism as a value that is threatened by the Islamic 
faith and needs therefore be protected).  
24. Cf. Trump v. Hawaii 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2433 (2018) (Sotomayor, S.,
dissenting) (Justice Sotomayor criticizes the contentious “Travel Ban” that was 
designed and enforced just shortly after President Donald J. Trump came to power. 
She notes the Supreme Court’s majority fails to see that the travel ban is a violation 
of religious neutrality and a clear sign of Muslim fear.  Sotomayor says that 
“repackaging” the ban as a security need, knowing that its background is laid down in 
the electoral promise of shutting down the U.S. borders for Muslims, “does little to 
cleanse [the Travel Ban] of the appearance of discrimination that the President’s 
words have created.  Based on the evidence in the record, a reasonable observer would 
conclude that the Proclamation was motivated by anti-Muslim animus . . . The 
majority holds otherwise by ignoring the facts, misconstruing our legal precedent, and 
turning a blind eye to the pain and suffering the [Travel Ban] inflicts upon countless 
families and individuals, many of whom are United States citizens.”). 
25. See Brenna Bhandar, The Ties that Bind Multiculturalism and Secularism
Reconsidered, 36 J.L. & SOC’Y 301, 304, 326 (2009) (discussing multiculturalism and 
secularism as established dominant political doctrines dealing with diversity. 
Bhandar claims that these political theories “reproduce and hold in place a unitary, 
sovereign political subjectivity.  Despite their ostensible differences as political 
ideologies, both multiculturalism and secularism are deployed as techniques to govern 
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This strategy of reconciliation26 touches on diversity and issues 
related to diversity, from a biased and dominant majoritarian 
perspective.27  The main aim of this reconciliation strategy is to make 
diversity as a concept, “majoritarian-proof.”28  That is to say, what is 
considered to fit the diversity concept passes through the majoritarian 
difference.”  She concludes by saying that both political theories have in common the 
objective “to govern and manage difference that is perceived to violate dominant 
norms and values, defined in reference to the Christian cultural heritage of the nation 
state.”); see also Steven M. Rosato, Saving Oklahoma’s Save Our State Amendment: 
Sharia Law in the West and Suggestions to Protect Similar State Legislation from 
Constitutional Attack, 44 SETON HALL L. REV. 659 (2014); Michael A. Helfand, 
Religious Arbitration and the New Multiculturalism: Negotiating Conflicting Legal 
Orders, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1231 (2011). 
26. S.A.S. v. France, App. No. 43835/11, Eur. Ct. H. R. ¶ 126 (2014) (Fr.) (the
Court rules that for “democratic societies, in which several religions coexist within 
one and the same population, it may be necessary to place limitations on freedom to 
manifest one’s religion or beliefs in order to reconcile the interests of the various 
groups and ensure that everyone’s beliefs are respected.”); see also Kokkinakis v. 
Greece, App. No. 14307/88, Eur. Ct. H. R. ¶ 33 (1993) (Greece) (the ECtHR 
formulated in this first religious freedom judgment the “reconciliation formula,” using 
the same language as in S.A.S. v. France); see also Mark Hill, Tensions and Synergies 
in Religious Liberty: An Evaluation of the Interrelation of Freedom of Belief with 
Other Human Rights; Parallel Equality and Anti-discrimination Provisions; 
Enforcement in Competing European Courts; and Mediated Dispute Resolution, 2014 
BYU L. REV. 547 (2014) (providing some insights and background in the case law of 
the ECtHR on religious freedom).  
27. Eoin Daly, Fraternalism as a Limitation on Religious Freedom: The Case
of S.A.S. v. France, 11 RELIGION & HUM. RTS. 140, 165 (2016) (criticizing the way 
contentious practices of religious minorities have often been approached from an 
ethnocentric perspective that has been grounded on majoritarian cultural norms that 
provide little room for the habits of cultural and religious minorities); see also Anna 
Triandafyllidou, Tariq Modood & Ricard Zapata-Barrero, European challenges to 
multicultural citizenship. Muslims, secularism and beyond, in ANNA 
TRIANDAFYLLIDOU, TARIQ MODOOD & RICARD ZAPATA-BARRERO (EDS.), 
MULTICULTURALISM, MUSLIMS AND CITIZENSHIP. A EUROPEAN APPROACH 1, 3 
(2006) (saying that “there is a widespread perception that Muslims are making 
politically exceptional, culturally unreasonable or theologically alien demands upon 
European states.”).  
28. Cf. Irene Zubaida Khan, The Rule of Law and the Politics of Fear: Human
Rights in the Twenty-First Century, 14 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 2 (2008) (outlining 
her “Afghanistan experience” and claiming: “What I saw in Kabul in 2003 is a 
microcosm of what I see is happening across our world today; a world where the 
interests of the powerful and the privileged prevail over those of the poor and the 
marginalised, and security trumps human rights.”). 
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lens of skepticism and beats the criticism of favoritisms toward 
religious believers or immigrants.  Thus, what diversity should entail is 
made dependent upon the desires and wishes of a dominant majority.29  
This idea of making diversity majoritarian-proof has serious 
consequences for the true free exercise of fundamental rights (i.e., 
freedom of religion, freedom of expression, and freedom of 
association).  The non-sectarian and thus the egalitarian approach to 
fundamental rights is threatened.30  In addition, the reconciliation 
strategy involves another highly unpleasant risk. 
Specifically, the reconciliation strategy concerns the emergence of 
a “Chrisotcracy” and the shifting away from the religion-neutral liberal 
democracy.31  Here, Christocracy does not refer to a theocracy that is 
governed by Jesus’ words or following God’s divine revelations in the 
Holy Bible.32  The type of Christocracy emerging here takes the form 
29. Cf. Bhandar, supra note 25, at 315 (discussing the British dilemma of how
to deal with religious manifestations of Muslims in the aftermath of theoterrorism and 
the rise of radicalism and extremism).  
30. The egalitarian interpretation of religion and religious freedom is not
affected by the specific beliefs that form the basis of certain claims for exceptions. 
See RONALD DWORKIN, RELIGION WITHOUT GOD, 146 (2013).  Another appropriate 
example in this context is the local French ban on wearing the so-called Burkini that 
covers the whole body except the face, arguing that this piece of clothing is not 
“respectful of good morals and of secularism,” completely ignoring similar clothing 
worn by non-Muslim women.  See Alissa J. Rubin, French ‘Burkini’ Bans Provoke 
Backlash as Armed Police Confront Beachgoers, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 24, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/25/world/europe/france-burkini.html; see also 
Mohamed Abdelaal, Extreme Secularism vs. Religious Radicalism: The Case of the 
French Burkini, 23 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 443, 454 (2017) (discussing the way 
French courts have dealt with the legality of the ban on wearing burkini).  One of the 
sectarian arguments that is used to justify a non-egalitarian application of religious 
freedom is laid down in the idea that Christianity stands for peace while Islam is 
inherently violent: STAATKUNDIG GEREFORMEERDE PARTIJ (“SGP”) [THE DUTCH 
REFORMED POLITICAL PARTY], ISLAM IN NEDERLAND [ISLAM IN THE NETHERLANDS] 
3, 4 (2017), https://www.sgp.nl/actueel/manifest—islam-in nederland/6125 (last 
visited Feb. 27, 2019). 
31. Wahedi, supra note 22 (raising up the question as to whether liberal
democracies are moving toward a regime that is democratic for the “native” majority 
and “reactionary” in its approach toward the minorities’ claims for exemptions from 
general laws).  
32. Cf. Erik J. Krueger, God versus Government: Understanding State
Authority in the Context of the Same-Sex Marriage Movement, 7 LIBERTY U. L. REV. 
162
2019]  FREEDOM OF RELIGION AND LIVING TOGETHER 223 
of a democracy for the “natives,” which consists of a Christian majority 
who have full access to the basic liberties.33  However, this privilege is 
not reserved for religious minorities.34  The concept of Christocracy is 
quite ethnocentric in its response to the claims, manifestations, and 
beliefs of other religious minorities.35  This response is meant to 
promote the Christian, and as claimed by some, the Judeo-Christian 
heritage of Westerns societies.  The proponents of this line consider this 
historic heritage the cradle of European civilization that has brought 
liberties and prosperity to Western nations.36 
The emergence of the reconciliation strategy, and the rise of 
ethnocentrism across Western democracies such as the United States 
and Europe, might affect the propagated egalitarian understanding of 
religious freedom and the idea of “living together in diversity.”37  Thus, 
235, 237 (2013) (Krueger describes Christocracy as “a community of Christians 
governed by Christ through the Church according to the immutable divine law.”). 
33. See SGP, supra note 30, at 3-4.
34. See generally Najmeh Mahmoudjafari, Religion and Family Law: The
Possibility of Pluralistic Cooperation, 82 UMKC L. REV. 1077, 1085 (2014) (on file 
with author) (wondering whether the Muslim community could benefit from the same 
privileges of religious arbitration, as this option is for example available for the Jewish 
community). 
35. Joppke, supra note 23, at 96 (in the religious freedom case law of the
ECtHR, Joppke has discovered “a laxness for Christianity and an unforgiving stance 
toward Islam,” which he qualifies as “a double standard at work”); see also Sohail 
Wahedi & Renée Kool, De Strafrechtelijke aanpak van meisjesbesnijdenis in een 
rechtsvergelijkende context [The criminal law approach toward female circumcision: 
a comparative law perspective], 7 TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR RELIGIE, RECHT EN BELEID [J.
FOR RELIGION, L. AND POL’Y], 51 (2016) (on file with author) (highlighting the 
emergence of ethnocentrism in the enforcement of laws against the practice of female 
genital mutilation).  
36. Yasser Louati, Islamophobia in France. National Report 2017, in ENES 
BAYRAKLI & FARID HAFEZ (EDS.), EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2017 225 
(2018) (commenting on how French politicians have referred to the Judeo-Christian 
background of France to promote their political opinions. Louati says, “[w]hile [some 
French politicians] constantly pose as staunch advocates of a repressive laïcité when 
speaking of the religious rights of Muslims, they nevertheless invoke religious 
freedoms or the “Judeo-Christian roots” of France to justify special arrangements for 
their political base.”); see also Leyla Yildirim, Islamophobia in Netherlands. National 
Report 2017, in ENES BAYRAKLI & FARID HAFEZ (EDS.), EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA
REPORT 2017 431 (2018) (for similar rhetoric used in the Netherlands). 
37. Ilias Trispiotis, Two Interpretations of Living Together in European Human 
Rights Law, 75 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 580, 582 (2016) (arguing that “the historical 
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where does our analysis bring us in terms of the widely advocated 
egalitarian understanding of religious freedom in liberal political 
philosophy and the idea of “living together in diversity”?  To develop a 
robust theoretical framework that helps us reflect on this question, we 
should deal with two intertwined matters.  On the one hand, we have to 
deal with the question of religious freedom and its propagated non-
sectarian and egalitarian understanding.  On the other, we need to 
properly address the rise of ethnocentrism across Western democracies 
and the related concerns about the reconciliation strategy.38 
Our analysis begins with the question of whether the move toward 
ethnocentrism and the use of a reconciliation strategy reflect the 
propagated non-sectarian role religion should play for the purposes of 
religious accommodation and decisions taken in liberal democracies.39  
To explore more on this matter, we need to take two steps.  First, we 
need to conceptualize the reconciliation strategy.  Second, we need to 
provide a clear theoretical framework that helps us find out what role 
religion plays, for legal and political purposes, within the paradigm of 
liberal political philosophy.  A recent draft report of the special 
European Parliamentary committee on anti-terrorism provides a 
helping hand regarding this first step; the report urges member states to 
combat Islamic manifestations that violate European values.40  The 
same is true for the case law of the European Court of Human Rights 
(“ECtHR”).  The ECtHR has used the concept of “living together,” as 
used in S.A.S. v. France (S.A.S.), ruling that norms prohibiting or 
restricting “contentious religious manifestations” do not violate 
religious freedom.  The Court held that such prohibitions are meant to 
protect the rights and freedoms of others through ruling out religious 
practices that challenge the core values of a democratic society.41 
Part I of this article draws on relevant case law and the 
recommendations of the special committee to theorize the 
emphasis on peaceful coexistence” reveals much of the way European authorities deal 
with religion). 
38. Cf. Micah Schwartzman, Religion, Equality and Anarchy, in RELIGION IN
LIBERAL POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 15 (Cécile Laborde & Aurélia Bardon eds., 2017) 
(explaining the relevant methodology). 
39. Cf. CÉCILE LABORDE, LIBERALISM’S RELIGION (2017); CÉCILE LABORDE & 
AURÉLIA BARDON, RELIGION IN LIBERAL POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY (2017). 
40. EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, supra note 12.
41. S.A.S. v. France, ¶ 126 (2014).
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reconciliation strategy.  Although this theorization rests heavily on 
European experiences, a similar development of reinforcing 
majoritarianism is happening in the United States.  The most recent case 
in the United States that illustrates reinforcing majoritarianism is Trump 
v. Hawaii.  However, the “Travel Ban” preceding this Supreme Court
ruling is not unique in its effect of singling out one faith for a special
ban.  The “Save Our State” Amendment in Oklahoma, resulting in
Awad v. Ziriax,42 and the upcoming United States v. Nagarwala,43
contain elements of what this article theorizes as the reinforcement of
majoritarianism that causes feelings of anxiety toward the “stranger.”44
Part II of this article focuses on whether the reconciliation strategy 
could be considered a paradigmatic expression of the most recent 
theoretical developments regarding the place of religion within liberal 
political philosophy.45  These developments involve a growing support 
42. This case concerned the lawfulness of State Question 755 that aimed to ban
the use of Sharia Law in the courts of the state of Oklahoma.  Its author, Rex Duncan, 
presented his initiative as a necessary mean in the battle against an evil culture.  Both 
the District Court as well as the Court of Appeals decided that the ban—which was 
approved by more than 70% of the Oklahomans participating in the ballot—was 
clearly aimed at singling out the Islamic law for a disfavored treatment and for these 
reasons both legal instances held that challenger would likely be able to challenge this 
ban because it was unconditional and violated the Establishment Clause.  Awad v. 
Ziriax, 754 F. Supp. 2d 1298 (W.D. Okla. 2010); Awad v. Ziriax 670 F.3d 1111 (10th 
Cir. 2012); see Amara S. Chaudhry-Kravitz, The New Facially Neutral Anti-Shariah 
Bills: A Constitutional Analysis, 20 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 25, 31 
(2013); Lee Tankle, The Only Thing We Have to Fear Is Fear Itself: Islamophobia 
and the Recently Proposed Unconstitutional and Unnecessary Anti-Religion Laws, 21 
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 273 (2012); Asma T. Uddin & Dave Pantzer, A First 
Amendment Analysis of Anti-Sharia Initiatives, 10 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 363 (2012). 
43. United States v. Nagarwala, 350 F. Supp. 3d 613 (E.D. Mich. 2018) (the
legality of female circumcision, which involves separating the mucous membrane 
from the genitalia, however the District Court held that the Federal law banning this 
practice is unconstitutional because “Congress had no authority to pass this statute 
under either the Necessary and Proper Clause or the Commerce Clause.”  The District 
Court referred in this respect to United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 566, 115 S. Ct. 
1624 and Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. at 858, 134 S. Ct. 2077.  This case is pending 
appeal). 
44. Trispiotis, supra note 37.  Here, “stranger,” means those who do not belong
to an established majority, either because they adhere to another religion or because 
they have an immigrant background.  
45. Part II includes and revises the analysis on the role of religion in liberal
political philosophy that has been published previously.  See Sohail Wahedi, 
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for a “religion-empty” and a “God-empty” understanding of religion 
and religious freedom.46  Such understanding draws on non-
sectarianism, anti-favoritisms, and thus, an egalitarian approach to the 
beliefs, views, expressions, and manifestations of citizens.47  Part II 
helps us understand why religion qua religion does not require special 
protection.  Thus, each liberal protection provided for the exercise of 
religion takes place through finding suitable substitutes for the category 
of religion.  This means religion is only special because of abstraction. 
Allegedly, it is not possible to provide a liberal protection regime for 
religion qua religion.48  This theoretical framework helps us to answer 
the question of why majoritarian sensitivities seem to prevail in 
important free exercise cases. 
As we will see, in S.A.S. v. France, the ban on religious face-
covering veils has been justified as a matter of “living together.”49  The 
“Travel Ban” in Trump v. Hawaii was justified as a matter of security.50  
The “Save Our State” Amendment was a serious attempt to keep the 
“stranger”51 outside the territories of the state—a policy of fear that 
Abstraction from the Religious Dimension, 24 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1 (2017-
2018).  
46. See generally Wahedi, supra note 22.
47. Id.
48. STEVEN D. SMITH, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF AMERICAN RELIGIOUS 
FREEDOM 83 (2014). 
49. The French ban on face-covering veils did not violate the right to Religious
Freedom, as France had “a broad margin of appreciation” to make a choice regarding 
the lawfulness of face-covering veils.  
50. For example, the first version of the travel ban, Executive Order 13769,
Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States, explicitly 
said that  
Deteriorating conditions in certain countries due to war, strife, disaster, and 
civil unrest increase the likelihood that terrorists will use any means 
possible to enter the United States.  The United States must be vigilant 
during the visa-issuance process to ensure that those approved for admission 
do not intend to harm Americans and that they have no ties to terrorism. 
Exec. Order No. 13,769, 82 FR 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017). 
51. Sahar F. Aziz, A Muslim Registry: The Precursor to Internment, 2017 BYU 
L. REV. 779, 825 (2017); Eunice Lee, Non-Discrimination in Refugee and Asylum
Law (Against Travel Ban 1.0 and 2.0), 31 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 459, 464 (2017) (both
saying that the aim—as explicitly mentioned in the first version of the travel ban,
Executive Order 13,769—to keep honor killers outside the United States is an obvious
reference to Muslims).
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advanced the political agenda of spreading anxiety toward the 
“stranger.”  Another example is United States v. Nagarwala, where the 
interventions were based on protecting girls, leaving zero room for 
analogies.52  Moreover, why do authorities allow religious male 
circumcision qua religious,53 while religious and ritual female 
circumcision has been outlawed in all its variants?  Part II also suggests 
that we can understand this way of “re-packaging” religious cases as 
“abstraction from the religious dimension,” which does not justify 
singling out one faith for special bans in liberal democracies. 
Part III draws on the liberal critique of singling out religion qua 
religion for special protection in law and the emergence of the 
reconciliation strategy.  Part III also addresses the shift toward 
ethnocentrism to provide a more “close-to-reality” conception of 
religious freedom that is “diversity-friendly,” “sectarian-proof,” and 
compatible with the egalitarian view of this right that rejects religious 
toleration qua religious.54 
This article concludes that although the presence of the 
reconciliation strategy and the shift toward ethnocentrism can be 
52. Cf. United States v. Nagarwala, 350 F. Supp. 3d 613 (E.D. Mich. 2018)
(outlawing the Federal law on banning female circumcision and saying with reference 
to United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607 (2000) that “as the Supreme Court 
found in Morrison, rape and other forms of sexual assault against women are not 
economic or commercial activity, and therefore not part of an interstate market, no 
different conclusion can be reached concerning FGM, which is another form of 
gender-related violence.”). 
53. Cf. Cent. Rabbinical Cong. of U.S. & Canada v. New York City Dep’t of
Health & Mental Hygiene, 763 F.3d 183 (2d Cir. 2014) (on file with author) (holding 
that a local regulation banning the practice of immediate oral suction of the 
circumcision wound—also known as metzitzah b’peh and practiced by some 
Orthodox Jews—preventing the spread of (Herpes Simplex Virus) is not neutral nor 
generally applicable.  “The Regulation is not neutral because it purposefully and 
exclusively targets a religious practice for special burdens.  And . . . the Regulation is 
not generally applicable either, because it is underinclusive in relation to its asserted 
secular goals: the Regulation pertains to religious conduct associated with a small 
percentage of HSV infection cases among infants, while leaving secular conduct 
associated with a larger percentage of such infection unaddressed.”  In fact, the Court 
accepts at this point that ritual male circumcision is a permissible religious practice as 
it points out that the Regulation mainly “targets a religious practice for special 
burdens.”). 
54. Part III includes and revises the analysis on the pragmatic defense of
religious freedom that has been published previously.  See Sohail Wahedi, The Health 
Law Implications of Ritual Circumcisions, 22 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L. J 209 (2019). 
167
228 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 49 
theorized in light of the abstraction theory, as developed and defended 
in this article, we need to be very cautious about this justification.  After 
all, non-sectarianism and egalitarianism are two sides of the same coin. 
This means authorities need to be very careful about disfavoring 
harmless, though very different lifestyles that deviate from the desired 
standards.  This religion-empty understanding of religious freedom 
supports the proposition that people should be free to organize and live 
their lives as they choose.55  However, the reconciliation strategy and 
the emergence of strong ethnocentrism give cause to rethink religious 
freedom in a way that endorses diversity for pragmatic reasons, 
intending to avoid a Hobbesian “war of all against all.”56  Hence, this 
defense of religious freedom is rooted in grounds that are non-sectarian, 
non-majoritarian, and non-violent toward the advocated egalitarian 
conception of religious freedom.57 
I. THE RECONCILIATION STRATEGY
Hidden behind the façade of “unity in diversity” that aims to 
combat “radical Islam” and support the moderate Muslim, a special 
anti-terrorism committee of the European Parliament has proposed in 
its recent report to only tolerate variants of Islam that are “in full 
accordance with EU values.”58  These values include respect for human 
rights, fundamental freedoms, human dignity, equality, and solidarity.59  
Mosques and other Islamic institutes that violate these values should be 
closed immediately.60  This radical proposal is the first serious and most 
comprehensive legislative attempt to create a legal basis for state 
interventions against norm deviant beliefs, expressions, and 
55. See generally DWORKIN, supra note 30 (this idea is grounded in the
neutrality principle of liberal philosophy.  The State should act in a religion-blind way. 
This positions considers religion a non-sectarian concept that could help people to 
organize their lives independently, and thus without State interference, except for 
cases of harm or damages). 
56. Cf. BRIAN LEITER, WHY TOLERATE RELIGION? 9 (2014).
57. Cf. Sohail Wahedi, Female circumcision as an African problem: double
standards or harsh reality?, in CHRISTIAN GREEN, JEREMY GUNN & MARK HILL 
(EDS.), RELIGION, LAW AND SECURITY IN AFRICA 400 (2018).  
58. EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, supra note 12, 17.
59. Id. at 14.
60. Id. at 17.
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manifestations of a “contentious minority” in Europe.  However, it is 
not something completely unique.  On a different level and in a case by 
case assessment, judges across liberal democracies have ruled in a large 
number of cases on the legality of religious manifestations that are 
considered contrary to legal and social norms of society.61 
The legal outcomes of some of these cases are as controversial as 
the proposed plans of the special committee.  The controversy lies in 
two specific grounds that shape the contours of the reconciliation 
strategy.  First, some court judgments and the special committee report 
seek to adjust beliefs, expressions, and manifestations that violate 
general expectations about how one should live a life conforming to the 
dominant standards of the society.  Second, the court judgments and the 
recommendations of the European Parliament seem to single out one 
“contentious” minority for special bans and restrictions.  At this point, 
the majoritarian attitude is that some beliefs, expressions, and 
manifestations of this minority are unwelcome, anomalous, or simply 
problematic,62 as they do not show enough respect for the societal 
achievements of Western societies, such as the equality between men 
and women.63 
Taking both developments together unveils that very little of the 
propagated egalitarian and non-sectarian conception of religious 
61. Shelby L. Wade, Living Together or Living Apart from Religious
Freedoms: The European Court of Human Right’s Concept of Living Together and 
Its Impact on Religious Freedom, 50 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 411 (2018); Sarah 
Trotter, Living Together, Learning Together, and Swimming Together: Osmanoglu 
and Kocabas v Switzerland (2017) and the Construction of Collective Life, 18 HUM. 
RTS. L. REV. 157, 169 (2018) (discussing the emergence of the “living together” 
doctrine in the case law of the ECtHR and how this shift move toward constructing a 
“common identity” has affected free exercise of religious freedom); Cf. Stephanie A. 
Ferraiolo, Justice for Injured Children: A Look into Possible Criminal Liability of 
Parents Whose Unvaccinated Children Infect Others, 19 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L. J. 29 
(2016); Geurt Henk Spruyt, Politicians and Epidemics in the Bible Belt, 12 UTRECHT 
L. REV. 114, 124 (2016) (refraining from child vaccination on religious grounds
provides another appropriate example of a contentious religious manifestation).  Cf.
John Alan Cohan, Honor Killings and the Cultural Defense, 40 CAL. W. INT’L L.J.
177 (2010).
62. Triandafyllidou, Modood & Zapata-Barrero, supra note 27, at 3.
63. Cf. Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij v. the Netherands (SGP), App. No.
58369/10, Eur. Ct. H. R. (2012) (critically scrutinizing the practice of a “native” 
religious minority).  
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freedom has been adopted by decision makers in law and politics across 
liberal democracies.64 
Instead, the protection of the rights and freedoms of others has been 
prioritized to cut off non-mainstream ways of life.65  This approach is 
clearly present in the ECtHR’s case law concerning the legality of 
Islamic dress codes,66 such as headscarves and face-covering veils.67  
The European Parliament’s recent draft report highly relies on the same 
ECtHR formula.  The rule of thumb is that protecting the rights and 
freedoms of “others” justifies state practices that violate a minority’s 
rights.68  Hence, the special committee’s recommendations might sound 
radical or even contradictory to the concept of “living together” in peace 
and diversity, but it attempts to codify the line that was developed by 
the ECtHR.  In other words, the recommendations of the special 
committee and the ECtHR’s case law share exactly the same narrative 
64. Cf. Id.  The SGP case is controversial for several reasons.  Mainly, the idea
that the State should not interfere in the way people want to give content to their lives, 
simply because the authorities do not appreciate that way of life, not because that way 
of life is causing harm or puts the safety of others under serious health risks.  See 
generally DWORKIN, supra note 30, and Michael J. Perry, From Religious Freedom 
to Moral Freedom, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 993 (2010) (arguing that the state should 
not prescribe how people should live their lives). 
65. Cf. interview with the former acting mayor of Amsterdam Jozias van
Aartsen: Niels Klaassen, ‘VVD moet moslims juist beschermen’ [‘VVD must protect 
Muslims’], AD (July 20, 2018) (on file with author) (Van Aartsen claims that much 
of the current policy is based on gut feelings and suspicion toward Muslims, while 
religious freedom is meant to stop the government from prescribing how one should 
exercise his religion).  
66. The ECtHR judgment in the SGP case forms an exception to this view.
Another exception to this rule is the court judgment in Refah Partisi and Others v. 
Turkey, App. Nos. 41340/98, 41342/98, 41343/98 and 41344/98, Eur. Ct. H. R. (2003) 
(in both judgments the major concern was the rights and freedoms of others).  
67. Dahlab v. Switzerland, App. No. 42393/98, Eur. Ct. H. R. (2001)
[hereinafter, Dahlab v. Switzerland]; Leyla Şahin v. Turkey, App. No. 44774/98, Eur. 
Ct. H. R. (2005) [hereinafter Leyla Şahin v. Turkey].  See also Timothy J. Murphy, 
Comparative Secularism: Leaving Room for the Holy Spirit and Headscarves in 
Turkish and American Public Schools, 45 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 297 (2015) (providing a 
comparative critical analysis of the protection regime for religion in the United States 
and Turkey). 
68. EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, supra note 12; see also Trotter supra note 61, at
163 (analyzes and discusses the way the ECtHR has embraced through case law the 
doctrine of “living together” as part of the limitation ground “protecting the rights and 
freedoms of others” to justify restrictions upon religious freedom). 
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that, in turn, reconciles diversity with majoritarian sensitivities about 
the way people should live their lives.  What does this narrative exactly 
entail and how does it help us to theorize the reconciliation strategy? 
To answer this question, we can make use of the court’s ruling in S.A.S. 
and compare this decision to the special committee’s recommendations. 
A. S.A.S. v. France 
In S.A.S., the ECtHR used, for the first time, the predominantly 
French concept of “living together” to rule on the legality of the French 
ban on publicly wearing face-covering veils.69  The background of this 
judgment lies in the adoption of a highly controversial bill that aimed 
to ban face-covering dresses and veils, such as the burqa and niqab.70  
In July 2010, the French Assemblée Nationale passed the bill that was 
meant to prohibit concealing one’s face in the public space.  An absolute 
majority of the then present Assembly members voted in favor of this 
bill.  Only one member voted against it while three members 
abstained.71  In September 2010, the French Sénat adopted by an 
absolute majority the bill that criminalized wearing face-covering 
dresses in public (“prohibition law”).72 
69. Hakeem Yusuf, S.A.S. v. France: Supporting Living Together or Forced
Assimilation, 3 INT’L HUM. RTS. L. REV. 277, 281 (2014) (criticizing the embracement 
of the French “living together” doctrine in S.A.S.). 
70. LOI n° 2010-1192 du 11 octobre 2010 interdisant la dissimulation du
visage dans l’espace public (LOI n° 2010-1192) [Law no. 2010-1192 of October 11, 
2010 prohibiting the concealment of the face in the public space] (Fran.).  
71. See generally Assemblée nationale, Année 2010. – No 72 [2] A.N. (C.R.), –
2e SÉANCE DU 13 JUILLET 2010, 5550 (Fran.) (on file with author) (335 out of 339 
present Assembly members voted in favor of the bill). 
72. Sénat, Année 2010. – No 82 S. (C.R.), SÉANCE DU 14 SEPTEMBRE 2010,
6763 (Fran.) (246 out of 247 present Senate members voted in favor of the bill. One 
member voted against). 
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1. The French Prohibition Law
The French prohibition law, which has been active since April 
2011,73 prohibits anyone from covering his or her face in public,74 
unless this face concealment is required: (1) to fulfil a legal duty, (2) 
for a festivity, traditional, or artistic event, or (3) for the exercise of a 
particular sport.75  An individual who violates this prohibition is fined 
or obligated to take a course on citizenship, or a combination of both.76  
The parliamentary proceedings on this bill reveal that the main rationale 
behind this piece of legislation has been the complete withdrawal of the 
Islamic face-covering dresses, such as the burqa and niqab from the 
public space in France.77  The main justification for this intervention 
has been enshrined in the French idea of “living together” that has 
allegedly been threatened and frustrated by face-covering dresses.78  
73. See generally S.A.S. v. France, ¶¶ 14; 24-27 (providing a chronological
overview of the legislative steps set to criminalize the concealment of the face in 
public).  
74. LOI n° 2010-1192, (Article 1: No one may, within the public space, wear
clothing that conceals the face.)  See also S.A.S. v. France, ¶ 28 (provides a translation 
of the French Law on face-covering veils). 
75. LOI n° 2010-1192, Article 2, section II.
76. LOI n° 2010-1192, Article 3 (the amount of this fine is connected with the
infringements of second class). 
77. See Expose des Motifs, Explanatory Memorandum of LOI n° 2010-1192,
https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichLoiPubliee.do;jsessionid=A3D47BAB744505
C3074B405E1EA232DA.tplgfr25s_3?idDocument=JORFDOLE000022234691&ty
pe=expose&typeLoi=&legislature= (last visited Feb. 27, 2019) (according to this 
document that explains the rationale behind the bill, the French values of liberty, 
equality and fraternity, which “underpin the principle of respect for . . .  equality 
between men and women” are threatened “by the wearing of full veil”).  The 
quotations are based on the translation of the Expose des Motifs in S.A.S. v. France, 
¶ 25.  Also, the debates in the French Parliament reveals that the main aim of this 
prohibition has been the Islamic face-covering veils, like burqa and niqab.  As such, 
only during the three debate at the Assemblée nationale, these contentious pieces of 
clothes are mentioned 92 times. 
78. Expose des Motifs, Explanatory Memorandum of LOI n° 2010-1192, supra
note 77 (the main argument behind this bill has always been that face-covering dresses 
are incompatible with the idea of “living together.”  The Memorandum does not 
explicate what this concept entails.  However, it says that the French Republic is based 
on certain values, such as liberty, equality and fraternity and also some principles, like 
gender equality, which are threatened by a “sectarian manifestation” that rejects the 
values of the French Republic.  Hence, the Memorandum suggests that “the 
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The bill’s historical background is essential to better understand the 
rationale behind the bill.79  The bill’s historical background unveils that 
the concept of “living together” is basically defined by an exclusive 
French Republican ideal about how citizens should live and behave 
within the Republic,80 providing little room for groups or people who 
reject this view.81  Furthermore, this domestic background helps us 
evaluate the implications of adopting the ECtHR’s “living together” 
doctrine and its impact on the free exercise of religion and matters of 
diversity that are so closely related to this right.82 
2. The French Prohibition Law Before the European Court
of Human Rights 
In S.A.S., a French citizen who was born in Pakistan but living in 
France, challenged the prohibition law.83  She described herself as a 
“devout Muslim.”84  In her public and private life, she occasionally 
Republican social covenant” that forms the basis of the French society needs to be 
protected through outlawing practices that are contrary to this).  See also S.A.S. v. 
France, ¶¶ 25, 140-41.  This call can also be found back in the Parliamentary debate 
concerning the bill.  Cf. the position of André Gerin who has defended the prohibition, 
since “the burqa, is the refusal of the Republic”: Assemblée nationale, Année 2010. – 
No 70 [1] A.N. (C.R.), – 1re SÉANCE DU 7 JUILLET 2010, 5394 (Fran.) (on file with 
author). 
79. Daly, supra note 27, at 141 (arguing that “living together,” which has
played such an important role in the justification of the prohibition, is a French 
concept about the manners of behavior in public life, in other words, it concerns “the 
duty of fraternity”). 
80. This line of reasoning is echoed very well by the contribution of Jean-
Claude Guibal, who was a member of the Union pour un mouvement populaire 
[Union for a Popular Movement] that was led by Nicolas Sarkozy.  During his address 
of the bill at the Assemblée nationale, Guibal defended the proposed prohibition and 
argued that although France is a tolerant society, it does not accept that some groups 
refuse to live in France as French people. Guibal said that such groups threatened 
“our” way of “living together” by their provocative behavior.  
81. Daly, supra note 27, at 146-47 (criticizing the Court judgment in S.A.S.).
This point of criticism was also mentioned by the applicant who challenged the French 
prohibition law before the ECtHR.  See S.A.S. v. France ¶ 77.  
82. See Trotter, supra note 61.
83. S.A.S. v. France ¶ 76.
84. Id. ¶ 11.
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covered her face for religious, cultural, and personal purposes.85  In 
doing so, she did not experience any forces or threats from her family 
or her husband to cover her face.86  If needed, she refrained from using 
her face-covering niqab or burqa.87  However, she insisted on having 
the option to cover her face when she was in a particular spiritual mood, 
such as during the Islamic fasting period.88 
Although she was not prosecuted for a breach of the new 
prohibition law nor did she experience any negative consequence 
immediately after the enactment of the prohibition law,89 she aimed to 
challenge the legality of this law for different reasons.90  However, for 
the purpose of theorizing the reconciliation strategy, we will only focus 
on the alleged violation of religious freedom and the way the ECtHR 
has dealt with this particular concern.91  The complaint about the 
violation of religious freedom rested strictly on two arguments.92  The 
first argument suggested that although the ban on wearing face-
covering dresses was prescribed by law,93 it generally lacked 
resemblance to any of the legitimate limitation grounds against the free 
exercise of religion.94  Moreover, the criticism put the defense of the 
French style of “living together” in the public area under critical 
85. Id. ¶ 12.
86. Id. ¶ 11.
87. Id.
88. Id. ¶ 12.
89. Id. ¶ 57.
90. Id. ¶¶ 69-73 (she argued before the Court that the French prohibition law
put her at risk of harassment.  Furthermore, she claimed that the ban discriminated 
against her and violated her freedoms of expression, association, and respect for the 
private life). 
91. See id. ¶¶ 76-80 (arguing why the ban violated her right to religious
freedom and respect for the private life).  See id. ¶¶ 110-158 (the Court’s assessment 
of the complaint regarding the alleged violation of religious freedom and the right to 
respect the private life). 
92. Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights [hereinafter,
ECHR]. 
93. S.A.S. v. France ¶ 76.
94. Id. ¶ 77 (the applicant argues why the prohibition law cannot pursue the
legitimate limitation ground of “public safety,” since the ban was not designed for 
security reasons). 
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scrutiny.95  The argument was that this French justification for the 
prohibition law completely neglected the minority’s perspective.  This 
particular viewpoint rested on the idea that it is possible for minorities 
to peacefully live together with the majority, while keeping their own 
habits and traditions.96  In other words, living peacefully does not 
require the minority group to strictly follow the French style of “living 
together.”97  In the same way, presenting the law as a tool to pursue 
gender equality was considered a “simplistic” presentation of the reality 
in which there are groups of women who themselves choose to cover 
their faces.98 
The second argument that questioned the legality of the prohibition 
law challenged the “necessity” of this ban in light of the prohibition 
law’s justification.99  The criticism, at this point, contended that it is not 
95. See Assemblée nationale, supra note 71, at 5548 (on file with author).  The
original text of this address reads as follows: 
“[L]e port du voile intégral constitue bien une pratique aux antipodes des 
valeurs qui fondent et structurent l’idée que tous ici nous nous faisons de la 
République.  C’est un déni de liberté lorsqu’il a lieu sous l’effet de la 
contrainte, que celle-ci soit patente ou diluée dans un environnement social 
; c’est une négation de l’égalité entre citoyens qui dépouille la femme de 
son identité, quand ce n’est pas de son humanité ; c’est un refus affiché de 
l’idéal de fraternité, une volonté de se soustraire au vivre ensemble 
républicain.”  
96. See S.A.S. v. France ¶ 77.
97. Id. ¶ 77 in conjunction with ¶ 114.
98. Id.
99. Id. ¶ 111.  The ECtHR follows four specific steps to decide upon an alleged
violation of the right to respect: private and family life; the freedom of thought, 
conscience, and religion; and freedom of expression, assembly, and association.  First, 
it decides upon the presence of an interference.  Second, it rules on the question as to 
whether this interference was prescribed by law.  Third, it answers the question 
whether this interference was meant to pursue one or more of legitimate limitation 
grounds upon fundamental freedoms.  Finally, it considers whether such a legitimate 
interference is necessary in a democratic society.  The necessity question is a 
proportionality test.  In fact, it helps judges determine whether a particular limitation 
upon a fundamental right “is necessary in a democratic society” to meet one or more 
of the legitimate limitation grounds, such as public safety, health, or morals, and the 
protection of public order as well as the rights and freedoms of others.  Although the 
Court does not want to frustrate the democratic decisions of national states that in 
some cases limit the exercise of fundamental freedoms, giving states a certain “margin 
of appreciation” to take decisions, it aims to consider whether there is a “pressing 
social need” for a specific limitation.  That pressing social need is meant to determine 
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to the authorities to favor or disfavor a particular lifestyle.  Thus, the 
critique was about state’s interferences in how people want to live their 
individual lives.100  More generally, the argument suggested that a free 
society should accommodate a wide range of people, both believers and 
non-believers.101  Hence, the authorities should not single out a 
particular lifestyle for disfavored treatment, even if there might be 
political support for that purpose.  In other words, political support for 
a limitation does not automatically say that the measure is “necessary 
in a democratic society.”102  The argument relied on the idea that French 
authorities have failed to study less restrictive measures that could have 
reached the same goals as the ones behind the prohibition law.103 
3. The Court’s Assessment of the Legality of the French
Prohibition Law 
In the Court’s assessment of the alleged violation of the right to 
religious freedom, it first rules that the French prohibition law interferes 
with the right to free exercise of religion.104  Subsequently, the Court 
considers this “continuing interference” as sufficiently prescribed by 
the limitation’s necessity.  See generally Steven Greer, The Interpretation of the 
European Convention on Human Rights: Universal Principle or Margin or 
Appreciation, 3 UCL HUM. RTS. REV. 1, 9 (2010); Gerorge Letsas, Two Concepts of 
the Margin of Appreciation, 26 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 705, 710-11 (2006) 
(analyzing how the ECtHR assesses complaints about alleged violation of 
fundamental rights).  See also Christopher Belelieu, The Headscarf as a Symbolic 
Enemy of the European Court of Human Rights’ Democratic Jurisprudence: Viewing 
Islam through a European Legal Prism in Light of the Sahin Judgment, 12 COLUM. J. 
EUR. L. 573, 590 (2006); Jeffrey A. Brauch, The Margin of Appreciation and the 
Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights: Threat to the Rule of Law, 11 
COLUM. J. EUR. L. 113, 128 (2005) (providing a historical overview of the way the 
margin of appreciation doctrine has been developed in the case law of the ECtHR and 
discussing the way the Court has dealt with the “necessity test”). 
100. S.A.S. v. France ¶ 78.
101. Id.
102. Id.; see also DWORKIN, supra note 30, at 130 (arguing that a liberal state
should not favor or disfavor a particular lifestyle because another lifestyle is 
“intrinsically better.”  It should be left to citizens to decide which way of life better 
suits them).  
103. S.A.S. v. France ¶ 78.
104. Id. ¶¶ 110-112.
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law.105  The Court elaborates quite extensively on the question of 
whether the French prohibition law pursues a legitimate aim.106  The 
same is true for the legal assessment of the necessity test, which asks: 
is the prohibition law necessary in a democratic society to pursue one 
or more of the legitimate limitation grounds?107 
What does the Court say about the legitimacy of the aim behind the 
prohibition law?  The Court starts by noting that the list of grounds on 
which states could rely on to justify interferences with fundamental 
rights is “exhaustive” and their definition is “restrictive.”108  Meaning, 
the Court refrains from applying an extensive interpretation method to 
interpret the limitation grounds in light of an alleged violation of 
fundamental rights.109 
In order to rule on whether there is a legitimate ground for the 
prohibition law, the Court draws on the justification provided by the 
French authorities in favor of the law.110  The authorities have argued 
the ban pursues two goals.  First, it aims to protect public safety.111  
Second, it aims to enforce respect for the minimum set of values of an 
open and democratic society.112  The Court concludes that the latter aim 
does not “expressly” correspond with any of the legitimate limitations 
grounds that are mentioned in the Convention.113  Absent a Convention 
limitation ground, the Court specifies with reference to the explanation 
provided by the French authorities that the second aim behind the 
prohibition law is meant to serve three values.114  The three values are: 
(1) pursing respect for gender equality, (2) pursuing respect for human
dignity, and (3) pursing respect for the minimum requirements of life
in society.115
105. Id.
106. Id. ¶¶ 113-122.
107. Id. ¶¶ 123-159.
108. Id. ¶ 113.
109. Id.
110. Id. ¶ 110-11
111. Id. ¶ 114-115.
112. Id. ¶ 114.
113. Id.
114. Id. ¶ 116.
115. Id.
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At first sight, the Court says that pursuing these three values cannot 
be related to one of the legitimate limitations grounds that are enlisted 
in the ECHR.116 
Nevertheless, the Court relies on the French government’s 
argument, which suggests ensuring respect for the minimum set of 
values of an open and democratic society as part of the legitimate 
limitation ground of protecting the rights and freedoms of others.117  In 
doing so, the Court first examines and rejects the gender-equality 
argument. 
According to the Court, this gender argument is ill-founded to 
pursue protection of the rights and freedoms of others as ultimate 
justification for the prohibition law.118  In this context, the Court refers 
to women who insist to wear this type of clothing in public for religious 
purpose and as a matter of personal choice.119  In other words, the treaty 
does not allow the limiting of people’s basic liberties by an appeal to 
protecting these people from the free exercise of fundamental rights.120 
116. Id. ¶ 117.
117. Id.; Id. ¶¶ 81-82.
118. Id. ¶ 119.  The court’s rejection of the gender argument is a shift away
from its own jurisprudence in which the Court repeatedly showed leniency toward the 
gender argument, allowing far reaching restrictions upon free exercise of religion and 
targeting particularly women.  See Deborah L. Rhode, The Injustice of Appearance, 
61 STAN. L. REV. 1033, 1094 (2009); Karima Bennoune, Secularism and Human 
Rights: A Contextual Analysis of Headscarves, Religious Expression, and Women’s 
Equality under International Law, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 367, 382 (2007); 
Benjamin Bleiberg, Unveiling the Real Issue: Evaluating the European Court of 
Human Rights’ Decision to Enforce the Turkish Headscarf Ban in Leyla Sahin v. 
Turkey, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 129 (2005).  Interestingly enough, the Government’s 
gender argument in favor of the ban was later debunked by empirical findings.  See 
Eva Brems, Face Veil Bans in the European Court of Human Rights: The Importance 
of Empirical Findings, 22 J.L. & POL’Y 517, 551 (2014) (purporting that some of 
women who cover their faces “express assertive emancipated views against traditional 
role patterns and against unequal gender practices in the Muslim community,” 
concluding that “the face veil is not an indicator of its wearer’s approval of male 
dominance, let alone of its promotion.”). 
119. Id. ¶ 125.
120. Id. ¶ 119 (the Court held: “a State Party cannot invoke gender equality in
order to ban a practice that is defended by women . . . in the context of the exercise of 
the rights enshrined in those provisions, unless it were to be understood that 
individuals could be protected on that basis from the exercise of their own 
fundamental rights and freedoms.”). 
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With regard to the argument that the prohibition law aims to pursue 
respect for human dignity, this noble ground does not justify “a blanket 
ban” on face-covering dresses in public, despite the fact that this piece 
of clothing is considered “strange” by many people in the society.121  
The argument is that this “expression of a cultural identity” is crucial 
for the maintenance of pluralism,122 which is according to the Court in 
favor of the whole democracy.123 
When it comes to the assessment of the third value, respect for the 
minimum requirements of life in society (that is synonymous to “living 
together”), the Court very briefly says that pursuing this value might 
fall under the scope of the legitimate limitation ground of protecting the 
rights and freedoms of others.124  In this regard, the Court engages with 
the French position—that considers an unveiled face in public as an 
indispensable tool for social interaction.125  The Court reaches the 
following conclusion: 
It can understand the view that individuals who are present in places 
open to all may not wish to see practices or attitudes developing there 
which would fundamentally call into question the possibility of open 
interpersonal relationships, which, by virtue of an established 
consensus, forms an indispensable element of community life within 
the society in question.  The Court is therefore able to accept that the 
barrier raised against others by a veil concealing the face is perceived 
by the respondent State as breaching the right of others to live in a space 
of socialisation which makes living together easier.  That being said, in 
view of the flexibility of the notion of “living together” and the resulting 
risk of abuse, the Court must engage in a careful examination of the 
necessity of the impugned limitation.126 
After having concluded that the French prohibition law constitutes 
an interference, which is prescribed by law and also pursues a legitimate 
aim, the Court starts examining the necessity of the legitimate limitation 
121. Id. ¶ 120.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. ¶ 122.
125. Id.
126. Id.
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in a democratic society.127  In this regard, the Court first reiterates its 
standard interpretation of religious freedom, noting that: 
[F]reedom of thought, conscience and religion is one of the
foundations of a “democratic society” within the meaning of the
Convention.  This freedom is, in its religious dimension, one of the
most vital elements that go to make up the identity of believers and
their conception of life, but it is also a precious asset for atheists,
agnostics, sceptics and the unconcerned.  The pluralism indissociable
from a democratic society, which has been dearly won over the
centuries, depends on it.  That freedom entails, inter alia, freedom to
hold or not to hold religious beliefs and to practise or not to practise
a religion.128
However, the Court has also ruled that limitations upon free 
exercise of religious freedom are at some points justified as a tool “to 
reconcile the interests of the various groups and ensure that everyone’s 
beliefs are respected.”129  This asks judges to “balance between the 
fundamental rights of each individual which constitutes the foundation 
of a ‘democratic society.’”130  This judicial balance should not frustrate 
the decision making process that has democratic legitimacy.  The Court 
admits at this point that it has a “subsidiary role” in assessing whether 
particular restrictions upon fundamental rights in democratic societies 
are necessary.131  This is because the Court views the sovereign states 
are “in principle better placed than an international court to evaluate 
local needs and conditions.”132 
127. Id. ¶ 124.
128. Id.
129. Id. ¶ 126.
130. Id. ¶ 128.
131. Id. ¶ 129.
132. Id.; see Brauch, supra note 99 (for more information on “the better placed
argument”).  See also Patricia Popelier & Catherine van de Heyning, Subsidiarity 
Post-Brighton: Procedural Rationality as Answer, 30 LJIL 5 (2017) (analyzing how 
the ECtHR has dealt with the principle of subsidiarity, comparing the period before 
and after the so-called “Brighton” declaration that aimed to reinforce the idea that 
national States are in a better position to deal with the proper protection of 
fundamental rights); Alastair Mowbray, Subsidiarity and the European Convention 
on Human Rights, 15 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 313 (2015) (using a quantitative research 
method to analyze the subsidiarity principle); Matthew Saul, The European Court of 
Human Rights’ Margin of Appreciation and the Processes of National Parliaments, 
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This is especially the case, the Court found, when it faces questions 
of law and religion.133  Hence, the Court ruled that in such cases, “the 
role of the domestic policy-maker should be given special weight.”134  
In such cases, the Court grants states a wider “margin of 
appreciation,”135 in assessing whether the legitimate limitation upon a 
particular freedom can undergo the necessity test.136  To examine this 
properly, the Court must determine whether there is “consensus” 
amongst the member states of the ECHR concerning the need to impose 
certain limitations upon the exercise of a freedom.137  This margin of 
appreciation does not provide states a carte blanche, rather it “goes 
hand in hand with a European supervision embracing both the law and 
the decisions applying it.  The Court’s task is to determine whether the 
15 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 745, 751 (2015) (providing an explanation for the subsidiarity 
principle, referring to the democratic legitimacy of nation Sates, the state of art with 
regard to a particular limitation amongst the States and the domestic expertise that an 
international Court generally lacks). 
133. S.A.S. v. France ¶ 129.
134. Id. ¶ 129.  See also Robert F. Cochran, Jr. & Michael A. Helfand, The
Competing Claims of Law and Religion: Who Should Influence Whom?, 39 PEPP. L. 
REV. 1051, 1052 (2013) (on the continuous and “endless jousting” between law and 
religion).  
135. In short, this doctrine entails that the Court grants the State certain room
to develop its own policies.  That room—the margin of appreciation—might be wider 
(i.e., the Court is less restrictive) in cases concerning subjects that state parties are 
“better placed” to deal with or issues where state parties respond differently to, the 
so-called “no-consensus” argument. 
136. S.A.S. v. France ¶ 129; see also Aaron R. Petty, Religion, Conscience,
and Belief in the European Court of Human Rights, 48 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 
807, 824 (2016). 
137. Id.; see Brauch, supra note 99, at 126-27 (identifying two key-factors that
help to define the scope of the margin of appreciation: “[first,] a balancing of the 
importance of the right with the importance of the restriction, [second] the existence 
of a European consensus on the matter before the Court.”); Peter Cumper & Tom 
Lewis, Empathy and Human Rights: The Case of Religious Dress, 18 HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 61, 69 (2018) (arguing that consensus amongst the member States generally 
leads to a narrower margin of appreciation).  Cf. Ryan Thoreson, The Limits of Moral 
Limitations: Reconceptualizing Morals in Human Rights Law, 59 HARV. INT’L L.J. 
197, 217 (2018) (giving the example of restrictions and limitations upon adult same-
sex activities and illustrating how growing consensus amongst member States led to 
a narrower margin of appreciation in finding justification for such limitations). 
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measures taken at national level were justified in principle and 
proportionate.”138 
In addition to the analysis above, the Court also examined the 
necessity of the ban in light of the public safety argument.139  In a more 
general note, the Court found that restrictions upon religious freedom 
for security reasons are, under some circumstances, necessary in a 
democratic society.140  However, the Court did not see any reason to 
consider the prohibition law as a legitimate limitation that aims to deal 
with an immediate security threat.141  For instance, the Court considered 
that the authorities could have chosen a less restrictive measure, such 
as requiring women to take off their veils at places that are constantly 
under high pressure of security threats.142  Hence, the Court ruled that 
the interference caused by the prohibition law cannot be justified in a 
democratic society on the ground of pursuing public safety.143 
The Court then assessed the necessity of the French prohibition law 
in light of the second justification provided by the authorities: 
considering the ban as ensuring the “living together” ideal.144  Against 
the backdrop of the weight French authorities have given to ensure a 
particular way of “living together,” the Court was sensitive to the 
argument that states should be given room “to secure the conditions 
whereby individuals can live together in their diversity.”145  Hence, the 
138. S.A.S. v. France ¶ 131.  See Letsas, supra note 99, at 711 (claiming that
the proportionality question “is by far the most important and most demanding 
criterion for whether the limitation of a right was permissible under the Convention.”).  
Cf. Rosamund Scott, Reproductive Health: Morals, Margins and Rights, 81 MOD. L.
REV. 422, 425 (2018) (arguing that the proportionality test “underlies the assessment 
of necessity and the Convention as a whole,” which in turn requires a proper 
assessment “between the interests and rights of the individual and those of the 
community, including the public interest.”). 
139. S.A.S. v. France ¶ 137 (rejecting first the claim that the prohibition law
was meant “to protect women against a practice which was imposed on them or would 
be detrimental to them.”). 
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. ¶ 140 (the value of respect for the minimum requirements of life in
society is amongst the three values of the broader goal pursuing respect for the 
minimum set of values of an open and democratic society). 
145. Id. ¶ 141.
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Court found the interference upon religious freedom “justified in its 
principle solely” because it aims to shape the contours of “living 
together” in the French society.146 
With regard to the democratic necessity of imposing a ban on 
wearing face-covering veils in public that aims to ensure “living 
together,” the Court admitted that this ban might “seem excessive,” 
because it is designed to target a very small group who wants to cover 
their face in public.147  Furthermore, the Court emphasized that it is 
aware of the fact that: 
[T]he ban has a significant negative impact on the situation of
women who, like the applicant, have chosen to wear the full-face veil
for reasons related to their beliefs.  As stated previously, they are thus
confronted with a complex dilemma, and the ban may have the effect
of isolating them and restricting their autonomy, as well as impairing
the exercise of their freedom to manifest their beliefs and their right
to respect for their private life.  It is also understandable that the
women concerned may perceive the ban as a threat to their
identity.148
Although the Court acknowledged that many human rights groups 
have objected to the French prohibition law as “disproportionate,”149 
and that some voices consider this law “islamaphobic,”150 the Judges 
ruled they are not in the position to intervene in domestic political 
debates that result in limitations of fundamental rights.151  Nevertheless, 
the Court reiterated that: 
[A] State which enters into a [sensitive] legislative process . . . takes
the risk of contributing to the consolidation of the stereotypes which
affect certain categories of the population and of encouraging the
146. Id. ¶ 142.
147. Id.
148. Id. ¶ 146.
149. Id. ¶ 147.
150. Id. ¶ 149.
151. Id. (ruling that “[it] is admittedly not for the Court to rule on whether
legislation is desirable in such matters.”) 
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expression of intolerance, when it has a duty, on the contrary, to 
promote tolerance.152 
The Court also noted that the prohibition law was not designed to 
protest against the “religious connotation” of face-covering veils.153  
Rather, the ban is “solely” meant to combat the concealment of the 
face.154  At the same time, the Court admitted that the ban leads to a 
decrease of pluralism in the French society.155  By situating itself as 
such, the Court is not refrained from being genuinely sympathetic about 
the French struggle in this case, which seeks to protect and ensure: 
[A] principle of interaction between individuals, which in its view is
essential for the expression not only of pluralism, but also of
tolerance and broadmindedness without which there is no democratic 
152. Id. (the Court also says “that remarks which constitute a general, vehement 
attack on a religious or ethnic group are incompatible with the values of tolerance, 
social peace and non-discrimination which underlie the Convention and do not fall 
within the right to freedom of expression that it protects.”). 
153. Id. ¶ 151.
154. Id.  However, neutralizing the ban as merely a legal project that is not
singling out religious face-covering dresses in public qua religious is a gross denial 
of the parliamentary history behind this ban.  The history attests to the fact the ban 
was certainly designed to stop Muslim women from wearing face-covering dresses.  
The arguments used by the French Minister of Justice defending this ban in the 
Assemblée nationale, leave no ambiguity about this.  She argues the French style of 
Islam respects French laws and she refers to the role Imams will play in explaining 
the prohibition law to their worshippers and community.  In addition, the many 
exceptions the law makes for other groups to cover their faces, either for religious or 
non-religious purposes, clearly reveals that the prohibition not only aimed to single 
out the burqa and niqab for a special ban, but also introduces a French Islam that is 
compatible with the ideal of “living together.”  See Assemblée nationale, supra note 
78, at 5417; see also Sofie G. Syed, Liberte, Egalite, Vie Privee: The Implications of 
France’s Anti-Veil Laws for Privacy and Autonomy, 40 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 301, 
306 (2017); W. Cole Jr. Durham & Alexander Dushku, Traditionalism, Secularism, 
and the Transformative Dimension of Religious Institutions, 1993 BYU L. REV. 421, 
450 (1993) (discussing how seemingly neutral laws affect religious minorities: “The 
major problem is that any neutral, generally applicable law, however insignificant and 
ill-conceived, can trump religious liberty.  This places smaller religious groups that 
lack significant political influence at constant risk of having their religious freedom 
rights violated by an intolerant or inadvertently insensitive majority.”).  Cf. R. J. 
Delahunty, Does Animal Welfare Trump Religious Liberty? The Danish Ban on 
Kosher and Halal Butchering, 16 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 341 (2015). 
155. S.A.S. v. France ¶ 149.
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society . . . It can thus be said that the question whether or not it 
should be permitted to wear the full-face veil in public places 
constitutes a choice of society.156 
Against this backdrop, the Court refrained from making a value 
judgment about how the French decided to establish and maintain their 
society.  The criticism entailed that “such review will lead it to assess a 
balance that has been struck by means of a democratic process within 
the society in question.”157  Thus, in cases characterized by a high 
amount of sensitivity and polarization, the primacy lies with the 
national legislator.  This means France has a broad margin of 
appreciation to decide upon the admissibility of face-covering dresses 
in public, in light of the “living together” ideal that it aims to ensure. 
To justify this wide margin, the Court referred to the lack of consensus 
amongst its member states with regard to the legality of face-covering 
veils.158 
The Court reasoned that given the broad margin of appreciation 
France has in this case, the interference on religious freedom caused by 
the prohibition law, pursues a legitimate aim.159  This legitimate aim 
ensures “living together” as part of protecting the rights and freedoms 
of others.  This legitimate limitation is, according to the Court, 
necessary in a democratic society.160  Therefore, there was no violation 
of religious freedom or any other right.161  This way of reasoning 
revealed that the margin of appreciation doctrine is very sensitive 
toward reinforcing majoritarianism that effectively advances a 
particular political agenda.162 
156. Id. ¶ 154.
157. Id.
158. Id. ¶ 156.
159. Id. ¶ 157.
160. Id. ¶ 158.
161. Id. ¶¶ 156-159.
162. For example, the Court held that it needs to be restrained in opining about
the lawfulness of “matters of general policy, on which opinions within a democratic 
society may reasonably differ widely.”  In such cases, the Court says, “the role of the 
domestic policy-maker should be given special weight.”  See id. ¶ 154.  This facially 
neutral consideration is problematic for many reasons.  But most importantly, it is 
problematic because the Court neglects its main task: giving protection to 
subordinated and marginalized people who seek protection under the law.  Drawing 
on technical reasoning that gives majorities a wide margin of discretion effectively 
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B. “Majoritarian-proof” Making of Diversity
How can we understand the “abrupt” endorsement of “living 
together” in S.A.S.? 163  The adoption of this novel legitimate limitation 
ground on religious freedom reveals the use of a majoritarian lens and 
language to eventually decide the admissibility of contentious and norm 
deviant practices of minorities.164  This approach immediately 
implicates that majoritarian ideas about the acceptability of contentious 
religious manifestations, such as wearing face-covering veils in public, 
matter very much in the justification of imposed restrictions upon 
“unwelcome” practices of religious groups.  This reinforces and 
legitimizes the search, construction and maintenance of a collective 
cultural identity.165  In other words, pursing and developing a shared 
narrative about the roots and character of the society, either secular or 
Judeo-Christian, results in “majoritarianism.”166  This majoritarian 
narrative aims to protect the native “national” identity that tells us more 
about “who we are.”  The construction of this “common background” 
advances their political agenda.  See also Trump v. Hawaii 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018) 
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (rightly pointing out that the judiciary must correct 
political branches of power when they obviously neglect constitutional rights). 
163. Cf. Kristin Henrard, Exploring the Potential (Contribution) of Multi-
Disciplinary Legal Research for the Analysis of Minorities’ Rights, 8 ERASMUS L.
REV. 111, 120 (2015) (criticizing the way the Court has assessed the different interests 
in S.A.S., speaking of a poorly motivated decision).  
164.  LABORDE, supra note 39, at 33 (speaks about the decisiveness of majorities 
sensitivities for the acceptability of minorities’ practices); Joppke, supra note 23, at 
95-99 (discussing the preference for the preserve of the majoritarian practices in the
case law of the ECtHR); Saba Mahmood, Religious Reason and Secular Affect: An
Incommensurable Divide?, in TALAL ASAD ET AL. (EDS.), IS CRITIQUE SECULAR?
BLASPHEMY, INJURY, AND FREE SPEECH 79 (2009) (discussing how “majoritarian
cultural sensibilities” challenge the beliefs and practices of Muslim minorities across
Europe).
165. Trotter, supra note 61, at 169.
166. Cf. Ratna Kapur, The Ayodhya Case: Hindu Majoritarianism and the
Right to Religious Liberty, 29 MD. J. INT’L L. 305, 307 (2014) (discussing how a local 
Indian court’s judgment has contributed to the establishment of “Hindu 
Majoritarianism,” affecting the rights of the Muslim minority).  Cf. also Loren E. 
Mulraine, Religious Freedom: The Original Civil Liberty, 61 HOWARD L.J. 147, 149 
(2017) (defending religious liberty and warning against the rise of nationalism that 
threatens this fundamental liberty).  See also Bridgette Dunlap, Protecting the Space 
to Be Unveiled: Why France’s Full Veil Ban Does Not Violate the European 
Convention on Human Rights, 35 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 968 (2012). 
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leads to the immediate accusation of “disloyalty” for those who do not 
share the majoritarian narrative, or who cannot comply with 
majoritarian expectations about how one should live a life.167  Hence, 
reinforcing majoritarianism advances ethnocentrism.  This shift reduces 
the free exercise of fundamental rights for minorities who do not fit the 
perfect majoritarian picture.168 
A timely example of the endorsement and reinforcement of 
majoritarianism is the Court’s ruling in S.A.S., which uniquely justifies 
its legitimate limitation ground against religious freedom in the pursuit 
of “living together.”169  This expansion of the limitation grounds is 
167. Indeed, the dominant idea suggests: who can be against the dominant
narrative that tells us more about “who we are”?  Cf. Beydoun, supra note 10, at 1764 
(discussing how some have labeled U.S. Muslims as disloyal in the post-9/11 terrorist 
attacks era); Sahar F. Aziz, Coercive Assimilationism: The Perils of Muslim Women’s 
Identity Performance in the Workplace, 20 MICH. J. RACE & L. 1, 39 (2014) 
(elaborating on how Muslim women in the U.S. have been accused of “disloyalty” 
because of their extant Islamic appearance, such as wearing headscarves); David 
Smith, Presumed Suspect: Post-9/11 Intelligence Gathering, Race, and the First 
Amendment, 11 UCLA J. ISLAMIC & NEAR E. L. 85, 120 (2012) (describing the logic 
used by authorities that result in considering Muslims as “disloyal”); Nagwa Ibrahim, 
The Origins of Muslim Racialization in U.S. Law, 7 UCLA J. ISLAMIC & NEAR E. L. 
121, 142 (2008) (arguing how the “racialization” of Muslims as disloyal citizens have 
created “a new zone of lawlessness where they are neither citizen nor alien, but rather 
belong to [the] inherently evil world called “Islam.”“).  See also Nehal Bhuta, Two 
Concepts of Religious Freedom in the European Court of Human Rights, 113 S. 
ATLANTIC Q. 9, 25 (2014) (discussing ECtHR case law, framing Islamic headscarves 
as incompatible with democratic values). 
168. See generally Wahedi, supra note 45; LABORDE, supra note 39; Joppke,
supra note 23; Kapur, supra note 166; Mahmood, supra note 164 (sharing the point 
of view that using majoritarian standards in the legal assessment of minority practices 
results in an asymmetrical toleration regime: merciful for the majority and stingy in 
granting exemptions to religious minorities). 
169. However, the outcome of the case is not surprising nor unique.  It was
even predictable as it fits a notorious line of jurisprudence that has been set out by the 
ECtHR, which is not merciful but stingy toward the habits and beliefs of the Muslim 
minority in Europe.  See LABORDE, supra note 39, at 33 (“The European Court of 
Human Rights freedom of religion jurisprudence has notoriously been lenient toward 
practices of Christian establishment and overtly intolerant toward the presence of 
Islam in the public sphere.”); see generally Keturah A. Dunner, Addressing Religious 
Intolerance in Europe: The Limited Application of Article 9 of the European 
Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 30 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 117 
(1999).  In other words, S.A.S. fits the overall Islamophobic case law of the ECtHR, 
which is part of an Islamophobic atmosphere that is currently dominating debates on 
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thought-provoking and prone to criticism.170  What does the normative 
attitude of the Court in S.A.S. tell us about the role of religion in liberal 
political philosophy?171 
1. The Prohibition Law and Majoritarianism
Does the judgment reflect support for the French struggle of 
ensuring and reinforcing the minimum requirements of life in society 
thereby backing “living together” in a French style?172  In addition, does 
migration and the place of Islam in Western democracies.  See Wahedi, supra note 22 
(describing Islamophobia merely as the fear for the Islam and Muslims and providing 
some recent examples of this tendency); see generally MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, THE 
NEW RELIGIOUS INTOLERANCE: OVERCOMING THE POLITICS OF FEAR IN AN ANXIOUS 
AGE (2012) (discussing the contemporary fear toward religious minorities, 
particularly the Muslim minority, in the Western world); Martha C. Nussbaum, In 
Defense of Universal Values, 36 IDAHO L. REV. 379 (2000).  
170. The Court’s expansion of the legitimate limitation grounds is one of the
most prominent points of criticisms toward the judgment in S.A.S. Cf. Brett G. 
Scharffs, Islam and Religious Freedom: The Experience of Religious Majorities and 
Minorities, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. ONLINE 78, 96 (2018) (saying that the 
justification of the ban on grounds of “living together” has been criticized as 
expansion of the legitimate limitation grounds). 
171. The central question of this liberal paradigm is: what role does religion
play for the purposes of religious accommodation and justification of public policies? 
See Wahedi, supra note 45 (claiming that religion is not a unique protection-worthy 
category qua religion within the paradigm of liberal political philosophy); LABORDE, 
supra note 39 (discussing the emphasis on egalitarianism in contemporary liberal 
theories of religious freedom and calling upon legal philosophers to think about 
religion as an interpretive concept); LABORDE & BARDON, supra note 39, at 1-5 
(identifying four types of debates concerning the question of religion in liberal 
political philosophy.  First, the debate concerning the specialness of religion for legal 
purposes.  Second, the religion neutrality debate.  Third, the question of religious 
accommodation.  Fourth, the debate on the relationship between religion and 
comparable, though non-sectarian categories, such as conscience and identity); Carlo 
Invernizzi Accetti, Religious Truth and Democratic Freedom, in RELIGION,
SECULARISM, AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 293-94 (Jean Louise Cohen & 
Cécile Laborde eds., 2016) (criticizing and providing an explanation for why within 
the paradigm of liberal political philosophy religious arguments are systematically 
labelled as inadmissible or reformulated in neutral terms). 
172. Thus, does the S.A.S. judgment strengthen “forced assimilation” of French 
citizens who do not have a “native” French background, through allowing 
mechanisms that encourage minorities to adopt the majoritarian French lifestyle?  See 
Syed, supra note 154, at 303 (qualifying the prohibition law as “assimilationist”); see 
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this jurisprudential expansion force minorities to follow the 
majoritarian choice of society,173 providing little room for the habits, 
traditions, and ideas that diverge from this majoritarian norm?174  In 
sum, how does the Court’s judgment in S.A.S. fit the tendency of 
reinforcing majoritarianism and what does this mean for diversity and 
free exercise of religion?175  To answer this question, we need to clarify 
which majoritarian ideas the Court has embraced and reinforced.  The 
search for this answer helps us in two ways.  First, it enables us to 
develop a theoretical framework we can use to embed the Court’s 
approach.  Second, it helps us to map the implications of the 
endorsement of majoritarianism for diversity and the free exercise of 
religion.176  To conceptualize the Court’s decision in S.A.S. we need to 
focus on the arguments used by the judges to justify the expansion of 
the limitation grounds with “living together,” resulting in the 
justification of the imposed ban on wearing face-covering dresses in 
public. 
Although, the Court’s reasoning is meandering in this respect and 
often very contradictory, the overall outcome of this case affirms the 
large body of criticism that accuses the Court of being “overtly 
intolerant toward the presence of Islam in the public sphere.”177  This 
also Yusuf, supra note 69, at 284 (claiming that S.A.S. reinforces policies that are 
meant to assimilate minorities). 
173. S.A.S. v. France ¶¶ 153-154 (the question of having or not a ban on
wearing face-covering dresses in public concerns a “choice of society.”  The Court 
says in this respect that it “has a duty to exercise a degree of restraint in its review of 
Convention compliance, since such review will lead it to assess a balance that has 
been struck by means of a democratic process within the society in question.”) 
174. See LARBODE, supra note 39, at 33; Daly, supra note 27, at 165 (criticizing 
the use of majoritarian standards as yardstick in assessing the admissibility of minority 
practices). 
175. Cf. Trotter, supra note 61, at 169 (warning for the shift toward a collective
culture that is little merciful toward the religious demands of minorities, analyzing the 
post-”living together” judgments). 
176. See Kapur, supra note 166, at 307.
177.  LABORDE, supra note 39, at 33; Bhuta, supra note 167, at 26 (arguing that
the ECtHR provides more room for majoritarian practices, while it adopts a militant 
secularist approach in assessing the legality of minority practices—in particular with 
regard to headscarves—resulting in the “equation of Islamic religious practices with 
intolerance, discrimination, and inequality,” which obviously do not deserve 
protection under the Convention).  See generally Wahedi, supra note 45; Joppke, 
supra note 23. 
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theoretical critique provides a fruitful insight in the general attitude of 
the Court toward contentious religious practices of a non-native 
minority.  Therefore, this critique also helps to conceptualize the 
Court’s decision in S.A.S—paving the way toward conceptualizing the 
Court’s approach toward diversity. 
This part argues that justifying far-reaching restrictions upon 
religious freedom with an appeal on “living together” aims to make 
diversity, as a concept, majoritarian-proof.  That is to say: what is 
considered protection-worthy under “diversity” depends on 
majoritarian sensitivities, standards, and ideas about how people in a 
society should behave and live.178 
Making diversity majoritarian-proof is meant to pass hard cases 
regarding the legality of contentious practices through the skeptical and 
critical lens of the majority, which aims to promote its own narrative. 
This results in an asymmetrical toleration regime: protective toward the 
rights, habits, and beliefs of the “native” majority, but intolerant, 
reactionary, and aggressive toward the exemption claims of “non-
native” minorities, such as Muslims.179  What evidence do we have to 
178. See Mahmood, supra note 164, at 68.
179. See generally Wahedi, supra note 22.  See Mahmood, supra note 164 at
86 (referring to Peter G. Danchin and discussing the criticism that qualifies the ECtHR 
attitude as “hypocritical,” allegedly protecting the Christian majority, and being 
intolerant toward the Muslim minority); Peter G. Danchin, Of Prophets and 
Proselytes: Freedom of Religion and the Conflict of Rights in International Law, 49 
HARV. INT’L L.J. 249, at 275 (2008) (referring to critics of the ECtHR case law and 
concluding that “there appears to be a bias in the jurisprudence of the Court under 
article 9 toward protecting traditional and established religions and a corresponding 
insensitivity toward the rights of minority, nontraditional, or unpopular religious 
groups.”); see also Samuel Moyn, Religious Freedom and the Fate of Secularism, in 
RELIGION, SECULARISM, AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 27 (Jean Louise Cohen 
& Cécile Laborde eds., 2016) (asking rhetorically with respect to the systematically 
different legal treatment of Islamic cases before the ECtHR: “Do the cases . . . reflect 
a Christian Islamophobia in the principled garb of secularism?”); Bhuta, supra note 
167, at 26 (criticizing the double standard that is seemingly used by the ECtHR to 
assess the admissibility of the manifestations of Muslims and Christians.  “When it 
comes to Christian religious values, their potential inconsistency with democracy, 
equality, and tolerance is never in doubt, revealing sharply the degree to which this 
line of cases rests not on a thoroughgoing rationalist secularism but on a political 
theology of Christian democracy in which the identity of democratic values with an 
imagined Christian civilizational tradition is unquestioned.”).  For a similar argument 
raised in the United States, see Robert L. McFarland, Are Religious Arbitration Panels 
Incompatible with Law: Examining Overlapping Jurisdictions in Private Law, 4 
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claim that the Court has interpreted the limitation grounds upon 
religious freedom in a way that makes diversity ultimately 
“majoritarian proof?” 
For the answer to this question we need to briefly recall the 
objectives of the French prohibition law.  This discursive approach 
helps us see how the Court’s endorsement of “living together” through 
an extensive interpretation of the legitimate limitation ground that 
attempts to protect the rights and freedoms of others has actually 
resulted in the reinforcement of majoritarianism.180  In other words, 
attempting to protect the rights and freedoms of others is making 
diversity majoritarian-proof.  The historical background of the 
prohibition law reveals that the ban has been considered necessary to: 
protect French secularism, rescue women who are victims of gender-
inequality, and reaffirm fraternalism; as the full-face veil constitutes a 
breach of the French style of “living together” in public.181  In short, the 
veil has been considered a sectarian “rejection of the values of the 
Republic,” which makes social interaction impossible.182 
The French authorities defended the limitation this law posed upon 
religious freedom as necessary for national security, and defending the 
rights and freedoms of others, which should guarantee a minimum 
amount of respect for the values of an open and democratic society.183  
The majoritarian argument suggests that face-covering veils do not 
belong to the “real” France, as these pieces of clothing make open 
communication impossible.  The “true” Frenchman respects equality, 
human dignity, and is willing to interact socially in public.184  The veil 
allegedly contradicts this majoritarian tradition. 
However, the Court convincingly debunked the national security 
arguments,185 and most of the arguments relating to the protection of 
the rights and freedoms of others, such as the gender-equality 
FAULKNER L. REV. 367, 371 (2013) (criticizing the stinginess of those who defend 
religious arbitration, but do not want to extend that right to Muslims). 
180. For a comparable method applied to reach the same conclusion, compare
Kapur, supra note 166, at 307. 
181. S.A.S. v. France ¶¶ 17; 24-25.
182. Id. ¶ 25.
183. Id. ¶ 82.
184. Cf. id. ¶ 25.
185. Id. ¶ 139.
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argument186 and the human dignity argument.187  Nevertheless, the 
Court interpreted the protection argument to justify the imposition of 
far reaching restrictions upon the free exercise of religious freedom 
with an appeal on ensuring the French style of “living together.”188  At 
first sight, this extensive interpretation of the Court is not only very 
remarkable but also very problematic because it reinforces 
majoritarianism and establishes ethnocentrism. 
The Court’s endorsement of “living together” is only remarkable in 
light of the Court’s arguments discussing the legitimacy of the ban’s 
aims and its necessity in a democratic society.  As such, the Court has 
countlessly reaffirmed the importance and the value of pluralism and 
tolerance in democratic societies that are seemingly endangered by the 
prohibition law.189  The Court also shared its concerns of animosity 
toward religious minorities at different points and called upon all parties 
involved to look for the dialogue instead of clashes and 
confrontation.190  Thus, it is hard to believe the same Court has 
developed an argumentation pattern that contradicts the emphasis on 
tolerance, pluralism, and diversity.  In fact, the Court’s reasoning itself 
is intolerant and disrespectful toward “the other.” 
2. The Reconciliation of Diversity with Majoritarian Sensitivities
The Court’s argument, as a whole, is contradictory.  On the one
hand, it emphasizes pluralism, broadmindedness, and the ability to 
develop unique identities.  On the other hand, it shows understanding 
for “an established consensus” about public performance.191  This 
contradictory way of reasoning can only be understood against the 
backdrop of a decisive and proven formula insinuated between the 
Court’s reasoning in S.A.S.  The judges reiterate that: “[in] democratic 
societies, in which several religions coexist within one and the same 
population, it may be necessary to place limitations on freedom to 
186. Id. ¶ 118.
187. Id. ¶ 120.
188. Id. ¶¶ 142.
189. Id. ¶ 128.
190. Id. ¶¶ 128; 149; 152.
191. Id. ¶ 122.
192
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manifest one’s religion or beliefs in order to reconcile the interests of 
the various groups and ensure that everyone’s beliefs are respected.”192 
This reconciliation strategy that aims to protect the rights and 
freedoms of others, generally the majority, has proven to be a very 
effective formula in finding justifications for far-reaching restrictions 
upon free exercise of religion.  As such, in Dahlab v. Switzerland 
(“Dahlab”), although the Court declared the applicant’s complaints 
about violating her right to manifest her religion inadmissible, it 
accepted the idea that wearing headscarves is problematic because this 
practice: 
[A]ppears to be imposed on women by a precept which is laid down
in the Koran and which, as the Federal Court noted, is hard to square
with the principle of gender equality.  It therefore appears difficult to
reconcile the wearing of an Islamic headscarf with the message of
tolerance, respect for others and, above all, equality and non-
discrimination that all teachers in a democratic society must convey
to their pupils.193
With reference to this Dahlab reconciliation formula, the Court in 
Leyla Şahin v. Turkey (“Şahin”) again draws on prejudiced and hostile 
arguments to justify the Turkish ban on wearing religious symbols at 
the university.194  While this ban was still enforced, the Court argued 
that in such places: 
[W]here the values of pluralism, respect for the rights of others and,
in particular, equality before the law of men and women are being
taught and applied in practice, it is understandable that the relevant
authorities should wish to preserve the secular nature of the
institution concerned and so consider it contrary to such values to
allow religious attire, including, as in the present case, the Islamic
headscarf, to be worn.195
The Court used a very similar argument in its merciless judgments 
in Dahlab and Şahin to help reconstruct the Court’s logic in S.A.S., 
192. Id. ¶ 126.
193. Dahlab v. Switzerland, ECthr at 13 (2001).
194. Leyla Şahin v. Turkey, App. No. 44774/98, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 116; 111
(2005) (addressing the reconciliation formula of Dahlab). 
195. Id.
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resulting in the endorsement of “living together” as a legitimate 
limitation ground against the free exercise of religion.  The Court stated 
that 
[it] can understand the view that individuals who are present in 
places open to all may not wish to see practices or attitudes 
developing there which would fundamentally call into question the 
possibility of open interpersonal relationships, which, by virtue of an 
established consensus, forms an indispensable element of 
community life within the society in question.196 
Reconciling diversity questions—dealing with inclusiveness—
with majoritarian sensitivities relating to integration and assimilation of 
minority groups is not helpful “to hold the coordinate branches to 
account when they defy our most sacred legal commitments.”197  
Furthermore, as these cases have revealed, reconciling diversity with 
majoritarian sensitives equates to “blindly accepting the Government’s 
misguided invitation to sanction [discriminatory policies] motivated by 
animosity toward a disfavored group, all in the name of a superficial 
claim of [for example] national security, gender-equality or living 
together.”198 
3. The Reinforcement of Majoritarianism
The Court in S.A.S. v. France accepted that wearing full face-
covering veils is a breach of the right to live together with others, which 
“under certain conditions,” can be related to the limitation ground that 
aims to protect the rights and freedoms of others.199  Thus, the Court 
found that in this case the veil is the trouble maker, as it does not fit a 
protection-worthy “established consensus” about how one should dress 
in public.  The Court reaffirmed the reconciliation formula of Dahlab 
through Sahin,200 and ruled that because the French aim is to ensure 
“living together” through defending and protecting “a principle of 
interaction,” it is not for an international Court to give a value judgment 
196. S.A.S. v. France ¶ 122.
197. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2448 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
198. Id.
199. S.A.S. v. France ¶ 122.
200. Id. ¶ 126.
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about the “choice of society,” which is the exclusive right of French 
citizens.201  The Court uses this reasoning along with the fact that 
European states are very much divided on the legality of wearing face-
covering veils in public to provide France with a wide margin of 
appreciation.202  However, relating the French wide margin of 
appreciation to the legality of face-covering dresses in other European 
states, does little to hide the reconciliation strategy that is clearly 
present in this case.  The application of this strategy results in a 
majoritarian-proof version of diversity.203 
In S.A.S., the majoritarian concern was the incompatibility of the 
burqa and niqab in public with the French lifestyle, or the French way 
of “living together,” which allegedly prescribes an “open visor.”204  The 
Court’s decision in S.A.S. reaffirms and declares the French “open 
visor” theory, a majoritarian narrative about “living together,” as a 
protection worthy category in law.  This “living together” narrative 
could be invoked against the manners of minorities that counter and 
harm the majoritarian narrative about how people should behave in 
public.205 
S.A.S. reinforces majoritarianism in a further way.  The 
endorsement of “living together” promotes the majoritarian narrative, 
which prescribes the conditions under which one can be considered a 
201. Id. ¶¶ 153-154.
202. Id. ¶ 155.
203. Id. ¶ 128.  It is very confusing to read what the Court says in S.A.S. about
majoritarian desires in a democratic society: “democracy does not simply mean that 
the views of a majority must always prevail: a balance must be achieved which 
ensures the fair treatment of people from minorities and avoids any abuse of a 
dominant position.”  However, it seems that the Court has operated in another way. 
204. The concern regarding “the public manners” is illustrated by the fact that
an overwhelming majority of both chambers previously voted in favor of the 
prohibition law.  See Assemblée nationale, supra note 78; Sénat, supra note 72; see 
also Ralf Michaels, Banning Burqas: The Perspective of Postsecular Comparative 
Law, 28 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 213, 238 (2018) (providing insights into the 
impossibility to reconcile the desire to wear face-covering veils in public with the 
French conception of “living together”). 
205. Eva Brems, S.A.S. v. France: A Reality Check, 25 NOTTINGHAM L.J. 58,
70 (2016) (arguing that the Court’s reasoning in S.A.S. “legitimizes a majority banning 
minority expressions from the entire public sphere on the sole basis of an ideological 
position that is the expression of the majority’s culture.”).  Cf. Daly, supra note 27, at 
161 (arguing that the “living together” ideology burdens religious and ethnic 
minorities more than the established majority). 
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real French citizen.  S.A.S. clearly shows that one of the crucial elements 
in this respect is not only the ability to socialize in public, but also 
showing the willingness to do that through an “open visor,” leaving 
little room for those who do not want to socialize publicly.206 
C. The “Sacrifice” of a Fundamental Right
S.A.S. reinforced majoritarianism through an extensive 
interpretation of the limitation grounds of religious freedom by 
prioritizing the “living together” narrative.  Subsequently, the Court has 
moved away from its traditionally used “religious freedom” 
rationale,207 by reconciling diversity questions with majoritarian 
sensitivities about the acceptability of non-majoritarian practices, such 
as wearing face-covering dresses in public.  This approach ultimately 
favors “the cultural and religious beliefs of the majority population.”208 
The downside of a majoritarian-proof-made-diversity is that non-
native religions are “treated as a second-class religion not entitled to the 
same sort of consideration as the Christian faith.”209  Within this 
framework, the crucifix is allowed for reasons of diversity, as it does 
not counter majoritarian concerns about tolerance or human dignity. 
The Islamic hijab, however, both headscarves and face-covering 
dresses, is not considered a primary matter of diversity—but rather a 
practice that threatens the majoritarian culture about gender equality, 
206. Cf. Jill Marshall, S.A.S. v France: Burqa Bans and the Control or
Empowerment of Identities, 15 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 377, 385 (2015) (criticizing the 
Court’s willingness to accept the French perception of “living together” that 
necessitates a ban on face-covering veils in public, and “effectively bulldozes a right 
to personal identity unless that identity is acceptable and permissible in the eyes of 
the majority.”). 
207. The religious freedom rationale considers religious freedom a right that
promotes pluralism, while enabling human beings to develop unique identities and 
live in accordance with their own conception of life.  See Trispiotis, supra note 37, at 
581 (referring to critics of S.A.S. accusing the Court of having favored majoritarian 
ideas at the expense of religious freedom). 
208. Mahmood, supra note 164, at 86.  See generally Samuel P. Kovach-Orr,
Banning the Burka: Indicative of a Legitimate Aim or a Thinly-Veiled Attempt to 
Legislate Religious and Cultural Intolerance, 18 RUTGERS J. L. & RELIGION 89 
(2016). 
209. Moyn, supra note 179, at 29 (based on an analysis of the ECtHR case law).
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human dignity, ethical integrity, and tolerance in general.210  This 
reconciliation strategy does not rely “on a thoroughgoing rationalist 
secularism but on a political theology of Christian democracy, in which 
the identity of democratic values with an imagined Christian 
civilizational tradition is unquestioned.”211  This has far-reaching 
consequences for religious liberty, however, as free exercise becomes 
dependent upon the sensitivities of the majority. 
Therefore, does the reinforcement of majoritarianism result in the 
subordination of religious freedom to principles that are designed to 
promote the majoritarian narrative?212  It does.213  The reinforcement of 
the French style of “living together” grossly limits the way people 
develop their personal and unique identities.  It also limits the 
opportunity to pursue a life in accordance with their own beliefs on how 
to present themselves in public.214  In a sense, the Court’s judgment in 
S.A.S. has not only “sacrificed” the free exercise of a very important 
liberty,215 but it has also provided lip service to a majoritarian political 
210. See Syed, supra note 154, at 308 (describing the French perception of the
Islamic hijab as a symbol of “Muslim oppression from which Muslim women need 
deliverance at the hands of secular actors”); see also Bhuta, supra note 167, at 29 
(“One of the fears concerning Dahlab’s headscarf was that it might invite curious 
questions from pupils leading to a discussion of her religious beliefs and, thereby, a 
risk of offense or coercion of children and their parents.  The crucifix poses no such 
threat, and the possibility that it could stimulate a dialogue about religious beliefs is 
welcomed as conducive to tolerance.”) 
211. Bhuta, supra note 167, at 26.  See generally Joseph H. H. Weiler, Freedom
of Religion and Freedom from Religion: The European Model, 65 ME. L. REV. 759 
(2013). 
212. Joint partly dissenting opinion of Judges Nussberger and Jäderblom in
S.A.S. v. France ¶ 2 (arguing that “the opinion of the majority . . . sacrifices concrete 
individual rights guaranteed by the Convention to abstract principles.”).  
213. Syed, supra note 154, at 314 (arguing that the French arguments in favor
of the prohibition law have supported Islamophobia). 
214. Cf. S.A.S. v. France ¶ 124 (the “freedom of thought, conscience and
religion is . . . in its religious dimension, one of the most vital elements that go to 
make up the identity of believers and their conception of life . . . .”). 
215. Joint partly dissenting opinion of Judges Nussberger and Jäderblom in
S.A.S. v. France ¶ 2. 
197
258 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 49 
agenda.216  This agenda has set out its minimum expectations of 
citizenship for its minorities in the receiving society.217 
Through its interpretation of “living together,” the Court has 
advanced a political agenda regarding the role and the place of the Islam 
in liberal democracies.218  This agenda reaffirms the majoritarian 
narrative that tells us who we are and what our binding characteristics 
are, not only historically, but also in terms of building a common future. 
In other words, this agenda reinforces a national and collective identity 
agenda.219  Formulated in this way, the Court’s jurisprudence on the 
216. Id.
217. Cf. Kapur, supra note 166, at 311 (illustrating how the legal discourse in
India reinforced a majoritarian political agenda).  See also Michaels, supra note 204, 
at 238 (arguing that within the French context, the prohibition law should be 
understood as a matter of “a civil duty . . . .  By requiring the Muslim woman to take 
off her face veil, the state creates a positive duty for her to express her belonging to 
the state.”); Stephane Mechoulan, France Bans the Veil: What French Republicanism 
Has to Say about It, 35 B.U. INT’L L.J. 223, 273 (2017); Daly, supra note 27, at 164 
(arguing that the prohibition law can be considered a tool for the purpose of protecting 
a “republican habitus”); Trispiotis, supra note 37, at 591 (quoting Stephanie Berry 
who has argued that the “living together” argument is in favor of a “distinctly 
assimilationist agenda.”); Susan S. M. Edwards, No Burqas We’re French: The Wide 
Margin of Appreciation and the ECtHR Burqa Ruling, 26 DENNING L.J. 246, 258 
(2014) (claiming that S.A.S. reinforces the French assimilation agenda).  
218. Trispiotis, supra note 37, at 591 (quoting Eva Brems, who has suggested
that the argument of “living together” in the context of face covering veils reflects 
“the fundamental unease of a large majority of people with the idea of an Islamic face 
veil, and the widespread feeling that this garment is undesirable in ‘our society’.”); 
Myriam Hunter-Henin, Why the French Don’t Like the Burqa: Laïcité, National 
Identity and Religious Freedom, 61 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 613, 615 (2012) (arguing that 
the French ban on both wearing headscarves at school and face-covering veils in 
public are “legal expression of the French sensitivity to the presence of Islam in the 
public sphere.”).  
219. Michaels, supra note 204, at 215; Trotter, supra note 61, at 169; Syed,
supra note 154, at 322.  A very recent example of adjusting to the dominant norms is 
present in Osmanoǧlu & Kocabaş v. Switzerland.  In this case, the ECtHR held that 
the Swiss authorities’ denial to exempt Muslim girls from taking part in mixed-school 
swimming does not violate the right to religious freedom.  Here, the judges 
unanimously held that although denial of the exemption request interfered with 
religious freedom, this interference was justified in light of the promotion of pupils’ 
integration into Swiss society.  See Osmanoǧlu & Kocabaş v. Switzerland, App. No. 
29086/12, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2017).  In a similar case, a Muslim pupil had asked the 
Federal Constitutional Court of Germany, the Bundesverfassungsgericht (BVerfG), 
to review a decision of the Federal Administrative Court, the 
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lawfulness of laws that burden Muslim citizens, is difficult to reconcile 
with the notions of tolerance, equality, and respect. 
The same is true for the European Parliament’s recent 
recommendations that singled out Islamic institutions for a disfavored 
treatment qua Islam.  With its proposal to shut down mosques that 
violate the EU’s values and its call to develop education programs that 
can spread a “moderate” version of Islam, the Parliament reinforces 
majoritarianism and advances political Islamophobia that 
institutionalizes Islam and Muslim fear.220  Like the ECtHR, the 
European Parliament has aimed to reconcile “Islam” with majoritarian 
sensitivities about terrorism, radicalization, and security matters in 
general.  This resulted in the European Parliament drafting far-reaching 
proposals that ultimately treat the Islamic faith as a second-class 
religion—instead of a particular conception of life that helps human 
beings to flourish. 
In sum, S.A.S. illustrates how the use of the “living together” 
argument has resulted in limiting the free exercise of religion and the 
reinforcement of a majoritarian political agenda suggesting how people 
should act in public.  Additionally, EU Parliament’s recommendations 
(relying on reconciliation strategy) will have serious consequences for 
Bundesverwaltungsgericht (BVerwG).  The BVerwG had ruled that the school 
authorities’ refusal to exempt applicant from joint swimming lessons did not violate 
the right to religious freedom.  The BVerfG did not accept the complaint for 
adjudication, as the petitioner failed to explain convincingly why the burkini could 
not qualify as a religious alternative for other swimming clothes.  See 
Bundesverfassungsgericht, BvR 3237/13, ¶ III.3.aa, Nov. 7, 2016 (Germ.); Sohail 
Wahedi, BVerfG 3237/13, 6 OXFORD J. L. & RELIGION 426 (2017) (on file with 
author).  The problem with this way of reasoning is that the judge sits on the clergy.  
On this specific criticism, see Faizan Mustafa & Jagteshwar Singh Sohi, Freedom of 
Religion in India: Current Issues and Supreme Court Acting as Clergy, 2017 BYU L. 
REV. 915, 953 (2017) (on file with author) (critical of the way the Indian Supreme 
Court has introduced an “essentiality” test that aims to examine which practices do 
belong to a faith, “[elevating] the judiciary to the status of clergy.”). 
220. EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, supra note 12, recommendation 15 (“Urges the
Member States to encourage and tolerate only ‘practices of Islam’ that are in full 
accordance with EU values.”); recommendation 17 (“invites the Commission and the 
Member States to develop and fund a network of European religious scholars that can 
spread - and testify to - practices of Islam that are compliant with EU values.”); 
recommendation 20 (“Urges the Member States to close without delay mosques and 
places of worship and ban associations that do not adhere to EU values and incite to 
terrorist offences, hatred, discrimination or violence.”). 
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equal treatment of the adherents of different religious groups. 
Therefore, the reconciliation strategy has given diversity a majoritarian 
content, fitting the sensitivities of the established majority and leaving 
little room for unpopular faiths, such as the Islam, and non-majoritarian 
religious manifestations, such as the full-face veil in public.  Thus, such 
religious manifestations fail to satisfy the protection-worthy version of 
diversity that encompasses important liberal democratic values, like 
human dignity and gender equality.221 
II. ABSTRACTION FROM THE RELIGIOUS DIMENSION
The question is whether this majoritarian-proof-making approach 
to “diversity” is compatible with the egalitarian and non-sectarian 
understanding of religion and religious freedom.  To answer this 
question, this part first outlines the broader context of S.A.S. and the EU 
Parliament’s recommendations, which concerns the question of religion 
in liberal political philosophy.  Second, it develops a theoretical 
framework for religion and religious freedom within the paradigm of 
liberal political philosophy.  Third, this theoretical framework will be 
used to reflect on the reconciliation of “diversity” with the dominant 
view regarding the desirability and legality of “contentious religious 
manifestations.”  The next question asks: is the “reconciliation strategy” 
a paradigmatic expression of recent developments in legal theory and 
liberal political philosophy about the role of “religion” for the 
justification of religious accommodation and public decisions taken in 
law and politics? 
221. Michaels, supra note 204, at 227 (arguing that “regardless of whether the
face veil is cultural or political or both, classifying it as nonreligious has an advantage: 
if the face veil is not religious, then the woman who wears it cannot invoke freedom 
of religion to do so.  If she has been forced to wear it by family members, then the ban 
provides her with protection.  If she has freely chosen to wear it . . .  then this choice 
is inherently suspicious, because it shows that the woman is either against gender 
equality, or in favor of a politically suspicious movement.”).  See also Siobhán 
O’Grady, After refusing a handshake, a Muslim couple was denied Swiss citizenship, 
WASH. POST (Aug. 18, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2018/08/18/ 
after-refusing-handshake-muslim-couple-was-denied-swiss-citizenship/?noredirect 
=on&utm_term=.74b13ae51014 (reporting about the Swiss denial to grant a Muslim 
couple citizenship after they insisted in their rejection to shake hands with the opposite 
gender).  
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A. Religion in the Paradigm of Liberal Political Philosophy
The recurring conflict in liberal democracies between competing 
religious demands and established legal norms has resulted in a 
principled debate in legal theory and liberal political philosophy 
regarding the role of religion in law and politics.222  Religious 
manifestations that compete with legal and majoritarian norms of 
liberal democracies have accelerated the need for clarification of the 
question: does religion qua religion deserve any special protection?223  
More specifically, should liberal democracies care about religion qua 
religion for the public justification of decisions taken in law and 
222. Cf. debates on the legality of Islamic veils in public, ritual circumcisions
of children, ministerial exceptions, mixed school swimming cases and the religious 
slaughter cases.  See Mechoulan, supra note 217 (contextualizing the French 
prohibition law); Trotter, supra note 61 (analyzing how the “living together” 
argument has played a role in a couple of recent judgments); Wahedi, supra note 54 
(discussing the “double standards” argument in the debate on the legality of ritual 
circumcisions); Yasmine Ergas, Regulating Religion Beyond Borders, in RELIGION,
SECULARISM, AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 66 (Jean Louise Cohen & Cécile 
Laborde eds., 2016) (discussing the legality of female circumcision from a law and 
religion perspective); see generally Jeremy A. Rovinsky, The Cutting Edge: The 
Debate over Regulation of Ritual Slaughter in the Western World, 45 CAL. W. INT’L 
L.J. 79 (2014) (discussing the legality of ritual slaughter in Western democracies).
223. See generally Kenneth Einar Himma, An Unjust Dogma: Why a Special
Right to Religion Wrongly Discriminates against Non-Religious Worldviews, 54 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 217 (2017); Arif A. Jamal, Considering Freedom of Religion in a Post-
Secular Context: Hapless or Hopeful? 6 OXFORD J. L. & RELIGION 433 (2017); 
Christopher C. Lund, Religion is Special Enough, 103 VA. L. REV. 481 (2017); Brett 
G. Scharffs, Why Religious Freedom - Why the Religiously Committed, the Religiously 
Indifferent, and Those Hostile to Religion Should Care, 2017 BYU L. REV. 957
(2017); NELSON TEBBE, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN AN EGALITARIAN AGE (2017); Tara
Smith, Religious Liberty or Religious License: Legal Schizophrenia and the Case
against Examptions, 32 J.L. & POL. 43 (2016); LABORDE, supra note 39; SMITH,
supra note 48; LEITER, supra note 56; DWORKIN, supra note 30; ANDREW 
KOPPELMAN, DEFENDING AMERICAN RELIGIOUS NEUTRALITY (2013); MICAH
SCHWARTZMAN, What if Religion is Not Special?, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 1351 (2012);
MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE (2008); Chad Flanders, The
Possibility of a Secular First Amendment, 26 QLR 257 (2008); CHRISTOPHER L.
EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE G. SAGER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE CONSTITUTION
(2007); James Nickel, Who Needs Freedom of Religion?, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 941
(2005); WINNIFRED FALLERS SULLIVAN, THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
(2005).  Cf. Steven P. Aggergaard, The Question Speech on Private Campuses and
the Answer Nobody Wants to Hear, 44 MITCHELL HAMLINE L. REV. 629 (2018).
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politics?224  Hence, what do current debates in legal theory and liberal 
political philosophy tell us about the way modern liberal democracies 
interpret, value, protect, and deal with religious freedom?  Is the 
outcome of S.A.S. compatible with the existing line of research within 
the liberal paradigm of law and religious scholarship?  To answer all 
these questions, we need to develop a theoretical framework to help us 
conceptualize the possible liberal responses to the question whether 
religion qua religion deserves special protection.225 
1. Liberal Theories of Religious Freedom
The main distinction in law and religious scholarship on the role of 
religion for granting exemptions and justifying decisions in law lies 
between liberal and sectarian theories of religious freedom.  As such, 
sectarian theories justify the special legal solicitude toward religion 
with an appeal to some values that are considered distinctly religious.226  
224. Schwartzman, supra note 38, at 15 (arguing the current debate in liberal
political philosophy regarding the role of religion in law and politics consists of two 
more specific debates: (1) the role of religion for the purpose of state actions (public 
justification debate); and (2) its relevance for granting exemptions (the religious 
accommodation debate) to certain groups in society).  
225. The main research method of this Part is a conceptual meta-analysis of
positions defended in the “specialness-debate” of religion, with a particular focus on 
the liberal theories of religious freedom.  To identify the binding characteristic of the 
normative positions, this article has developed a matrix of positions.  This matrix 
focuses on the arguments developed to deal with the question whether religion qua 
religion needs special legal protection.  An advantage of this method is that it helps to 
see what the advantages and disadvantages of a particular concept are.  It is also 
helpful to see what the alternatives are.  See generally Schwartzman, supra note 38, 
at 28 (explaining how building up a theory in a systematic way sharpens our mind to 
see the inconsistencies in the existing body of knowledge); W. COLE DURHAM, JR. & 
BRETT G. SCHARFFS, LAW AND RELIGION: NATIONAL, INTERNATIONAL, AND 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 45 (2010) (on file with author) (providing a taxonomy 
of the various definitions of religion, as used in the case law or defended in the law 
and religion scholarship).  
226. See generally Lund, supra note 223, at 490 (providing an overview of and
discussing some of the religious arguments in favor of religious freedom); Cécile 
Laborde, Religion in the Law: The Disaggregation Approach, 34 LAW & PHIL. 581, 
582 (2015) (explaining the distinction between liberal and sectarian theories of 
religious freedom and arguing that the transcendental value of religion does not justify 
religious freedom).  For a sectarian justification of religious freedom qua religious, 
compare RAFAEL DOMINGO, GOD AND THE SECULAR LEGAL SYSTEM 79, 80-82 
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The paradigmatic distinction between sectarian and liberal theories of 
religious freedom is present within the paradigm of religion in liberal 
political philosophy.227  There are also hybrid theories of religious 
freedom, using a mixture of liberal and sectarian arguments to justify 
religious freedom and the legality of certain religious manifestations.228  
This section focuses on the liberal theories of religious freedom that 
have put the question of religious accommodation under critical 
scrutiny, either by challenging or defending the special legal solicitude 
(2016) (considering the “protection of suprarationality” as the “ultimate justification” 
for protecting religion qua religion); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Priority of God: A 
Theory of Religious Liberty, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 1159, 1183 (2013); DAVID NOVAK, IN 
DEFENSE OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 116, 117 (2009) (using a transcendental argument to 
justify the special legal protection of religion); JOHN H. GARVEY, WHAT ARE 
FREEDOMS FOR? 57 (1996) (on file with author) (claiming that within the context of 
U.S. constitutional law, the “split-level character” could only be clarified in light of 
an exclusive “religious justification” of religious freedom); Michael W. McConnell, 
Accommodation of Religion, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 15 (1985) (arguing the liberal state 
is not able to ultimately exclude the possibility that religious claims might be true, 
which means that the transcendental authority of such claims has more value than the 
claims of the state).  McConnell continued to defend this line in recent publications. 
See Michael W. McConnell, Why Protect Religious Freedom?, 123 YALE L.J. 770, 
786-89 (2013).
227. Cf. Paul B. Anderson, Religious Liberty under Communism, 6 J. CHURCH 
& ST. 169 (1964) (showing non-liberal, non-sectarian theories of religious freedom). 
228. Cf. Donna E. Arzt, Religious Freedom in a Religious State: The Case of
Israel in Comparative Constitutional Perspective, 9 WIS. INT’L L.J. 1 (1990) 
(comparing the Israeli approach to religious freedom).  The hybrid approach to the 
justification of religious freedom should not be confused with quasi-liberal 
approaches to religious liberty, which favor the majoritarian religion or the religions 
of “recognized” minorities.  Compare with the Constitution of the Islamic Republic 
of Iran that contains a sectarian explanation of “religious freedom.”  Articles 12 and 
13 of Iran’s Constitution exhaustively enumerate religions that are allowed to practice 
their faiths within the legal framework of the Islamic Republic.  The “recognized” 
religions include Zoroastrianism, Judaism and Christianity.  The Shia Jafari school of 
beliefs is the “eternally immutable” state’s religion.  See QANUNI ASSASSI JUMHURII 
ISLAMAI IRAN [THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN] (1980) (Iran), 
http://www.divan-edalat.ir/show.php?page=base, (translation) (last visited Feb. 27, 
2019).  For a quasi-liberal approach to religious freedom, see the recent proposal of 
the Dutch SGP. This party has argued that the state should make a distinction between 
religions that have shaped the Dutch tradition (including Christianity and Judaism but 
excluding Islam), to protect the Judeo-Christian character of the Dutch culture and 
society.  See SGP, supra note 30, at 3-4. 
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for religion.229  Essential to the religious accommodation debate is for 
whom accommodations should be made for and for what kind of 
reasons?230  These questions are used by legal theorists and liberal 
political philosophers to determine the normative tolerance and 
protection of religious beliefs and practices in liberal democracies. 
In order to identify how the liberal paradigm of the law and 
religious scholarship has evolved, we need to categorize the type of 
arguments used within this paradigm.  Categorizing this paradigm looks 
beyond the empirical argument that suggests religion is special because 
of religious freedom, accommodation through case law, and people’s 
relationship with religion as a special experience that deserves special 
protection in law.  Rather, this categorization draws on the body of 
normative arguments that posit how the law in liberal democracies 
should deal with the category of religion.231  Generally, liberal theories 
of religious freedom contain “strong rejectionist” and “soft rejectionist” 
responses to the question of whether religion should be treated special 
in law.  The strong rejectionist responses claim that there is nothing 
special about religion that makes it a protection worthy category in law. 
Therefore, religion does not deserve any special protection qua 
229. See generally LABORDE & BARDON, supra note 39.
230. These two questions are helpful to deal in a more systematic way with the
controversies that arise out of free exercise.  Cf. LEITER, supra note 56, at 3 (Brian 
Leiter compares an orthodox Sikh boy to a non-Sikh boy from a traditional family. 
Both boys want to wear a dagger—the orthodox Sikh boy for religious purposes (he 
wants to wear a kirpan, a religious object made of metal that resembles a dagger) and 
the other for reasons of tradition.  This case questions what the justification would be 
to treat the two differently.  That is to say, Leiter asks, “[w]hy the state should have 
to tolerate exemptions from generally applicable laws when they conflict with 
religious obligations but not with any other equally serious obligations of 
conscience.”). 
231. Basically, the conceptual question of these liberal theories of religious
freedom is: should the law grant religion qua religion special protection, or rather, 
should the law treat religion special because of the protection-worthy liberal 
substitutes of religion.  For the development of this particular argument, I have 
benefited tremendously from the feedback of professor Benjamin Berger on the theory 
of abstraction during my stay as visiting researcher at Osgoode Hall Law School in 
Toronto (Apr. 2017).  For a similar method that aims to challenge the empirical 
argument, see generally LEITER, supra note 56; DWORKIN, supra note 30; 
Schwartzman, supra note 223; Perry, supra note 64; Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 
20 (questioning why the law protects religion specially). 
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religion.232  The softer responses cover the body of arguments positing 
that the category of religion is not special as such but the liberal 
substitutes of religion are special.  Therefore, religion is only special by 
virtue of abstraction from the religious dimension. 
2. A Taxonomy of the Liberal Theories of Religious Freedom
This section develops a conceptual framework of normative 
approaches to religion in law.  This framework classifies the liberal 
positions into five categories.  First, principled rejection of arguments 
that justify the special legal protection of religion with an appeal to 
values that are presented as distinctly religious.  Rejectionist arguments 
reject qualifying specific beliefs or manifestations as religious.  Second, 
substitution consists of arguments explaining why religion is a subset 
of a broader human faculty, namely conscience.  Substitution also 
covers arguments that say religious freedom has no distinct 
constitutional value, like other liberties, such as the freedom of 
expression and association.  These in combination with the right to non-
discrimination, in practice could guarantee free exercise of religion. 
Third, generalization opposes a sectarian interpretation of religion and 
religious freedom, arguing that religion stands for deep ethical 
commitments of human beings and that religious freedom is the general 
right that gives human beings access to ethical independence and moral 
freedom.  Fourth, equation, which says that equality of treatment should 
be the norm when authorities are dealing with deep commitments of 
human beings who ask for exemptions from the application of general 
laws.  Fifth, representation, which justifies the special legal protection 
of religion in light of values that are not necessarily religious in nature. 
Religion represents in this position certain values that let human beings 
flourish—this particular argument justifies the special legal protection 
of religion.233 
232. Basically, the position of Brian Leiter and Kenneth Einar Himma.  See
generally LEITER, supra note 56; Himma, supra note 223. 
233. The focus is on the appropriate interpretation of “the notion of religion in
law (regardless of whether the category of freedom of religion is upheld or not).” 
Laborde, supra note 226, at 594.  
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a. Rejection
The rejectionist position discards arguments that justify religious 
freedom with an appeal to values that are considered distinctly 
religious. This position consists of two broader categories: principled 
rejection and non-principled rejection. Non-principled rejection claims 
that the concept of religion does not apply to certain beliefs, traditions 
or manifestations.234 Yet, non-principled rejection does not exclude the 
option to use the term “religion” to consider other manifestations as 
religious for reasons of consensus and tradition.  Thus, it promotes the 
term “religion” for particular religions and excludes other religions as 
not falling under the specific definition of “religion.”  The appropriate 
example is the rhetorical approach currently present in the political 
discourse, which views Islam not as a religion but as a totalitarian 
ideology with a closed internal system of rules that prescribe in detail 
how one should live his or her life.  Against this backdrop, it has been 
argued practices and beliefs that are based on Islam should not have 
access to the privileges of religious freedom.235  Principled rejection 
draws primarily on the idea that there are no principled reasons to 
tolerate religion qua religion within liberal democracies.236 
i. Principled Rejection
The principled rejectionist rejects tolerating religion qua religion 
for principled reasons (i.e., reasons that find their origins in morality or 
epistemology).  This position starts from the question of what toleration 
on principled grounds says about the justification of the special legal 
protection of religion qua religion.  Thus, it questions whether the 
concept of toleration provides any room for arguments that justify 
religious toleration because of any specialness of religion (i.e., 
distinctly religious values).  This sub-position defines pure toleration as 
234. See generally AMOS N. GUIORA, FREEDOM FROM RELIGION 19 (2009).
235. See generally Wahedi, supra note 45.
236. LEITER, supra note 56, at 7, 55, 67; see also Schwartzman, supra note 38,
at 22; Cécile Laborde, Conclusion: Is Religion Special?, in RELIGION, SECULARISM,
AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 423 (Jean Louise Cohen & Cécile Laborde eds., 
2016); DWORKIN, supra note 30, at 111, 144; NUSSBAUM, supra note 223, at 164; 
Nickel, supra note 223, at 943; Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 20, at 1248; see 
generally SULLIVAN, supra note 223; Himma, supra note 223. 
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the situation in which the dominant group sees on moral, or epistemic 
grounds a reason to allow, or tolerate on such principled grounds, 
another group of citizens to continue with acts or manifestations that 
are considered objectionable by the dominant group.  Principled 
rejection draws on this particular definition of toleration and concludes 
that the principle of toleration does not require special legal protection 
for religion qua religion.237 
The principled rejectionist questions whether one can identify one 
or more principled reasons that could justify a toleration regime for 
religion qua religion.  To answer this question, a distinction is made 
between two potentially distinctive characteristics of religion: “the 
categoricity of religious commands” and “insulation [of religious 
beliefs] from evidence” and reason.238  This particular feature is closely 
related to the argument that religious beliefs might be distinctive due to 
their involvement in a “metaphysics of ultimate reality.”239  According 
to this position, the moral reasons for toleration only justify the special 
legal protection of human conscience.  This moral justification of 
liberty of conscience does not simultaneously single out religion and its 
categoricity of commands for special legal protection.  Thus, no 
evidence could support the argument that people in the Rawlsian 
“original position” will opt for religious freedom next to equal liberty 
of conscience.240  Hence, the emphasis on the need for liberty of 
conscience does not make a distinction between the backgrounds of 
conscientious commands—it does not single out religion for a special 
favored treatment.241  Leiter explains this argument as follows: 
237. Toleration is usually justified on different types of moral and epistemic
grounds.  Brian Leiter concludes there is nothing special, in terms of morality or 
epistemology, to warrant toleration of religion qua religion.  LEITER, supra note 56, 
at 7-13; see LORENZO ZUCCA, A SECULAR EUROPE. LAW AND RELIGION IN THE
EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONAL LANDSCAPE 8, n.17 (2012) (providing a broader 
definition of toleration).  
238. LEITER, supra note 56, at 33-34.
239. Id. at 47.  See also NUSSBAUM, supra note 223, at 168.
240. Rawlsian morality argues in favor of toleration stating that people in the
original position, when they perform behind the “veil of ignorance,” will definitely 
accept some categorical demands, though these are not of a religious nature per se.  In 
other words, this ground of toleration does not provide a principled argument to 
tolerate “religion qua religion.”  See generally LEITER, supra note 56, at 55.  
241. See Simon Căbulea May, Exemptions for Conscience, in RELIGION IN
LIBERAL POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 191 (Cécile Laborde & Aurélia Bardon eds., 2017) 
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Rawls repeatedly lumps religious and moral categoricity together, so 
that it is fair to say that the only thing individuals behind the veil of 
ignorance know is that they will accept some categorical demands, 
not they will accept distinctively religious ones, that is, ones whose 
grounding is a matter of faith.242 
Similarly, the utilitarian moral arguments for toleration (which 
focus on the maximization of human well-being that, among others, 
depends on the ability of people to live by their conscience) do not 
prescribe special protection of religion.  Therefore, toleration on moral 
grounds does not support the arguments that aim to single out religion 
as a matter of principled toleration.243 
The other principled ground for toleration found in the epistemic 
arguments draws on an accepted toleration for knowledge expansion. 
Interestingly, knowledge expansion conflicts with religion’s second 
potentially distinctive feature: insulation of religious beliefs from 
evidence and reason.244  As Leiter argues, it is far from obvious “to 
think, after all, that tolerating the expression of beliefs that are insulated 
from evidence and reasons—that is, insulated from epistemically 
relevant considerations—will promote knowledge of the truth.”245  
Although this argument does not address religious manifestations’ 
effect on knowledge expansion, it is conceivable to say that principled 
rejection equally rejects arguments that aim to justify toleration of 
religious conduct, solely because of religion.  Arguably, there is no 
reason to deny that both religious practices and beliefs are equally 
insulated from evidence. 
(arguing that accommodation of sincere conscientious objections to generally 
applicable laws face the same criticism of unfair treatment as religious 
accommodation does). 
242.  LEITER, supra note 56, at 55; see Andrew Koppelman, A Rawlsian Defence 
of Special Treatment for Religion, in RELIGION IN LIBERAL POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 
31 (Cécile Laborde & Aurélia Bardon eds., 2017) (presenting some Rawlsian 
arguments in defense of religious freedom). 
243. LEITER, supra note 56, at 55, 61.
244. Leiter argues reliance on Mill’s perspective on what is “true for the right
reasons” will not make a strong case to tolerate religion qua religion for epistemic 
reasons; religious faith excludes the idea that there might be some uncovered truth.  
Id. at 58. 
245. Id. at 55-56.
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ii. Non-Principled Rejection
Non-principled rejection rejects the qualification of certain beliefs, 
speeches, or conducts as religious, and is mainly present in political and 
legal discourse.  As such, one can refer to the political approach of the 
Dutch right-wing party, Partij voor de Vrijheid (the Party for Freedom), 
toward Islam.  This political party has repeatedly argued that Islam is 
not a religion, but rather a totalitarian ideology that should not enjoy 
the privileges of religious freedom.  Consequently, it has proposed an 
immigration ban from Islamic countries, legal prohibition of the Koran, 
and closure of all mosques and Islamic schools in the Netherlands.246  
Non-principled rejection in legal discourse occurs when one asks for 
permission to perform a practice that is portrayed as religious but 
apparently prohibited by authorities.  In some of the cases dealing with 
the legal admissibility of norm-deviant practices, the court or other 
parties involved refuse to admit that the practice at stake has a 
potentially religious dimension.247 
Similarly, in the legal debate related to the Travel Ban of President 
Trump, some scholars have explicitly argued that this ban has nothing 
to do with religion, purporting that it is related to security concerns.248  
Most notably, one of the legal advisors to President Trump revealed the 
President-elect asked him about how he could realize his promised 
246. Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal [The House of Representatives],
Aanhangsel Handelingen II [Parliamentary Proceedings II], 2016/2017, at 2-6-61 
and 2-6-62 (Neth.) (on file with author). 
247. Compare with tax exemption litigations of the Scientology Church and the
Church of Satan case: Hof. Den Haag 21 October 2015, 
ECLI:NL:GHDHA:2015:2875, ¶ 8.16 (Neth.) (holding that the activities of the 
Scientology Church—in particular, Auditing and Training—are commercial in nature 
and not religious, serving primarily private interests.  Thus, the Church is ineligible 
for tax exemptions).  The case of Saint-Walburga, which focused on sisters forming 
the Church of Satan, turned on the question whether a brothel could be considered a 
religious institution.  HR 31 October 1986, ECLI:NL:HR:1986:AC9553 (Neth.); Cf. 
Religion Based on Sex Gets a Judicial Review, N.Y. TIMES, 
http://www.nytimes.com/1990/05/02/us/religion-based-on-sex-gets-a-judicial-
review.html  (discussing a case in which a couple charged for pimping and prostitution 
claimed that the activities that took place in the Church were part of their sacred 
religion). 
248. See generally Michael B. Mukasey, Judicial Independence: The Fortress
Threatened from Within, 47 U. MEM. L. REV. 1223 (2017) (defending the ban as a 
matter of national security) (on file with author). 
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Muslim travel ban in a legal way.249  The advisory team found “danger” 
was an appropriate substitute for those coming from Muslim majority 
countries—the category of people, the President promised he would 
single out for special travel restrictions.250  The shift from focusing on 
security matters and rejecting the religious dimension in this context 
was “perfectly sensible, perfectly legal.”251 
b. Substitution
The substitution position claims both religion and religious 
freedom have adequate substitutes.252  Like the rejectionist position, 
substitution consists of both principled substitution and non-principled 
substitution.253  Principled substitution draws on arguments that view 
religion as a subset of a particular faculty that is worthy of special legal 
protection.  This protection-worthy faculty concerns human 
conscience.254  The argument is that free exercise of religion and the 
admissibility of religious claims for exemptions could be adequately 
ensured through freedom of conscience.255  Non-principled substitution 
249. Jim Dwyer, First Came Giuliani’s Input on the Immigration Order. Now
There’s the Court Test, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/09/nyregion/rudolph-giuliani-donald-trump-
travel-ban.html. 
250. See id.
251. Id.
252. See generally LABORDE, supra note 39; Michah Schwartzman, Religion
as a Legal Proxy, 51 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1085, 1099 (2014) (discussing the 
“substitution” position). 
253. See generally NUSSBAUM, supra note 223 (providing a deeper
philosophical account for the argument that religion has a substitute, like conscience); 
Nickel, supra note 223 (purporting that religious freedom can be replaced by other 
freedoms). 
254. This article will not engage in the discussion about the different
conceptions of conscience.  Neither will it discuss the argument that there is a 
difference between human conscience and religious conscience.  See Lund, supra note 
223, at 503-04.  For the argument that this article aims to develop, it is sufficient to 
indicate that some liberal theorists of religious freedom argue that religion and 
religious freedom have certain substitutes. 
255. See JOCELYN MACLURE & CHARLES TAYLOR, SECULARISM AND FREEDOM 
OF CONSCIENCE 89 (2011) (arguing that given “the context of contemporary societies 
marked by moral and religious diversity, it is not religious convictions in themselves 
that must enjoy a special status but rather, all core beliefs that allow individuals to 
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views basic liberties as being in practice enough to guarantee the free 
exercise of religion.  Thus, as Nickel has rightly asked: “who needs 
freedom of religion,” when this right turns out to be superfluous?256 
i. Principled Substitution
Principled substitution says that religion is a subset of a broader 
protection-worthy category: the conscience.257  With reference to the 
work of Roger Williams, Nussbaum argues: 
The faculty with which each person searches for the ultimate 
meaning of life is of intrinsic worth and value, and is worthy of 
respect whether the person is using it well or badly.  The faculty is 
identified in part by what it does—it reasons, searches, and 
experiences emotions of longing connected to that search—and in 
part by its subject matter—it deals with ultimate questions, questions 
of ultimate meaning.  It is the faculty, not its goal, that is the basis of 
political respect, and thus we can agree to respect the faculty without 
prejudicing the question whether there is a meaning to be found, or 
what it might be like.  From the respect we have for the person’s 
conscience, that faculty of inquiring and searching, it follows that we 
ought to respect the space required by any activity that has the 
general shape of searching for the ultimate meaning of life, except 
when that search violates the right of others or comes up against 
some compelling state interest.258 
According to Nussbaum, this way of reasoning helps us “make 
sense of our feeling that there really is something about religion or 
quasi-religion that calls for special protection and delicacy.”259  
structure their moral identity.”).  See also LABORDE, supra note 39, at 66-67 (critical 
of the position defended by Jocelyn Maclure and Charles Taylor). 
256. Nickel, supra note 223, at 943.
257. See also Koppelman, supra note 242, at 38 (rejecting the claim that
religion is a subset of human conscience and arguing that the latter is at best a 
complement, not a substitute, for teleologically loaded terms such as religion).  
258. NUSSBAUM, supra note 223, at 168-69.
259. Id. at 169 (arguing the search for meaningful answers to ultimate questions 
of life helps us to keep our special solicitude for religion, as a matter of respect for a 
broader human faculty, separated from “silly” faculties.  That is to say, “faculties used 
by my car lover, who isn’t engaged in a search for meaning, or the person who feels 
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Specifically, this protection-worthy “something” is the human 
conscience, which is an inalienable dignity people possess, regardless 
of educational or socioeconomic background, health, religious belief, 
and more.260  Thus, there is no principled reason to single out religion 
because it is religion.  Rather, there is a principled argument to justify 
the special protection of a broad liberty of conscience that encompasses 
and protects the religious conscience as a matter of respect for human 
dignity.261  Accordingly, religious claims for exemptions are sometimes 
granted “because they involve matters of conscience, not matters of 
religion.”262 
ii. Non-Principled Substitution
Non-principled substitution seeks to invalidate the necessity of a 
separate right to religious freedom.263  Specifically, existing freedoms 
of speech and association, and bans on discrimination and violence, 
render a separate right unnecessary.264  In other words: freedom of 
religion has at least some very “adequate substitute[s].”265  Arguments 
that support the replacement of religious freedom consider this right 
“dispensable,”266 as other basic liberties ensure the free exercise of 
religion.  The argument suggests religious manifestations are related to 
a broad range of areas, such as business, politics and association.  Non-
called to dress like a chicken when going to work, which is (probably) just too silly to 
count as a genuine search for meaning.”).  
260. Id.
261. Id. at 164-74; see also NUSSBAUM, supra note 169, at 61-66; see generally
LEITER, supra note 56 (discussing the line that liberty of conscience is an appropriate 
substitute for religious freedom).  In the theoretical framework that Leiter uses to 
develop his argument, principled substitution arises out of what the liberal concept of 
toleration considers protection-worthy for principled reasons: equal liberty of 
conscience.  
262. LEITER, supra note 56, at 64.
263. See generally Nickel, supra note 223.
264. See generally Nickel, supra note 223, for a further discussion of this
position; see also Mark Tushnet, Redundant of Free Exercise Clause?, 33 LOY. U.
CHI. L. J. 71, 73, 94 (2001).  See generally Scott M. Noveck, The Promise and 
Problems of Treating Religious Freedom as Freedom of Association, 45 GONZ. L.
REV. 745 (2009). 
265. Tushnet, supra note 264, at 94.
266. Nickel, supra note 223, at 941.
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principled substitution understands religious freedom in light of the 
argument “that the sorts of activities it involves are covered by the most 
important general liberties.”267 
Furthermore, non-principled substitution expects religious freedom 
shares the same basis as other basic liberties.  Thus, there is no reason 
to think religion is something unique that could justify the special legal 
solicitude toward religion qua religion.  The expectation is that 
understanding the need for the free exercise of religion in light of 
existing basic liberties may eliminate the idea that religious beliefs are 
privileged in society.  Therefore, the granted exemptions are the 
outcome of a proper application of basic liberties and not derived from 
the presumed distinct value of religious beliefs.  Lastly, the emphasis 
on the protection of religious beliefs through the application of basic 
liberties ensures people have a real choice to engage in or disapprove 
certain convictions.268 
c. Generalization
Generalization advocates a broader, ecumenical and non-sectarian 
definition of religion and religious freedom.  Against this normative 
backdrop, generalization defends the position that religious freedom 
should not be considered a special right, which protects only a selected 
group of people—the believers.269  Rather, religious freedom should be 
a general right to ethical and moral independence.270  This position is 
ecumenical because it looks beyond the sectarian theistic accounts of 
religion.  It is also non-sectarian because it does not bifurcate theistic 
and non-theistic convictions about the good.271  Generalization looks 
beyond the narrow, theistic conception of “religion” and argues that 
both God-believers and non-believers may be considered “religious,” 
as both could have the same convictions about fundamental 
questions.272  In examining the deep commitment that religious and 
267. Id. at 950.
268. Id. at 943-50.
269. DWORKIN, supra note 30, at 132 (discussing religious freedom as a general 
right to ethical independence); see also Perry, supra note 64, at 996 (stating how 
broadening religious freedom will encompass moral freedom). 
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. DWORKIN, supra note 30, at 5.
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non-religious people share, the generalist position sees an “intrinsic and 
inescapable ethical responsibility” to succeed in life.273  Accordingly, 
this position says religious freedom should be the general right to 
ethical independence that opens the doors to moral freedom.274 
Under the generalist framework, religious freedom is the right that 
gives humans full access to ethical independence.275  Thus, the 
generalist account of religious freedom emphasizes the opportunities 
for individuals to make independent life decisions based on their deeply 
held ethical commitments.  This approach apparently extends the 
definition of religion.276  The main justification for this extension is 
rooted in the idea that we need a deeper, non-sectarian understanding 
of religious freedom because the free exercise of religion cannot be 
protected on sectarian grounds for distinctly religious reasons.277  The 
leading normative argument behind generalization’s core tenets—
religious beliefs as deep ethical commitments and religious freedom as 
a general right to moral and ethical independence—is the assumption 
that public authorities are not apt to judge what should count as moral 
or religious truth.278 
273. Id. at 114.  See also James McBride, Paul Tillich and the Supreme Court:
Tillich’s Ultimate Concern as a Standard in Judicial Interpretation, 30 J. CHURCH & 
ST. 245, 260 (1988) (discussing Paul Tillich’s idea of “ultimate concerns” that 
scholars have used to interpret religion beyond its theistic definition).  Many thanks 
to Christy Green for the suggestion to have a look at Paul Tillich’s discussion of 
“ultimate concerns.” 
274. DWORKIN, supra note 30, at 129-30.
275. Id. at 132.
276. See Schwartzman, supra note 38, at 22.  A serious concern of this
“symmetrical theory” of religious freedom—on both sides (public justification and 
religious accommodation) religion is not something special—is the huge risk of 
anarchy.  See generally DWORKIN, supra note 30, at 117; LEITER, supra note 56, at 
95; NUSSBAUM, supra note 223, at 173 (drawing attention to the side-constraints of 
an all-inclusive term religion). 
277. DWORKIN, supra note 30, at 17, 129.  See generally Matthew Clayton, Is
Ethical Independence Enough?, in RELIGION IN LIBERAL POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 132 
(Cécile Laborde & Aurélia Bardon Eds.) (2017) (a recent defense of Dworkin’s 
approach to religious freedom). 
278. Perry, supra note 64, at 1012.  This concerns a Lockean criticism on
governmental interference in matters of morality and religion.  Locke states that the 
main purpose of the law “is not to provide for the truth of opinions, but for the safety 
and security of the commonwealth and of every particular man’s goods and person.” 
Id. at 1003. 
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Understanding religion in terms of access to ethical independence 
pursues an ideal of liberal neutrality,279 toward what Nussbaum has 
called, the “ultimate questions” of life.280  The call for liberal neutrality 
toward deep human commitments is bolstered by the crux of ethical 
independence, which “requires that government not restrict citizens’ 
freedom when its justification assumes that one concept of how to live, 
or what makes a successful life, is superior to others.  It is often an 
interpretive question, and sometimes a difficult one, whether a policy 
does reflect that assumption.”281  To clarify why we should endorse 
liberal neutrality as a matter of principle, the generalist position divides 
basic liberties into special and general rights. The difference between 
these two variants is rooted in what the threshold authorities must cross 
when they aim to restrict a right.  Special rights focus on a particular 
“subject matter” and it is complicated to limit these rights legitimately, 
except in cases of emergency.  General rights, on the other hand, focus 
on the relation between authorities and people.  General rights restrict 
the scope of arguments authorities can provide to legitimately limit the 
exercise of a general right.282 
The specific distinction between general (restrict arguments to limit 
free exercise) and special (focus is on a protection-worthy subject) 
rights gives generalists a reason to argue that religious freedom should 
be a general right, as the category of “religion” remains a complicated 
subject to interpret.  Thus, the definition problem of religion, which the 
generalists posit is intertwined with freedom of religion, is an important 
argument to oppose granting religious freedom a special status.  That is 
to say, considering religious freedom a special right.  The semantic 
criticism at this point conveys that a special right would explicitly focus 
279. Cécile Laborde, Dworkin’s Freedom of Religion Without God, 94 B.U. L. 
REV. 125, 125 (2014). 
280. NUSSBAUM, supra note 223, at 168.
281. DWORKIN, supra note 30, at 141-42.
282. DWORKIN, supra note 30, at 132-33 (stating that “a special right of religion 
declares that government must not constrain religious exercise in any way, absent an 
extraordinary emergency.  The general right to ethical independence, on the 
contrary . . . limits the reasons government may offer for any constraint on a citizen’s 
freedom at all.”). 
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on the definition of religion and it would not be able to solve the 
definition problem of this right.283 
Furthermore, a special right requires high demands on restrictions 
that aim to limit the exercise of such a right.  Instead, the generalist 
position argues that approaching religious freedom as a general right to 
ethical independence will provide protection to the free exercise of 
religion.  The generalist position explains that the right to ethical 
independence “condemns any explicit discrimination . . . that 
assumes . . . that one variety of religious faith is superior to others in 
truth or virtue or that a political majority is entitled to favor one faith 
over others or that atheism is father to immorality.”284  Moreover, it 
“protects religious conviction in a more subtle way as well: by 
outlawing any constraint neutral on its face but whose design covertly 
assumes some direct or indirect subordination.”285  However, 
understanding religious freedom as a general right to ethical 
independence might force people to adjust their religious conduct in a 
way that conforms to laws that are not per se catered to them.286  
Therefore, the generalist position argues that authorities should take 
into account whether restrictions on a particular practice they propose 
are in fact targeting what one group might consider “a sacred duty.”287  
If so, “then the legislature must consider whether equal concern . . . 
requires an exemption or other amelioration.  If an exception can be 
managed with no significant damage to the policy in play, then it might 
be unreasonable not to grant that exception.”288 
283. Id.; see generally LABORDE, supra note 39, at 30-33; SULLIVAN, supra
note 223, at 1-4 (discussing the problem of defining religion). 
284. DWORKIN, supra note 30, at 133-34.
285. Id. at 134.
286. Ronald Dworkin stated, “[i]f we deny a special right to free exercise of
religious practice, and rely only on the general right to ethical independence, then 
religions may be forced to restrict their practices so as to obey rational, non-
discriminatory laws that do not display less than equal concern for them.”  Id. at 135-
36. 
287. Id. at 136.
288. Id.
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d. Equation
Equation requires equal respect for all deep concerns of people.  In 
effect, religious beliefs and practices of one group of citizens, as they 
relate to deep human concerns, should not be favored over similar deep 
concerns of others.  Religious freedom should ensure this equal 
treatment of people.289  Against this backdrop, equation opposes 
arguments that justify religious freedom in light of any “distinct value” 
of religious manifestations.  Rather, it argues that believers’ 
vulnerability to discrimination should be considered the main 
justification for religious freedom.  In addition, equation opposes a 
“religious” understanding of religious freedom.  In this sense, equation 
is very close to generalization.  However, there are two main 
differences.  First, it is not indifference or neutrality as such that 
requires principled equation.290  Rather, it is the ideal of equality of 
treatment of all acts and thoughts that have an intrinsic value.291  
Second, equation does not generalize religious freedom to something 
like the general right to ethical independence and moral freedom.292  
Instead, equation approaches religious freedom from the principle of 
equality of treatment, which is considered the main constitutional value 
of a liberal democracy.293  Therefore, the equation approach is part of 
289. Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Does It Matter What
Religion Is? 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 807, 834-35 (2009) (stating that “the point of 
the Religion Clauses is not to affirm (or deny) the value of religious practices, any 
more than the point of the Free Speech Clause is to affirm (or deny) the value of flag 
burning.”). 
290. See Bret Boyce, Equality and the Free Exercise of Religion, 57 CLEV. ST.
L. REV. 493, 496-97, 520 (2009).
291. See Christopher C. Lund, Exploring Free Exercise Doctrine: Equal
Liberty and Religious Exemptions, 77 TENN. L. REV. 351, at 352 (2010) (arguing that 
some liberal theorists of religious freedom have “[attacked] religious exemptions on 
the general premise that they are fundamentally unfair to nonreligious people.”). 
292. See EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 223, 51-77 (2007); see generally 
LABORDE, supra note 39, at 55-57; Lund, supra note 291, at 360 (critical of the theory 
developed by Eisgruber and Sager).  See also Boyce, supra note 290, at 496-97 
(differentiating between equality in treatment and equality in effect). 
293. See LABORDE, supra note 39, at 19.
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what has been called the egalitarian theories of religious freedom.294  
The question is, however, equation of what?295  At the outset, this 
position is anti-favoritism,296 as it advocates equal treatment of all 
conscientious manifestations and beliefs that contain an intrinsic 
value.297 
Equation “requires simply that government treat[s] the deep, 
religiously inspired concerns of minority religious believers with the 
same regard as that enjoyed by the deep concerns of citizens 
generally.”298  Thus, there are no principled reasons to differentiate 
between deep human commitments.  The norm should be an equal 
approach to non-religious and religious perspectives on the ultimate 
questions of life.  The equation approach rethinks religious freedom as 
“the right of the individual . . . to life outside the state—the right to live 
as a self on which many given, as well as chosen, demands are made. 
Such a right may not be best realized through laws guaranteeing 
religious freedom but by laws guaranteeing equality.”299  Thus, the 
regime of religious toleration should be understood against the 
backdrop of human vulnerability to discrimination.  Eisgruber and 
Sager states: 
[what] properly motivates constitutional solicitude for religious 
practices is their distinct vulnerability to discrimination, not their 
distinct value; and what is called for, in turn, is protection against 
discrimination, not privilege against legitimate governmental 
concerns.  When we have replaced value with vulnerability, and the 
paradigm of privilege with that of protection, then it will be possible 
both to make sense of our constitutional past in this area and to chart 
an appealing constitutional future.300 
294. See Cécile Laborde, Liberal Neutrality, Religion and the Good?, in
RELIGION, SECULARISM, AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 249 (Jean Louise Cohen 
& Cécile Laborde Eds., 2016) (discussing egalitarian theories of religious freedom). 
295. See LABORDE, supra note 39, at 89.
296. SULLIVAN, supra note 223, at 149; see also LABORDE, supra note 39, at
42. 
297. EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 223, at 51-77; LABORDE, supra note 39,
at 51. 
298. Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 20, at 1283.
299. SULLIVAN, supra note 223, at 159.
300. Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 20, at 1248.
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This position allows us to accept two main differences between 
generalization and equation.  In short, generalization focuses on how 
we should understand religious freedom as a liberty and equation 
approaches religious freedom from the ideal of equality. 
e. Representation
Representation’s main claim is that a single group should not have 
exclusive protections that are not afforded to other groups.  Hence, it is 
not a sectarian theory of religious freedom.  Representation is rooted, 
as Laborde says, “in the ecumenical value of ethical integrity, and in 
the normative justifications for generic liberal rights such as speech and 
association.”301  Representation views religion as a concept that stands 
for a set of protection-worthy values that are not necessarily “religious” 
at the core.302  These values justify the codification of a special right to 
religious freedom.303 As such, religion, like respect, stands for a 
“hypergood”—a particular category of higher goods.304  Koppelman 
argues that: 
[religion] . . . has a value that can override many other goods and 
preferences.  But religion is one among many hypergoods.  It should 
not be privileged over the rest of them.  This fundamental problem 
of modernity should not be adjudicated by the state.  The problem of 
determining the appropriate hypergood, if any, and its reconciliation 
with the broad range of ordinary goods, is a question that occupies 
the same existential territory as religion.  If the state is incompetent 
301. The position this article qualifies as “representation” elaborates on the
“proxy” and “disaggregation” approaches.  See LABORDE & BARDON, supra note 39, 
at 599-600. 
302. See generally Ronan McCrea, The Consequences of Disaggregation and
the Impossibility of a Third Way, in RELIGION IN LIBERAL POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 69 
(Cécile Laborde & Aurélia Bardon eds., 2017) (criticizing Laborde’s disaggregation 
approach).  
303. Jane Rutherford, Religion, Rationality, and Special Treatment, 9 WM. & 
MARY BILL RTS. J. 303, 332 (2001). 
304. Andrew Koppelman, Is it Fair to Give Religion Special Treatment?, 2006
U. ILL. L. REV. 571, 594 (2006).
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to resolve religious questions, it is likewise incompetent to resolve 
this one.305 
To identify the relevant legal values of religion, the representation 
position reflects on the potential matches between the “different parts 
of the law” and “different dimensions of religion for the protection of 
different normative values.”306  Examples of such matches are: the 
presentation of religion as a conception of the good life; a conscientious 
moral obligation; the key feature of identity; mode of human 
association; a vulnerability class; a totalizing institution; and an 
inaccessible doctrine.307  Specifically, matches such as the presentation 
of religion as a conception of the good life, a matter of conscience, 
identity and association, are more “relevant to the notion of freedom of 
religion” than other overlapping areas.308  Hence, representation could 
be defined as “religion-blind without being religion-insensitive, 
because it sees religion, not as a specialised and self-contained area of 
human belief and activity, but as a richly diverse expression of life 
itself.”309 
B. Religious Freedom: Abstraction from the Religious Dimension
Does religion qua religion deserve special legal protection?  At the
outset, there is no right or wrong answer to this question.  At most, 
classifying different positions is instructive for mapping the main 
arguments to explore alternative methods.  Also, classifying normative 
approaches is helpful when examining the theoretical differences of the 
305. Id.  In his later publications, Andrew Koppelman has elaborated on
considering religion a legal proxy.  See, e.g., Andrew Koppelman, How Shall I Praise 
Thee? Brian Leiter on Respect for Religion, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 961, 981 (2010) 
(stating “it is not possible to offer a unitary account of what religion is good for.  Like 
a knife or a rock, it is something that people find already existing in the world, which 
they then put to a huge variety of uses.  Religion denotes a cluster of goods.”).  This 
position has been defended more recently in KOPPELMAN, supra note 223, at 124.  See 
also Koppelman, supra note 242, at 36-37 (repeating the view that religion 
encompasses many goods that people aim to purse and religious freedom enables them 
to do that). 
306. Laborde, supra note 226, at 594.
307. Id. at 594-95.
308. Id. at 595-97.
309. Id. at 600.
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liberal theories of religious freedom.  Moreover, mapping out 
differences streamlines the process of finding an element of 
commonality between the theories.  The similarities between the 
responses reveal two potential categories.  First, a “strong rejectionist 
response.”  Second, a “soft rejectionist response.”  The strong 
rejectionist response posits that religion should not be considered a 
special protection-worthy category in law.  This position corresponds 
with the rejectionist position.  The softer response also rejects the 
position that religion is special qua religion in law—entailing that the 
liberal substitutes of religion make this category possibly protection 
worthy.  Therefore, religion is only special through substitution, 
generalization, equation, and representation.  Does this twofold 
response about religion’s specialness provide us with a binding 
commonality between all liberal theories of religious freedom?  It does. 
The underlying message supporting both categories of responses is 
that distinctly religious values are not enough to justify the special legal 
solicitude toward religion.  Thus, both responses reject the specialness 
of the metaphysics of religion for the special legal solitude toward 
religion.  The synthesis of the twofold response is the dismissal of the 
special legal protection of religion qua religion.  Moreover, this 
synthesis renounces arguments that justify religious freedom with an 
appeal to any distinct value of religion.  What clarifies and justifies the 
special legal attention for religion is a broader and apparently religion-
empty (i.e., free from distinctly religious values) framework of 
faculties, liberties, and vulnerabilities.310 
The question is, what does this predominantly negative answer to 
the question of whether religion qua religion requires special legal 
protection suggest about the binding feature of the liberal theories of 
religious freedom?  Can we claim that the twofold response that we 
have given is an illustration of “decoupling religion from a god?”311  
Alternatively, does the synthesis of our twofold response fit the 
310. LABORDE, supra note 39, at 42 (criticizing the “vague” broader framework 
that is adopted by egalitarian theorists of religious freedom to justify the special legal 
solicitude toward religion).  
311. DWORKIN, supra note 30 at 132 (stating that “the problems we
encountered in defining freedom of religion flow from trying to retain that right as a 
special right while also decoupling religion from a god.”). 
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“tendency, among legal practitioners, to re-describe” religious matters 
in non-religious terms?312 
The synthesis of our negative response encompasses both 
hypothetical questions when it reacts to the justification grounds of the 
special legal solicitude toward religion.  It decouples religion from any 
God.  Essentially, it presents religion as one subcategory in the more 
general and apparently non-religious categories of human conscience 
and the conceptions of the good life.  It decouples religion from any 
God in a further sense.  The twofold response conceptualizes religion 
in a God-empty way, free from distinctly religious values.  For example, 
the definition of religion states that it is the combination of categorical 
demands that are insulated from evidence and reason.313  Other God-
empty conceptions of religion are concerned with the identification of 
general and apparently non-religious values that are worthy of legal 
protection.  Examples of such intrinsic and valuable aspects of religion 
include: the values behind human conscience,314 ethical integrity,315 
312. Laborde, supra note 226, at 590 (arguing that “there has been a tendency,
among legal practitioners, to re-describe [particular religious] practices in the 
language of conscientious obligation, so as to accommodate them under the label of 
freedom of religion.”).  
313. LEITER, supra note 56, at 33-34. Koppelman is critical of Brian Leiter’s
conception of religion, referring to it as “a radically impoverished conception.”  
Koppelman, supra note 305, at 962; see also McConnell, supra note 226, at 784 
(suggesting, “it is futile to draw up a list of features descriptive of religion and only 
of religion.  What makes religion distinctive is its unique combination of features, as 
well as the place it holds in real human lives and human history.”)  See also François 
Boucher & Cécile Laborde, Why Tolerate Conscience?, 10 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 493, 496 
(2016) (stating that “Leiter fails to establish insulation from reasons and evidence as 
the demarcating feature of religion.  This is because he draws on incompatible 
interpretations of ‘insulation from reasons and evidence’ to reply to different 
challenges regarding either the under-inclusiveness or the over-inclusiveness of his 
definition of religion.”).  
314. NUSSBAUM, supra note 223, at 168-69.  But see KOPPELMAN, supra note
223, at 153 (arguing that “[it] is not clear how Nussbaum can maintain the distinction 
between her position and a libertarian view in which any regulation of anyone’s 
conduct is presumptively invalid . . . . [As such], [t]he boundaries of protection in 
Nussbaum are thus uncertain.”).  See also Laborde, supra note 226, at 589 (arguing 
that the substitution position is not able to provide equal protection to all religious 
practices that are valuable, though not always on conscientious grounds). 
315. Laborde, supra note 226, at 589.
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deep ethical commitments,316 hope and vulnerability to injustice.317  
These valuable—though not specifically or distinctly religious—
aspects of religion justify the special legal protection of religious beliefs 
and manifestations. 
The synthesis of our twofold response fits the tendency of re-
description, which suggests that in analyzing the legal aspects of a 
religious manifestation case, it is neither necessary nor useful to define 
or understand that case in distinct religious terms.  The tendency of re-
description arises from projects that aim to rethink religious freedom in 
a religion-empty way, protecting both theistic and non-theistic beliefs 
and manifestations.  The normative argument is that both theistic and 
non-theistic beliefs and manifestations with an intrinsic value, which 
attaches to valuable aspects of a human life, should be treated with the 
same amount of respect and concern.  As such, religious freedom has 
been rethought, approached and defended as: the liberty of 
conscience,318 the right to moral freedom,319 the right to ethical 
independence, and the citizens’ equal right to live outside the state.320 
Thus far, we have argued that the synthesis of our twofold response 
decouples religion from any God and relies mainly on non-religious 
language to re-describe religious matters.321  The question is whether 
we could provide a more coherent description of our synthesis, 
encompassing both the decoupling and re-description aspect of the 
debate in jurisprudence about law and religion.  In other words, is it 
possible to systematically identify and subsequently define the feature 
that serves as the binding characteristic of the liberal theories of 
religious freedom?  This feature looks beyond the varieties of normative 
316. DWORKIN, supra note 30, at 5.
317.  KOPPELMAN, supra note 223, at 122 (discussing hope); Eisgruber & Sager,
supra note 20, at 1248 (discussing the vulnerability to injustice). 
318. MACLURE & TAYLOR, supra note 255, at 89; NUSSBAUM, supra note 223,
at 169. 
319. Perry, supra note 64, at 996.
320. DWORKIN, supra note 30, at 130 (on the right to ethical independence);
SULLIVAN, supra note 223, at 159 (on the right to live outside the state). 
321. Cf. Peter Jones, Religious Exemptions and Distributive Justice, in
RELIGION IN LIBERAL POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 163 (Cécile Laborde & Aurélia Bardon 
eds., 2017) (explaining that the non-religious description of religious exemptions, 
such as the use of a cultural frame, fits the egalitarian strategy to defend religious 
exemptions on non-sectarian grounds).  
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positions and connects these perspectives through a common focus—
the justification grounds for the special legal protection of religion. 
With this presumption in mind, the starting point in identifying the 
potential binding element of the liberal theories of religious freedom is 
the interpretative concern about the proper legal definition of religion 
and religious freedom and the definition’s fair application in practice. 
This interpretative concern guides us to define the binding 
characteristic of the liberal theories of religious freedom.  First, we have 
seen that these theories aim to provide the most appropriate definition 
of religion in law.  Second, they have one important concern: the 
egalitarian attention to fair treatment of deep human commitments and 
beliefs. 
Hence, the binding characteristic is a normative response to the 
question: how should liberal democracies understand and accordingly 
deal with the concept of religion in law?  This binding element 
encompasses the entire body of arguments that paves the way for 
balancing religion’s role in law as it relates to the paradigm of liberal 
political philosophy.  The binding characteristic takes the form of an 
interpretative shield.  It is embedded in philosophical arguments that 
can resist the justification of religious freedom with an appeal to 
distinctly religious values.  In addition, it draws on a non-sectarian 
language to conceptualize religion and religious manifestations. 
What does this interpretative shield suggest about the binding 
feature of the liberal theories of religious freedom?  Does it help provide 
a more coherent definition of our synthesis that covers the decoupling 
and the re-description aspects of the law and religion debate in 
jurisprudence?  Yes, it does. The negative answer to the question as to 
whether religion qua religion requires special legal protection stands 
for abstraction from the religious dimension.  The abstraction theory 
entails that religion does not deserve special protection in law qua 
religion.  Religion receives only a special treatment through abstraction, 
meaning through the non-sectarian, protection-worthy categories that 
serve as proper liberal substitutes for the category of religion.  This is 
due to the egalitarian approach of religious freedom’s liberal theories 
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to theistic and non-theistic beliefs and the emphasis of these theories on 
neutrality toward any particular worldview.322 
Abstraction manifests itself by refusing to justify religious freedom 
through appeals to religious values, thus rejecting the toleration of 
religion qua religion.  Moreover, it also refuses to justify free exercise 
by appealing to a more general framework of values that are not theistic 
per se.  Even more, abstraction insists that justifications for religious 
exceptions, like for any other type of legal exception, need to be 
ecumenical.323 
As with ritual dietary restrictions, the liberal argument suggests 
exemptions are granted not because of any religious narrative, but 
because of the commitment to respect the human conscience equally.324  
The abstraction theory unveils that within the liberal paradigm of 
political philosophy, religious freedom is in fact a euphemism for 
abstraction from the religious dimension.  As such, abstraction is not 
about the empirical argument concerning the specialness of religion. 
Rather, abstraction covers the complete body of conceptual and 
normative arguments that either strongly (rejection) or less strongly 
(substitution, generalization, equation and representation) oppose to the 
empirical reality in liberal democracies that treats religion as special 
qua religion. 
However, the abstraction theory provides two ways to understand 
the law and religious scholarship within the paradigm of liberal political 
philosophy.  First, the metaphysics of religion are not considered 
special—this has a legal explanation.  The abstraction argument 
suggests that law always abstracts from a particular perspective toward 
a more general perspective.  Second, religion is not a special protection-
worthy category in law qua religion.  Liberal theories of religious 
freedom strongly oppose favoritism of religious beliefs and practices, 
and abstraction is an ideological tool to equalize beliefs and 
experiences. 
322.  Laborde, supra note 294, at 249 (for a discussion of the egalitarian theories 
of religious freedom).  There is also a legal explanation for the phenomenon of 
abstraction, however that is beyond the scope of this article.  
323. Ecumenical, here, is not in the religious meaning of the word, but rather
in the sense of being widely accessible to a broad public, and not because of the quality 
of people’s beliefs but simply because they are human beings who share certain 
important features, such as the conscience. 
324. Cf. MACLURE & TAYLOR, supra note 255, at 77.
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C. Abstraction and “Living Together”
Abstraction and “Living Together” directs our attention back to 
S.A.S., the recommendations of the EU Parliament, the “reconciliation 
strategy” and the reinforcement of majoritarianism.  Is the 
“reconciliation strategy” a paradigmatic expression of recent 
developments in legal theory and liberal political philosophy about 
religion’s role in justifying accommodation and decisions in law and 
politics?  In other words, does the abstraction theory help us to reconcile 
diversity with majoritarian sensitivities under critical scrutiny?  It does. 
The abstraction theory, with its emphasis on the use of religiously 
neutral or religion-empty language in discussions concerning the 
lawfulness of contentious religious manifestations helps us discuss the 
outcome of S.A.S. in light of the most recent theoretical developments 
in the field of liberal political philosophy.  On the one hand, presenting 
an extant religious manifestation (such as face-covering veils) as a 
matter of gender-equality, human dignity, and “living together” fits the 
non-sectarian approach of abstraction.  Indeed, the abstraction theory 
does not support any legal discussion of religious practices from a 
sectarian perspective, meaning an exclusively religious view.  In other 
words, the use of that language fits the tendency of “re-describing” 
extant religious manifestation in non-religious terms.  That is not 
problematic per se.  But the Travel Ban case has shown that such a 
facially neutral language does not help to vanish its history of animus 
toward Muslims.325 
Furthermore, reinforcing the argument that particular lifestyles are 
not welcome might pose a serious danger to the egalitarian defense of 
religious freedoms.  The abstraction theory has unveiled the notion that 
liberal theories of religious freedom strongly oppose favoring or 
disfavoring a particular lifestyle because of the specific narratives 
behind that lifestyle.326  Nevertheless, the empirical argument suggests 
something else. 
325. Matthew J. Lindsay, The Perpetual Invasion: Past as Prologue in
Constitutional Immigration Law, 23 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 369, 389 (2018) 
(on file with author) (rightly pointing out that Trump’s anti-Muslim rhetoric during 
the Presidential campaign, was more than a slip of the tongue). 
326. Cf. DWORKIN, supra note 30 at 130; Perry, supra note 64 (both arguing
that the state should not prescribe how people should live their lives). 
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Over the past few years, particularly over the last decade and in the 
aftermath of terrorist attacks that are linked to radicalized Islamic 
groups, a growing number of liberal democracies have developed 
monitoring policies that single out Muslims and Muslim organizations 
for special bans.327  The arguments used to defend these types of 
prohibitions are similar: defending the neutrality of the state, avoiding 
radicalization, and combatting life styles that are contrary to Western 
norms.  The latter objective challenges us to think about the 
compatibility of these special bans with the standards of liberal political 
philosophy that has shaped the contours of modern liberal democracies. 
Within this liberal paradigm of political thought, the state should refrain 
from favoring or disfavoring particular lifestyles.  As a result, the recent 
prohibitions targeting Muslims across liberal democracies for their 
norm deviant behavior violates the favored egalitarian understanding of 
religious freedom.  Hence, the endorsement of living together and the 
reinforcement of majoritarianism are both paradigmatic expressions of 
the shifts toward ethnocentrism that is little tolerant of non-mainstream 
ideas and practices. 
III. THE PRAGMATIC DEFENSE
The reinforcement of majoritarianism results in the creation of the 
“good religion,” which is adopted by the vast majority.  Subsequently, 
“bad religions” are outlawed by making diversity and religious plurality 
majoritarian-proof.  The outcome is the establishment of a “State’s 
Religion,” which clearly admires the category of good religions of the 
dominant majority.  These are basically religious practices and beliefs 
that fit the state’s agenda of how citizens should live their lives.  Hence, 
practices and beliefs that do not fall within the category of good 
327. See generally Khaled A. Beydoun, 9/11 and 11/9: The Law, Lives and Lies 
That Bind, 20 CUNY L. REV. 455 (2017) (on the anti-Muslim agenda of President 
Trump); Mark C. Rahdert, Exceptionalism Unbound: Appraising American 
Resistance to Foreign Law, 65 CATH. U. L. REV. 537, 558 (2016) (critical of singling 
out Sharia law qua Sharia for a special ban); Yaser Ali, Shariah and Citizenship—
How Islamophobia is Creating a Second-Class Citizenry in America, 100 CALIF. L.
REV. 1027 (2012) (on how anti-Muslim initiatives reinforce disparities); Jennifer 
Heider, Unveiling the Truth behind the French Burqa Ban: The Unwarranted 
Restriction of the Right to Freedom of Religion and the European Court of Human 
Rights, 22 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 93 (2012) (on file with author) (on the rise of 
Islamophobia and how this affects the fundamental rights of Muslims). 
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religions are banned, restricted, or labeled as “unwelcome.”  The 
question is: are we able to develop argumentation patterns that help us 
refrain from this dangerous path, while remaining aware of the security 
threats some beliefs pose to the core ideals of a liberal democracy?  Is 
it possible to rethink religious freedom in a way that is more “diversity-
friendly” and compatible with the egalitarian understating of this right 
that rejects religious toleration qua religious?  How can we develop 
argumentation patterns that would fit a broad sense of justice when we 
talk about religious freedom?  Reflecting on the implications potential 
bans would have on extant religious practices, internally and externally, 
is a helpful first exercise to develop the sort arguments needed to defend 
religious freedom beyond the sectarian justification of this right. 
A. The Anti-Alienation Argument
To explain this argument we need to think about a real threat to a 
particular religious manifestation.  The potential ban on ritual infant 
male circumcision (“MC”) is an appropriate example.  Although, this 
practice has not been outlawed yet, a few “exceptional judgments” 
mirror the growing public outcry across Western countries to stop MC. 
These decisions consider the current legal approach to MC as contrary 
to the child’s best interests.  The argument is that given the high health 
risks of MC, such as the risk of developing sexual and mental health 
problems, the non-therapeutic ritual circumcision of boys should be 
postponed until the child is of an age that he can competently consent 
to the procedure.328  The most outspoken court ruling embracing this 
line of reasoning is the 2012 German Cologne Landgericht ruling.329  A 
similar decision was reached a few years earlier in Finland,330 and in 
328. Peter W. Adler, Is Circumcision Legal?, 16 RICH. J. L. & PUB. INT. 439,
440-41 (2013).
329. The court ruled that parents’ right to religious freedom—in general—does
not justify MC, if the intervention is not medically required.  The child should have 
the opportunity to decide himself about the status of his foreskin.  See also Bijan 
Fateh-Moghadam, Criminalizing Male Circumcision, 13 GERMAN L.J. 1131 (2012). 
330. The Tampere District Court held that religious freedom does not justify
the violation of bodily integrity.  The court referred to the ban on female circumcision 
and argued that toleration of male circumcision would result in discrimination.  See 
generally Heli Askola, Cut-Off Point? Regulating Male Circumcision in Finland, 25 
INT’L J.L. POL’Y & FAM. 100 (2011). 
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Iceland a bill to completely ban ritual male circumcision was 
designed.331 
Reflecting on the implications of a potential ban on ritual male 
circumcision would have internally, we can argue that such a total ban 
would give Jews and Muslims the impression that they do not enjoy 
equal respect from authorities.  This argument finds support in scholarly 
works that have found how anti-Sharia legal initiatives in the United 
States, such as the “Save our State” Amendment, have put Muslim 
communities at risk of isolation and alienation.332  Therefore, liberal 
democracies need to encourage mutual understanding between different 
groups of citizens.  This “anti-alienation” argument helps maintain the 
legal status quo of ritual male circumcision, not because of its sectarian 
nature, but rather because a total ban on this practice could further 
alienate marginalized groups that attach great importance to ritual male 
circumcision.333 
331. Harriet Sherwood, Iceland law to outlaw male circumcision sparks row
over religious freedom, GUARDIAN (Feb. 18, 2018), 
https://www.theguardian.com/society/2018/feb/18/iceland-ban-male-circumcision-
first-european-country. 
332. Ali, supra note 327, at 1031.  See also Ross Johnson, A Monolithic Threat: 
The anti-Sharia Movement and America’s Counter-Subversive Tradition, 19 WASH.
& LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 183, 218 (2012). 
333. OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN 
RIGHTS, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON FREEDOM OF RELIGION AND 
BELIEF ON HIS MISSION TO DENMARK (2016).  Interestingly enough, the enormous and 
global sensitivity about a potential ban regarding male circumcision is completely 
absent in the area of female circumcision.  On the contrary, many countries around 
the globe have decided to eliminate this practice by either using standard laws banning 
assault and other types of physical harm or developing special bans on female 
circumcision.  See Renée Kool & Sohail Wahedi, European Models of Citizenship 
and the Fight against Female Genital Mutilation, in DEVELOPMENT AND THE 
POLITICS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 205-221 (Scott Nicholas Romaniuk & Marguerite 
Marlin Eds., 2015) (on file with author).  See also Saul Levmore, Can Wrinkles be 
Glamorous? in SAUL LEVMORE & MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, AGING THOUGHTFULLY:
CONVERSATIONS ABOUT RETIREMENT, ROMANCE, WRINKLES, AND REGRET 104-05 
(2017) (saying “the fact that so many thoughtful people find female but not male 
circumcision abhorrent, suggests that a critical difference is that one is practiced on a 
group that is, at least to Western eyes, seriously constrained and subjugated by a 
variety of practices.”); see generally Hope Lewis & Isabelle R. Gunning, Essay: 
Cleaning Our Own House: Exotic and Familial Human Rights Violations, 4 BUFF.
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 123 (1998).  On the presence of double standards in this context, 
see Obiajulu Nnamuchi, Hands off My Pudendum: A Critique of the Human Rights 
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B. The Wrong-Signal Argument
Next to the anti-alienation argument, we can also reflect on the 
external effects of a ban on ritual male circumcision.  The question is: 
what implications would a ban on ritual male circumcision have for the 
foreign policies of liberal democracies?  Such policies are, among other 
matters, concerned with the protection of the rights of non-believers, 
atheists, proselytes, and critics of religion in countries that lack 
fundamental rights, such as the freedoms of speech, conscience, and 
association.334  Notably, religious freedom is within the human rights 
discourse understood as the right to believe, to not believe, to change 
religion, and to be able to criticize religion.  Therefore, a complete ban 
on ritual male circumcision, which has also been practiced in countries 
that do not have a strong human rights record, would further complicate 
and narrow our possibilities when asking to direct attention to the rights 
of vulnerable groups around the globe.  In other words, such a policy 
would send the wrong signal about religion and related freedoms.335 
This “wrong signal” argument accepts that within liberal 
democracies, religious freedom has no intrinsic liberal value.  It 
understands this freedom as a religion-empty liberty that provides 
protection to a wide range of beliefs and practices, without making a 
distinction between the theistic and non-theistic beliefs people may 
have.  However, in line with the political commitment to draw attention 
to the human rights situation of vulnerable groups,336 in countries that 
lack religious freedom, we would benefit from this freedom to raise 
awareness about the deplorable human rights situation of vulnerable 
groups.  We need to draw attention to the insecurity threatening these 
Approach to Female Genital Ritual, 15 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L. J. 243, 253 (2011) 
(pointing out that a traditional practice like female circumcision is generally 
associated with harm and mutilation, while similar harsh language is absent from the 
discussion on cosmetic interventions upon female bodies). 
334. The European Union has even a Special Envoy, Ján Figel, former Slovak
diplomat, who promotes religious freedom as part of the European Union’s foreign 
policy.  See also Ján Figel, The European Union and Freedom of Religion or Belief: 
A New Momentum, 2017 BYU L. REV. 895 (2017). Cf. Jeremy Patrick, Religion and 
New Constitutions: Recent Trends of Harmony and Divergence, 44 MCGEORGE L. 
REV. 903 (2013). 
335. Cf. Yusuf, supra note 69, at 293.
336. Vulnerable groups, in this context, include: atheists, adherents of new
religions, and critics of religion. 
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vulnerable groups in countries that do not recognize the right to 
religious freedom.  Therefore, any serious restriction—such as a total 
ban on important religious practices like ritual male circumcision 
(relevant for many Muslims and Jews)—creates a complex situation for 
liberal democracies.337 
C. The Non-Sectarian Liberal Defense of Religious Liberty
Although the pragmatic arguments help us to oppose a complete 
ban on MC and a toleration regime for FC, they are not the similar to 
principled arguments that criticize the ban on face-covering dresses and 
the proposed closure of mosques by the EU Parliament.  Opposing 
restrictions on the latter category of religious manifestations draws on 
matters related to liberties of conscience, expression, and association. 
The theory of abstraction from the religious dimension, with its 
emphasis on the egalitarian and non-sectarian understanding of 
religious freedom, provides principled arguments to oppose measures 
that unfairly restrict ways of life that are not favored by the majority. 
Meaning, that the pragmatic defense of religious freedom based on the 
“anti-alienation” and “wrong signal” arguments is not principled in 
nature.  This defense does not convincingly debunk the liberal rejection 
(the “strong rejectionist response”) and substitution (the “soft 
rejectionist response”) criticism.  However, for the time being, it 
provides arguments that explain why we should be aware of imposing 
restrictions upon certain extant religious manifestations.  The case of 
ritual circumcision reveals that any total ban on ritual male 
circumcision would call for both internal and external resistance. 
Hence, the pragmatic arguments warn us for the implications of a ban 
internally and externally.  This reflection is a helpful exercise for 
developing a theory of religious freedom that endorses diversity for 
pragmatic reasons. 
337. We may also find support for this argument in Justice Kennedy’s
concurring opinion in Trump v. Hawaii 138 S. Ct. at 2424, “The First Amendment 
prohibits the establishment of religion and promises the free exercise of religion. 
From these safeguards, and from the guarantee of freedom of speech, it follows there 
is freedom of belief and expression.  It is an urgent necessity that officials adhere to 
these constitutional guarantees and mandates in all their actions, even in the sphere of 
foreign affairs.  An anxious world must know that our Government remains committed 
always to the liberties the Constitution seeks to preserve and protect, so that freedom 
extends outward, and lasts.” (emphasis added). 
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However, there is something very crucial about the relationship 
between abstraction and the non-sectarian liberal defense of religious 
liberty.  What we should clearly dispatch, is the idea that the theory of 
abstraction—with its talent to undo religious practices from a religious 
angle, is effectively an open invitation to disregard fundamental rights 
of people.  Denying them the right to manifest or even have their own 
beliefs, and declaring them and religious accommodation at war. 
Liberal political philosophy has a dichotomous relationship with 
religion.  On the one hand it contends that religion qua religion should 
not be singled out for a special, or favored, treatment in law.  Hence, no 
religious freedom simply because religion is special.  On the other hand, 
liberal political philosophy includes many arguments we could rely on 
to say that religion qua religion should not be singled out for a special 
disfavored treatment in law.338  This is because of the reasons liberal 
political philosophy generally gives to object a legal protection regime 
for religion qua religion. 
This rejection is laid down in an egalitarian approach to questions 
of accommodation.  However, egalitarianism in this context does not 
imply that religious people should be deprived from the right to 
manifest their beliefs.  Egalitarianism, in relation to religious 
accommodation, challenges the legal protection regime, asking if there 
is anything special about religion that warrants a special and favored 
treatment of religion qua religion.  Admittedly, it answers this question 
negatively.  But it provides via abstraction a wide range of grounds and 
substitutes on which the toleration regime for religious accommodation 
can continue.  It continues, not because it involves religion, but, for 
example, because of conscience and the high importance it attaches to 
the protection hereof.339 
338. Cf. the “inclusive non-accommodation” theory of religious freedom, as
discussed by Micah Schwartzman.  The inclusiveness of this theory is related to the 
public justification debate (on the “specialness” of religion for the purpose of 
justifying public decisions), implying that religion is not something special for the 
justification of legal and political decisions.  Thus, no limitation on adding religion to 
the body of categories that can be used by legal and political authorities to justify their 
decisions.  Similarly, religion is not special for the accommodation question: religions 
and non-religions should be treated equally by granting exemptions.  See 
Schwartzman, supra note 38, at 22. 
339. Wahedi, supra note 54.
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This egalitarian challenge to religious accommodation does not 
only help us critically revisit the protection regime for a wide range of 
religious practices.  It also helps us to dismantle and uncover double 
standards behind plans that target religion, either in an implicit way or 
a clear showing of animus toward religion.  Hence, the egalitarian 
perspective—with its focus on the non-sectarian substitutes of 
religion—helps us to challenge facially neutral grounds that effectively 
challenge the lawfulness of religious manifestations or target the 
adherents of a particular religion.340 
Since singling out religion qua religion for special legal protection 
is problematic, it is equally troublesome to single out religion qua 
religion for special prohibitions.  To put it differently, neither sectarian 
grounds nor grounds evincing animosity toward religion should be 
considered decisive for granting exemptions or issuing bans.  Both are 
equally objectionable.  This point can be illustrated in light of the 
problematic cases we have discussed in this article and by asking 
ourselves the following two questions.  First, does the action attest to 
singling out religion qua religion for a disfavored treatment?  Second, 
would we have been able to scrutinize this action in absence of religious 
freedom? 
Let’s begin with The Austrian “Islam bill.”  Does the ban for 
Islamic organizations and houses of worship on receiving foreign 
founding attest to singling out religion qua religion for a disfavored 
treatment?  It does.  Other religious groups do not face similar 
restrictions.  Hence, this may point to the presence of double standards 
in dealing with religious radicalization, the facially neutral ground the 
restriction rests on.  But, would we have been able to scrutinize this 
action in absence of religious freedom?  Yes.  The limitations it poses 
on the freedom of association and the opportunities to have equal access 
to, for example, crowdfunding actions, would help us argue that the 
Austrian bill is wrong, apart from the fact that it implies a double 
standard.  Both the substitution and the equation approach would help 
us at this point to challenge the legality of the Austrian “Islam bill.” 
Next, let’s review the French ban on face-covering dresses.  Does 
the French Prohibition Law attest to singling out religion qua religion 
for a disfavored treatment?  It does.  The notorious history of this ban 
340. See generally Sohail Wahedi, Muslims and the Myths in the Immigration
Politics of the United States, CAL. W. L. REV. (forthcoming). 
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contains many indications revealing this ban was initiated as a response 
to Islamic manifestations in public.341  The exceptions it contains, for 
example, for those who cover their faces to participate in traditional and 
artistic events, reinforce the suspicion that the ban effectively singled 
out an Islamic practice qua Islamic.  Would we in any way have been 
able to scrutinize this action in absence of religious freedom?  Yes.  We 
would have approached this ban, for example, as contradictory to 
freedom of conscience, as the women who cover their faces are 
deprived from the right to live in accordance with their deepest 
convictions, without posing serious harm to other people or the society 
as a whole.  Hence, the substitution approach to religion and the 
generalization approach to religious freedom, rethink this right as the 
right to ethical independence and helps us to put the ban under critical 
scrutiny. 
Our next illustration is the Travel Ban of President Trump.  Does 
the enactment of travel restrictions for people coming from Muslim 
majority countries attest to singling out religion qua religion for a 
disfavored treatment?  It does.  The issuance of the Travel Ban 
incarnated the promise of Republican Party’s Candidate Trump to close 
all the U.S. borders to Muslims.342  But, would we have been able to 
scrutinize this action in absence of religious freedom?  Yes.  The Travel 
Ban—lacking a profound justification for the choice of targeted 
nations—is an obvious example of discrimination based on nationality. 
Furthermore, the fact that the Ban mainly targets Muslims—or people 
coming from Muslim majority countries—makes it possible to posit 
that it is clearly against the freedom of expression, as it hinders people 
to pursue their path of beliefs.  The equation and the substitution 
approaches would help us to further challenge the Travel Ban in 
absence of religious freedom. 
We can add the Save our State debacle in the state of Oklahoma, 
singling out the Sharia law for a special ban to the list of examples 
discussed.  And we can even revisit the legality of ritual male 
341. Adrien Katherine Wing & Monica Nigh Smith, Critical Race Feminism
Lifts the Veil: Muslim Women, France, and the Headscarf Ban, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
743, 746 (2006) (saying that the bans in this area were meant to target the Islamic 
appearance in public qua Islamic for a disfavored treatment). 
342. Cf. Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, National Security, Immigration and the
Muslim Bans, 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1475, 1501 (2018) (arguing that the issued 
travel bans effectively incarnate Donald Trump’s promise of issuing a Muslim ban).  
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circumcision—although this illustration would ask a much deeper 
discussion.  On the one hand, we may rely on the non-sectarian 
argument that parents should have the autonomy to raise their child in 
accordance with their convictions.  But does this mean that we should 
similarly create exemptions for those types of female circumcision that 
are comparable to male circumcision?  And does autonomy allow to 
irreversibly alter the body of your own child, even if there is no medical 
support for that alteration?  That is very questionable—but our brief 
analysis is large enough to conclude that facially neutral arguments do 
not cleanse legislative steps from obvious animus towards religion. 
Furthermore, our brief analysis has shown us what we could have 
done in all these cases in absence of religious freedom.  In other words, 
do we lose anything if we would delete religious freedom from the 
constitution?  Apart from the pragmatic arguments we have provided at 
the beginning of this section, we contend that we do not lose anything. 
The paradigm of liberal political philosophy contains enough 
arguments to oppose any mistreatment of religious people qua 
religious.  Hence, the abstraction knife cuts on two sides: it is a helpful 
strategy to repackage and undo religious practices from their religious 
dimension, but it is never as such a justificatory strategy for obvious 
discrimination, religious intolerance, and spread of hatred toward 
unpopular religious groups or religions. 
CONCLUSION 
This article has reflected on the reconciliation of diversity with 
majoritarian sensitivities as present in the Travel Ban of President 
Trump, the Save our State initiative from Oklahoma, and the religious 
freedom jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights.  The 
European Court of Human Rights has “notoriously been lenient toward 
practices of Christian establishment and overtly intolerant toward the 
presence of Islam in the public sphere.”343  Reconciliation of diversity 
questions with majoritarian sensitives effectively reinforces 
majoritarianism and advances a political agenda that is not tolerant of 
the practices of religious minorities.  This development violates the 
advocated egalitarian understanding of religious freedom.  To face the 
challenge at this point, this article has developed two novel pragmatic 
343. LABORDE, supra note 39, at 33.
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arguments in favor of religious freedom.  These arguments are not 
principled in nature.  However, for the time being, they provide very 
strong arguments to reflect critically upon the internal and external 
implications of a potential ban on extant religious manifestations of 
religious minorities.  This is a temporary defense of religious freedom 
rooted in grounds that are non-sectarian, non-majoritarian, and non-
violent to the advocated egalitarian conception of religious freedom.  In 
addition to the development of this pragmatic framework this article has 
set out why even in absence of the right to religious freedom, religious 
people and their practices warrant protection, that is because these cases 
involve matters of conscience, association, and expression.344 
The dichotomous relationship of liberal political philosophy with 
religion does not support a disfavored treatment of either singling 
people or their religion out for special prohibitions and restrictions. 
Ultimately, this helps us “hold the coordinate branches to account when 
they defy our most sacred legal commitments.”345 
344. Cf. LEITER, supra note 56, at 64.
345. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2448 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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Today, the explicit use of anti-immigration rhetoric has become 
common among a significant portion of the American political 
establishment. With the 2016 election of President Trump came a tougher 
attitude toward immigration and immigrants.  Subsequently, the 2018 
midterm elections revealed an increase in “Islamophobic” rhetoric among 
political campaigners. This article focuses on the challenges faced by one 
group—the Muslim community. Specifically, this article aims to shed
light on the ways in which the contemporary anti-immigration 
atmosphere has targeted American Muslims. In doing so, this article 
analyzes recent public decisions that have both burdened Muslims and 
negatively affected their civil liberties. Drawing on these recent decisions, 
this article proposes a strategy to overcome the contemporary era of fear, 
anxiety, and intolerance toward newcomers—specifically those with an
Islamic background. 
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  MUSLIMS AND THE MYTHS 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 The American Dream of “a land in which life should be better and 
richer and fuller for every man, with opportunity for each according to 
his ability or achievement,”1 is a fruitful source of inspiration for many 
American societal groups in the fight for equality.2 The American Dream 
of a better life for everyone, everywhere in the United States, is endorsed 
by the Declaration of Independence, which states clearly that “all men 
are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain 
unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit 
 
† PhD Candidate, Erasmus School of Law, L.L.B., 2012 and L.L.M., 2015 Utrecht 
University, the Netherlands. Writing fellow, International Center for Law and Religion Studies’ inaugural Oxford Program, “Religion and the Rule of Law,” University of Oxford 
(Jul.-Aug. 2018). Visiting fellow Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto (Apr. 
2018). Deputy Court Clerk, Rotterdam District Court (2012-2015). Intern, Embassy of the 
Kingdom of the Netherlands in Tel Aviv, Israel (Jul.-Dec. 2011). Research for this article is 
made possible by the Erasmus School of Law Innovation Programme Research, Erasmus 
Trustfonds and the International Center for Law and Religion Studies at Brigham Young 
University. The main argument of this article on singling out the Islamic faith for special bans was discussed in San Diego (“Border Myths” Symposium 2019, March 9, 2019); Bologna (“European Academy of Religion” Annual Conference 2019, March 4, 2019); Prague 
(“State Responses to Security Threats and Religious Diversity” Conference, Nov. 26-28, 2018) and Rio de Janeiro (the Fifth ICLARS Conference, “Living Together in Diversity: Strategies from Law and Religion,” Pontifical Catholic University, Sept. 12-14, 2018). I am 
grateful to the participants of those events for their feedback. Also, many thanks for the 
outstanding editorial support I have received from the people at the California Western 
Law Review. I am especially grateful to Katherine Norton, Samantha Sneen, Janna Ferraro 
and Meagan Stevens. Errors remain mine. Feedback, comments and criticism could be sent 
directly to wahedi@law.eur.nl 
1. JAMES TRUSLOW ADAMS, THE EPIC OF AMERICA 404 (1931). See also Geoffrey D. Korff, 
Reviving the Forgotten American Dream, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 417, 427 (2008) (quoting 
Adams and arguing that the classic work-hard-play-hard conception of the American 
Dream with the aim of achieving a higher level of welfare has made room for a thicker 
conception. The modern version of the American Dream includes other themes that are 
relevant to human flourishing. Korff mentions in this respect education, employment opportunities, healthcare, a reliable retirement system and “a general sense of social mobility.”).  
2. Although a shift has taken place in the way people have defined the American Dream 
concept through the history, today, the bottom line is an egalitarian approach: equal 
opportunities for all citizens, regardless their racial or economic background. Cf. Andrea J. 
Boyack, A New American Dream for Detroit, 93 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 573, 574 (2016); 
Katherine M. Vail, Saving the American Dream: The Legalization of the Tiny House 
Movement, 54 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 357, 379 (2016) (arguing that the American Dream 
rests on an idea of creating equal opportunities for all); Paul D. Carrington, Financing the 
American Dream: Equality and School Taxes, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1227 (1973) (claiming that “the right to equal educational opportunity is the American Dream incarnate as constitutional law.”). See for an official endorsement of this egalitarian conception of the 
American Dream: George Bush, Exporting the American Dream, 17 HUM. RTS. 18 (1990) (defending the export of the “American Dream” to new democracies and arguing that 
equality is the most important principle in law that should be guaranteed and protected strongly. That is a democracy “that supports a strict equality of rights: one that guarantees 
all men and women-whatever their race or ancestry-stand equal before the law.”).  
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of Happiness.”3 This powerful and timeless promise of equality and 
welfare inspired great advocates of civil rights and civil liberties, such as 
Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. In what he revealed as “a dream deeply 
rooted in the American dream,” Dr. King scrutinized the presence of 
obvious inequalities in the American society and urged the nation to stop 
racial discrimination.4 He dreamed of a land where people would “not be 
judged by the color of their skin but by the content of their character.”5 
He dreamed of true fulfillment of the promise “that all men are created 
equal.”6 With his renowned “I Have a Dream” speech, Dr. King created 
awareness of parallel societies in the United States where people did not 
live together, but rather were separated from one another. He warned 
against the devastating effects of segregation, discrimination, and 
hatred.7 Dr. King described a nightmare in which many people lived at 
that time, and declared his unambiguous ambition to end this nightmare 
for those who faced hatred and discrimination instead of opportunities 
and freedoms.8  
The resounding message behind Dr. King’s speech was that the 
American Dream was a far destination for many American citizens to 
reach.9 His concerns about the inaccessibility of the American Dream 
have urged politicians and legal scholars to consider concrete steps to 
preserve this ideal.10  
 
3. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776); See also JIM CULLEN, THE 
AMERICAN DREAM 38 (2003) (arguing that the second paragraph of the Declaration of Independence is the “key” to this important document as it “underwrites” the American 
Dream). See also Darrell A.H. Miller, Continuity and the Declaration of Independence, 89 
S. CAL. L. REV. 601, 605 (2016) (critically analyzing the language used in the Declaration 
and explaining why so many judges, politicians and civil rights activists have drawn on this 
document to develop their arguments). 
4. Martin Luther King, Jr., “I have a Dream …” Speech at the “March on Washington” (Aug. 
28, 1963), transcript, available at https://www.archives.gov/files/press/exhibits/dream-
speech.pdf (last visited Feb. 15, 2019) (referring to the equality promise of the Declaration 
of Independence and criticizing the lack of opportunities for non-white people to flourish in 
life due to the obvious presence of racial discrimination).   
5. Id.  
6. Id.  
7. See also Katharine Klebes, The Limited Provision of Mental Health Services at 
Community Colleges: Obstacles, Initiatives, and Opportunities for Change, 19 QUINNIPIAC 
HEALTH L. J. 315, 322 (2017) (referring to a recent study that shows how racism hinders the 
true social integration of students with an immigrant background at university campuses).  
8. Cf. Kevin Brown, Hopwood: Was this the African-American Nightmare or the African-
American Dream, 2 TEX. F. ON C.L. & C.R. 97, 102 (1996) (providing an overview of cases 
that have challenged the legality of segregation and defending a skeptical approach about 
the elimination of racial discrimination in the future). See also Kevin Brown, End of the 
Racial Age: Reflections on the Changing Racial and Ethnic Ancestry of Blacks on 
Affirmative Action, 22 TEX. J. ON C. L. & C. R. 139 (2017). 
9. Cf. Monroe H. Little, Jr., More than a Dreamer: Remembering Dr. Martin Luther King, 
Jr., 41 IND. L. REV. 523, 529 (2008) (paying attention to the achievements of Martin Luther 
King, Jr., arguing that King was more than the main voice of civil rights protests).  
10. David B. Oppenheimer, Dr. King’s Dream of Affirmative Action, 21 HARV. LATINX L. 
REV. 55 (2018) (arguing that the work of Dr. King is still valuable to fight inequalities 
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Recent history reminds us that institutional support of inequality 
reinforces the emergence of parallel societies. Within these divisions, 
only a few people can benefit from opportunities to flourish, while others 
suffer from stagnation and deprivation of basic liberties.11 Therefore, the 
idea that all people should have equal opportunities to realize the 
American Dream is often echoed in initiatives propagated by legal 
scholars, or enacted by law after extensive political debates.12 However, 
despite the many initiatives geared toward creating equal opportunities, 
the American Dream is still difficult to realize for many groups in 
American society.13 Even the historic victory of Barack Obama in the 
2008 and 2012 presidential elections, and the recent elections of two 
Muslim women with immigrant backgrounds to Congress, do not erase 
the palpable presence of racial discrimination in the United States.14  
Studies have reaffirmed the presence of ethnic and racial 
discrimination in aspects of life considered crucial for the realization of 
the American Dream.15 Such discrimination exists in the job market,16 
access to financial instruments,17 housing,18 education, and many other 
 
related to race and class). See also Trina Jones, Occupying America: Dr. Martin Luther 
King, Jr., the American Dream, and the Challenge of Socio-Economic Inequality, 57 VILL. 
L. REV. 339, 342 (2012). 
11. Cf. Khaled A. Beydoun, Why Ferguson Is Our Issue: A Letter to Muslim America, 31 
HARV. J.RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST. 1 (2015). 
12. These steps are mainly set in the field of housing, health care, education, job market 
and political freedoms and are meant to provide all people—regardless of their race, color, 
class, religion, origin or sexual orientation—access to the basic needs that enable them to 
flourish in the American society. However, the changes in these areas should not be 
overstated. See Damon J. Keith, What Happens to a Dream Deferred: An Assessment of Civil 
Rights Law Twenty Years after the 1963 March on Washington, 19 HARV. C. R.-C. L. L. REV. 
469 (1984) (quite rightly expressing the expectation that the struggle for equality is not over, rather “the gains made in the legal arena over the past . . . decades form only a skeletal foundation for the monumental changes that must take place”).  
13. See generally Russell K. Robinson, Unequal Protection, 68 STAN. L. REV. 151 (2016) 
(criticizing the lack of equal protection in the case law of the Supreme Court).  
14. Alex M. Johnson, Jr., What the Tea Party Movement Means for Contemporary Race 
Relations: A Historical and Contextual Analysis, 7 GEO. J. L. & MOD. CRITICAL RACE PERSP. 
201, 202 (2015) (pointing out that racism “remains endemic in American society,” and 
saying that the fact that some members of minority groups have been successful does not 
say much about equal opportunities for all). See also Reginald Oh, Regulating White Desire, 
2007 WIS. L. REV. 463 (2007). 
15. Eric K. Yamamoto, Sandra Hye Yun Kim & Abigail M. Holden, American Reparations 
Theory and Practice at the Crossroads, 44 CAL. W. L. REV. 1, 7-8 (2007) (arguing that the 
struggle for more equality will continue because “the economic and psychological wounds 
of slavery and segregation persist in the form of well-documented discrimination”).   
16. Cf. Kevin Woodson, Derivative Racial Discrimination, 12 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 335, 386 (2016) (introducing “derivative racial discrimination” as a form of “institutional 
discrimination that disadvantages black workers derivatively” due to socio-cultural 
differences). 
17. See Andrea Freeman, Racism in the Credit Card Industry, 95 N.C. L. REV. 1071 (2017) 
(reporting about the prevalence of racism and discrimination in the financial world). 
18. See generally Alexander Polikoff, Racial Inequality and the Black Ghetto, 1 NW. J. L. & 
SOC. POL’Y 1 (2006); David R. James, The Racial Ghetto as a Race-making Situation: The 
Effects of Residential Segregation on Racial Inequalities and Racial Identity, 19 LAW & SOC. 
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areas.19 In light of these findings, some scholars have suggested the era 
of civil liberties is waning.20 This sad and alarming conclusion is not a 
new revelation.21 Rather, it is a renewed reminder of the complexity 
involved in shaping the right conditions to provide all people equal 
opportunities to flourish in life.22  
This lasting reminder illustrates the fragility and vulnerability of 
the victories achieved in the field of civil liberties.23 However, it does not 
 
INQUIRY 407 (1994); Karl Taeuber, The Contemporary Context of Housing Discrimination, 
6 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 339 (1988) (on the presence of racial discrimination in the context 
of housing and real estate). 
19. Cf. Jason P. Nance, Student Surveillance, Racial Inequalities, and Implicit Racial Bias, 
66 EMORY L.J. 765 (2017) (finding that schools with an overrepresentation of racially-
diverse students tend to be stricter on developing safety measures, while there is no 
empirical evidence in favor of this approach). See also Angela Onwuachi-Willig, 
Complimentary Discrimination and Complementary Discrimination in Faculty Hiring, 87 
WASH. U. L. REV. 763 (2010) (identifying a “unique” form of racial discrimination in the 
hiring system of universities). 
20. This position has been defended explicitly in the aftermath of the 2013 Supreme Court’s 
decision in Shelby v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013) (outlawing the “coverage-formula” of the 
Voting Rights Act of 1965, which was designed to guarantee equal voting rights). See 
generally REBEKAH HERRICK, MINORITIES AND REPRESENTATION IN AMERICAN POLITICS 
(2017). See also Guy-Uriel E. Charles & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, The Voting Rights Act in 
Winter: The Death of a Superstatue, 100 IOWA L. REV. 1389, 1391 (2015) (arguing that the 
unambiguous message behind Shelby is that the era of civil rights is over); Seth Davis, 
Equal Sovereignty as a Right against a Remedy, 76 La. L. Rev. 83, 118 (2015) (calling the 
decision in Shelby “not nuanced”); Ilya Shapiro, Shelby County and the Vindication of 
Martin Luther King’s Dream, 8 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 182 (2013) (criticizing the critics of 
Shelby and arguing that this judgment reaffirms that “widespread, official racial discrimination in voting has disappeared.”). 
21. Cf. Mario L. Barnes, The More Things Change: New Moves for Legitimizing Racial 
Discrimination in a Post-Race World, 100 MINN. L. REV. 2043, 2096 (2016) (providing an 
in-depth analysis of decisions reached by the Supreme Court in employment, education and 
voting rights cases that touch upon the theme of racial discrimination and claiming that the Court’s rejectionist approach toward the “realness of race” has obviously resulted in the current situation, in which “the Court avoids interrogating larger concerns such as 
structural racism and white supremacy.”). See also the dissenting opinion of Justice 
Sotomayor in Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, 572 U.S. 291 (2014) (Sotomayor believes that race still matters “because of persistent racial inequality in society”). 
22. Deborah Hellman, Two Concepts of Discrimination, 102 VA. L. REV. 895, 906 (2016) (pointing to a serious challenge caused by affirmative actions: “these policies express that 
blacks are inferior to whites. Why is that problematic? It is problematic because one way to fail to treat people as equals is to express that they are not, in fact, equals.”). See also Anita 
Christina Butera, Assimilation, Pluralism and Multiculturalism: The Policy of 
Racial/Ethnic Identity in America, 7 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 8 (2001) (highlighting the 
main constraints of various models of citizenship in dealing properly with racism and 
discrimination).  
23. Cf. Paul Finkelman, The Necessity of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and the Difficulty of 
Overcoming Almost a Century of Voting Discrimination, 76 LA. L. REV. 181, 185 (2015) 
(arguing that although the Voting Rights Acts of 1965 has improved political participation of black population, “there are still large disparities between the actual population of 
African Americans in the South and the actual representation in southern legislatures and 
in Congress. In part, this is a result of residual white hostility to black political participation”). See also Anthony J. Gaughan, Has the South Changed? Shelby County and 
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herald the end of the civil rights era.24 Rather, this illustration prompts 
us to be cautious.25 The key questions are: how can we pursue the 
courageous path set out in Brown v. Board of Education,26 and how can 
we avoid a revitalization of Plessy v. Ferguson in the future?27 Put 
differently, how can we halt the “insidious and pervasive evil” that is 
racial discrimination?28 These are fundamental questions in an era 
where, unfortunately, race is a decisive factor in the continuation of 
obvious disparities between groups of people.29 We must keep our eyes 
open and remain alert to developments that jeopardize the equality many 
have fought for over recent decades.30  
Admittedly, we have few reasons to be pessimistic about the 
scholarly efforts that have highlighted “the stark reality that race 
matters” in relation to opportunities that help people improve their 
lives.31 Yet, we do have reason to be worried, in general, about the rise of 
intolerance toward newcomers and citizens with immigrant backgrounds 
or ethnic appearances. In particular, there is cause for concern regarding 
 
the Expansion of the Voter ID Battlefield, 19 TEX. J. ON C. L. & C. R. 109, 112 (2013) 
(expecting that Shelby will “retreat” historical achievements).  
24. See Kevin R. Johnson, The End of Civil Rights as We Know It: Immigration and Civil 
Rights in the New Millennium, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1481, 1484 (2002) (arguing that 
immigration will introduce all kinds of new civil rights disputes). 
25. Michael Selmi, Understanding Discrimination in a Post-Racial World, 32 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 833, 855 (2011) (providing a clear analysis of the steps that are necessary for the 
purpose of reaching an era in which racial discrimination is practically vanished from all 
important aspects of life). 
26. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (ruling that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits racial 
discrimination at public schools). See also Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education 
and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 524 (1980) (arguing that the 
outcome in Brown was probably the home version of the freedom and equality message 
spread by the United States during the second world war).  
27. 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (ruling that separate but equal public education for different racial 
groups was not at odds with the Fourteenth Amendment and allowing effectively the 
continuation of racial segregation at public school).  
28. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966) (ruling on the constitutionality of 
the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and terming racial discrimination in the exercise of voting rights an “evil”). 
29. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that “the 
effects of centuries of law-sanctioned inequality remain painfully evident in our” society 
and referring to the presence of racial discrimination in the job market, education and the 
health sector). 
30. Richard R. W. Brooks, The Banality of Racial Inequality, 124 YALE L. J. 2626, 2662 
(2015) (quoting Justice Sotomayor who wrote in her dissenting opinion in Schuette that race 
is still relevant because many people suffer from racial discrimination in their daily life. To 
stop this unfortunate situation—Brook quotes again Justice Sotomayor at this point—we 
need to apply the Constitution in a way that shows awareness of the long history of racial 
discrimination).  
31. 572 U.S. 291 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). See also Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal 
Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 748 (2011) (providing an in-depth analysis of the shift in the equal protection jurisprudence, saying that the “end of traditional equality 
jurisprudence . . . should not be conflated with the end of protection for subordinated groups.”).  
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the emergence and political advancement of Islamophobia.32 Nearly sixty 
years after Dr. King delivered his famous speech, we must again be 
concerned with the inaccessibility of the American Dream and the tragic 
re-emergence of a “system of racial caste.”33 Our main concern should be 
halting the reinforcement of segregation that will inevitably increase 
fundamental disparities between groups of people. The best solution to 
this problem lies within the law and politics relating to immigration.34  
A brief analysis of modern immigration law reveals that many 
stereotypes have been used to justify restrictions with far-reaching 
consequences upon civil rights. The travel bans instituted by President 
Trump, popularly known as the Muslim travel bans,35 are timely 
examples of regulations that rest strongly on anti-Muslim stereotypes 
and anti-immigration rhetoric.36 Similarly, Oklahoma’s Save Our State 
Amendment prohibited courts from using Islamic Sharia law or 
international law, and therefore targeted immigrants with Islamic 
backgrounds in particular.37 This initiative rested on the same anti-
Muslim narratives and stereotypes as the recent travel bans. 
 
32. Cf. David S. Rubenstein, Taking Care of the Rule of Law, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 168, 210 (2018) (critically discussing some of President Trump’s major anti-immigration 
projects). 
33. Adarand Constructors v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). See also 
Frank S. Ravitch, Creating Chaos in the Name of Consistency: Affirmative Action and the 
Odd Legacy of Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 101 DICK. L. REV. 281 (1997). 
34. Cf. Geoffrey Heeren, Illegal Aid: Legal Assistance to Immigrants in the United States, 
33 CARDOZO L. REV. 619, 662 (2011); Saby Ghoshray, Is There a Human-Rights Dimension 
to Immigration? Seeking Clarity through the Prism of Morality and Human Survival, 84 
DENV. U. L. REV. 1151, 1168 (2007) (both analyzing the law, politics and jurisprudence of 
immigration). 
35. Exec. Order No. 13,769, 82 FR 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017) (Exec. Order 13,769); Exec. Order 
No. 13,780, 82 FR 13209 (Mar. 6, 2017) (Exec. Order 13,780), both titled Protecting the 
Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States; Proclamation No. 9645 82 Fed. 
Reg. 45,161 (Sept. 24, 2017), titled Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for 
Detecting Attempted Entry Into the United States by Terrorists or Other Public-Safety 
Threats (Proclamation 9723). 
36. Khaled A. Beydoun, Muslim Bans and the (Re)Making of Political Islamophobia, 2017 
U. ILL. L. REV. 1733, 1735 (2017) (arguing that the Muslim ban fits a long tradition of 
Islamophobia that has always been present in the American law and politics of 
immigration); Ved P. Nanda, Migrants and Refugees Are Routinely Denied the Protection of 
International Human Rights: What Does the Future Hold?, 45 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 
303, 315 (2017) (arguing that the travel ban incarnates anti-immigration rhetoric of 
President Trump). See also Adrienne Rodriguez, A Cry for Change: The Fallacy of the 
American Dream for K-4 Children, 16 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 399, 422 (2017) (relating the 
tougher attitude toward immigration to the election of President Trump). 
37. Yaser Ali, Shariah and Citizenship—How Islamophobia is Creating a Second-Class 
Citizenry in America, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 1027 (2012) (exploring on the roots of the Save Our 
State Amendment and arguing that this legal initiative fits the tendency of Islamophobia, 
which reinforces racism toward Arab Americans). See generally on the uselessness of anti-
Sharia legislation: Lee Ann Bambach, Save us from Save Our State: Anti-Sharia Legislative 
Efforts across the United States and Their Impact, 13 J. ISLAMIC L. & CULTURE 72 (2011) 
(warning against the negative effects of anti-Sharia legislation upon businesses, arguing 
that State and Federal law provide enough remedies against alleged human rights 
violations under Sharia law). 
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What can we say about the contemporary tenor of politics 
surrounding immigration, immigrants, and non-white citizens generally? 
How shall we appraise, for example, an incident that took place not so 
long ago in Washington D.C.? A group of teenagers, equipped with “Make 
America Great Again” apparel, were caught in an altercation with 
Nathan Phillips, a Native American activist and Omaha tribe elder. The 
teenagers allegedly chanted “build the wall!”38—a reference to President 
Trump’s plan to build a wall physically separating the United States from 
Mexico.39  
How can we rationalize accusations of disloyalty against politicians 
with immigrant backgrounds?40 Take, for example, Rashida Tlaib, who is 
among the first ever Muslims in Congress and one of only two Muslim 
women ever elected to the House of Representatives. She has been 
considered, by some, to be a potential danger because of her Islamic and 
Palestinian background. One Florida city commissioner went so far as to 
accuse Representative Tlaib “of being a ‘danger’ who might ‘blow up’ the 
U.S. Capitol.”41 Similar accusations have been raised against Republican 
 
38. This is a contentious example since there is no video-recorded evidence of pupils shouting “build the wall!” See David Williams & Emanuella Grinberg, Teen in confrontation 
with Native American elder says he was trying to defuse the situation, CNN (Jan. 23, 2019), 
https://edition.cnn.com/2019/01/19/us/teens-mock-native-elder-trnd/index.html (last 
visited Feb. 15, 2019). The reference might also be contentious as “Make America Again” hats are a hype among teens “to signify you’re on a “winning” team.” See Rebecca Jennings, 
It isn’t just the Covington Catholic students—MAGA hats are a teen trend, VOX (Jan. 22, 
2019), https://www.vox.com/the-goods/2019/1/22/18192933/covington-catholic-maga-teen-
nick-sandmann-hat (last visited Feb. 15, 2019) (noting that although the hats might be a 
teen hype, there are reports revealing how students wearing such hats have harassed their 
fellow students with an immigrant or non-white background).  
39. Referring to the Washington D.C. incident might be contentious, however it is valuable 
for the argument this article will develop about the rise of using hostile rhetoric in the 
politics to talk about immigration and people with an immigrant background. In this respect, “Make America Great Again” is a clear sign of support for President Trump who 
was elected after running a campaign full of rhetoric against immigration and people with 
an immigrant background. See Lindsay Pérez Huber, Make America Great again: Donald 
Trump, Racist Nativism and the Virulent Adherence to White Supremecy Amid U.S. 
Demographic Change, 10 CHARLESTON L. REV. 215, 224 (2016). 
40. Most notably against former President Obama who has been “accused” of being secretly 
a Muslim ruling the United States. See Jared A. Goldstein, The Tea Party Movement and 
the Perils of Popular Originalism, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 827, 848 (2011) (saying that Obama was 
accused of being born outside the United States, and having a hidden faith: the Islam). 
41. See Holly Rosenkrantz, Florida official says U.S. Rep. Rashida Tlaib may “blow up” 
Capitol, CBS NEWS (Jan. 24, 2019), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/florida-official-says-
rep-rashida-tlaib-may-blow-up-the-capitol/ (last visited Feb. 15, 2019) (quoting Anabelle 
Lima-Taub, a Florida official, who has called Rashida Tlaib a “Hamas-loving anti-Semite . . . [who] would not put it past her to become a martyr and blow up Capitol Hill.”). Similar 
accusations have been raised against the other Muslim representative Ilhan Omar. See 
Katie Mettler, ‘Just deal,’ Muslim lawmaker Ilhan Omar says to Pastor who complained 
about hijabs on House floor, WASH. POST (Dec. 7, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/religion/2018/12/07/just-deal-muslim-lawmaker-ilhan-
omar-says-pastor-who-complained-about-hijabs-house-floor/?utm_term=.cf94512b35c8 
(last visited Feb. 15, 2019) (quoting the critics to the allowance of headscarves in the House 
of Representatives). 
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Shahid Shafi, elected Southlake City Council member and vice chairman 
of the Tarrant County Republican Party in Texas. His Muslim 
background has been used to portray him as an unreliable person. In a 
special rally, the Tarrant Republicans asked the party, in vain, to remove 
Sahid Shafi from his political post. As a practicing Muslim, the Tarrant 
Republicans reasoned Shafi would not be able to represent the Party, 
since “not [all] Republicans . . . think Islam is safe or acceptable in the 
U.S., in Tarrant County, and in the [Republican Party].”42 
Does the language used today to talk about immigration and those 
with immigrant backgrounds or non-white appearances indicate that we 
have entered an entirely new era? No. Immigration has always been a 
subject of political debate in the United States.43 Are the measures that 
target some religious groups for special bans and restrictions unique in 
their sort? Not really. In the past, some immigrants were expelled from 
the colonies by powerful settlers because of their “heretic” views. More 
generally, some colonies were “not open” to Baptists, Jews, and Quakers. 
And, until very recently, Catholics in the United States suffered from 
widespread feelings of animosity and prejudice dating back from the Irish 
migration wave during the nineteenth century.44  
Can we say that actual or propagated bans that single out the 
Islamic faith qua Islamic faith for special prohibitions and restrictions—
such as those targeting Muslims qua Muslims—add an entirely new 
perspective to the debate about the law and politics of immigration in the 
United States? Even this is not the case. For decades, immigrants from 
predominantly Muslim nations, including non-Muslim immigrants such 
as Christians, were deprived the right to become full citizens of the 
United States.45 In the years following the 2001 terrorist attacks, racial 
 
42. Adeel Hassan, Texas Republicans Rally Behind Muslim Official as Some Try to Oust 
Him Over Religion, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 10, 0219), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/10/us/muslim-republican-shahid-shafi-texas.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2019) (quoting Dorrie O’Brien). 
43. Cf. Pooja R. Dadhania, Deporting Undesirable Women, 9 UC IRVINE L. REV. 53 (2018). 
See also Kevin R. Johnson, Immigration and Civil Rights in the Trump Administration: 
Law and Policy Making by Executive Order, 57 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 611 (2017) (arguing 
that history contains many examples of anti-immigration policies); Amanda Frost, 
Independence and Immigration, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 485 (2016) (analyzing immigration law 
from a historical perspective); David B. Oppenheimer, Swati Prakash & Rachel Burns, 
Playing the Trump Card: The Enduring Legacy of Racism in Immigration Law, 26 
BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 1, 6 (2016) (providing a historical overview of immigration policies); 
Jill E. Family, The Future Relief of Immigration Law, 9 DREXEL L. REV. 393, 395 (2017) 
(discussing the future of deportation law and paying attention to the history of this debate, 
revealing that immigration has always been part of the political debate). See also Martha 
C. Nussbaum, Lockean Neutrality versus Religious Accommodation, 11 DARTMOUTH L.J. 1 
(2013) (pointing to the accommodation challenge faced by colonists and caused by 
migrants). 
44. MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, THE NEW RELIGIOUS INTOLERANCE 7 (2012). 
45. Beydoun, supra note 36, at 1735. See for a thorough analysis of this form of racial 
discrimination: Khaled A. Beydoun, Between Muslim and White: The Legal Construction of 
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profiling, discrimination, and hatred have been major issues for those 
with immigrant backgrounds in the United States.46 This group includes 
not only Muslims, but others whose appearances are similar to adherents 
of the Islamic faith,47 including those with headscarves or turbans, 
beards, non-Hispanic brown complexions, and Middle-Eastern 
postures.48  
Our brief analysis of the law and politics surrounding immigration 
reveals that neither the strong language used in connection with 
immigrants, nor the policies related to immigration, indicate that we 
have entered a new anti-immigration era. In both cases, stereotypes 
appear to be persistently present, governing the tone of the debate as well 
as the seriousness of the interventions designed to regulate 
immigration.49 These persistent stereotypes have generated serious 
concern regarding undocumented immigrants, illegal border crossings, 
and national security threats. The latter concern is often used to justify 
 
Arab American Identity, 69 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 29 (2013) (exploring on the roots and 
meaning of “whiteness,” which was for a long period a requirement for a successful 
citizenship application, pointing to the lack of scholarly attention to cases that have 
challenged this racial discrimination). See also Jonathan Weinberg, Proving Identity, 44 
PEPP. L. REV. 731, 742 (2017) (arguing that the Naturalization Act of 1790 made it 
practically impossible for the group of Chinese immigrants to become citizens of the United 
States); Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707, 1744 (1993) 
(arguing that whiteness was important because of the associated privileges). 
46. Margaret Chon & Donna E. Arzt, Walking While Muslim, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
215 (2005). Makau Mutua, Terrorism and Human Rights: Power, Culture, and 
Subordination, 8 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1 (2002) (exploring on the roots of the “War on Terror,” which has drawn a line between us—the civilized world—and them.). See also 
Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Is Immigration Law National Security Law, 66 EMORY L.J. 669 
(2017) (discussing how the national security agenda has shaped contemporary immigration 
policies); Sara Mahdavi, Held Hostage: Identity Citizenship of Iranian Americans, 11 TEX. 
J. ON C.L. & C.R. 211 (2006); Susan M. Akram & Kevin R. Johnson, Race, Civil Rights, and 
Immigration Law after September 11, 2001: The Targeting of Arabs and Muslims, 58 N.Y.U. 
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 295 (2001) (critical of the security measures post 9/11). 
47. Romtin Parvaresh, Prayer for Relief: Anti-Muslim Discrimination as Racial 
Discrimination, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 1287, 1313 (2014); Sahar F. Aziz, Sticks and Stones, the 
Words That Hurt: Entrenched Stereotypes Eight Years after 9/11, 13 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 33, 
43 (2009); Vijay Sekhon, The Civil Rights of Others: Antiterrorism, the Patriot Act, and Arab 
and South Asian American Rights in Post-9/11 American Society, 8 TEX. F. ON C.L. & C.R. 
117 (2003) (discussing how non-Muslims have suffered from racial profiling and hatred 
after the 9/11 terrorist attacks).  
48. Khaled A. Beydoun, Acting Muslim, 53 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (2018) (exploring on 
the consequences of purposefully manifesting or hiding the Islamic faith in public).  
49. Today, the explicit use of anti-immigration rhetoric has become very common among a 
major part of the political establishment. Furthermore, it has provoked the immigration 
debate and shaped the contours of the contemporary political discourse concerning this 
subject. As such, the 2018 midterms showed a clear uprise of Islamophobic rhetoric in the 
political campaigns. More generally, the 2016 election of President Trump resulted in a 
tougher attitude toward immigration and immigrants. This attitude has manifested its face 
in two ways. First, the language that has been used to discuss immigration has generally 
an aggressive tone. Second, there is a proliferation of actual or propagated restrictions that 
aim to reduce the immigration numbers. What is striking about both political 
developments, is the use of many stereotypes. See Nanda, supra note 36. 
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the special need for radical measures in the fight against immigration—
measures that range from building a separation wall between the United 
States and Mexico,50 to issuing travel bans that deny citizens of some 
countries access to the United States.51  
People with immigrant backgrounds often suffer harassment, 
hatred, and racial profiling as a consequence of this harsh political 
reality.52 Remaining silent in the face of this discrimination only 
advances the process of creating parallel societies with second-class 
citizens.53 This interim conclusion exhorts us to be cautious. While the 
inaccessibility of the American Dream remains a larger issue, the re-
emergence of Islamophobia is especially concerning. This article thus 
focuses on the challenges faced by the Muslim community today. 
Specifically, this article explores how the contemporary anti-immigration 
climate—particularly the increased focus on border protection—has 
impacted the Muslim community.  
Part I of this article focuses on recent public decisions burdening 
Muslims, such as the travel bans implemented by President Trump, and 
analyzes the legality of those policies. Part II looks critically at how 
particular steps taken in the public and private fields have contributed 
to the racialization of Muslims.54 This Part explores the stereotypes and 
conspiracy theories developed to gain political support for far reaching 
anti-immigration policies. Not only do these policies aim to limit 
opportunities for legal immigration to the United States, they specifically 
target people with immigrant backgrounds, such as the Muslim 
community.55 In Part III, the article draws upon this theoretical 
framework to introduce a strategy to overcome this era of fear, anxiety, 
 
50. Moria Paz, Between the Kingdom and the Desert Sun: Human Rights, Immigration, and 
Border Walls, 34 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 1 (2016) (providing a thought-provoking explanation 
for the rise of physical walls separating states). 
51. Jennifer M. Chacón, Immigration and the Bully Pulpit, 130 HARV. L. REV. F. 243, 257 
(2017) (describing how the Trump administration framed the travel ban for different 
purposes. Toward its supporters of a more strict immigration policy, it was presented as 
the promised Muslim ban. In courts, it was defended as a necessary security measure). See 
also Bill Ong Hing, Entering the Trump Ice Age: Contextualizing the New Immigration 
Enforcement Regime, 5 TEX. A&M L. REV. 253 (2018) (arguing that much of the immigration 
policies today, continue the line that was set out by preceding administrations). 
52. Cf. Lawrence J. Trautman, Presidential Impeachment: A Contemporary Analysis, 44 U. 
DAYTON L. REV. 529, 564 (2019) (giving some examples of racism and discrimination in 
which the Trump administration was involved).  
53. Ali, supra note 37, at 1031 (arguing that “growing anxiety and antagonism toward Islam 
and Muslims—Islamophobia—as exhibited by the Oklahoma law is creating a distinct 
second-class citizenry.”). See also Mohammad-Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou, Responsibility, 
Injustice and the American Dilemma, 11 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 3 (2005). 
54. Nagwa Ibrahim, The Origins of Muslim Racialization in U.S. Law, 7 UCLA J. ISLAMIC 
& NEAR E. L. 121, 142 (2008) (positing that racialization of Muslims has resulted in “a new 
zone of lawlessness where [Muslims] are neither citizen nor alien, but rather [adherents of the] inherently evil world called “Islam.””).  
55. MUSLIM ADVOCATES, RUNNING ON HATE (2019). 
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and intolerance toward newcomers and those with immigrant 
backgrounds. This article concludes that the racialization of people with 
immigrant backgrounds contributes to the creation of parallel societies. 
This development, in turn, negatively affects equal access to 
fundamental liberties. Consequently, not everyone has an equal ability 
to flourish in life and to achieve the promises of the Declaration of 
Independence that made the American Dream possible. A final reflection 
about the tendency of singling out certain groups for special prohibitions 
follows in the epilogue of this article.  
I. PROTECT OUR NATION FROM MUSLIMS 
In what has been considered Donald Trump’s “most infamous anti-
Muslim screed,” he called for “a total and complete shutdown of Muslims 
entering the United States.”56 This dramatic call came just days after the 
2015 terrorist attack in San Bernardino. At the time, Donald Trump was 
a frontrunner in the Republican Party’s primaries for the 2016 
presidential elections. In a sense, his call for singling out Muslims for a 
special entry ban did not came as a surprise.57 This was not Donald 
Trump’s first anti-Muslim plan. Prior to these statements, Donald 
Trump had shown a strong aversion to granting asylum to refugees 
coming from Syria, comparing them to the “Trojan horse.”58 He also 
suggested closing mosques, colorfully describing them as places where 
“some of the hatred—the absolute hatred—is coming from.”59 Thus, the 
call to introduce an entry ban singling out Muslims qua Muslims fit a 
longer tradition of proposals targeting both Muslims and their religion 
for special restrictions and prohibitions.60 However, this call to stop 
Muslims coming to the United States was something more than putting 
out an anti-immigration feeler—it set the tone for a new, anti-Muslim 
 
56. Gregory Krieg, Trump’s history of anti-Muslim rhetoric hits dangerous new low, CNN 
(Nov. 30, 2017), https://edition.cnn.com/2017/11/29/politics/donald-trump-muslim-
attacks/index.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2019) (quoting Donald Trump who advocated for a Muslim ban until the authorities have “[figured] out what the hell is going on.”). 
57. Cf. Vienna Flores, Competing Paradigms of Immigrant Human Rights in America, 21 
LAW & BUS. REV. AM. 459, 466 (2015); Tyler Lloyd, Closing the Golden Door: The Potential 
Legality of Donald Trump’s Ban on Muslim Immigration, 30 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 399 (2016) 
(critical of a Muslim ban).   
58. Jenna Johnson & Abigail Hauslohner, ‘I think Islam hates us’: A timeline of Trump’s 
comments about Islam and Muslims, WASH. POST (May 20, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2017/05/20/i-think-islam-hates-us-
a-timeline-of-trumps-comments-about-islam-and-
muslims/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.418b059fabaa (last visited Feb. 15, 2019) (providing 
an overview of anti-Muslim statements made by Donald Trump). 
59. Id.  
60. Cf. Pérez Huber, supra note 39, at 225 (on Trump’s attitude toward the Latino 
community). 
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rhetoric.61  
The call to stop Muslims from entering the United States soon 
proved to be more than political rhetoric.  In 2016, newly-elected 
President Trump suited the action to the word, and the word to the 
action. Upon taking office, he issued two Executive Orders and one 
Proclamation, predominantly targeting travelers from Muslim-majority 
countries.62 The “Muslim Ban” became a reality,63 throwing the United 
States back to a dark era of racial discrimination.64 This Part analyzes 
the history of the travel bans and the various case law addressing the 
lawfulness of these restrictions. 
      A. Executive Order 13,769  
Despite harsh criticism from lawyers, political leaders, and 
commentators, the newly elected President introduced Executive Order 
13,769, popularly known as the “Muslim Ban,” just days after the 
presidential election.65 By signing this order, titled Protecting the Nation 
from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States, the President paved 
the way for the realization of one of his major election pledges: enacting 
a travel ban for Muslims.66 After all, Donald Trump’s election campaign 
was highly dedicated to border protection and national security issues, 
 
61. Johnson & Hauslohner, supra note 58 (quoting Trump saying: “I think Islam hates us.”). 
See also Khaled A. Beydoun, 9/11 and 11/9: The Law, Lives and Lies that Bind, 20 CUNY 
L. REV. 455 (2017) (discussing the anti-Muslim agenda of President Trump). 
62. Matthew J. Lindsay, The Perpetual Invasion: Past as Prologue in Constitutional 
Immigration Law, 23 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 369, 389 (2018) (rightly pointing out that Trump’s anti-Muslim rhetoric during the presidential campaign, was something more than 
a slip of the tongue).  
63. See for an overview of travel restrictions that targeted Muslims: Shoba Sivaprasad 
Wadhia, National Security, Immigration and the Muslim Bans, 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
1475, 1502 (2018). 
64. Julia G. Young, Making America 1920 again? Nativism and US Immigration, Past and 
Present, 5 J. ON MIGRATION & HUM. SEC. 217 (2017) (comparing the anti-immigration era 
of 1920 to the present day, concluding that there are many similarities between the two 
eras of nativism). 
65. Jennifer Lee Barrow, Trump’s Travel Ban: Lawful but Ill-Advised, 41 HARV. J. L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 691 (2018) (defending the line that border and admission questions fall under the 
authority of the president, making the Executive Order 13,769 lawful); Michael B. 
Mukasey, Judicial Independence: The Fortress Threatened from within, 47 U. MEM. L. REV. 
1223 (2017) (defending the ban as a matter of national security); Virgil Wiebe, The 
Immigration Hotel, 68 RUTGERS U.L. REV. 1673, 1684 (2016) (arguing that challenging restrictive immigration laws before the court would be difficult, because of the “plenary power doctrine.”). See also Charles Gordon, The Alien and the Constitution, 9 CAL. W. L. 
REV. 1 (1972) (paying attention to the limited role judges play in assessing the legality of 
immigration laws because of the “plenary power doctrine”). 
66. Exec. Order 13,769, at 8977. See also Harold A. Lloyd, Speaker Meaning and the 
Interpretation and Construction of Executive Orders, 8 WAKE FOREST J. L. & POL’Y 319, 332 (2018) (analyzing Trump’s anti-Muslim rhetoric and its contribution to the enacted travel 
restrictions). 
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focusing specifically on who enters the country and how to stop those 
invaders.67  
Executive Order 13,769 aimed to protect the United States against 
foreign terrorism, drawing on experiences from the 9/11 attacks. The 
main purposes of this order were to fill an important security gap and 
eliminate opportunities for foreign nationals to commit acts of terrorism 
within the United States.68 The Order urged authorities to approach 
foreign nationals’ travel requests with stricter scrutiny.69 The main 
argument behind this tougher attitude toward immigration and border 
protection was that: 
 
[the] United States cannot, and should not, admit those 
who do not support the Constitution, or those who would 
place violent ideologies over American law. In addition, 
the United States should not admit those who engage in 
acts of bigotry or hatred (including ‘‘honor’’ killings, other 
forms of violence against women, or the persecution of 
those who practice religions different from their own) or 
those who would oppress Americans of any race, gender, 
or sexual orientation.70 
 
Upon first read, Executive Order 13,769 singled out troublemakers 
for special travel restrictions. But more specifically, this order 
suspended—categorically—the issuance of travel visas and other 
“immigration benefits” to nationals of “countries of particular concern.”71 
Although not all explicitly mentioned in the text, these countries of 
particular concern included Syria, Iraq, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, and 
Yemen. This was evident from the decision to revoke all issued and valid 
visas—except diplomatic visas—to nationals from these seven 
 
67. Cf. Stuart Chinn, Threats to Democratic Stability: Comparing the Elections of 2016 and 
1860, 77 MD. L. REV. 291 (2017); A. Reid Monroe-Sheridan, Frankly Unthinkable: The 
Constitutional Failings of President Trump’s Proposed Muslim Registry, 70 ME. L. REV. 1 (2017) (both arguing that immigration and Islam were amongst the hot topics of Trump’s 
election campaign).  
68. Exec. Order 13,769, at 8977 (in Section 1, the Order explains that “while the visa-
issuance process was reviewed and amended after the September 11 attacks to better detect 
would-be terrorists from receiving visas, these measures did not stop attacks by foreign 
nationals who were admitted to the United States.”). 
69. Id.  
70. Id. 
71. Id. The only country mentioned by name was Syria for the purposes of halting the entry 
of refugees coming from this country. The list of particular concern countries that faced 
travel restrictions was developed by the Obama administration, following the Visa Waiver 
Program Improvement and Terrorist Travel Prevention Act of 2015. However, the latter 
did not categorically suspended the entry of any national from the countries on the list, it 
only posed certain restrictions upon those nationals to whom the Visa Waiver Program 
applied.  
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countries.72 
The issued travel restrictions targeted people from Muslim-majority 
countries in particular. Put differently, Executive Order 13,769 
predominantly singled out Muslims for a special prohibition: travel to the 
United States.73 The restrictions consisted of a general ban on travelling 
to the United States for a period of 90 days. Additionally, the order urged 
the Secretary of State to halt the admission of refugees—regardless of 
their origin—for a period of 120 days, and to suspend the entry of Syrian 
refugees indefinitely, claiming the presence of pressing security needs.74 
 However, Executive Order 13,769 did allow the Secretaries of State 
and Homeland Security “to admit individuals to the United States as 
refugees on a case-by-case basis, in their discretion, but only so long as 
they determine that the admission of such individuals as refugees is in 
the national interest.”75 In this respect, the ban urged authorities to 
expedite refugee applications from persecuted members of religious 
minority groups who would not pose security or welfare risks upon their 
arrival into the United States.76 Despite the presence of this tiny exit 
door, scholars still criticized the ban for its vagueness, arbitrariness, and 
willingness to stigmatize, drawing on strong anti-Muslim stereotypes, 
such as honor killings and other forms of gender-related violence.77  
Executive Order 13,769 caused a wave of public indignation and 
worldwide condemnation after media reports leaked footage of dozens of 
 
72. United States Department of State, No. 1:17-cv-10154-NMG (Jan. 27, 2017). 
73. Daphna Renan, Presidential Norms and Article II, 131 HARV. L. REV. 2187, 2192 (2018); 
Josh Blackman, The Legal Resistance, 9 FAULKNER L. REV. 45, 56 (2017); Latoya Tyson, A 
Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing: Executive Order No. 13, 780 as a Disguise for a Muslim Ban: The 
Implications of International Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 40 N.C. CENT. L. REV. 
140, 141 (2017) (all saying that Executive Order 13,769 was designed to stop Muslims from 
visiting the United States).  
74. Exec. Order 13,769, at 8979 (arguing that the entry of Syrian refugees could harm 
national interests).  
75. Id. 
76. Id. (also people in transfer could be exempted). Critical of the choice to favor religious 
minority groups: Barrow, supra note 65, at 715 (speaking of a “poor policy choice” in this 
respect). 
77. Kate Aschenbrenner Rodriguez, Eroding Immigration Exceptionalism: Administrative 
Law in the Supreme Court’s Immigration Jurisprudence, 86 U. CIN. L. REV. 215, 218 (2018) (criticizing Executive Order 13,769 because of the “vague” language used); Kaila C. 
Randolph, Executive Order 13,769 and America’s Longstanding Practice of Institutionalized 
Racial Discrimination towards Refugees and Asylum Seekers, 47 STETSON L. REV. 1, 35 
(2017); Melissa Brooke Winkler, Executive Order Protecting the Nation from Foreign 
Terrorist Entry into the United States: Violating First Amendment Rights or Altering 
Constitutional Provisions Granting Foreign Policy Powers to the President, 34 T. M. COOLEY 
L. REV. 79, 83 (2017) (referring to the critics asking why countries that have supported 
terrorism, such as, Saudi Arabia, were not put on the list of countries affected by the 
Executive Order 13,769); Sahar F. Aziz, A Muslim Registry: The Precursor to Internment, 
2017 BYU L. REV. 779, 825 (2017); Eunice Lee, Non-Discrimination in Refugee and Asylum 
Law (against Travel Ban 1.0 and 2.0), 31 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 459, 464 (2017) (both positing 
that the aim to keep honor killers outside the United States is an obvious reference to 
Muslims). 
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stuck and detained travelers.78 The enacted travel restriction further 
provoked heated debate among legal scholars and immigration attorneys. 
This debate was specifically geared toward claims of First Amendment 
violations,79 given the specific political context in which the travel 
restrictions were realized,80 and the clear presence of favoritism toward 
religious minority groups.81  
 It did not take long before this travel restriction was challenged in 
court. In fact, the litigation journey started just hours after the 
announcement of the restrictions. On January 28, 2017, in Darweesh v. 
Trump, District Judge Ann Donnelly ordered a temporary injunction 
halting the removal of passengers with valid travel documents who were 
affected by the imposed travel restriction.82  
On the same day, in Aziz v. Trump, District Judge Leonie Brinkema 
from Virginia granted a Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”), ordering 
authorities to provide lawyers access to affected travelers at Dulles 
International Airport who were in possession of valid entry documents, 
such as green cards. Judge Brinkema further enjoined authorities from 
 
78. Enid Trucios-Hyanes & Marianna Michael, Mobilizing a Community: The Effect of 
President Trump’s Executive Orders on the Country’s Interior, 22 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 
577, 590 (2018) (both paying attention to the role media and attorneys played in challenging 
the lawfulness of Executive Order 13,769, specifically drawing attention on the allegedly 
unlawful detention of travelers coming from the banned countries). See also Rebecca Ingber, 
Bureaucratic Resistance and the National Security State, 104 IOWA L. REV. 139, 203 (2018). 
See on the importance of using the media in another context: Mimi A. Akel, The Good, the 
Bad, and the Evils of the #MeToo Movement’s Sexual Harassment Allegations in Today’s 
Society: a Cautionary Tale Regarding the Cost of These Claims to the Victims, the Accused, 
and Beyond, 49 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 103, 106 (2018). 
79. Earl M. Maltz, The Constitution and the Trump Travel Ban, 22 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 
391 (2018) (critically discussing the First Amendment argument, positing however that 
admission policy concerns—falling under the authority of the legislative and executive 
branches of power—are rather political of nature); Gary Feinerman, Civility, Dignity, 
Respect, and Virtue, 71 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 140, 144 (2018) (briefly highlighting the 
Establishment Clause argument). 
80. See on the importance of the broader political context for determining the lawfulness of 
the imposed travel restrictions: John G. Roberts, Jr. et al. In Tribute: Justice Anthony M. 
Kennedy, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1, 20 (2018) (referring to the travel ban controversy and rhetorically asking “what if (some) words are part of the problem?”); Anton Sorkin, Make 
Law, Not War: Solving the Faith/Equality Crisis, 12 LIBERTY U. L. REV. 663, 723 (2018) (briefly discussing the concept of “extrinsic” evidence that helps to prove the main objective 
behind certain actions). 
81. Keith A. Petty, Duty and Disobedience: The Conflict of Conscience and Compliance in 
the Trump Era, 45 PEPP. L. REV. 55, 79 (2018).  
82. Darweesh v. Trump, No. 17 Civ. 480 (AMD) (E.D. N.Y. Jan. 28, 2017) (two Iraqi men, 
Mr. Darweesh and Mr. Alshawi, were on their way to the United States with valid travel 
visas. However, because of the travel restrictions, both were banned from entering the 
country and put in detention) (case information, available at 
https://www.aclu.org/cases/darweesh-v-trump) (last visited Feb. 15, 2019). See also 
Matthew R. Segal, Civil Rights and State Courts in the Trump Era, 12 HARV. L. & POL’Y 
REV. 49 (2018) Spencer E. Amdur & David Hausman, Nationwide Injunctions and 
Nationwide Harm, 131 HARV. L. REV. F. 49 (2017); Carson Holloway, Judicial Review and 
Subjective Intentions, 9 FAULKNER L. REV. 1 (2017) (all paying attention to Darweesh and 
similar cases).  
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removing those passengers.83  
In another TRO granted one day after Darweesh and Aziz, District 
Judge Allison Burroughs of Massachusetts also enjoined authorities from 
removing affected passengers in possession of lawful travel documents 
and who, “absent the Executive Order, would be legally authorized to 
enter the United States.”84 This TRO also ordered authorities “to notify 
airlines that have flights arriving at Logan Airport of this Order and the 
fact that individuals on these flights [cannot] be detained or returned 
based solely on the basis of the Executive Order.”85  
Although none of these temporary orders explicitly required 
authorities to provide entry to affected travelers,86 the Trump 
administration sharply criticized these legal decisions,87 and reiterated 
that it would continue enforcing the travel restrictions “humanely and 
with professionalism . . . to protect the homeland.”88 The criticism, 
however, did not come only from the Trump administration. Legal 
scholars also expressed criticism of the way the judges blocked 
enforcement of the executive order.89 Specifically, the critics were 
concerned about the issuance of nationwide injunctions enjoining 
authorities from enforcing the travel restrictions.90 Critics questioned the 
constitutionality of issuing geographically unlimited restraining orders, 
or nationwide injunctions.91 This criticism arose specifically in the 
aftermath of the court’s decision—first granting a nationwide TRO and 
 
83. Aziz v. Trump, No. 1:17-cv-116 (E.D. Va. Jan. 28, 2017). 
84. Tootkaboni v. Trump, Civil Action No. 17-CV-10154 (D. Mass. Jan. 29, 2017), motion 
for extension of TRO declined in Louhghalam v. Trump, 230 F. Supp. 3d 26 (D. Mass. 2017). 
85. Id. See also Amanda Frost, In Defense of Nationwide Injunctions, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1065, 1099 (2018) (pointing to the geographical limitedness of the TRO in Tootkaboni, and 
the confusion it has caused regarding the question who is allowed to enter the country). 
86. An exception to this: Mohammed v. Trump, No. CV 17-00786 AB (C.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2017) (enjoining the authorities from “blocking the entry” for anyone traveling on a valid 
visa, though affected by the travel restrictions). 
87. Rebecca Buckwalter-Poza, New Sheriff, Old Problems: Advancing Access to Justice 
under the Trump Administration, 127 YALE L.J. F. 254, 267 (2017).  
88. DHS Statement On Compliance With Court Orders And The President’s Executive 
Order, transcript, available at https://www.dhs.gov/news/2017/01/29/dhs-statement-
compliance-Court-orders-and-presidents-executive-order (last visited Feb. 15, 2019). 
89. Frost, supra note 85, at 1068 (referring to legal critics of the legal steps set to freeze the 
travel restrictions). In this regard, Frost refers, among others, to Samuel L. Bray, Multiple 
Chancellors: Reforming the National Injunction, 131 HARV. L. REV. 417 (2017); and, Zayn 
Siddique, Nationwide Injunctions, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 2095 (2017) (both critical of 
nationwide injunctions). 
90. Frost, supra note 85, at 1068, 1090 (providing three counter-arguments in favor of 
nationwide injunctions: (i) if that is the only way for complete relief; (ii) in case it avoids 
irreparable injuries; (iii) when geographically curtailed injunctions would end up in chaos). 
91. Josh Blackman, The 9th Circuit’s Contrived Comedy of Errors in Washington v. Trump, 
95 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 221, 225 (2016). See also Matthew Erickson, Who, What, and 
Where: A Case for a Multifactor Balancing Test as a Solution to Abuse of Nationwide 
Injunctions, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 331, 352 (2018) (developing a balancing test to assess the 
necessity of nationwide injunctions). 
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later denying the stay thereof, pending an emergency appeal—in 
Washington v. Trump, where the state of Washington, later joined by 
Minnesota, challenged the lawfulness of the enacted travel restrictions.92  
While both the district court and the court of appeals appeared to 
sympathize with the states’ view that the travel restrictions had 
negatively affected them, neither court thoroughly engaged with 
allegations that the travel restrictions were designed to ban Muslims 
from entering the United States. This was likely due to the highly 
“sensitive interests” involved in the litigation and the relatively limited 
task of the court.93 Particularly relevant here is the courts’ discussion of 
separation of powers and the judiciary’s role to review immigration 
policies. District Judge James Robart admitted he lacked authority 
 
to create policy or judge the wisdom of any particular 
policy promoted by the other two branches. That is the 
work of the legislative and executive branches and of the 
citizens of this country who ultimately exercise 
democratic control over those branches. The role of the 
Judiciary and this Court, is limited to ensuring that the 
actions taken by the other two branches comport with our 
country’s laws, and more importantly, our Constitution.94 
 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit continued this discussion on separation 
of powers. While assessing the emergency motion of the Federal 
Government to stay the TRO, pending an emergency appeal, the court 
reasoned that  
 
[although] our jurisprudence has long counseled 
deference to the political branches on matters of 
immigration and national security, neither the Supreme 
Court nor our Court has ever held that Courts lack the 
authority to review executive action in those arenas for 
compliance with the Constitution. To the contrary, the 
Supreme Court has repeatedly and explicitly rejected the 
notion that the political branches have unreviewable 
authority over immigration or are not subject to the 
Constitution when policymaking in that context.95 
 
92. No. C17-0141JLR (W.D. Wash. Feb. 3, 2017) (granting a nationwide TRO), aff’d, 847 
F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017) (denying a stay of the granted TRO). 
93. Cf. Washington v. Trump, No. C17-0141JLR (W.D. Wash. Feb. 3, 2017); 847 F.3d 1151 
(9th Cir. 2017). 
94. Washington v. Trump, No. C17-0141JLR (W.D. Wash. Feb. 3, 2017). 
95. Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017) (also refusing—with reference to 
Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015) aff’d sub nom United States v. Texas, 
136 S. Ct. 2271—any geographical limit of the TRO, because “such a fragmented 
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This precedential backdrop led the Ninth Circuit to the conclusion 
that it had the authority to review the lawfulness of executive actions.96 
In ruling on the emergency motion to stay the TRO, the court employed 
a four-part test:  
 
(1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing 
that he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the 
applicant will be irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) 
whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure the 
other parties interested in the proceeding; and (4) where 
the public interest lies.97 
 
The Ninth Circuit concluded—preliminarily—that the Government 
failed to meet its burden regarding the first two elements.98 The court 
further noted that the last two elements of the test also did not weigh in 
favor of the Government.99 Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit denied the 
 
immigration policy would run afoul of the constitutional and statutory requirement for uniform immigration law and policy.”). 
96. Id. (positing that “although Courts owe considerable deference to the President’s policy 
determinations with respect to immigration and national security, it is beyond question 
that the federal judiciary retains the authority to adjudicate constitutional challenges to executive action.”). See also Jerry L. Mashaw & David Berke, Presidential Administration 
in a Regime of Separated Powers: An Analysis of Recent American Experience, 35 YALE J. 
ON REG. 549, 572 (2018) (arguing that compared to the district court’s discussion of the separation of powers argument, the Ninth Circuit’s discussion of this argument was less political of nature, rather it was based “(facially) on more technical statutory interpretation.”). 
97. Id. (quoting Lair v. Bullock, 697 F.3d 1200, 1203 (9th Cir. 2012), which quotes Nken v. 
Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 433 (2009), and saying that the first two questions are in fact leading, 
while the last two steps matter, only after the first two question have been answered).   
98. Id. (concluding with reference to the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution that 
authorities have failed to prove that the enacted regime of travel restrictions “provides what due process requires, such as notice and a hearing prior to restricting an individual’s ability 
to travel. . . . Rather, . . . the Government argues that most or all of the individuals affected 
have no rights under the Due Process Clause.” Also concluding that the authorities have 
failed to prove that the absence of a stay would cause irreparable injury. Firstly, because 
the Government failed to prove the presence of an injury absent a stay. Secondly, because the injury that is allegedly caused due to “erosion of the separation of powers, . . . is not “irreparable.””). 
99. Id. (saying that “the States [of Washington and Minnesota] have offered ample evidence 
that if the Executive Order were reinstated even temporarily, it would substantially injure [them].” Also concluding that both parties can draw on public interests argument. “On the 
one hand, the public has a powerful interest in national security and in the ability of an 
elected president to enact policies. And on the other, the public also has an interest in free 
flow of travel, in avoiding separation of families, and in freedom from discrimination . . .; 
when considered alongside the hardships discussed above, these competing public interests 
do not justify a stay.”). 
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stay.100  
In response to this decision, President Trump quickly took to 
Twitter, writing: “SEE YOU IN COURT, THE SECURITY OF OUR 
NATION IS AT STAKE!”101 The President’s challenge to go to court soon 
became a reality. Although the nationwide injunction had survived the 
first round of litigation, opponents of the travel restrictions continued to 
challenge the Executive order. The growing body of court rulings against 
the newly-enacted travel restrictions gave rise to a new category of 
arguments, challenging the legality of the restrictions based on religious 
discrimination, and specifically anti-Muslim discrimination.102 But 
courts showed reservation about accepting such claims.103  
However, in granting the preliminary injunction in Aziz v. Trump 
and enjoining authorities from enforcing a key section of Executive Order 
13,769, the court noted the ambiguity of the Trump administration’s 
reasoning for the travel restriction.104 Inside the courtroom, the 
administration defended the restriction on neutral grounds, presenting 
it as a necessary security measure. But outside the court, the restriction 
was defended as a necessary means to address the “Muslim problem.”105 
In discussing this ambiguity, the district court stated: 
 
[the] Establishment Clause concerns (…) do not involve 
an assessment of the merits of the president’s national 
security judgment. Instead, the question is whether the 
EO was animated by national security concerns at all, as 
 
100. See also S. Cagle Juhan & Greg Rustico, Jurisdiction and Judicial Self-Defense, 165 
U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 123, 135 (2017) (defending the anonymously written decision of the Ninth Circuit, as “anonymity frames the debate in institutional terms.”).  
101. Donald J. Trump (@realdDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Feb. 9, 2017, 3:35 PM), 
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/829836231802515457 (last visited Feb. 15, 
2019).  
102. Admittedly, allegations, suggesting the enacted travel restrictions incarnate the 
promised Muslim ban were raised previously. See, e.g., Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 
1151 (9th Cir. 2017) (saying that the states have provided evidence related to the anti-
Muslim character of the enacted travel restrictions). 
103. See for a denial of the Establishment Clause arguments in relation to the imposed travel restrictions: Louhghalam v. Trump, 230 F. Supp. 3d 26, at 35 (D. Mass. 2017) (“[The 
argument] that [Executive Order 13,769] favors Muslims over Christians, in violation of 
the Establishment Clause [is wrong]. . . . Nothing [in the text of the Executive Order] 
compels a finding that Christians are preferred to any other group.”) 
104. 234 F. Supp. 3d 724 (E.D. Va. 2017) (enjoining the authorities from enforcing § 3(c) of 
the Executive Order 13,769, and specifying the targeted groups). See also Josh Blackman, 
The Domestic Establishment Clause, 23 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 345, 346 (2018) (critical 
of accepting the Establishment Clause arguments in immigration law cases, positing that 
such arguments have “no place in the realm of foreign affairs and national security.”). 
105. 234 F. Supp. 3d 724, at 730 (E.D. Va. 2017)(discussing Trump’s relationship with the 
travel restrictions enacted, before and after becoming President). See generally Chacón, 
supra note 51, at 257 (arguing that the enacted travel restrictions regime was defended differently for various uses, saying that “to supporters, it was the promised Muslim ban, but to Courts, it was not.”). 
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opposed to the impermissible motive of, in the context of 
entry, disfavoring one religious group and, in the area of 
refugees, favoring another religious group.106 
 
The court further noted a “conceptual link between [the promised] 
Muslim ban and the [imposed travel restrictions].”107 Referencing Rudy 
Giuliani’s comments about the rationale behind the travel restriction,108 
the court concluded that the imposed restriction was not designed to meet 
a pressing security need.109 More importantly, the court enervated the 
argument that authorities would become powerless if the imposed travel 
restriction was to be interpreted as a Muslim ban. The court qualified 
this fear as “exaggerated” and found the “the dearth of evidence 
indicating a national security purpose” persuasive.110 The serious 
engagement of the court with this argument against the travel restriction 
makes Aziz an exceptional case.111 Perhaps even more importantly, Aziz 
is the first ruling in which the court explicitly hinted to the 
unconstitutional nature of the travel restriction, concluding “enjoining 
unconstitutional action by the Executive Branch is always in the public’s 
interest.”112 
While litigation continued in the aftermath of Aziz and Washington 
v. Trump,113 the Trump administration announced it would issue a new 
 
106. 234 F. Supp. 3d 724, at 735-36 (E.D. Va. 2017). 
107. Id. at 737 (saying that what matters is the “discriminatory purpose” of the action). 
108. Id. at 736 (Giuliani had linked the imposed restrictions to the promised Muslim ban). 
109. Id. (saying that the context in which the travel restrictions were designed “bolsters the 
. . . argument that the [choice to enact those travel restrictions] was not motivated by rational national security concerns.”). 
110. Id. at 736 (also explaining why it does not take into account post hoc clarifications 
denying that the travel restrictions incarnate the promised Muslim ban). 
111. Admittedly, arguments touching upon the legality of the enacted travel restriction 
from the angle of non-Establishment were discussed previously in Louhghalam v. Trump, 
230 F. Supp. 3d 26, at 35 (D. Mass. 2017) (rejecting the argument that the imposed travel 
restrictions cause a violation of the guarantees under the Establishment Clause, saying 
that the language used in the Executive Order 13,769 is neutral and does not point at any 
stage to favoring one religious group over others). 
112. Aziz v. Trump, 234 F. Supp. 3d 724, at 739 (E.D. Va. 2017). Cf. on the jurisprudential 
support in favor of this position of the court: Beatrice Catherine Franklin, Irreparability, I 
Presume: On Assuming Irreparable Harm for Constitutional Violations in Preliminary 
Injunctions, 45 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 623, 665 (2014).  
113. Not all litigation concerned cases about the constitutionality of the imposed travel 
restrictions, seeking for injunctions that should enjoin authorities from the enforcement of 
the newly enacted restrictions. However, the cases were in some way related to the broader 
legal debate about the travel restrictions. Cf. for example: Decker v. Washington, No. 3:17-
CV-00254, 2017 WL 891318 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 14, 2017) (asking the court to overturn the 
denial of stay decision of the Ninth Circuit); McDonnell v. City and Cty. of Denver, 238 F. 
Supp. 3d 1279 (D. Colo. 2017) (on the lawfulness of the authorities’ decision to prevent an 
anti-travel ban demonstration); Taiebat v. Scialabba, No. 17-cv-0805-PJH, 2017 WL 839807 
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2017) (aimed at changing his legal status as non-immigrant working and 
living in the United States, as he was afraid of not being allowed to re-enter the country as 
an Iranian citizen). Cf. for a ruling brought before the court by the challengers of the travel 
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round of travel restrictions more “tailored to [the] very bad decision” of 
the Ninth Circuit.114 On March 6, 2017, almost six weeks after the 
announcement of the first Executive order, the administration revoked 
Executive Order 13,769 and issued Executive Order 13,780, also titled 
Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States. 
The pending appeal in the Ninth Circuit was voluntarily dismissed.115 
      B. Executive Order 13,780  
In many ways, the new version of Protecting the Nation from Foreign 
Terrorist Entry into the United States was similar to its predecessor, 
Executive Order 13,769.116 Executive Order 13,780 retained the fixed 
period entry ban for nationals of six predominantly Muslim countries: 
Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen, claiming their admission 
“would be detrimental to the interests of the United States.”117 
Additionally, the fixed period suspension of admitting refugees under the 
U.S. Refugee Admissions Program remained unhurt.118 The same is true 
for the reference to potential foreign troublemakers, such as honor 
killers.119  
However, this new travel restriction also contained important 
differences from the previous order.120 Iraq was removed from the list of 
countries affected by the travel restrictions,121 and the choice to keep the 
other countries on the list was explicitly justified.122 Additionally, the 
 
restriction: International Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, No. TDC-17-0361, 2017 WL 
818255 (D. Md. Mar. 1, 2017) (granting the motion to proceed under pseudonyms).  
114. Laura Jarrett et al., Trump promises new immigration order as DOJ holds off appeals 
Court, CNN (Feb. 17, 2017), https://edition.cnn.com/2017/02/16/politics/donald-trump-
travel-ban-executive-order/ (last visited Feb. 15, 2019). 
115. Nanda, supra note 36, at 318. See also Washington v. Trump, 853 F.3d 933 (9th Cir. 2017) (Bybee, J., dissenting from the majority’s opinion not to rehear the case en banc and 
saying that “[even] if we have questions about the basis for the President’s ultimate 
findings—whether it was a “Muslim ban” or something else—we do not get to peek behind the curtain. So long as there is one “facially legitimate and bona fide” reason for the President’s actions, our inquiry is at an end.”) 
116. Barrow, supra note 65, at 693 (comparing the two versions of the Executive Orders 
and pointing to the similarities and differences between them).   
117. Exec. Order 13,780, at 13213. 
118. Id. at 13215 (also the case-by-case decision to admit some refugees in spite of enacted 
travel restrictions remained intact). 
119. Id. at 13217 (urging the authorities to inform the President about “the number and 
types of acts of gender-based violence against women, including so-called ‘‘honor killings,’’ in the United States by foreign nationals.”). 
120. Barrow, supra note 65, at 693. 
121. Exec. Order 13,780, at 13212 (saying that “the close cooperative relationship between 
the United States and the democratically elected Iraqi government, the strong United 
States diplomatic presence in Iraq, the significant presence of United States forces in Iraq, and Iraq’s commitment to combat ISIS justify different treatment for Iraq.”). 
122. Id. at 13210-11. 
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new order provided guidance for dealing with those nationals who had 
been affected by the travel restrictions but possessed valid travel 
documents.123 
More importantly, Executive Order 13,780 was Trump’s response to 
the litigation surrounding revoked Executive Order 13,769 in general,124 
and in particular to the panel’s opinion denying the government’s motion 
to stay the TRO.125 Consequently, the new order gave the President room 
to waive aside allegations of a discriminatory rationale behind the former 
version. President Trump defended the revoked version, saying: 
  
Executive Order 13769 did not provide a basis for 
discriminating for or against members of any particular 
religion. While that order allowed for prioritization of 
refugee claims from members of persecuted religious 
minority groups, that priority applied to refugees from 
every nation, including those in which Islam is a minority 
religion, and it applied to minority sects within a religion. 
That order was not motivated by animus toward any 
religion, but was instead intended to protect the ability of 
religious minorities.126 
 
The President also showed serious disagreement with the Ninth 
Circuit’s denial of the motion to stay. While the court agreed the 
executive branch is in a better position to make decisions concerning the 
admission policy, it—in spite of this important acknowledgement—
“declined to stay or narrow [the granted TRO] pending the outcome of 
further judicial proceedings.”127 However, the “better position” argument 
led the President to design a new travel ban,128 which “expressly 
exclude[d] from the suspensions categories of aliens that have prompted 
judicial concerns and which clarifie[d] or refine[d] the approach to certain 
other issues or categories of affected aliens.”129  
 
123. Id. at 13213-14 (for example, excepting green card holders, people with a valid travel 
visa, affected nationals with a dual citizenship, as long as the travel documents are not 
issued by one of the affected countries). 
124. Id. at 13210 (speaking of a “delay” in the enforcement of the travel restrictions, due to 
litigations). 
125. Id. (referring to the panel’s opinion). 
126. Id.  
127. Id. Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017) (admitting the lack of authority “to . . . rewrite the Executive Order.” Since the executive branch is “far better equipped to make appropriate distinctions”). 
128. Robert S. Chang, Whitewashing Precedent: From the Chinese Exclusion Case to 
Korematsu to the Muslim Travel Ban Cases, 68 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1183, 1189 (2018) (saying that racial discrimination jurisprudence is “the strongest precedential authority for President Trump’s executive actions” to enact travel restrictions against Muslims). 
129. Exec. Order 13,780, at 13212. 
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These new justifications, explanations, and exemptions did not 
guarantee the full enforcement of the new travel restrictions. Rather, a 
new series of litigation began.130 And again, the challengers to President 
Trump booked important victories in the courtroom.131 The first 
nationwide TRO blocking implementation of the new travel restrictions 
was issued on March 15, 2017. In an opinion similar to Aziz, the district 
court of Hawaii enjoined authorities from enforcing Sections 2,132 and 6 
of the new Executive Order,133 one day before the new restrictions came 
into effect.134 
In issuing the injunction, the court discussed the allegations of 
Muslim discrimination behind the travel restrictions. Unlike the decision 
in Louhghalam, which found the language in the Executive Order 
neutral to religion,135 the district court of Hawaii concluded that 
“statements by President and other government officials, in months 
leading up to and contemporaneous with signing of executive order, 
demonstrated that order was issued with purpose to temporarily suspend 
entry of Muslims, despite its stated religiously-neutral purpose of 
protecting United States from terrorist attacks.”136 This conclusion 
informed how the court dealt with the Government’s claim that the 
enacted travel ban was designed to meet neutral security purposes.  
The Government argued that the ban did not target the Islamic faith 
or all Muslims around the globe, emphasizing the fact that the restriction 
was limited to a specified number of countries. Addressing this 
argument, the court said:  
 
[this] illogic of the Government’s contentions is palpable. 
The notion that one can demonstrate animus toward any 
group of people only by targeting all of them at once is 
fundamentally flawed. The Court declines to relegate its 
Establishment Clause analysis to a purely mathematical 
exercise. (…) Equally flawed is the [argument] that the 
Executive Order cannot be found to have targeted Islam 
because it applies to all individuals in the six referenced 
countries. It is undisputed, using the primary source 
 
130. Cf. Doe v. Trump, No. 17-cv-112-wmc, 2017 WL 975996 (W.D. Wis. Mar. 10, 2017) 
(granting a TRO in part and enjoining the authorities from the enforcement of Exec. Order 
13,780 in relation to the plaintiff). 
131. Nanda, supra note 36, at 318 (providing an overview of cases against the new Order). 
132. With few exceptions, generally banning the nationals of six predominately Muslim 
majority countries from entering the United States 
133. Hawaii v. Trump, 241 F. Supp. 3d 1119 (D. Haw. 2017) (§ 6 of the new Executive Order 
concerned the temporary suspension of admitting refugees to the United States). 
134. Exec. Order 13,780, at 13218. 
135. Louhghalam v. Trump, 230 F. Supp. 3d 26, at 35 (D. Mass. 2017). 
136. Hawaii v. Trump, 241 F. Supp. 3d 1119, at 1121 (D. Haw. 2017) (granting nationwide 
TRO). 
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upon which the Government itself relies, that these six 
countries have overwhelmingly Muslim populations (…). 
It would therefore be no paradigmatic leap to conclude 
that targeting these countries likewise targets Islam. 
Certainly, it would be inappropriate to conclude, as the 
Government does, that it does not.137 
 
The court concluded that, by subjecting travelers from 
predominately Muslim nations to prohibitions, the new travel ban again 
singled out one specific religion for disfavored treatment. This conclusion 
formed the legal underpinning of the court’s discussion of the alleged 
violation of the Establishment Clause.138 With reference to the political 
context in which the travel bans were issued, the court found that 
challengers had rightly stated a violation of non-Establishment. 
According to the court, the political context surrounding the travel 
restrictions clearly illustrated the true motivation behind the bans: 
“religious animus.”139 The “unrebutted evidence” of this animus 
explained why the authorities had urged the court to focus on the plain 
text of the order, rather than the broader political context.140 In the days 
after Hawaii, courts across the country granted temporary injunctions 
on similar grounds,141 blocking and freezing enforcement of the enacted 
 
137. Id. at 1135. 
138. Id. at 1134 (arguing that “[because] a reasonable, objective observer—enlightened by 
the specific historical context, contemporaneous public statements, and specific sequence of 
events leading to its issuance—would conclude that the Executive Order was issued with a 
purpose to disfavor a particular religion, in spite of its stated, religiously neutral purpose, 
the Court finds that [challengers] are likely to succeed on the merits of their Establishment Clause claim.”). The Court developed a similar argumentation pattern to say that the main 
purpose of the enacted travel restriction was to single out Muslims for a special prohibition: 
see id. at 1137 (arguing that any “objective observer would conclude . . . that the stated secular purpose of the Executive Order is, at the very least, “secondary to a religious objective” of temporarily suspending the entry of Muslims.” Quoting McCreary Cty. v. Am. 
Civil Liberties Union, 545 U.S. 844). Critical of this way of reasoning by the court: Elbert 
Lin, States Suing the Federal Government: Protecting Liberty or Playing Politics, 52 U. 
RICH. L. REV. 633, 644 (2018).  
139. Hawaii v. Trump, 241 F. Supp. 3d 1119, at 1136 (D. Haw. 2017) 
140. Id. (arguing that “the historical background [of the travel restrictions] makes plain why the Government wishes to focus on the Executive Order’s text, rather than its context. 
The record before this Court is unique. It includes significant and unrebutted evidence of 
religious animus driving the promulgation of the Executive Order and its related predecessor.”). 
141. See, e.g., Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 241 F. Supp. 3d 539 (D. Md.) 
(granting nationwide preliminary injunction, blocking enforcement of § 2(c) Exec. Order 
13,780, restricting the entry opportunities of the nationals of six predominantly Muslim 
majority countries), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir. 2017), cert. granted, 
137 S. Ct. 2080, 198 L. Ed. 2d 643 (2017), and vacated and remanded sub nom. Trump v. 
Int’l Refugee Assistance, 138 S. Ct. 353, 199 L. Ed. 2d 203 (2017); Hawaii v. Trump, 245 F. 
Supp. 3d 1227 (D. Haw. 2017) (granting nationwide preliminary injunction), hearing in 
banc denied sub nom. Hawaii v. Trump, 864 F.3d 994 (9th Cir. 2017), and aff’d in part, 
vacated in part, remanded sub nom. Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. 
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travel restrictions.142 The administration’s response to these judicial 
developments was twofold. Put differently, the administration played—
like chess masters—on two boards at the same time. First, the President 
used public debate to lash out at judges who had voted against his travel 
restrictions, accusing them of endangering the country and writing 
political judgments to aggrandize their own power and influence.143 
Simultaneously, his team of lawyers and legal advisors worked on a 
strategy to convince judges that the President had the sole legal 
authority to make decisions regarding the admission of aliens.144 This 
double-faceted strategy is characteristic of the Trump administration’s 
dealings with political disappointments, at least in the area of regulating 
immigration.145 
However, these strategies did not immediately turn out to be the 
legal game-changer the President had hoped they would be. Instead, 
history repeated itself. The nationwide injunctions—blocking 
enforcement of key parts of the new travel suspension and restriction 
regime—were largely upheld by the Fourth and Ninth Circuits.146 Both 
 
granted sub nom. Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080, 198 L. Ed. 2d 
643 (2017), and vacated and remanded, 138 S. Ct. 377, 199 L. Ed. 2d 275 (2017), and appeal 
dismissed as moot sub nom. Hawaii v. Trump, 874 F.3d 1112 (9th Cir. 2017); Hamama v. 
Adducci, No. 17-CV-11910, 2017 WL 2684477 (E.D. Mich. June 22, 2017) (granting TRO to 
stay the execution of removal); State v. Trump, 263 F. Supp. 3d 1049 (D. Haw.), aff’d, 871 
F.3d 646 (9th Cir. 2017) (grating nationwide injunction against enforcement of travel 
restrictions—§§ 2(c), 6(a), and § 6(b) Exec. Order 13,780—affecting close relatives, like 
grandparents, of people living in the U.S.) 
142. An exception to this was Sarsour v. Trump, 245 F. Supp. 3d 719 (E.D. Va. 2017) 
(denying TRO that should enjoin authorities from the enforcement of the new travel 
restrictions, holding that the executive order is unreviewable under the Administrative 
Procedure Act, furthermore holding that the challengers were not to succeed under the guarantees of the Establishment Clause: “the substantive revisions reflected in [the new 
executive order] have reduced the probative value of the President’s statements to the point 
that it is no longer likely that Plaintiffs can succeed on their claim that the predominate 
purpose of [the new executive order] is to discriminate against Muslims based on their 
religion and that [the new executive order] is a pretext or a sham for that purpose.”). 
143. Elizabeth Thornburg, Twitter and the #So-CalledJudge, 71 S.M.U. L. REV. 249, 265 
(2018) (discussing how Trump has repeatedly attacked the judiciary after a disappointing 
judgment and arguing that judges should use social media to reach a broader audience). 
See also Alison Higgins Merrill, Nicholas D. Conway & Joseph Daniel Ura, Confidence and 
Constraint: Public Opinion, Judicial Independence, and the Robert Court, 54 WASH. U. J. 
L. & POL’Y 209, 223 (2017) (pointing out that judges have little means to save their 
institution from political attacks). 
144. Tara Leigh Grove, The Origins (and Fragility) of Judicial Independence, 71 VAND. L. 
REV. 465, 501 (2018) (providing an overview of statements made by President Trump to 
show his disagreement with the legal decisions issued against his travel restrictions, also 
pointing to willingness of the Administration to respect the legal decisions and follow the 
procedures to proceed further in court).  
145. Cf. Chacón, supra note 51, at 257. 
146. International Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir. 2017) (holding, among others, that challengers were “likely to succeed on merits of religious purpose element of Establishment Clause claim.”); Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741 (9th Cir. 
2017) (holding, per curiam, among others, that challengers were “likely to succeed on merits 
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courts shared an important concern: the waning influence of the rule of 
law, which shaped a dangerous precedent for fact-free engagement in 
politics.147  
Nevertheless, in Trump v. International Refugee Assistance Project, 
President Trump gained an important victory on his way to establish his 
desired travel regime.148 Equipped with this safeguard, the President 
issued a new travel ban: Proclamation 9645, titled Enhancing Vetting 
Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry Into the United 
States by Terrorists or Other Public-Safety Threats.149 The President 
announced this new ban in September 2017, just ninety days after 
receiving a partial stay of the issued injunctions. 
      C. Proclamation 9645 
Like its predecessors, the new travel ban singled out nationals of 
certain states for special travel restrictions. However, this ban was also 
unique in some respects. Remarkably, the Proclamation did not contain 
the stereotypes explicitly mentioned by its predecessors, namely, honor 
killers and women abusers. Instead, the general focus was on protecting 
the country from terrorism.150  
Another important distinction between this Proclamation and its 
predecessors concerns the durability of the latter. While the previous 
versions were designed to temporarily suspend the entry of certain 
nationals, the Proclamation had an indefinite character “to advance the 
 
of claim that temporary suspension of entry of nationals from six majority-Muslim countries violated INA’s prohibition of nationality-based discrimination.”). 
147. Renan, supra note 73, at 2259-60. See also Matthew R. Segal, America’s Conscience: 
The Rise of Civil Society Groups under President Trump, 65 UCLA L. REV. 1574, 1579 (2018) 
(expecting that the authorities will lose credibility under people because of President’s 
animus toward everything he dislikes and positing that when “the federal government is . . . going to behave just like a landlord who won’t rent to Black people, then it will command 
precisely the same level of respect.”).  
148. Cf. Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080, 2090 198 L. Ed. 2d 643 
(2017) (Thomas, J., with whom Alito, J., and Gorsuch J., join concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). What Justice Thomas said in his opinion was very promising for the President and his advisory team: “I agree with the Court’s implicit conclusion that the 
Government has made a strong showing that it is likely to succeed on the merits—that is, 
that the judgments below will be reversed. The Government has also established that failure to stay the injunctions will cause irreparable harm.”). 
149. Proclamation 9645.  
150. Id. (the President explains the need for this Proclamation as follows: “As President, I 
must act to protect the security and interests of the United States and its people. I am 
committed to our ongoing efforts to engage those countries willing to cooperate, improve 
information-sharing and identity-management protocols and procedures, and address both 
terrorism-related and public-safety risks. . . . I have determined, on the basis of 
recommendations from the Secretary of Homeland Security and other members of my 
Cabinet, to impose certain conditional restrictions and limitations . . . on entry into the 
United States of nationals of the countries identified in section 2 of this proclamation.”). 
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national security, foreign policy, and counterterrorism interests of the 
United States.”151 The only escape was through a recommendation to the 
President to change the policies, following the outcomes of a review every 
180 days.152 But more importantly, for the first time in the history of 
President Trump’s travel restrictions, the Proclamation included “non-
Muslim” countries. This new ban added North Korea,153 and Venezuela 
to the list of countries affected by the travel restrictions.154 Other states 
on this list included Iran,155 Libya,156 Somalia,157 Syria,158 Yemen,159 and 
Chad, which was removed from this list in April 2018.160 Despite this 
most recent version of the travel ban including some “non-Muslim” states 
and removing one Muslim majority country, Sudan, the vast majority of 
the targeted states still consisted of places with predominantly Muslim 
populations.161 Furthermore, the addition of Venezuela had primarily a 
symbolic significance, since most of its nationals were not affected by the 
suspension.162 Therefore, North Korea was the only “non-Muslim” state 
that faced the same travel restrictions as other predominantly-Muslim 
countries on the list.163 
 
151. Id. § 8 (also urging to enforce the restrictions “to the maximum extent possible.”). 
152. Id. § 4 (urging the authorities to report “within 180 days, . . . and every 180 days thereafter” about the need to uphold the restrictions and if necessary to modify them).  
153. Id. § 2(d)(ii) (suspending all nonimmigrant and immigrant visas).  
154. Id. § 2(f)(ii) (suspending [notwithstanding] section 3(b)(v) of this proclamation [that excepts those “traveling on a diplomatic or diplomatic-type visa . . .”], the entry into the 
United States of officials of government agencies of Venezuela involved in screening and 
vetting procedures . . . and their immediate family members, as nonimmigrants on business 
(B-1), tourist (B-2), and business/tourist (B-1/B-2) visas”). 
155. Id. § 2(b) (ii) (suspending all nonimmigrant visas, except F, M and J visas, and 
suspending all immigrant visas, subjecting visa holders to screening procedures). 
156. Id. § 2(c)(ii) (suspending nonimmigrant B-1, B-2 and B-1/B-2 visas, and suspending all 
immigrant visas). 
157. Id. § 2(h)(ii) (suspending all immigrant visas, and putting nonimmigrant visa applicants under “additional scrutiny to determine if [they] are connected to terrorist 
organizations or otherwise pose a threat to the national security or public safety.”). 
158. Id. § 2(e)(ii) (suspending all nonimmigrant and immigrant visas). 
159. Id. § 2(g)(ii) (suspending nonimmigrant B-1, B-2 and B-1/B-2 visas, and suspending all 
immigrant visas). 
160. Proclamation No. 9723, 83 Fed. Reg. 15,937 (Apr. 13, 2018), titled Maintaining 
Enhanced Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry Into the United 
States by Terrorists or Other Public-Safety Threats (Proclamation 9723) (finding “that the 
entry into the United States of the nationals of Chad [would no longer] be detrimental to 
the interests of the United States, and therefore [proclaiming the removal of restrictions and limitations on Chad]”). 
161. Proclamation 9645, § 3 (listing exceptions and waivers to decide case-by-case).  
162. Proclamation 9645, § 2(f)(ii). 
163. Critical of this inclusion: Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 265 F. Supp. 3d 570, 623 (D. Md. 2017) (holding that “the inclusion of two non-majority Muslim nations, 
North Korea and Venezuela, does not persuasively show a lack of religious purpose behind 
the Proclamation. The Venezuela ban is qualitatively different from the others because it 
extends only to government officials, and the ban on North Korea [affects] fewer than 100 
people.  . . . In short, the inclusion of Venezuela and North Korea in the Proclamation has little practical consequence.”).  
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The issuance of this new and indefinite travel ban has had two 
important short-term effects. First, because Executive Order 13,780 
expired on the date President Trump issued Proclamation 9645, the 
Supreme Court vacated and remanded the cases it had previously 
granted certiorari to hear. The Court instructed the Fourth and Ninth 
Circuits to dismiss as moot those cases challenging the legality of the 
travel restrictions.164 Second, a new wave of legal challenges blocked 
enforcement of the travel restrictions. Again, the likelihood of success in 
challenging the travel restrictions regime on grounds that it 
discriminates and violates the Establishment Clause played an 
important role in courts granting nationwide injunctions.165  
After thoroughly analyzing the history and political context of the 
imposed travel restrictions, the method adopted to select the countries to 
be put under security scrutiny, and the language used to define the 
restrictions, Judge Theodore Chuang stated:  
 
there are substantial reasons to question whether the 
asserted national security purpose has now indeed 
become the primary purpose. First, the underlying 
architecture of the prior Executive Orders and the 
Proclamation is fundamentally the same. Each of these 
executive actions bans the issuance of immigrant and 
nonimmigrant visas on the basis of nationality to 
multiple majority-Muslim countries on the basis of 
concerns about terrorism. The Proclamation does not 
abandon this fundamental approach, but rather doubles 
down on it.166 [Hence,] the Court concludes that where 
 
164. Respectively Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance, 138 S. Ct. 353 (2017) (mem.); Trump 
v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 377 (2017) (mem.). See also W. Neil Eggleston & Amanda Elbogen, 
The Trump Administration and the Breakdown of Intra-Executive Legal Process, 127 YALE 
L.J. F. 825, 831 (2018); Peter Margulies, Bans, Borders, and Sovereignty: Judicial Review 
of Immigration Law in the Trump Administration, 2018 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1, 50-51 (2018) 
(both providing a brief timeline of the legal developments related to the travel restriction 
regimes of President Trump). 
165. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 265 F. Supp. 3d 570 (D. Md. 2017), aff’d, 
883 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 2018), as amended, (Feb. 28, 2018), cert. granted, judgment vacated, 
138 S. Ct. 2710 (2018), and cert. granted, judgment vacated, 138 S. Ct. 2710 (2018); State 
v. Trump, 265 F. Supp. 3d 1140 (D. Haw. 2017), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 878 F.3d 662 
(9th Cir. 2017), cert. granted 138 S. Ct. 923 (2018), and rev’d and remanded, 138 S. Ct. 2392 
(2018). 
166. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 265 F. Supp. 3d 570, 624 (D. Md. 2017). Cf. 
also State v. Trump, 265 F. Supp. 3d 1140, 1157 (D. Haw. 2017) (critical of the 
methodological justification behind the selection of the targeted countries, concluding that “[the Proclamation’s] individualized country findings make no effort to explain why some 
types of visitors from a particular country are banned, while others are not. (…) [Furthermore, the Proclamation’s] scope and provisions also contradict its stated rationale. As noted above, many of [the Proclamation’s] structural provisions are unsupported by 
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the Proclamation itself is not sufficiently independent of 
[its predecessors] to signal a purposeful, persuasive 
change in the primary purpose of the travel ban, and 
there were no other public signs that ‘‘as persuasively’’ as 
the original violation established a different primary 
purpose for the travel ban, it cannot find that a 
‘‘reasonable observer’’ would understand that the 
primary purpose of the Proclamation’s travel ban is no 
longer the desire to impose a Muslim ban.167 
 
The sharpest judicial condemnation of Trump’s travel ban as a sign 
of animosity toward Muslims and Islam followed a few months later. In 
International Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, the Fourth Circuit 
held that the nationwide injunction was warranted only in relation to 
“foreign nationals with a bona fide relationship with an individual or 
entity in United States.”168 However, after a thorough examination of 
“official statements from President Trump and other executive branch 
officials, along with the Proclamation itself,” the court concluded that the 
ban was “unconstitutionally tainted with animus toward Islam.”169  
This sharp conclusion about religious animosity—“evidenced by 
official statements of the President . . . that graphically disparage the 
Islamic faith and its practitioners”170—came at a time when President 
Trump was celebrating his most significant progress in dealing with the 
legal challenges that had continuously delayed what he had promised to 
his voters: enacting a travel ban. In December 2017, the Supreme Court 
ordered to stay the granted preliminary injunctions pending “disposition 
of the Government’s appeal . . . and disposition of the Government’s 
petition for a writ of certiorari.”171 Furthermore, the Supreme Court 
urged the courts of appeal to reach their decisions “with appropriate 
dispatch.”172 In light of this order, the circuit courts decided to stay their 
decisions pending the Supreme Court’s future decisions.173  
 
verifiable evidence, undermining any claim that its findings ‘‘support the conclusion’’ to categorically ban the entry of millions.”) 
167. Id. at 628 (referring to McCreary C. v. Am. Civil Liberties Union 545 U.S. 844 (2005)). 
168. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 883 F.3d 233, 271 (4th Cir. 2018). 
169. Id. at 257. 
170. Id. at 353 (Harris, Cir. J., with whom Gribbon Motz, Cir. J., and King, Cir. J., join, 
concurring).  
171. Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 138 S. Ct. 542 (2017) (mem.); Trump v. 
Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 542 (2017) (mem.). 
172. Id.  
173. Hawaii v. Trump 878 F.3d 662, 702 (9th Cir. 2017); Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. 
Trump, 883 F.3d 233, 274 (4th Cir. 2018). See also Lauri Kai, Embracing the Chinese 
Exclusion Case: An International Law Approach to Racial Exclusions, 59 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 2617, 2621-22 (2018) (expecting that contemporary travel restrictions survive Supreme Court review because the “plenary power doctrine” has made policies related to immigration and admission “nonjusticiable.”).  
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This order did not issue any limitations on the scope of the travel 
restrictions,174 and the Trump administration approached it as a 
“substantial victory for the safety and security of the American people.”175 
This timely victory advanced the President’s immigration agenda,176 and 
the administration began to enforce the travel restrictions soon after the 
issuance of the stays.177 Moreover, the authorities continued to uphold 
the travel restrictions after the Supreme Court granted certiorari in 
January 2018.178 Consequently, the stay order remained in power 
pending the Supreme Court’s final decision.179 This decision came in June 
2018, when the Supreme Court upheld Proclamation 9645 in Trump v. 
Hawaii.180  
The Court’s opinion in this case was extraordinary.181 Not merely 
because of the animus toward one particular religion that surrounded the 
case,182 prompting today’s travel ban controversy to be mentioned in the 
same breath as cases of racial exclusion from the dark decades behind 
us.183 No, Trump v. Hawaii is special because the Supreme Court missed 
an opportunity to explain to its critics why the travel ban case was so 
 
174. The previous stay order, granting certioraris limited the scope of the enforcement to those who failed to prove their bona fide relationship: Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance 
Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080, 2087 (2017). Critical of this formula: Jeremy Martin, Trump v. 
International Refugee Assistance Program 137 S. Ct. 2080 (2017), 44 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 
131, 142 (2018). 
175. Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Allows Trump Travel Ban to Take Effect, N.Y. TIMES 
(Dec. 4, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/04/us/politics/trump-travel-ban-supreme-
Court.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2019) (quoting Attorney General Jeff Sessions). 
176. Josh Blackman, The Travel Bans, 2017 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 29, 30 (2017-2018) (arguing that the stay order “was a conclusive indication that the lower Courts had gone astray.”). 
See also Ratna Kapur, The Ayodhya Case: Hindu Majoritarianism and the Right to 
Religious Liberty, 29 MD. J. INT’L L. 305, 311 (2014) (pointing out how landmark decisions 
can advance a political agenda). 
177. U.S. Department of State, https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/us-visas/visa-
information-resources/presidential-proclamation-archive/2017-12-04-Presidential-
Proclamation.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2019) (responding to the stay order and saying that 
the authorities have started to implement the restriction as of Dec. 8, 2017).   
178. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 923 (2018) (mem.). In June 2018, in Trump v. Int’l Refugee 
Assistance Project, 138 S. Ct. 2710 (2018) (mem.) the Supreme Court granted certiorari and 
vacated the decision of the Fourth Circuit below this case. 
179. Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 138 S. Ct. 542 (2017) (mem.); Trump v. 
Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 542 (2017) (mem.). 
180. 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018).  
181. Cf. Josh Chafetz & David E. Pozen, How Constitutional Norms Break Down, 65 UCLA 
L. REV. 1430, 1453 (2018) (saying that the negative assessment the travel ban has received 
fits a broader tendency, in which other branches of power show their serious disagreement with the President Trump’s violation of important (unwritten) norms). 
182. Emily C. Callan, A Funny Thing Happened on My Way to the Border. How the Recent 
Immigration Executive Orders and Subsequent Lawsuits Demonstrate the Immediate Need 
for Comprehensive Immigration Reform, 47 U. BALT. L. REV. 1, 11 (2017) (saying that the 
travel ban jurisprudence is interesting because it juxtaposes the restriction regimes to the 
statements of the President). 
183. Cf. David S. Rubenstein & Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Immigration Exceptionalism, 
111 NW. U. L. REV. 583, 594-95 (2017); Shawn E. Fields, The Unreviewable Executive: 
National Security and the Limits of Plenary Power, 84 TENN. L. REV. 731, 753 (2017).  
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different from other recent controversies concerning religious 
discrimination and religious neutrality, such as the Masterpiece 
Cakeshop case.184  
Before discussing this point of criticism further, we must first 
explore the arguments set forth in Trump v. Hawaii denying the 
unconstitutionality of the most recent travel ban. We will then turn to a 
criticism of double standards, analyzing how the Court has responded 
differently to those officials’ statements showing hostility toward 
religion. Finally, we will briefly highlight the argument that authorities 
should always be mindful of the constitutional tradition, the freedoms 
guaranteed, and the impact their actions might have on society, as 
powerfully advocated by concurring Justice Kennedy.185   
                      1. Trump v. Hawaii   
On June 26, 2018, Chief Justice Roberts delivered the majority 
opinion ruling on the lawfulness of President Trump’s latest travel 
ban.186 Although the Court dispatched this case barely two months after 
hearing oral arguments, the 5-4 vote was a clear indication of the Court’s 
contrasting views. The highly divided Supreme Court upheld 
Proclamation 9645 on the grounds that: (1) the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (“INA”) allows the President to deny entry to aliens when 
their admission would harm the interests of the United States;187 (2) the 
non-discrimination provision of the INA relating to the issuance of visas 
does not alter the right of the President to deny aliens entry to the United 
States;188 (3) the travel ban might be rationally related to the goal it 
preservers, namely national security;189 and (4) the ban did not violate 
the Establishment Clause.190 For purposes of this article, we will limit 
our analysis to the Court’s discussion of the travel ban’s constitutionality 
 
184. 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018). See Leslie Kendrick & Micah Schwartzman, The Etiquette of 
Animus, 132 HARV. L. REV. 133, 135 (2018) (blaming the Supreme Court for not providing 
the standards for how to deal in cases about religious discrimination and claims for equal 
protection, also criticizing the Court for delivering contradictory opinions in Masterpiece 
and Trump v. Hawaii, both touching upon animosity toward religion and discrimination); 
Brandon L. Garrett, Unconstitutionally Illegitimate Discrimination, 104 VA. L. REV. 1471, 
1516 (2018) (saying that dissenting Justice Sotomayor is probably right that the majority 
has used a double standard through finding authorities’ hostility toward religion relevant 
in Masterpiece, while that point is barely considered in Trump. v Hawaii). 
185. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
186. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018) (Kennedy, J., and Thomas, J., concurring) 
(Breyer, J., with whom Kagan, J., join dissenting) (Sotomayor, J., with whom Ginsburg, J., 
join dissenting). 
187. Id. at 2408-10 (with reference to Immigration and Nationality Act § 1182(f)).  
188. Id. at 2414. 
189. Id. at 2415. 
190. Id. at 2423. 
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in light of the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause. 
The Supreme Court began this discussion by outlining the factors it 
would consider in assessing the lawfulness of the travel ban. First, the 
Court clarified that its task was not to denounce what the President had 
said, but rather to protect the authority of the Presidency and the 
legitimacy of the executive power. Thus, what the President has said 
needs to be assessed in light of what exercising his executive power 
entails. That was the main focus of the Court, since the travel restrictions 
addressed “a matter [that fell] within the core of executive 
responsibility.”191 The Court further stated that this case is 
fundamentally different than other non-Establishment guarantee 
litigation because the issued Proclamation touched upon issues of 
national security, drawing on entirely religion-neutral language. 
“Conventional” Establishment Clause cases, however, typically discuss 
the lawfulness of authorities’ endorsing religion in public.192 
With this background in mind, the Court reiterated that matters of 
admission and removal of aliens fall under the authority of the executive 
and legislative branches, insulating this specific issue from judicial 
scrutiny. The Court explained that those branches are better informed to 
make such decisions because “decisions in these matters may implicate 
‘relations with foreign powers,’ or involve ‘classifications defined in the 
light of changing political and economic circumstances.’”193 However, 
when admission questions implicate the constitutional rights of United 
States citizens, it may provide reason for the Court to put such cases 
under scrutiny.194 Yet this does not alter the legal authority given to the 
executive and legislative branches to make decisions concerning the 
admission of aliens. In other words, those branches retain the final say. 
That is also the case “when the Executive exercises this [delegated] power 
negatively on the basis of a facially legitimate and bona fide reason, the 
Courts will neither look behind the exercise of that discretion, nor test it 
by balancing its justification,” in light of the Constitutional rights of 
United States citizens.195  
Further, the Court approaches cases of national security with the 
highest possible cautiousness, given the authority and information the 
President has regarding such cases. The majority noted that applying the 
conventional inquiry—that is, asking whether the adopted policy was 
 
191. Id. at 2418. 
192. Id. 
193. Id. at 2418-19 (the Court is quoting from Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976)). 
194. Id. at 2419 (quoting from Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972), arguing that “although foreign nationals seeking admission have no constitutional right to entry, this 
Court has engaged in a circumscribed judicial inquiry when the denial of a visa allegedly burdens the constitutional rights of a U.S. citizen.”).  
195. Id. at 2419. 
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facially legitimate and bona fide—“would put an end to our review.”196 
However, following the suggestion of the Government, the Court delved 
beyond the ban’s facially neutral appearance.197 In this respect, the Court 
drew upon its rational basis doctrine to assess the lawfulness of the travel 
ban in light of the Establishment Clause. The Court “may consider . . . 
extrinsic evidence [as submitted by the challengers to the travel 
restrictions], but will uphold the policy so long as it can reasonably be 
understood to result from a justification independent of unconstitutional 
grounds.”198  
In other words, the rational basis doctrine does not help opponents 
of the travel restrictions to halt a policy that pursues a legitimate 
government interest. To illustrate this point, the majority referred to “a 
few occasions” where the Court has invalidated policies that were clearly 
harmful.199 In Romer v. Evans, for instance, the Supreme Court struck 
down a state amendment that clearly discriminated against non-
heterosexuals, depriving them of the right to access anti-discrimination 
laws.200 The Court’s limited precedent in striking down laws and policies 
that do not pursue a legitimate governmental interest provided little 
guidance here. However, the Court concluded that the travel ban regime 
did not share such characteristics with cases like Romer to warrant 
invalidating the Proclamation.201 Chief Justice Roberts stated:  
 
[the] Proclamation is expressly premised on legitimate 
purposes: preventing entry of nationals who cannot be 
adequately vetted and inducing other nations to improve 
their practices. The text says nothing about religion. 
[Challengers to the Proclamation] nonetheless 
emphasize that five of the seven nations currently 
included in the Proclamation have Muslim-majority 
populations. Yet that fact alone does not support an 
inference of religious hostility, given that the policy 
covers just 8% of the world’s Muslim population and is 
limited to countries that were previously designated by 
Congress or prior administrations as posing national 
security risks.202 
 
The Supreme Court also saw no reason to invalidate the 
 
196. Id. at 2420. 
197. Id. 
198. Id. See also Sorkin, supra note 80 (briefly discussing the “extrinsic evidence”). 
199. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2420 (2018). 
200. Id. 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (Scalia, J., with whom Rehnquist, C.J., and Thomas, J., join 
dissenting). 
201. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2420-21 (2018). 
202. Id. at 2421. 
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Proclamation on the ground that it lacked effectiveness, as posited by the 
challengers. The Court could not properly evaluate the content of that 
argument, since the effectiveness question involved complicated matters 
that were better suited for the executive branch. Put differently, the 
Court was not in a position to “substitute [its] own assessment for the 
Executive’s predictive judgments on [security] matters.”203 The fact that 
the Government had removed three predominantly-Muslim countries 
from the list of affected countries further reaffirmed the view that the 
Proclamation pursued a legitimate security interest.204 Furthermore, the 
Court reasoned, the Proclamation included “significant exceptions” and 
waiver programs for those nationals affected by the restrictions.205  
Despite the majority noting the Court would not denounce any 
political statements made by the President in the context of the travel 
bans, it nevertheless bitterly denounced any comparison between the 
contemporary travel bans and the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Korematsu v. United States concerning the lawfulness of forced 
relocations based on race. Opponents of the travel bans had suggested 
that the restrictions rested on the same narrative present in 
Korematsu—namely, anxiety toward a specific group of people that 
ultimately resulted in singling them out for a problematic relocation 
policy.206 The majority vigorously denounced this comparison, saying: 
 
Korematsu has nothing to do with this case. The forcible 
relocation of U.S. citizens to concentration camps, solely 
and explicitly on the basis of race, is objectively unlawful 
and outside the scope of Presidential authority. But it is 
wholly inapt to liken that morally repugnant order to a 
facially neutral policy denying certain foreign nationals 
the privilege of admission. (…) The entry suspension is 
an act that is well within executive authority and could 
have been taken by any other President—the only 
question is evaluating the actions of this particular 
President in promulgating an otherwise valid 
Proclamation.207 
 
The majority went a step further in conveying its disdain toward 
Korematsu, stating the decision “was gravely wrong the day it was 
decided, has been overruled in the court of history, and—to be clear—‘has 
no place in law under the Constitution.’”208  
 
203. Id. 
204. Id. at 2422.  
205. Id. at 2422.  
206. Id. at 2423. See also 323 U.S. 214 (1944).  
207. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018). 
208. Id. (quoting dissenting Justice Jackson in Korematsu). 
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The Court concluded that the Government had met its burden to 
demonstrate the Proclamation pursued a legitimate government 
interest—security protection—which is itself a rational and justificatory
ground to limit the entry of certain nationals. Finding that the 
Proclamation survived rational basis review, the Supreme Court 
reversed the lower court’s judgment granting the preliminary 
injunction.209 
2. The Façade of Security Concerns and Double    
Standards 
While Trump v. Hawaii reaffirmed the Government’s argument that 
the Proclamation pursued a legitimate aim, one major criticism of the 
travel ban is that it is politically motivated and fulfills President Trump’s 
promise to implement a Muslim ban, instead of actually dealing with 
national security concerns.210 Critics maintain the travel ban lacks a 
bona fide justification, arguing that it instead rests primarily on 
stereotypes about immigrants.211 However, stereotyping immigrants—
varying from job-hunters to terrorists—has proven to be a successful 
method for justifying exclusionary politics today and in the past.212 
Another criticism of the travel ban case is that the Supreme Court’s 
majority opinion applied double standards. It was uncritical toward the 
President’s remarks about Muslims both during the election and after he
took office, but critical toward officials’ statements discrediting 
majoritarian religious sensitivities. For example, the Court considered 
the President’s statements toward Muslims irrelevant for purposes of 
assessing the travel ban, but the “hostile religious statements” of a local 
civil rights commissioner were found decisive for the Court’s assessment 
209. Id. 
210. See without being exhaustive in the references, for example: Wadhia, supra note 63, at 1502. The “disconnect” between a neutral defense of the ban (security concerns) and its 
political presentation (a Muslim ban) puzzled courts in how to approach the travel bans: 
Katherine Shaw, Beyond the Bully Pulpit: Presidential Speech in the Courts, 96 TEX. L. 
REV. 71, 124 (2017). 
211. Cf. Leti Volpp, Protecting the Nation from Honor Killings: The Construction of a 
Problem, 34 CONST. COMMENT. 133, 169 (2019) (arguing that “[the] specter of violence against women has played an important role in the Trump administration’s executive 
orders seeking to bar Muslims from entry, and continues to rationalize the notion that the 
nation must be protected through their exclusion. Yet this submerged story has been largely overlooked.”). 
212. Critics have placed contemporary travel bans in the category of exclusion policies that 
have through the history singled out specific groups of immigrants for special bans. See for 
example: Chang, supra note 128; Kai, supra note 173; Michael Kagan, Is the Chinese 
Exclusion Case Still Good Law? (The President Is Trying to Find out), 1 NEV. L.J. F. 80 
(2017). 
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of a First Amendment claim in Masterpiece Cakeshop.213  
These two major points of criticism—the façade of security concerns 
behind the travel ban and the presence of double standards—are further 
discussed in light of Justice Sotomayor’s dissenting opinion in Trump v. 
Hawaii, which dispatches each of these concerns thoroughly. Justice 
Sotomayor stated that “repackaging” the promise of enacting a “total and 
complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States” as a matter 
of national security “does little to cleanse Presidential Proclamation No. 
9645 of the appearance of discrimination that the President’s words have 
created.” 214  
Justice Sotomayor further suggested that “behind [the] facade of 
national security concerns” existed fear of the stranger in general and of 
the Muslim migrant in particular.215 This is reflected in the obvious 
presence of animus toward Muslims that drove the President to issue 
travel bans singling out Muslims in the first place. This hostile language 
toward Muslims has always surrounded the travel bans and plainly 
contradicts the guarantee of neutrality toward religion enshrined in the 
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. Furthermore, a historical 
review of the emergence of travel bans in the Trump era complicates the 
argument that the travel bans were not issued to target Muslims. It was 
therefore regrettable, according to Justice Sotomayor, that the majority 
limited its review to the plain text of the Proclamation.216  
To properly evaluate the challengers’ Establishment Clause claim, 
it is necessary, according to Justice Sotomayor, to review the statements 
of the President as a whole. It is this “full record [of statements that] 
paints a far more harrowing picture [than the one we may discern on the 
basis of the majority judgment], from which a reasonable observer would 
readily conclude that the Proclamation was motivated by hostility and 
animus toward the Muslim faith”217 instead of pressing security needs.218 
This is exacerbated, according to Justice Sotomayor, by the fact that 
President Trump has never rectified his bold statements, despite his 
 
213. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018). 
Jessica A. Clarke, Explicit Bias, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 505, 515-16 (2018) (criticizing the Court 
for being overtly protective toward majoritarian beliefs and sensitives, while indifferent 
toward similar claims for protection, though coming from minority groups). See also 
Thomas C. Berg, Masterpiece Cakeshop: A Romer for Religious Objectors, 2017 CATO SUP. 
CT. REV. 139, 168 (2017-2018) (saying that in general “majoritarian branches are 
insensitive to particular free-exercise claims,” and urging the Court to mind this 
unfortunate circumstance in its decisions). See generally Frank S. Ravitch, The Supreme 
Court’s Rhetorical Hostility: What is Hostile to Religion under the Establishment Clause, 
2004 BYU L. REV. 1031 (2004).   
214. 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2433 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., with whom Ginsburg, J., join dissenting). 
215. Id. 
216. Id. at 2435. 
217. Id. 
218. Id. at 2438. 
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many opportunities to do so.219 Instead of offering a different justification 
for the relationship between the travel restrictions and the Muslim faith, 
to make the national security claim more plausible to the objective 
observer, the President has continued his infamous attacks on the 
Muslim community.220  
Referencing the majority decision in Masterpiece Cakeshop—decided 
just weeks before Trump v. Hawaii—Justice Sotomayor called it striking 
that the Court found “less pervasive official expressions of hostility and 
the failure to disavow them to be Constitutionally significant.”221 Why 
the Court chose not to draw the same line in the travel ban case was 
“perplexing.”222 This difference in treatment leaves an unsatisfactory 
feeling. While local officials were held “accountable” for the impact of 
their statements about religion in Masterpiece Cakeshop, the majority 
declined to apply the same standard in this case.223 But, as Justice 
Sotomayor indicated, both cases questioned “whether a government actor 
exhibited tolerance and neutrality in reaching a decision that affects 
individuals’ fundamental religious freedom.”224 
The majority’s choice to exclude the President’s statements from its 
legal assessment—while operating opposite to Masterpiece Cakeshop, a 
case concerning majoritarian sensitives225—is a disservice to adherents 
of minority religions. Justice Sotomayor concluded that applying double 
standards in apparently similar cases “erodes the foundational principles 
of religious tolerance that the Court elsewhere has so emphatically 
protected, and it tells members of minority religions in our country” that 
they are not equally entitled to the same rights and privileges as those 
who belong to the majority.226 
 
 
 
219. Id. at 2439. 
220. Id. 
221. Id. 
222. Id. at 2441 (however, Justice Sotomayor uses the term “perplexing” to criticize the 
choice of the majority to draw on the rational basis doctrine in assessing the lawfulness of the Proclamation. This is in her eyes a “perplexing” choice because the Court has decided 
to apply “a more stringent” test in Establishment Clause cases, especially the ones about 
animosity toward religion. This major difference in deciding cases that share similarities justifies our choice to quote “perplexing.”). 
223. Id. at 2447. 
224. Id. 
225. Cf. Nora Olabi, “We Told You So”: Conservatives Use Masterpiece Decision to Energize 
Base, WESTWORD (Jun. 5, 2018), https://www.westword.com/news/colorado-republicans-
use-masterpiece-cakeshop-Court-decision-to-rally-support-for-november-elections-
10377635 (last visited Feb. 15, 2019). 
226. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2433, 2447 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., with whom 
Ginsburg, J., join dissenting). 
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                      3. The Freedom to Disregard the Constitutional 
Tradition   
Justice Sotomayor’s criticism of the Court’s decision in Trump v. 
Hawaii primarily concerned President Trump’s remarks, his decision not 
to rectify those remarks, and his continued hostility toward members of 
the Islamic minority in the United States. While the majority excluded 
President Trump’s remarks from their analysis, concurring Justice 
Kennedy noted that public statements made by the executive branch may 
have significant societal consequences.227 Justice Kennedy cautioned 
that although such statements are often “not subject to judicial scrutiny 
or intervention,” this does not allow government officials “to disregard 
the Constitution and the rights it proclaims and protects.”228 Officials 
have broad discretion free from judicial scrutiny, but it is this freedom 
that “makes it all the more imperative for [government officials] to 
adhere to the Constitution and to its meaning and its promise.”229 
Justice Kennedy applied this concept of public manners to First 
Amendment controversies. Because the Constitution guarantees the 
freedoms of religion and expression and simultaneously prohibits the 
Government from establishing any religion,  
 
[it is] an urgent necessity that officials adhere to these 
Constitutional guarantees and mandates in all their 
actions, even in the sphere of foreign affairs. An anxious 
world must know that our Government remains 
committed always to the liberties the Constitution seeks 
to preserve and protect, so that freedom extends outward, 
and lasts. 230   
 
In a forceful plea, Justice Kennedy urged authorities to be mindful of the 
constitutional tradition, the freedoms and constraints guaranteed, and 
the impact their actions might have, both internally and externally. The 
public appearance of authorities should attest to the rich constitutional 
tradition of freedom and neutrality.231  
While Justice Kennedy did not apply his framework of public 
manners explicitly to the travel ban case, and specifically to President 
 
227. Id. at 2424 (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
228. Id. 
229. Id. (also positing that the shared point of view in Trump v. Hawaii is that officials’ 
statements can be subjected to judicial scrutiny when such statements spread hostility toward, for example, religion. This means that the scope of putting authorities’ statements 
under judicial scrutiny is quite limited and reserved to extraordinary circumstances.). 
230. Id. 
231. Id.  
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Trump’s remarks about Muslims, his unambiguous message of minding 
the Constitution while exercising power raises the following questions: 
how should we appraise President Trump’s travel ban project? What does 
President Trump’s rhetorical attack on Muslims tell us? Does the 
President’s disregard for the Constitution, in terms of explicitly 
questioning the reliability of one group of people, namely Muslims,232 
indicate that the United States has entered into a completely new era of 
hatred and racial discrimination?233  
The President has almost unlimited discretionary authority, and 
thus power, to deny aliens entry into the United States.234 This is what 
Trump v. Hawaii tells us. And although it might be empirically right for 
the President to possess unlimited power to decide questions of 
admission, we must ask whether it is justified for the President to 
exclude categories of people. We must ask whether the President should 
be allowed to continue—unrestrained—to insult adherents of one 
religion, portraying them, for example, as a dangerous group,235 who are 
unreliable, ill-mannered, uncivilized, honor killers, rapists, ticking time 
bombs, and harmful to American society.236 It is the desire to exclude this 
group of individuals that has ultimately driven the President to enact a 
series of travel bans.237  
II. SAVE OUR STATE FROM ISLAM  
A historical analysis of President Trump’s travel ban project 
suggests his focus on border protection was mainly concerned with who 
is entering the country—drawing on stereotypes and ultimately ordering 
a series of facially neutral travel restrictions targeting one specific group 
of people. However, concerns about who is living in the United States 
have similarly disfavored the American Muslim community. For 
example, headscarves and beards kept for religious purposes have, for 
 
232. Id. at 2437 (Sotomayor, J., with whom Ginsburg, J., join dissenting) (cf. for example 
the record of anti-Muslim statements made by President Trump, as discussed by Justice 
Sotomayor in her dissenting opinion). 
233. Cf. Eric K. Yamamoto, Maria Amparo Vanaclocha Berti & Jaime Tokioka, Loaded 
Weapon Revisited: The Trump Era Import of Justice Jackson’s Warning in Korematsu, 24 
ASIAN AM. L.J. 5 (2017) (pointing to the rise of hatred against Muslims in the Trump era). 
234. See generally Barrow, supra note 65. 
235. 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2433, 2447 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., with whom Ginsburg, J., join 
dissenting) (dissenting Justice Sotomayor provides an overview of the statements made 
against Muslims by President Trump). 
236. See Khaled A. Beydoun, Islamophobia: Toward a Legal Definition and Framework, 
116 COLUM. L. REV. ONLINE 108, 111 (2016) (saying that stereotypes are a driving factor 
behind policies that target specifically Muslims). 
237. Caroline Mala Corbin, Terrorists Are Always Muslim but Never White: At the 
Intersection of Critical Race Theory and Propaganda, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 455, 481 (2017). 
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some, caused trouble in the workplace.238 Similar troubles arise in 
relation to plans to build mosques or Islamic centers. One particularly 
controversial example of this is the plan to build a multi-faith center close 
to Ground Zero in New York, popularly known as the “Ground Zero 
Mosque” by opponents of the project.239 Another consequence of the 
stereotypes surrounding the Muslim immigrant population appears in 
the form of legal initiatives prohibiting the use of Sharia law in the 
United States.240  
How can we rationalize policies that target a very specific group of 
people? Particularly, how can we rationalize those policies that target 
adherents of an unpopular religion, or those who come from regions 
associated with such religions? How can we understand the Supreme 
Court’s majority decision to uphold a policy obviously condoning hatred 
and animus toward one group of people? Oklahoma’s urgent plea to save 
their State from Islamic law,241 suggests President Trump’s exclusionary 
politics are not accidental. Rather, these policies share the same 
historical background of exclusion and are rooted in a narrative of fear—
fear of the non-white stranger in general and fear of the Muslim in 
particular. Fear has proven to be a useful breeding ground for policies of 
exclusion and reprisal in the United States.242 Part II of this article 
discusses Oklahoma’s Save Our State Amendment and determines that, 
like the President’s travel ban project, Oklahoma’s amendment emanates 
from feelings of fear and animus toward the stranger.243 This analysis 
will be used in Part III to uncover some of the possible myths driving 
 
238. Cf. Kelly A. Harrison, Hiding under the Veil of Dress Policy: Muslim Women, Hijab, 
and Employment Discrimination in the United States, 17 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 831 (2016); 
Cheryl A. Sharp, Sweet Land of Liberty: Islamophobia and the Treatment of Muslims in the 
State of Connecticut, 11 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 221 (2012); Deborah L. Rhode, The Injustice 
of Appearance, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1033 (2009) (all referring to controversies at work because 
of a religious appearance).   
239. Cf. Nicholas A. Primrose, Has Society Become Tolerant of Further Infringement on 
First Amendment Rights, 19 BARRY L. REV. 313 (2013); Heather Greenfield, International 
Law, Religious Limitations, and Cultural Sensitivity: The Park51 Mosque at Ground Zero, 
25 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 1317 (2011); Aziz Z. Huq, Private Religious Discrimination, 
National Security, and the First Amendment, 5 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 347 (2011). 
240. Asma T. Uddin & Dave Pantzer, A First Amendment Analysis of Anti-Sharia 
Initiatives, 10 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 363 (2012). 
241. Cf. Ross Johnson, A Monolithic Threat: The anti-Sharia Movement and America’s 
Counter-Subversive Tradition, 19 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 183, 191 (2012) 
(on how the American anti-Sharia movement present the fight against Sharia law in the United Sates as an “existential conflict”).  
242. See generally NUSSBAUM, supra note 44; Beydoun, supra note 236.  
243. John M. Bickers, False Facts and Holy War: How the Supreme Court’s Establishment 
Clause Cases Fuel Religious Conflict, 51 IND. L. REV. 305, 332 (2018); Hilal Elver, 
Racializing Islamn before and After 9/11: From Melting Pot to Islamophobia, 21 
TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 119, 162 (2012); Robert E. Michael, The Anti-Shari’a 
Movement and Oklahoma’s Save Our State Amendment—Unconstitutional Discrimination 
or Homeland Security, 18 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 347 (2012) (all pointing to the role fear 
plays in pushing anti-Sharia initiatives forward). 
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policymakers to design such exclusionary politics. 
      A. State Question 755  
In November 2010, Oklahoma residents participated in a ballot 
initiative aimed to single out Sharia law qua Sharia for a special ban.244 
This proposal, colloquially titled the Save our State Amendment, asked 
Oklahomans via State Question 755 whether they agreed with a ban on 
the use of international law and Sharia law in Oklahoma courts.245 The 
proposal defined Sharia law as “Islamic law . . . based on two principal 
sources, the Koran and the teaching of Mohammed.”246 More than 70% of 
the voters agreed with the ban.247  
Rex Duncan, a primary proponent of this initiative, defended this 
amendment as an absolute necessity in the “war for the survival of 
America.”248 Duncan stated that, contrary to Muslims:  
 
Oklahomans recognize that America was founded on 
Judeo-Christian principles … [a]nd State Question 755, 
the Save Our State Amendment, is just a simple effort to 
ensure that our Courts are not used to undermine those 
founding principles and turn Oklahoma into something 
that our founding fathers and our great-grandparents 
wouldn’t recognize.249 
 
This fallaciously gallant rhetoric unveiled the true motivation behind 
State Question 755: fear of the stranger, this is, Muslims. But this 
animus toward Muslims and their customs had deeper roots, grounded 
in majoritarian sensitivities about who Oklahomans were and where 
 
244. Sarah Topy, Sharia Law in the Sooner State and beyond: How the First Amendment 
Impacts the Future of Anti-Sharia Law Statutes, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 617, 641 (2011). 
245. House Joint Resolution, No. 1056, Sec. 1(b), transcript, available at 
https://www.sos.ok.gov/documents/questions/755.pdf (last visited Feb. 15, 2019). 
246. Id. 
247. Penny M. Venetis, The Unconstitutionality of Oklahoma’s SQ 755 and Other Provisions 
like it that Bar State Courts from Considering International Law, 59 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 189, 
190 (2011) (the proposal aimed to amend the Oklahoman Constitution in a way that 
prohibited courts from making use of international law, Sharia law or “the precepts of other nations or cultures.”). 
248. NUSSBAUM, supra note 44, at 11; Uddin & Pantzer, supra note 240, at 368. See also 
Justin R. Long, State Constitutions as Interactive Expressions of Fundamental Values, 74 
ALB. L. REV. 1739, 1745 (2010) (discussing how the ban was defended by its proponents in 
the public discourse). 
249. Lee Tankle, The Only Thing We Have to Fear Is Fear Itself: Islamophobia and the 
Recently Proposed Unconstitutional and Unnecessary anti-Religion Laws, 21 WM. & MARY 
BILL RTS. J. 273 (2012) (quoting Rex Duncan in defense of his Sharia ban). See also Amara 
S. Chaudhry-Kravitz, The New Facially Neutral Anti-Shariah Bills: A Constitutional 
Analysis, 20 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 25, 31 (2013). 
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their sentiments were coming from. Specifically, this animus stemmed 
from the idea that the Judeo-Christian character of Oklahoma needed 
protection from a serious threat coming from outside the state and even 
outside the country—those individuals who did not share the 
majoritarian narrative about who Oklahomans are. In other words, 
Oklahoma was clearly being threatened by Muslims and their customs,250 
and something had to be done.251 
 Apparently, for individuals like Rex Duncan:  
 
[when] it comes to Christian religious values, their 
potential inconsistency with democracy, equality, and 
tolerance is never in doubt, revealing sharply the degree 
to which [their] line of [reasoning] rests not on a 
thoroughgoing rationalist secularism but on a political 
theology of Christian democracy in which the identity of 
democratic values with an imagined Christian 
civilizational tradition is unquestioned.252  
      B. Disfavoring Muslims  
The approval of State Question 755 by Oklahoma voters was 
immediately challenged by Muneer Awad, the executive director of 
Oklahoma’s chapter of the Council on Islamic-American Relations.253 On 
November 29, 2010, the district court granted Awad a preliminary 
injunction, enjoining the Oklahoma State Board of Elections from 
 
250. Carlo A. Pedrioli, Constructing the Other: U.S. Muslims, anti-Sharia Law, and the 
Constitutional Consequences of Volatile Intercultural Rhetoric, 22 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 
65, 71 (2012) (analyzing why those who are outside the immigrant group fear this group 
and their rituals). 
251. Ali, supra note 37. 
252. Nehal Bhuta, Two Concepts of Religious Freedom in the European Court of Human 
Rights, 113 S. ATLANTIC Q. 9, 26 (2014) (admittedly, the quote is a critique on the 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights related to the assessment of laws 
targeting Muslims. However, this quote covers precisely what is so problematic about the 
Oklahoma case and its many lookalikes). Cf. for questions and criticism in the context of 
the United States that fit the critical analysis of Nehal Bhuta: Mark C. Rahdert, 
Exceptionalism Unbound: Appraising American Resistance to Foreign Law, 65 CATH. U. L. 
REV. 537, 558 (2016) (arguing singling out the Sharia law qua Sharia for a special ban, at 
least implies that the Judeo-Christian legal tradition is not entitled to the same amount of 
disfavor); Robert L. McFarland, Are Religious Arbitration Panels Incompatible with Law: 
Examining Overlapping Jurisdictions in Private Law, 4 FAULKNER L. REV. 367, 371 (2013) 
(criticizing the stinginess on the side of those who defend religious arbitration, but 
withdraw Muslims from the same privilege). See also Najmeh Mahmoudjafari, Religion 
and Family Law: The Possibility of Pluralistic Cooperation, 82 UMKC L. REV. 1077, 1085 
(2014) (wondering whether similar exceptions that are made for the Jewish community 
related to religious arbitration, could also be made for the Muslims).  
253. John T. Parry, Oklahoma’s Save Our State Amendment: Two Issues for the Appeal, 64 
OKLA. L. REV. 161 (2012). 
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certifying the election outcomes.254 The court found Awad had 
successfully demonstrated the criteria needed to grant the preliminary 
injunction. Specifically, Awad had demonstrated a substantial likelihood 
of success on the merits of his First Amendment claims and that he would 
suffer from irreparable harm if his request for an injunction was 
denied.255 Furthermore, the balance of hardship and public interests 
advocated for the issuance of an injunction in this case.256 
The district court was especially concerned about the consequences 
of the special disfavor to Sharia law. The court found:  
 
[Awad] has sufficiently set forth a personal stake in this 
action by alleging that he lives in Oklahoma, is a Muslim, 
that the amendment conveys an official government 
message of disapproval and hostility toward his religious 
beliefs, that sends a clear message he is an outsider, not 
a full member of the political community, thereby chilling 
his access to the government and forcing him to curtail 
his political and religious activities.257  
 
Similarly, the district court disavowed the argument that Oklahoma’s 
amendment concerned a permissible choice of law.258 In finding the 
amendment explicitly singled out Sharia Law for disfavor, the court said: 
 
[the] amendment creates two independent restrictions on 
use/consideration of Sharia Law: (1) the amendment 
requires that Oklahoma courts “shall not consider … 
Sharia Law”, and (2) the amendment allows Oklahoma 
courts to use/consider the law of another state of the 
United States but only if “the other state does not include 
Sharia Law’’. No other ‘‘legal precepts of other nations or 
cultures” is similarly restricted with respect to the law of 
 
254. Cf. Venetis, supra note 247, at 198 (providing an overview and timeline of the 
proceedings).  
255. Awad v. Ziriax, 754 F. Supp. 2d 1298 (W.D. Okla. 2010), aff’d, 670 F.3d 1111 (10th Cir. 
2012). 
256. Id. at 1308 (holding that “[while the public has an interest in the will of the voters 
being carried out, for the reasons set forth above, the Court finds that the public has a more 
profound and long-term interest in upholding an individual’s constitutional rights.”). 
257. Id. at 1303. 
258. Cf. Kimberly Karseboom, Sharia Law and America: The Constitutionality of 
Prohibiting the Consideration of Sharia Law in American Courts, 10 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 663, 675 (2012) (defending the line that “[if] Sharia is a legal system, then the Oklahoma 
voters had every right to ban its consideration in state courts. It is conceivable that the 
legislators included the portion about Sharia Law in the Save Our State Amendment 
because, as a legal system, it is not covered under the doctrine of the Establishment Clause 
and its subsequent cases. In any event, Oklahoma voters had the right to decide which types of law could be considered in their state courts.”). 
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another state.259  
 
More fundamentally, the court agreed with Awad’s argument that 
Sharia is not only a legal system, but a way of life “that [provides] 
guidance to [Awad] and other Muslims regarding the exercise of their 
faith.”260 
The Attorney General of Oklahoma appealed the preliminary 
injunction,261 but the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the 
district court’s decision in January 2012.262 On appeal, members of the 
Oklahoma State Board of Elections argued that Awad had not suffered 
actual harm because the adopted amendment was not yet in effect when 
he initiated his lawsuit. Neither had the rule limiting the use of Sharia 
law been implemented in any Oklahoma court. Therefore, appellants 
contended, Awad’s action rested merely on hypothetical risks.263 The 
appellate court rejected this line of reasoning, finding the fear of 
exclusion and “disfavored treatment” that had driven Awad to file the 
suit was not based on speculation.264 The ban would have been enacted a 
week after the voters’ approval. The court concluded the injunction was 
warranted, finding the four prongs of the injunction test—a successful 
claim, the balance of harms, irreparable injury, and public interests—
weighed in Awad’s favor.265 
In discussing the alleged violation of the Establishment Clause, the 
appellate court drew on the Larson test,266 due to the obviously 
discriminatory nature of the Save our State Amendment. In this respect, 
the court noted: 
 
[the] amendment bans only one form of religious law—
Sharia law. Even if we accept Appellants’ argument that 
we should interpret “cultures” to include “religions,” the 
text does not ban all religious laws. The word “other” in 
the amendment modifies both “nations” and “cultures.” 
Therefore, if we substituted the word “religions” for 
“cultures,” the amendment would prohibit Oklahoma 
courts from “look[ing] to the legal precepts of other … 
religions.” The word “other” implies that whatever 
religions the legislature considered to be part of domestic 
or Oklahoma culture would not have their legal precepts 
 
259. Awad v. Ziriax, 754 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1306 (W.D. Okla. 2010). 
260. Id. 
261. Venetis, supra note 247, at 199. 
262. Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111 (10th Cir. 2012). 
263. Id. at 1120. 
264. Id. at 1123. 
265. Id. at 1126. 
266. 456 U.S. 228 (1982). 
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prohibited from consideration, while all others would. 
Thus, the second portion of the amendment that 
mentions Sharia law also discriminates among 
religions.267 
 
The Tenth Circuit’s discussion of the existence of any concrete 
justification for the ban on Sharia law is meaningful not only for the 
greater legal debate concerning the presence or absence of a compelling 
state interest to pursue the ban, but also for its analysis of the real 
reasons behind the ban.268 This analysis again revealed strong feelings of 
animus toward Muslims and their customs. Consequently, the appellate 
court refrained from a thorough discussion of the existence of “a close fit 
with a compelling state interest.”269 The court’s discussion of irreparable 
harm in the absence of the injunction was also remarkably brief, merely 
approving the district court’s holding.270  
In relation to the balance of harms prong, the court first disavowed 
the argument that Oklahomans should have the right to see authorities 
take their vote seriously. The court explicitly rejected this idea, reasoning 
that the balance of harms test prevents authorities from enacting laws 
that seriously infringe upon the constitutional rights of part of the 
population. Similarly, the court found that avoiding violation of citizens’ 
fundamental rights is always in the public interest, and therefore 
affirmed the district court’s application of this prong of the injunction 
test.271 
Finally, in the summer of 2013, the District Court for the Western 
District of Oklahoma granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff, 
permanently enjoining the authorities from implementing State 
Question 755.272 Although Awad v. Ziriax halted Oklahoma’s Save Our 
State Amendment, such initiatives, largely defended as necessary to 
 
267. Id. at 1129.  
268. Id. at 1130 (with reference to the case before the district court, the Appeal Judges say 
that authorities have “admitted . . . that they did not know of even a single instance where 
an Oklahoma court had applied Sharia law or used the legal precepts of other nations or 
cultures, let alone that such applications or uses had resulted in concrete problems in 
Oklahoma.”).  
269. Id. (the court says that a further inquiry is useless because the strict scrutiny test 
requires the presence of both: a particular compelling interest and a close fit). 
270. Id. at 1131. 
271. Id. at 1131 (holding that “when the law that voters wish to enact is likely unconstitutional, their interests do not outweigh Mr. Awad’s in having his constitutional rights protected.”). 
272. Chaudhry-Kravitz, supra note 249, at 32 (providing a brief timeline of the legal 
proceedings in Awad v. Ziriax). 
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combat a “barbaric” culture,273 continue to appear.274 However, as was 
the case with President Trump’s travel bans, the presentation of these 
initiatives has changed: from explicitly anti-Sharia to “facially 
neutral.”275  
      C. Facially Neutral, But Obviously Sectarian  
Recall the history of President Trump’s travel bans: the President-
elect asked his advisory team how he could realize his promised Muslim 
travel ban in a legally-sound way.276 The advisory team concluded the 
threat of “danger” was an appropriate justification for banning 
individuals from Muslim majority countries: the same category of people 
the President had promised to single out for special travel restrictions.277 
This shift to focusing on national security instead of religion was 
“perfectly sensible, perfectly legal.”278 But, as Justice Sotomayor noted in 
Trump v. Hawaii, this use of neutral language does little “to cleanse” 
such initiatives from their discriminatory purpose and obvious animus 
toward specific groups.279 Contrary to Justice Sotomayor, the majority 
appeared to show sensitivity toward this shift, concluding that “because 
there is persuasive evidence that the entry suspension has a legitimate 
grounding in national security concerns, quite apart from any religious 
hostility, we must accept that independent justification.”280 
Apart from this adoption of more facially neutral language, there is 
something else of theoretical relevance about the rise of these legal 
 
273. Cf. Jeremy Grunert, How Do You Solve a Problem Like Sharia: Award v. Ziriax and 
the Question of Sharia Law in America, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 695 (2013). 
274. Holly Tao, Congress, Courts, and Control over Persuasive Sources of Law, 51 GONZ. L. 
REV. 235 (2015) (on the rise of anti-Sharia legal initiatives in the United States). 
275. Chaudhry-Kravitz, supra note 249, at 26-27 (saying that after the failure to realize an 
anti-Sharia bill in Oklahoma, the anti-Sharia movement has decided to rethink its strategy 
and moved toward facially neutral measures that could have the same effect as the Save 
our State Amendment). 
276. W. Bradley Wendel, Sally Yates, Ronald Dworkin, and the Best View of the Law, 115 
MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 78, 82 (2016) (using this as an example to answer the question “what happens when there are competing accounts of what the law permits or requires?”).  
277. Bennett L. Gershman, Rudolph Giuliani and the Ethics of Bullshit, 57 DUQ. L. REV. 
293, 303 (2019) (quoting Rudy Giuliani).  
278. Jim Dwyer, First Came Giuliani’s Input on the Immigration Order. Now There’s the 
Court Test, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/09/nyregion/rudolph-giuliani-donald-trump-travel-
ban.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2019). See also Ana Pottratz Acosta, Sunlight Is the Best 
Disinfectant: The Role of the Media in Shaping Immigration Policy, 44 MITCHELL HAMLINE 
L. REV. 803, 841-42 (2018) (on how this specific statement has played a major role in the 
litigations against the travel ban, saying that challengers have utilized statements made 
in the media to find support for their Establishment Clause claim). 
279. 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2433 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., with whom Ginsburg, J., join dissenting). 
280. Id. at 2421. 
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initiatives that may explain the prevalence of animosity toward the 
other. This may also help us conceptualize policies, like the travel bans, 
that show obvious disdain and disinvitation for individuals from Muslim 
majority countries. Put differently, there exists a much deeper ideological 
root behind the contemporary animosity toward the non-white other: 
misgivings about multiculturalism make a rejection of the Islamic 
culture possible, specifically in the area of alternative dispute resolution 
dealing with disputes that have a religious dimension.281 
Although criticism on religious arbitration as a form of alternative 
dispute resolution might sound fair because of favoritism toward 
religious people, singling them out for special favor,282 it does not 
however justify singling out Muslims for special disfavor, either in the 
form of travel bans or in the enactment of rules depriving them from 
living in accordance with their faith.283 This criticism touches upon the 
presence of double standards that explicitly disfavor some groups. For 
example, in the case of Oklahoma, the Save Our State Amendment 
singled out explicitly Sharia law qua Sharia for special disfavor but 
remained silent as to other religious legal systems.284 The courts in Awad 
easily parried the concerns and shattered the illusion—created out of 
myths and persisting conspiracy theories about Muslims—that 
Oklahoma was facing a huge Sharia problem. The Supreme Court in 
 
281. The lack of appreciation of multiculturalism frustrates the possibility of having “competing and independent legal orders,” enabling people to find appropriate solutions for 
their civil law disputes in accordance with their religious convictions. Cf. Michael A. 
Helfand, Religious Arbitration and the New Multiculturalism: Negotiating Conflicting 
Legal Orders, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1231, 1239 (2011) (purporting that anti-Sharia legal initiatives mainly “seek to undermine the ability of groups to serve as competing and 
independent legal orders, thereby striking at the very heart of the new multiculturalism.”). 
See also Sukhsimranjit Singh, Religious Arbitration and Its Struggles with American Law 
& Judicial Review, 16 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 360 (2016) (arguing that the debate about 
multiculturalism is at the heart of the debate concerning the permissibility of religious 
arbitration within secular systems); Joel A. Nichols, Religion, Marriage, and Pluralism, 25 
EMORY INT’L L. REV. 967, 976 (2011) (saying that the “disconnect between religious law and 
civil law, when combined with premises of multiculturalism and the deep commitments of 
religious believers, has led to calls for greater legal recognition of the decisions of religious tribunals.”). 
282. Importantly, this concern can be seen as the other side of our critique so far on 
measures that have singled out groups for a special disfavor qua religion. Singling groups 
out for a special favor qua religion is on similar grounds very objectionable. See generally 
Sohail Wahedi, Abstraction from the Religious Dimension, 24 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1 
(2017-2018) (discussing the liberal critique on singling out religion qua religion for a special 
favor). See however on the critique of favoritism in relation to religious arbitration: Brian 
Hutler, Religious Arbitration and the Establishment Clause, 33 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 
337, 358 (2018). Cf. generally on the problem with favoritism: Martha Minow, Should 
Religious Groups Be Exempt from Civil Rights Laws, 48 B.C. L. REV. 781, 788 (2007) 
(claiming that favoritism toward groups undermines the authority of rules).  
283. James A. Sonne, Domestic Applications of Sharia and the Exercise of Ordered Liberty, 
45 SETON HALL L. REV. 717, 728 (2015) (saying that a disfavored treatment of Sharia law 
qua Sharia in courts is not justified). 
284. Cf. Rahdert, supra note 252. 
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Trump v. Hawaii, however, showed sensitivity to the seemingly neutral 
re-description of the travel ban, despite its undeniable and notorious 
history of hostility toward Muslims. 
Comparing the travel ban cases to the Save our State Amendment 
debacle raises three delicate and challenging questions. First, how do we 
rationalize the return of exclusionary politics that single out people with 
immigrant backgrounds for disfavored treatment? Second, how can we 
understand the return of exclusionary politics as such? And third, how 
can we spread awareness of the devastating effects of such 
discriminatory policies?  
The first question is contextual in nature. Fear has played a 
significant role in both the enactment of the travel bans and in the rise 
of anti-Sharia initiatives.285 The fear of uncertainty as to who is entering 
the country, namely potential terrorists, led to the issuance of the travel 
ban. And it was the fear of who is already living here, namely people who 
follow the rules of an evil tradition, that caused the wave of anti-Sharia 
initiatives. This focus on border protection and preservation of the 
majoritarian narrative led to the rise of fear-based politics not grounded 
in a thorough and rationalist approach to the problems they claim to 
solve.286 
The second question about how we should understand the return of 
these exclusionary politics is a conceptual one. How did it come to be that 
in both cases, the religious dimension was pushed to the margins? The 
travel bans were presented—ultimately with great success—as solutions 
to growing national security concerns. The Save our State Amendment, 
finding significantly less success, was presented merely as a choice-of-
law or choice-of-forum issue. This sharp abstraction from the religious 
dimension,287 particularly to the field of national security, has made it 
possible to marginalize serious criticism of the travel restrictions. After 
 
285. Fear will play a major role in cases that in whatever way would pose threats to 
majoritarian sensitivities. Cf. for example the upcoming and first ever criminal trial in the 
United States regarding the permissibility of the lightest version of female circumcision, separation of the mucous membrane from the girls’ genitalia, was rhetorically presented as 
a horrifying case of brutality. While this case concerned religious female circumcision that 
in all respects was less invasive than religious male circumcision, the mass media attention for “genital mutilation” made it impossible to say something meaningful about the 
lawfulness of this variant of female circumcision. See Sohail Wahedi, The Health Law 
Implications of Ritual Circumcisions, 22 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L. J. 209 (2019). Cf. also Saul 
Levmore, Can Wrinkles be Glamorous? in SAUL LEVMORE & MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, AGING 
THOUGHTFULLY: CONVERSATIONS ABOUT RETIREMENT, ROMANCE, WRINKLES, AND REGRET 
104 (2017) (saying “the fact that so many thoughtful people find female but not male 
circumcision abhorrent, suggests that a critical difference is that one is practiced on a group 
that is, at least to Western eyes, seriously constrained and subjugated by a variety of practices.”).  
286. Cf. Bhuta, supra note 252. See also Jamie R. Abrams, Enforcing Masculinities at the 
Borders, 13 NEV. L.J. 564, 572 (2013). 
287. Cf. Wahedi, supra note 282. 
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all, who could be against national security measures?288 
The third question is about recommendations, focusing primarily on 
how to overcome the era of fear and spread awareness of the devastating 
effects of policies that single out minority groups for disfavored 
treatment. But before we can address solutions to the challenges posed 
by these fear-based politics, we must first identify and define what is at 
risk. 
III. FREE OUR POLITICS FROM ANIMUS 
Following our analysis of fear-driven politics, we are left with two 
fundamental questions. First, how can we conceptualize such politics? 
More specifically: against which theoretical backdrop can we 
conceptualize politics that single out specific groups—in our case, 
American Muslims—for special disfavored treatment? And second, how 
can we save our politics from fear and animus in an era of terror, anxiety, 
and social unrest? 
What is interesting about the travel ban project and the Save our 
State debacle is that we can identify some facially neutral justification in 
both cases. While both situations could easily be characterized as 
concerning animus toward Muslims, there is another approach: 
abstraction from the religious dimension. This is reflected in the Trump 
administration’s decision to translate the President’s promise to shut 
down the borders to Muslims. The administration found a suitable and 
legally acceptable way to keep that promise, shifting the attention from 
religion and instead focusing on national security. This strategy 
corresponded with concerns intelligence services generally have about 
people coming from conflict areas, such as the Middle East and other 
Muslim-majority countries. A similar strategy was adopted in the Sharia 
ban cases: shifting the attention from religion to choice-of-law and choice-
of-forum issues.  
Both security concerns and choice-of-law issues were facially neutral 
and, therefore, suitable substitutes for the categories they effectively 
targeted. But what does abstraction from the religious dimension entail 
and how does it work in relation to the fear-driven politics discussed in 
this article? To answer this question, we must first acknowledge that the 
idea of abstraction, as discussed here, derives from the scholarly debate 
about the relationship between law and religion within the paradigm of 
 
288. Cf. for example Michael Coenen & Seth Davis, Minor Courts, Major Questions, 70 
VAND. L. REV. 777, 838 (2017) (discussing President Trump’s style of leadership and saying that “today’s conditions of partisanship and polarization significantly reduce the possibility of meaningful oversight.”). 
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liberal political philosophy.289  Basically, liberal theories of religious 
freedom dealing with the specialness of religion for either religious 
accommodation or justification of public decisions,290 have one major 
commonality: abstraction from the religious dimension.291  
Liberal theories of religious freedom are skeptical about the 
specialness of religion qua religion, rejecting the special legal solicitude 
toward religion qua religion.292 In other words, there should be no room 
for sectarian justifications of the special legal solicitude toward 
religion.293 Within this approach, religion can only be considered special 
and, thus, a protection-worthy category via abstraction. That is to say, 
via the identification of its liberal and neutral substitutes.294 The 
question becomes whether politics of fear, as described in this article, are 
paradigmatic expressions of abstraction. Intuitively, the answer is yes. 
Because of the strong rejectionist nature of the abstraction thesis that 
aims to find liberal substitutes for religion, explaining based hereon, why 
it is for example worthy to protect some religious practices, such as 
wearing headscarves or consuming Halal and Kosher food. Ultimately, 
not because these cases concern matters of religion, but because they 
concern matters of conscience.295  
This rejection of the religious dimension that defines the abstraction 
strategy makes sense when analyzing the Government’s decision to 
present the travel ban as purely a security matter. This also helps 
explain why authorities in Oklahoma strongly emphasized approaching 
State Question 755 solely as a choice-of-law matter. In both cases, 
abstraction was a useful strategy to shift the conversation away from 
religion and its serious constitutional concerns.  
Although it may be true that abstraction from the religious 
dimension, as presented here, could be used to declare every unpopular 
 
289. Cf. on the debate about the place of religion in liberal political philosophy: CÉCILE 
LABORDE & AURÉLIA BARDON, RELIGION IN LIBERAL POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY (2017). 
290. Cf. Micah Schwartzman, What if Religion is Not Special? 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 1351 
(2012). 
291. Wahedi, supra note 282.   
292. Cf. Kenneth Einar Himma, An Unjust Dogma: Why a Special Right to Religion Wrongly 
Discriminates against Non-Religious Worldviews, 54 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 217 (2017); BRIAN 
LEITER, WHY TOLERATE RELIGION? (2014); RONALD DWORKIN, RELIGION WITHOUT GOD 
(2013); MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE (2008); CHRISTOPHER L. 
EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE G. SAGER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE CONSTITUTION (2007) 
(all having in common that sectarian arguments in favor of religious freedom are not 
enough to justify singling out religion for special legal solicitude). 
293. Cf. for a sectarian defense of religious freedom: Michael W. McConnell, Why Protect 
Religious Freedom? 123 YALE L.J. 770, 786-89 (2013); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Priority 
of God: A Theory of Religious Liberty, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 1159, 1183 (2013).  
294. For example conscience is considered an appropriate substitute for religion: JOCELYN 
MACLURE & CHARLES TAYLOR, SECULARISM AND FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE (2011). 
295. Cf. LEITER, supra note 292, at 64. See also MACLURE & TAYLOR, supra note 294, at 77. 
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religious act out of order,296 abstraction also emphasizes the importance 
of egalitarianism. In this context, that means authorities should enable 
all citizens to make use of their basic liberties to the same extent. 
Conversely, authorities should not favor one group at the expense of 
another. Thus, because of its emphasis on egalitarianism, abstraction 
disapproves a favored treatment of religion qua religion. But it also 
disapproves—for reasons of neutrality—a disfavored treatment of 
religion qua religion.297  
Neither the travel ban, nor the Save our State Amendment can pass 
the second prong of abstraction: the ban on singling out groups of people 
or beliefs for special restrictions. Animosity toward Muslims was 
obviously present in both cases. The travel ban claims to deal with 
security measures, keeping potential terrorists, rapists, honor killers, 
and other troublemakers outside the United States. The Save our State 
Amendment similarly hid the religious concerns of its Muslim victims by 
positing that it aims solely to see that Oklahoma courts utilize only 
American laws, rather than any foreign laws.  
The question now becomes how to overcome this era of anxiety 
toward the other. Anti-Sharia legal initiatives did not stop after Awad. 
In fact, there has been an increase in the amount of such initiatives 
proposed throughout the country. Additionally, the Islamic faith has 
been singled out for special restrictions in the areas of labor and land 
allocation for religious institutes.  
Obviously, politics of fear are contrary to the promise of the 
American Dream. The only legacies these fear-driven politics will leave, 
will be the creation of disparities between groups of people, downgrading 
them to secondary citizens;298 the reinforcement of majoritarianism and 
the political advancement of a clearly xenophobic immigration agenda;299 
and, above all, the institutionalization of Islamophobia.300  
But, we should not give up quickly. We may still have some hope to 
overcome this era of anxiety, animus, and disregard of the constitutional 
traditions of freedom and neutrality. Justice Kennedy’s concurring 
opinion regarding public manners in Trump v. Hawaii provides some 
guidance here. A broad interpretation of Justice Kennedy’s forceful plea 
reminds the authorities to be mindful of what the constitutional tradition 
tells them; to bear in mind the freedoms guaranteed in the Constitution; 
 
296. Sohail Wahedi, Freedom of Religion and Living Together, 49 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 213 
(2018-2019) (explaining European cases of singling out Muslims for specials restrictions in 
light of abstraction from the religious dimension). 
297. Cf. DWORKIN, supra note 292, at 130 (defending the line that liberal democracies 
should not abandon a particular lifestyle because another lifestyle is “intrinsically better.” 
It should be left to citizens to decide which way of life better suits them).  
298. Ali, supra note 37. 
299. Kapur, supra note 176. 
300. See generally Beydoun, supra note 36. 
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and to be aware of legal constraints, such as the Establishment Clause.301  
Indeed, we should not forget this country is “built upon the promise 
of religious liberty. [The Founding Fathers] honored that core promise by 
embedding the principle of religious neutrality in the First 
Amendment.”302 Similarly, we should keep in mind what Dr. King fought 
to achieve: more equality and less disparity. Pursuing the ideal of equal 
liberty and equal respect for human beings in a highly divided world is 
the least we can do to honor Dr. King’s powerful and timeless dream.  
Just as important as the plea for equal liberty, public manners, and 
respect for the constitutional tradition, is the need for having and 
maintaining “a Judiciary willing to hold the [political] branches 
[accountable] when they defy our most sacred legal commitments,” such 
as religious freedom.303 
CONCLUSION 
Immigration has always been subject to great political debate in the 
United States. Today, however, the explicit use of anti-immigration 
rhetoric has become common among a significant portion of the political 
establishment. This rhetoric has provoked the immigration debate and 
shaped the contours of the contemporary political discourse concerning 
immigration. With the 2016 election of President Trump came a tougher 
attitude toward immigration and immigrants. Subsequently, the 2018 
midterm elections revealed an increase in “Islamophobic” rhetoric among 
political campaigners. This stricter attitude toward immigration has 
manifested itself in two ways. First, through the aggressive language 
used to discuss immigration. And second, through the proliferation of 
restrictions aiming to inhibit immigrants from entering the United 
States.  
What is striking about both political developments is the undue use 
of stereotypes. These stereotypes have intensified concerns about 
undocumented immigrants, illegal border crossings, and national 
security threats. Specifically, this latter concern has been used to justify 
the special need for radical measures in the fight against immigration—
measures ranging from building a separation wall between the United 
States and Mexico to denying citizens of some countries access into the 
United States. As a consequence of this harsh political reality, people 
with immigrant backgrounds suffer from harassment, hatred, and racial 
profiling.  
This article has focused on the challenges faced by one group in 
 
301. 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2424 (2018) (Kennedy, J., concurring).   
302. Id. at 2433 (Sotomayor, J., with whom Ginsburg, J., join dissenting).  
303. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2448 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., with whom Ginsburg, 
J., join dissenting).   
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particular: the Muslim community. The contemporary anti-immigration 
atmosphere draws upon fears of uncertainty about who is crossing the 
borders and who is living here. To deal with these concerns, authorities 
have singled out Muslims and their faith for special restrictions. This is 
obviously discriminatory and contrary to the rich constitutional tradition 
of freedom and neutrality.  
To halt a further racialization of Muslims and to overcome the 
contemporary era of fear, anxiety, and distrust, we must act in 
accordance with and uphold the constitutional tradition of freedom and 
neutrality.  We must foster a strong judiciary that can halt the executive 
and legislative branches if necessary. We must keep in mind: no more 
racial discrimination, but equal liberty and equal respect toward the 
other, even if the other does not share our beliefs or our way of life. 
EPILOGUE 
The travel ban project and the Save our State debacle fit a broader 
tendency of disregarding constitutional traditions of religious liberty and 
state neutrality toward religion, applying double standards and framing 
the “other” as dangerous, unwelcome, and unfit. Unfortunately, this 
tendency is present across many liberal democracies: from the Far East, 
to the Middle East, Europe, and North America. Of these places, the 
situation in Europe is comparable to, and in some instances even worse, 
than what we see happening in the United States. The rise in measures 
targeting people with Islamic background is perplexing. And the 
restraint of the judiciary to defend “our most sacred legal commitments” 
is regrettable.304  
As such, the religious freedom jurisprudence of the European Court 
of Human Rights is notoriously Islamophobic in nature, likely resting on 
myths about Muslims,305 rather than drawing on an approach attesting 
to equal respect and equal liberty.306 It has proven to be very “lenient 
 
304. Id. 
305. Peter G. Danchin, Of Prophets and Proselytes: Freedom of Religion and the Conflict of 
Rights in International Law, 49 HARV. INT’L L.J. 249, at 275 (2008) (saying with reference 
to critics of the case law of this Court that “there appears to be a bias in the jurisprudence 
of the [European Court of Human Rights] under article 9 toward protecting traditional and 
established religions and a corresponding insensitivity toward the rights of minority, 
nontraditional, or unpopular religious groups.”). See also Samuel Moyn, Religious Freedom 
and the Fate of Secularism, in JEAN LOUISE COHEN & CÉCILE LABORDE (EDS.), RELIGION, 
SECULARISM, AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 27 (2016) (asking rhetorically with respect 
to the systematically different legal treatment of Islamic cases before the ECtHR: “Do the 
cases . . . reflect a Christian Islamophobia in the principled garb of secularism?”). 
306. Christian Joppke, Pluralism vs. Pluralism: Islam and Christianity in the European 
Court of Human Rights, in JEAN LOUISE COHEN & CÉCILE LABORDE (EDS.), RELIGION, 
SECULARISM, AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 88 (2016) (analyzing the case law of the 
European Court of Human Rights in religious freedom cases and claiming that the Court 
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toward practices of Christian establishment and overtly intolerant 
toward the presence of Islam.”307 But more alarming is the rise of 
concrete measures across European states singling out the Islamic faith 
for special bans qua Islam. For example, in 2015, Austria adopted the 
“Islam-bill,” singling out Islamic organizations and banning them from 
receiving foreign funding. More recently, the European Parliament has 
proposed to close all Islamic centers, including mosques and other 
institutes that operate contrary to values of the European Union, while 
again leaving other religions unmentioned.308 
Abstraction may be a helpful strategy to separate practices from 
their religious dimension, but it is never a justificatory strategy for 
discrimination, religious intolerance, or the spread of hatred toward 
unpopular religious groups.   
 
interprets pluralism as a value that is threatened by the Islamic faith and needs therefore 
be protected).   
307. CECILE LABORDE, LIBERALISM’S RELIGION 33 (2017). 
308. Wahedi, supra note 296. 
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CONCLUSION 
This project has focused on the “specialness” of religion in law either 
for the purposes of a favored treatment or a disfavored treatment. Based 
hereon, it has raised the question as to whether religion qua religion 
deserves special protection in law and if not what consequences does such 
a negative response have for disfavoring religion in law. This Conclusion 
will answer the main research question in two steps and in line with the 
twofold design of the main research question. Also, it remarks on four 
recurring issues that have played a major role in this project. These issues 
that will be reconsidered in light of the reasoned conclusions that we have 
reached at different points include (i) the phenomenon of abstraction; (ii) 
religious freedom; (iii) the (un)lawfulness of ritual circumcisions; and (iv) 
the reinforcement of majoritarianism.    
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FAVORING AND DISFAVORING RELIGION IN LAW 
This project has raised the following main research question: 
“Should the law in liberal democracies single out religion qua
religion for favored treatment? If not, what consequences does the answer 
to this question have for singling out religion qua religion in law for 
disfavored treatment?”
This Conclusion answers the main research question in line with its 
twofold shape: (i) should the law in liberal democracies single out religion 
qua religion for favored treatment? (ii) If not, what consequences does 
the answer to this question have for singling out religion qua religion in 
law for disfavored treatment? 
This response helps us to reconsider recurring themes and cases 
that have played an important role in the development of this project. 
Hence, after answering the two questions that have been raised by our 
research question, we reconsider the phenomenon of abstraction from the 
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religious dimension (Part I); freedom of religion (Part II); the legal 
admissibility of ritual circumcision (Part III) and the reinforcement of 
majoritarianism (Part IV). The final Part of this Conclusion contains a 
brief response to the main research-question of this study. 
 Back to the first part of our main question: should the law in liberal 
democracies single out religion qua religion for favored treatment? The 
first four Chapters of this study say: no. Religion should not be singled 
out in law for favored treatment qua religion. However, and as Chapters 
Three and Four have concluded religion deserves special protection in 
law via abstraction from the religious dimension. That is to say: the 
liberal and non-sectarian substitutes of religion need to be singled out in 
law for special protection. This means that there is no room for a 
sectarian justification of religious freedom. Because within the paradigm 
of liberal political philosophy, religion cannot be considered a protection-
worthy category in law qua religion.  
 Thus, for example conscience needs protection qua conscience in law 
and since it can cover both the religious and non-religious conscience, our 
negative conclusion that says religion should not be singled out in law for 
a favored treatment qua religion, does not affect the toleration regime for 
manifestations of religion that concern matters of conscience.  
 Chapters Three and Four refer in this context to dietary restrictions 
and objections to military service. Both examples can have a religious or 
a non-religious basis. The same is true for the choice to wear clothes that 
have a religious background. Therefore, the law should not allow for the 
possibility of wearing headscarves in public because of the specialness of 
religion—or the specialness of the metaphysics of religion, the law should 
allow for this practice, because covering the head concerns an important 
matter of conscience. In other words, it is not because religion is special 
that we say the law should allow for the choice to wear headscarves, it is, 
we posit because human conscience needs protection in law.  
 Thus, there is no need to single out religion in law qua religion for a 
favored treatment. What consequences does this answer have for singling 
out religion qua religion in law for a disfavored treatment? Chapters Five 
and Six have revealed that drawing on a religiously neutral language in 
justifying measures that have effectively singled out religion in law for a 
disfavored treatment is very problematic and in no way compatible with 
how liberal political philosophy aims to deal with religion in law. Nor are 
such measures comprehensible from that perspective.  
 At best, making use of facially neutral grounds and a religion-empty 
language in defense of measures that have disfavored religion in law qua 
religion can be conceptualized and understood in terms of abstraction 
from the religious dimension. But the use of abstraction for the purposes 
of disfavoring religion—simply because the regulatory authorities dislike 
a particular lifestyle—cannot justify to downgrade fundamental rights of 
some religious minorities. 
293
 CONCLUSION 
 The reason as to why liberal political philosophy does not provide a 
justification ground to single out religion for disfavored treatment in 
law—of course in those cases that manifestation of religion is not 
harming the society as a whole, thus we are not discussing the 
admissibility of for example “theoterrorism”—is because it emphasizes 
two matters that complicate the liberal justification of disfavoring 
religion in law qua religion. First, because of neutrality toward how 
people want to live their lives—and again we are not talking about 
terrorism or other harmful ways of life.  
 Second, because of equal respect toward religious and non-religious 
concerns, commitments, deep feelings, worldviews and ways of life. This 
means that the authorities have a positive obligation to create equal 
opportunities for all citizens so they could make equally use of their basic 
rights. It is against this backdrop very problematic for example to deprive 
Muslims from the right to freedom of religion, as some politicians in for 
example—but not limited to—the Netherlands have suggested.  
 We will now draw on these general notes to discuss more in-depth 
what our research outcomes tell us about some concepts and cases that 
have played a significant role in carrying out this research. We start with 
abstraction from the religious dimension. We then move toward religious 
freedom. After this, we clarify our position regarding ritual circumcisions 
and the reinforcement of majoritarianism. 
I. ABSTRACTION FROM THE RELIGIOUS DIMENSION RECONSIDERED 
 In different Chapters of this PhD project, but also in the preparatory 
phase, the idea that there is something like abstraction from the religious 
dimension in public discussions concerning religious accommodation and 
scholarly debates about the special legal solicitude toward religion has 
played a significant role. Now taking the six articles together, we may 
ask the question again: what is abstraction from the religious dimension 
about? How can we define this concept? Is it indeed a concept? Or is 
abstraction from the religious dimension rather a theory? If so, what is 
this theory about? What may help in answering these questions is that 
we have thought about abstraction at two different points in this study. 
 In Chapter Three, we have concluded that legal and liberal political 
philosophers abstract from the religious dimension in their theories of 
religious freedom, when they think about the need for protecting religion 
in law qua religion. They draw on a religion-empty language to reflect on 
the protection worthiness of religion, religious accommodation and free 
exercise of religion. In Chapter Four, we have said that religion should 
only receive a special treatment in law via abstraction from the religious 
dimension.  
 Thus, we have concluded that religion should only be singled out in 
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law for special protection if its liberal substitutes are protection-worthy 
as such. We have conceptualized this way of approaching religion in law 
as abstraction from the religious dimension. This is a description of what 
we have discerned in liberal political philosophy. But now we can take an 
important step and conclude that within the paradigm of liberal political 
philosophy abstraction is a concept that tells us what the liberal positions 
have in common in terms of their specific normative understanding of the 
specialness of religion in law. The commonality between these positions 
is that they all reject—though in different degrees—the idea that the law 
should tolerate religion qua religion. 
 The normative justification for this position is that liberal theories 
of religious freedom draw on egalitarianism and strongly advocate for an 
egalitarian approach to the choices people make to live their lives in line 
with their own insights, beliefs, deep commitments and so on. Therefore, 
authorities should refrain from upgrading religion and downgrading non-
religion. Instead, authorities should approach religion and non-religion 
equally and assess requests for exemptions from laws that are generally 
applicable equally. Thus, authorities should not distinguish between for 
example a Jehovah’s Witness who refuses service in the army on religious 
grounds, and a pacifist who refuses military service because of objections 
that are deeply rooted in his worldviews. 
 The second reason why liberal theories of religious freedom argue in 
favor of a God-empty and religion-empty approach to religious freedom 
is their emphasis on neutrality that says authorities should find a more 
ecumenical justification for any favored treatment in law. Thus, equality 
and neutrality are the grounds that have paved the way to abstract from 
the religious dimension. 
 Describing abstraction as a concept that tells us how liberal theories 
of religious freedom are connected to each other from a normative point 
of view, is a helpful step to understand the phenomenon of abstraction in 
the law and religion scholarship. But there is something more about this 
phenomenon. In the last two Chapters we have used abstraction for the 
purposes of conceptualizing a new and barely scrutinized development in 
law: disfavoring religion qua religion by using facially neutral grounds to 
repackage and redescribe a wide range of religious manifestations. 
 Chapter Five has revealed that the use of a religion-empty language 
has helped to shift the attention from religion to non-religious categories 
that warrant restrictive measures. This Chapter has referred to debates 
including, but definitely not limited to the legal admissibility of laws that 
have singled out face-covering veils for special bans and plans that single 
out Mosques and Islamic institutes for special restrictions and bans. 
 Chapter Six has revealed that adopting a religion-empty language 
helps to find neutral grounds that could justify certain interventions. As 
such, the travel bans of President Trump have been defended as security 
measures that are necessary to protect people against violence. The anti-
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Sharia law initiatives were presented as means to secure the use of state 
law in courts. 
 What both Chapters have illustrated is that from a rhetorical point 
of view, abstraction from the religious dimension is a useful instrument 
and a powerful political tool to shift the attention from religion toward a 
more neutral framework in order to justify restrictions upon free exercise 
of religion. But what both Chapters have also revealed is that the use of 
a religion-empty language, drawing hereby on facially neutral grounds, 
does not cleanse such measures from discrimination and animus toward 
religion.  
 To put it differently, abstraction from the religious dimension for 
the purposes of justifying restrictive measures, does not help—at the end 
of the day—to hide what is really behind the façade of neutral grounds. 
Nor is abstraction helpful in whitewashing the pretexts that have been 
used to disfavor religion or some religious minorities.  
 As such, Chapter Five has showed that the use of a religion-empty 
language in discussions about the legal admissibility of face coverings 
veils and closure of places of worship does not change the history of 
religious animus behind such concrete steps.  
 The same is true for the travel ban projects of President Trump and 
the anti-Sharia law initiatives that have been taken in different states. 
Abstraction from the religious dimension in relation to these two cases 
does not change the history of religious animus behind these cases. 
 What does abstraction from the religious dimension—as discussed 
in Chapters Six and Five—entail? Here, abstraction has been used for 
political purposes. But within the paradigm of liberal political philosophy 
abstraction has another meaning. We have concluded that abstraction in 
that part of the research stands for a descriptive concept about normative 
argumentation patterns concerning the specialness of religion in law. 
 However, our findings in the final phase of this research reveal that 
the phenomenon of abstraction from the religious dimension is broader 
than our initial conclusion about abstraction as a descriptive concept that 
tells us how liberal political philosophy thinks about the role of religion 
for the purposes of granting exemptions and justifying public decisions. 
 So we need to broaden our understanding of abstraction in law and 
religion. What we posit in this respect is that within the public, political 
and legal discourse on matters of law and religion, abstraction from the 
religious dimension has been used rhetorically to find very questionable 
justifications for restrictive measures that are not grounded in thorough 
reflections about the problems they aim to solve. Rather the façades and 
pretexts that have been used to justify disfavoring measures advance a 
political agenda that is very skeptical about diversity and pluralism in a 
world that is rapidly changing.  
 Thus, we can conclude that abstraction from the religious dimension 
is a broad phenomenon in the debate on law and religion. There is on the 
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one hand abstraction within the paradigm of liberal political philosophy. 
On the other hand, there is abstraction in the legal, political and public 
debates about religion, religious accommodation and free exercise. These 
two forms of abstraction differ from each other in the sense that political 
philosophers abstract for different reasons and purposes than those who 
abstract from the religious dimension to achieve certain political goals. 
 This dichotomous understanding of abstraction from the religious 
dimension—based on the specific discussion we have analyzed—as either 
a concept with normative positions on the specialness of religion in law 
or as a political instrument, at least suggests that the theory building 
about abstraction cannot be easily caught by one specific definition. What 
this research has done is outlining the contours of a theory that informs 
us about the presence of something that we could call abstraction from 
the religious dimension in the law and religion scholarship and public 
debates about religion, religious accommodation and free exercise. But at 
different points in this debate, abstraction takes a different meaning.  
 This may also suggest that this project has not been involved with 
a semantic debate about the most appropriate definition of abstraction. 
This is even more conceivable because providing such a comprehensive 
definition would be impossible. The two parts of this study have showed 
how we could understand abstraction from the religious dimension in law 
and religion debates.  
 Hence, for the purpose of this research abstraction has helped us in 
two ways. First, we have seen how liberal political philosophers think 
about the justification for the special legal solicitude toward religion. 
Second, we have been able to scrutinize the pretexts that have been used 
to develop restrictive measures.  
 Furthermore, thinking in terms of abstraction has helped us to 
contextualize why liberal political philosophers and authorities abstract 
when they are dealing with religion in law. Whereas the latter group 
abstract from the religious dimension because it has been driven by 
feelings of fear toward the stranger in general and Muslims in particular, 
theorists abstract to preserve the principles of equality and neutrality. 
II. FREEDOM OF RELIGION 
 The theoretical axis of this PhD project has been the specialness of 
religion, either for a favored treatment or a disfavored treatment in law. 
Obviously, freedom of religion plays a major role in this respect. As a 
matter of fact, it comes back in each one of the articles. So, the question 
is: what do our outcomes suggest about the need for a special right to 
religious freedom?  
 For the answer to this question we need to combine the outcomes of 
our analyses in Chapters Three to Six. These Chapters have showed that 
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from a theoretical perspective—more specifically from the perspective of 
liberal political philosophy—there is no reason to single out religion for 
favored treatment in law qua religion. Religion may only be singled out 
for special protection via abstraction. In other words, it is not religion as 
such that warrants special legal solicitude, but its liberal substitutes.  
 Does the conclusion that free exercise of religion can be guaranteed 
by combining non-discrimination with basic liberties, such as freedom of 
expression, conscience and association, imply that we do not need a 
special right to religious freedom? It does. This project has defended the 
argument that there is nothing special about religion that would urge us 
on principled grounds to single religion out qua religion for special legal 
protection. The principles of equality and neutrality do not provide any 
room for a sectarian justification of the need for a special right to religious 
freedom.  
 Thus, does religion qua religion deserve special protection in law? 
No, it does not. What does this conclusion actually mean for regional and 
international treaty provisions and other constitutional rights that single 
out religion for special protection? Should religious freedom be removed 
from constitutions and treaties that guarantee free exercise of religion? 
 Before answering this question, we will look at what our conclusion 
means for rights that guarantee a special right to religious freedom. Take 
for example the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.  
 
 “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom 
of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, 
and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” 
 
 International and regional human rights documents contain similar 
provisions. For example, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,1 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,2 the European 
Convention on Human Rights,3 and the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
of the European Union protect free exercise of thought, conscience and 
religion.4 
 So what does our conclusion about the lack of support for the special 
legal protection of religion qua religion mean for legal provisions that 
provide special protection to religion? Admittedly, the international and 
regional provisions concerning the right to free exercise also guarantee 
freedom of conscience and thought. But our national example shows some 
interesting differences. It singles out religion for two different purposes. 
 First, for the purposes of free exercise. Second, for a special ban on 
 
1. Article 18 (1), UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS. 
2. Article 18 (1), INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS. 
3. Article 9 (1), EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS. 
4. Article 10 (1), CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION. 
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authorities’ side to establish a religion. The assessment of this national 
provision in light of our normative framework of abstraction reveals that 
the First Amendment is underinclusive. There is no reference to what 
really needs specific legal protection: human conscience.  
 The fact that Courts today—and specifically during the Vietnam 
War era—have proliferated the legal definition of religious beliefs, as for 
example has happened in United States v. Seeger,5 does not change our 
critique that no explicit protection of conscience is unsatisfactory in light 
of what liberal political philosophy considers protection-worthy in law: 
that is not religion, but for example conscience or ethical independence, 
just to mention a few of the liberal alternatives.6 
  What about the international and regional human rights treaties 
that have singled out religion, conscience and thought for special 
protection? In a sense, these provisions are overinclusive. That is even 
more the case since those documents also guarantee non-discrimination 
and protect freedom of association and expression.  
 Hence, there is no need to protect free exercise of religion next to 
what these treaties protect (basic liberties) and prohibit (discrimination). 
The combination of non-discrimination with guarantees provided under 
freedoms of conscience, thought, association and expression are enough 
to have something like “religious liberty.” Hence, under those regimes 
there is no need to mention religion explicitly in the list of categories 
singled out for special legal protection.  
 What does our conclusion about the underinclusiveness and the 
overinclusiveness of national, international and regional rights related to 
free exercise of religion concretely suggest about the need for a special 
right to religious freedom?  
 We have strong normative arguments to posit that “religion” in the 
First Amendment should be replaced by “conscience.” For the regional 
and international instruments, we may suggest to remove the reference 
to religion.  
 Thus, our conclusion suggests that we do not need any reference to 
religion in relation to a freedom to have the legal opportunity and access 
to free exercise of religion. Paradoxically, we say: you do not need to have 
a special right to religious freedom to have religious liberty. This 
conclusion is grounded in the findings of Chapter Three. The five 
alternative liberal positions we have discussed in that Chapter all show 
how we could give protection to free exercise without reliance on religious 
 
5. 380 U.S. 163 (1965) (the Supreme Court held that conscientious objections to military 
service may be based on both: religious and non-religious grounds).  
6. Cf. MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE 167 (2008) (on the problem of 
underinclusiveness and overinclusiveness in relation to the right to free exercise of religion). 
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values or reference to religion.7  
 But does this negative recommendation to remove—under certain 
circumstances—an explicit reference to religion in the Constitution and 
human rights treaties herald the end of religious freedom? No, it does not 
for two reasons. First, our conclusion has a limited geographical scope. It 
is only defensible within those traditions and regimes that prohibit any 
form of discrimination and guarantee freedom of association, freedom of 
expression and freedom of conscience. Not only theoretically, but also in 
practice.  
 Therefore, we do not recommend to remove religious freedom from 
Constitutions that do not guarantee non-discrimination and other 
necessary freedoms that together make religious liberty—and thus free 
exercise—possible. Thus, we acknowledge the limited applicability of our 
conclusion in this respect. In line with this, Chapters Four and Five have 
mentioned two practical arguments that explain why the “removal” of 
religious freedom from the Constitution would create an undesirable 
precedent in today’s anxious world.  
 This conclusion has also been reaffirmed in Chapter Six that calls 
for “public manners,” i.e. authorities should not “disregard” what the 
tradition of freedom and neutrality tells them about respect for basic 
liberties and fundamental rights of all human beings.8 
 Simply said, we posit that there are no principled reasons to single 
out religion in law for special protection qua religion. The combination of 
other freedoms guarantee free exercise. However, this conclusion has a 
limited geographical application. Moreover, practical concerns make us 
to be cautious in our concrete actions in relation to religious freedom. 
 Admittedly, we do not expect that political leaders will change the 
current legal regime of guarantees for free exercise as codified in various 
national Constitutions, regional and international treaties. Moreover, as 
discussed in Chapters Four and Five, we do not want them to change at 
this time the current state of art. But with an eye to the future, we have 
set out an argumentation framework that could help the founding fathers 
of new countries what they should include in the Constitution. Also new 
organizations that work on the promotion of human rights could draw on 
our normative framework to think about the question what needs special 
 
7. The positions discussed in Chapter Three are just alternative approaches to the same 
question: does religion qua religion deserve special protection in law? Chapter Three does not aim to be exhaustive in its analysis of the liberal positions concerning the “specialness” 
of religion. It illustrates what alternative responses are possible without saying which one 
is the best alternative justification for the special legal solicitude toward religion. But that 
is not necessary, since all the positions discussed have something of abstraction in common 
when they talk about the specialness of religion. This commonality between liberal theories 
of religious freedom reveals that religion is only special in law via the route of abstraction 
from the religious dimension. 
8. Cf. Trump v. Hawaii 138 S. Ct. at 2424 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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protection, further advocacy and emphasis.  
 That is working toward non-discrimination and creating awareness 
about the importance of having equal access to basic liberties, such as the 
freedoms of conscience, thought and association. This should guarantee 
free exercise of religion without any explicit reference to religion. 
 A timely example of what our conclusion posits at this point is the 
project of “Human Dignity for Everyone and Everywhere” that draws on 
a language of human dignity to promote justice without singling out one 
specific category of beliefs or worldviews for special protection qua that 
category.9 
III. RITUAL CIRCUMCISIONS  
 This project has drawn inspiration from the debate concerning the 
(un)lawfulness of ritual circumcisions at different points. As such, this 
study starts with an analysis of the debate concerning the (un)lawfulness 
of ritual circumcisions. Furthermore, it confronts the outcomes of these 
analyses with the normative framework of abstraction. And it relies on 
this confrontation to develop a framework of arguments that defends 
religious freedom in a way that looks beyond the sectarian justification 
provided for this right.  
 Hence, the question is: what do our research outcomes suggest about 
the (un)lawfulness of ritual circumcisions? The answer to this question 
can be found in Chapter Four.  
 However, given the theoretical and methodological importance of 
the debate on the (un)lawfulness of ritual circumcisions, we will briefly 
summarize our conclusions on the legal admissibility of circumcisions. 
 In line with the conclusions reached in Chapter Three, we have said 
in Chapter Four that religious practices should not be singled out in law 
qua religious for favored treatment. So drawing on this conclusion, we 
have said that any favored treatment of ritual circumcisions in law qua 
religious would be indefensible. Hence, only a more ecumenical language 
would justify any exemptions made in law for ritual circumcisions.  
 Analyzing the (un)lawfulness of ritual circumcisions from this angle 
resulted in the conclusion that male circumcision could only be justified 
in law as a medical treatment. This approach trumps convincingly bodily 
integrity concerns. But moving from religion toward a medical treatment 
argument in the debate on the (un)lawfulness of ritual circumcisions has 
also helped us to provide a normative justification for the argument that 
religion as such should not be used as a justification ground to favor the 
category of interventions upon children’s bodies that are irreversible, and 
 
9. See PUNTA DEL ESTE DECLARATION ON HUMAN DIGNITY FOR EVERYONE EVERYWHERE, 
https://www.dignityforeveryone.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/5/2019/02/Punta-del-Este-
Declaration.pdf (last visited Jun. 27, 2019).  
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which lack proper medical need and consent. Hence, laws that single out 
male circumcision for a favored treatment in law qua religious are quite 
problematic. The same is true for laws that allow for cosmetic surgeries 
on female genitals for esthetic reasons, but which criminalize similar 
interventions upon female genitals for traditional reasons.  
 Laws that favor male circumcision qua religious are problematic as 
they do not single out religious variants of female circumcision that are 
not irreversible like ritual male circumcision. Laws that effectively single 
out one group of women for access to the cosmetic surgery industry, while 
criminalizing other women who would like to make use of the services of 
this industry for traditional purposes are problematic because such laws 
attest to “double standards” in how authorities appraise the lawfulness 
of practices that have more in common than we may want to believe. 
 However, as Chapters Four and Five have showed neither male nor 
female circumcisions should be singled out in law for favored treatment 
qua religious. Hence, as long as there is medical support for the practice 
of male circumcision, it should be allowed under that umbrella. Female 
circumcision does not have any health benefits. For this reason, it should 
not be accepted as an exemption in law. Moreover, practical concerns as 
discussed in Chapters Four and Five oppose any further restriction of 
ritual male circumcision and ease of the legal regime related to female 
circumcision.  
 Nevertheless, it remains very difficult to allow for ear piercings for 
young children, and approach the lightest version of female circumcision, 
as discussed in Chapter Four with reference to the Nagarwala case, as a 
serious violation of human rights.  After all, we have concluded and later 
defended the normative argument that equal protection concerns should 
prevent authorities from explicitly favoring or disfavoring a particular 
lifestyle.  
 Allowing for ear piercings because it concerns a practice of the 
dominant culture, while outlawing the lightest variant of ritual female 
circumcision because it does not fit majoritarian sensitivities, attest to a 
state practice that is clearly not neutral in the way it appraises similar 
practices. This conclusion does not call for allowing infibulation, excision, 
or clitoridectomy. It creates serious awareness about the presence of an 
asymmetrical toleration regime that is morally indefensible, but which is 
at least for the time being justifiable on pragmatic grounds. 
VI. REINFORCEMENT OF MAJORITARIANISM 
 The combination of the first four Chapters of this PhD project has 
showed that it is problematic to single out religion qua religion for a 
favored treatment in law. Similarly, the remaining last two Chapters of 
this project have illustrated—with references to experiences from Europe 
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and the United States—that it is equally troublesome to single out 
religion qua religion for disfavored treatment in law. The normative 
framework of abstraction, as developed in Chapter Three, with its 
emphasis on egalitarianism and neutrality, provides the arguments for 
opposing singling out religion qua religion for disfavored treatment in 
law. As a matter of fact, and as Chapters Five and Six have pointed out, 
this unfortunate development has targeted specifically members of the 
Islamic minority living in Europe and the United States.  
 Today, the rise of measures across such liberal democracies that 
have singled out the Islamic faith qua Islam for disfavored treatment is 
perplexing. And the restraint of the judiciary to intervene and make a 
clear statement against this tendency is regrettable. As the alarming 
analyses of Chapters Five and Six show, this tendency reinforces 
majoritarianism in an unprecedented way. 
 The reinforcement of majoritarianism takes place because of two 
mutually confirming developments. On the one hand, there is a rise of 
actual or propagated bans singling out the Islamic faith qua Islam for 
disfavored treatment in law, downgrading Muslims to secondary class 
citizens for whom other criteria apply when it comes to free exercise of 
basic liberties. On the other hand, the religious freedom jurisprudence of 
Courts across liberal democracies is overtly tolerant toward majoritarian 
sensitivities and intolerant toward requests for exemptions coming from 
people who do not fit within the majoritarian and dominant culture. This 
latter development does not only affect Muslims, but simultaneously 
other minority groups who—like Muslims—do not share the majoritarian 
cultural and religious narrative.  
 Hence, the risk of applying double standards in religious freedom 
cases is not something hypothetical. Chapters Five and Six have given 
concrete examples of cases in which Courts have used double standards 
in dealing with very similar cases of free exercise. Whereas for example 
in the Masterpiece Cakeshop judgment, the Supreme Court of the United 
States ruled that religious intolerant statements were problematic, in 
Trump v. Hawaii, the Court ruled—just a couple of days after its decision 
in Masterpiece—that the use of facially neutral language in the most 
recent version of the travel ban of President Trump was sufficient to 
reaffirm that the executive power is in charge of taking decisions upon 
entrance admission into the United States. This approach of the Supreme 
Court that could be understood in terms of abstraction from the religious 
dimension made it possible to ignore completely the history of animosity 
toward Muslims that resulted in the enactment of a series of travel bans.   
 The presence of “double standards” in combination with drawing on 
a language of abstraction—not in a normative way, but using abstraction 
as a rhetorical instrument—makes it possible to say that the Court shows 
leniency toward majoritarian sensitivities areas related to immigration 
politics and border security concerns. 
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 But more problematic is the religious freedom jurisprudence of the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), which effectively reinforces 
majoritarianism in an unprecedented way. This jurisprudence is for two 
reasons very problematic.    
 First, because the ECtHR gives its member states a wider margin 
of appreciation in those cases where its member states are “better placed” 
to take a decision, or in cases in which there is “no consensus” among its 
member states as to how the law should react to a certain matter that is 
subject of discussion.  
 As Chapter Five has concluded, this margin of appreciation doctrine 
reinforces majoritarianism. The ECtHR is there to protect and promote 
human rights, even if the outcome in a particular case is contrary to what 
majoritarian sensitivities suggest. 
 Second, because the ECtHR seems to be insensitive toward the large 
body of criticism upon its notorious religious freedom jurisprudence. As 
such, and as discussed in Chapter Five, its S.A.S. decision was criticized 
mainly because of the “abrupt” introduction of “living together” as ground 
for justifying restrictions upon free exercise of religion.  
 But instead of rethinking the problematic introduction of a 
limitation ground that is not mentioned in the Convention, the ECtHR 
has recently reaffirmed its S.A.S. judgment. In Dakir, the Court 
continues with using the S.A.S. living together limitation formula.10 
 This post-S.A.S. decision on the lawfulness of the ban on face-
covering veils in Belgium is thought provoking for two reasons.  
 On the one hand, the Court provides lip service to Muslims through 
saying that it is aware of the fact that banning face-covering veils affects 
this religious minority in particular.11 On the other hand, however, it has 
provided France and Belgium a wide margin of appreciation to form an 
opinion about the (un)lawfulness of wearing face-covering veils in public, 
since it assumes that there is no consensus upon this matter within its 
member states.12 But this is simply not true. Many European Countries 
are moving toward the enactment of laws banning face-covering veils in 
public. Hence, there is consensus upon a growing number of European 
countries to ban face-covering veils in the public space.13 This fact should 
have moved the ECtHR to reflect critically on bans that are born out of 
the “living together” formula. 
 
10. Dakir v. Belgium, App. No 4619/12, Eur. Ct. H. R. ¶ 56 (2017).   
11. Id. ¶ 55. 
12. Id. ¶ 59. 
13. The Islamic veil across Europe, BBC (May 31, 2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-
europe-13038095 (Jun. 27, 2019). 
304
Favoring and Disfavoring Religion in Law  
CONCLUSION 
 This PhD project has raised a twofold research question: (i) should 
the law in liberal democracies single out religion qua religion for favored 
treatment? (ii) If not, what consequences does the answer to this question 
have for singling out religion qua religion in law for disfavored 
treatment?  
 This research has showed in its first four Chapters that religion 
should not be singled out in law for favored treatment qua religion. The 
combination of the ban on discrimination with other basic liberties, such 
as freedom of conscience, expression and association guarantees the free 
exercise of religion. This response has a limited geographical scope. It is 
only applicable in places where the law does prohibit discrimination and 
guarantee freedoms of conscience, expression and association. Moreover, 
practical concerns complicate the move toward withdrawal of religious 
freedom from the Constitution and other documents, even if other laws 
guarantee freedom of conscience, expression and association. 
 This research has showed in its last two Chapters that disfavoring 
religion qua religion is also problematic. It reinforces majoritarianism 
and downgrades minority groups to secondary class citizens.  
 The conclusion that religion as such does not deserve special legal 
solicitude does not herald the end of religious accommodation. Religious 
toleration and true religious pluralism could only be guaranteed under a 
legal regime that guarantees non-discrimination and basic liberties, such 
as the freedoms of conscience, expression and association.  
 Hence, we can summarize the threefold conclusion of this research 
as follows. No, religion does not deserve special legal protection because 
it is religion. And no, religion should not be disfavored in law because it 
concerns religion. Free exercise of religion finds proper protection under 
the guarantees of basic liberties, like freedoms of conscience, expression 
and association, as well as the legal promises of non-discrimination and 
neutrality.   
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 SUMMARY 
 The main research question of this study aims to solve two matters: 
(i) should the law in liberal democracies single out religion qua religion 
for favored treatment? (ii) If not, what consequences does the answer to 
this question have for singling out religion qua religion in law for 
disfavored treatment?  
 This research has given an answer to this question via combining 
the outcomes of six articles, each representing one Chapter. The first four 
Chapters deal with the question whether religion should be singled out 
in law qua religion. The final two Chapters scrutinizes the tendency of 
disfavoring religion in law. Although each Chapter has its own method, 
the overarching research methodology is one of searching for a reflective 
equilibrium. The Introduction has accounted for the way this study has 
started, what role our intuitions have played in the preparatory phase, 
how we have reached conclusions and revised our preliminary considered 
convictions.  
 We began this project as a response to developments in the legal and 
political discourse dealing with the question how the law should deal 
with religion and claims for exemptions based thereon. Although our first 
working hypothesis suggested that abstraction from a normative point of 
view is a problematic development, the confrontation of this hypothesis 
with legal philosophy on the “specialness” of religion in law urged us to 
reconsider our first ideas about this phenomenon. The conclusion we 
reached after reviewing the paradigmatic debate in liberal political 
philosophy on the justification grounds for a favored treatment of religion 
in law, was that abstraction is not something problematic per se. But the 
rise of measures attesting to a disfavored treatment of religion in law 
urged us to reconsider our conclusions about the phenomenon of 
abstraction.  
 This moving back and forth between our first intuitions, considered 
conclusions, concrete debates, legal theory and legal philosophy helped 
us in the search for a reflective equilibrium.  
 The overarching research strategy was one of testing our first ideas, 
revise our conclusions and expand our network of professionals who could 
help us to improve our argumentation pattern. 
 The Assessment Framework of Ritual Male Circumcision (Chapter 
One) has analyzed the legal-political debate in the Netherlands and the 
Council of Europe on the legal admissibility of male circumcision. The 
method used was a combination of doctrinal and normative research. As 
such, this Chapter has scrutinized the Dutch case law, positive law and 
literature on the (un)lawfulness of ritual male circumcision. Next, it has 
focused on the political debates inside the Council of Europe.  
 Chapter One has revealed that the national (Dutch) and regional 
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approaches (Council of Europe) to ritual male circumcision are quite 
similar. Both consider this intervention as a medical practice that can be 
accepted in law if certain criteria are met.  
 Parental consent for circumcision is the most important criterion in 
this regard. But the law also prescribes that circumcisions should take 
place under appropriate conditions and carried out by professionals. This 
condition was reaffirmed by the Council of Europe. 
 Chapter One has posited that religious male circumcision should not 
be accepted in law qua religious. It has justified this normative argument 
on the basis of what liberal political philosophy tells us about the special 
legal solicitude toward religion. That is no favoritism toward religion qua 
religion. 
 The Criminal Law Approach toward Female Circumcision: A 
Comparative Law Perspective (Chapter Two) has elaborated on the legal 
and political debates concerning the unlawfulness of female circumcision. 
This Chapter has analyzed the narratives behind this practice focusing 
on the question why people continue with practicing female circumcision. 
In addition, it has analyzed the legal approaches to this practice, focusing 
on the question as to why France is the only country that has succeeded 
in bringing cases of female circumcision before the criminal court.  
 To scrutinize why many countries fail to combat female circumcision 
despite the fact that this practice is considered a crime and a violation of 
fundamental rights, Chapter Two has compared the legal approaches to 
this practice in France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. In this 
respect, it has drawn on qualitative literature research to explore the 
relationship between models of citizenship that prevail in France, the 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom, and the criminal law approach to 
female circumcision. This analysis has resulted in the conclusion that we 
could conceptualize the French success in enforcing criminal law against 
female circumcision in light of the French republican model of citizenship 
that works toward assimilation of people with an immigrant background 
in the French society. The lack of results in the criminal law enforcement 
toward female circumcision in the Netherland and the United Kingdom 
is related to the multicultural model of citizenship that for a long time 
prevailed in both countries. 
 Abstraction from the Religious Dimension (Chapter Three) has 
focused on the liberal theories of religious freedom and introduced a 
conceptual framework of normative positions about the role of religion in 
law. This framework involves argumentation patterns that are helpful to 
answer the question whether liberal democracies should single out 
religion for special legal protection.  
 To answer this question, Chapter Three has categorized the liberal 
approaches to religion as follows. Rejection: no toleration for religion in 
law qua religion. Substitution: no need to single out religion in law qua 
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religion for a favored treatment, free exercise could be guaranteed under 
other basic freedoms. Generalization: advocating for a broader definition 
of religion in law that looks beyond theism. Equation: no reason to favor 
religion qua religion, the law should guarantee equal protection of deep 
commitments of all human beings, and it should guarantee that all have 
equal access to basic liberties. Representation: justifying the special legal 
solicitude toward religion in light of non-theistic values.  
 This classification of liberal positions, based on a normative method 
that has analyzed the debate in liberal political philosophy on the role of 
religion in law, is the first step to answer the question whether religion 
qua religion deserves special legal protection in liberal democracies. The 
answer to this question is threefold, and its synthesis is characterized by 
abstraction from the religious dimension, which renounces arguments 
justifying religious freedom with an appeal to distinctly religious values.  
 The Health Law Implications of Ritual Circumcisions (Chapter 
Four) has scrutinized the different legal approaches to practices and 
traditions that are comparable, such as male circumcision, the least 
invasive version of female circumcision and female genital cosmetic 
surgeries. This Chapter has referred in this respect to the fact that many 
countries, including but not limited to Western countries have forbidden 
female circumcision, better known as female genital mutilation in all its 
variants, while ritual male circumcision and esthetic genital surgeries 
are allowed.  
 This attests to the presence of “double standards” favoring religion 
and the cosmetic surgery industry. To address properly this criticism of 
“double standards”, Chapter Four has focused on the legal admissibility 
of ritual circumcisions.  
 It has combined doctrinal and normative research, and adopted a 
health law perspective to put the legality of ritual circumcisions under 
critical scrutiny. This approach has helped to explain why circumcision 
of boys is generally allowed in law. This practice has been considered a 
medical intervention that seems to be in the best interest of the child. 
Therefore, Chapter Four has posited that the law should not single out 
male circumcision for a favored treatment in law qua religious. Chapter 
Four has given a normative justification for this position, that is that any 
exemption granted in law should be ecumenical of nature, meaning that 
the law should not favor religion qua religion. 
 The health law perspective has also helped to explain why ritual 
female circumcision should remain illegal: it has no health benefits and 
it harms female bodies significantly. But this no-health-benefits-
argument could also have consequences for the legal admissibility of 
male circumcision if the medical benefits are at a future time determined 
to be non-existent. This gives an unsatisfactory feeling, as the ban on 
ritual circumcision of boys hangs like a Damocles sword above this 
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practice.  
 To address this critique, this Chapter has developed argumentation 
patterns that are closer to reality, meaning arguments that look beyond 
the sectarian and liberal justifications of ritual circumcisions, explaining 
why we should refrain from the acceptance of female circumcision in law 
and why we should restrain from the creation of further restrictions upon 
male circumcision at this moment. 
 Chapter Four has found such grounds in foreign relation interests 
of liberal democracies and their commitment to create a space of mutual 
understanding between different groups of people.  
 Freedom of Religion and Living Together (Chapter Five) has argued 
that despite the recognition of religious freedom as a fundamental human 
right, recent developments inside the United States and Europe reveal 
that the Islamic faith has been singled out qua Islam for special 
disfavored treatment. Chapter Five has raised the question whether this 
approach is compatible with the normative understanding of religion and 
religious freedom. The answer to this question is: no and it is based on a 
combination of doctrinal and normative research.  
 After all, liberal political philosophy emphasizes egalitarianism and 
neutrality in relation to religion. And although religion does not warrant 
special legal solicitude qua religion, Chapter Five has concluded that it 
is equally problematic to single out religion for disfavored treatment in 
law qua religion, even if the justification is facially neutral. Chapter Five 
has drawn on facially neutral examples, such as: the French ban on face-
covering veils, the travel ban project of President Trump, and the anti-
Sharia debacle in the state of Oklahoma. But the use of a prima facie 
neutral language does not cleanse such measures from animosity toward 
religion and discrimination of minority groups.  
 Chapter Five has revealed that abstraction in the broader debate on 
law and religion has been used in two ways. One, within the paradigm of 
liberal political philosophy on the role of religion in law. Two, within legal 
and political debates about religion in the public space, free exercise and 
religious accommodation. 
 Muslims and the Myths in the Immigration Politics of the United 
States (Chapter Six) has identified the myths behind measures that have 
singled out Muslims qua Islam for special restrictions and bans in the 
United States. This Chapter has analyzed the travel ban project of 
President Trump and the “Save our State Amendment” that aimed to 
outlaw the use of Sharia law in the state of Oklahoma. Chapter Six has 
revealed that behind the façades of security and neutrality there is fear 
of the stranger and in particular, fear of the Muslim migrant. Fear has 
played a major role in justifying measures and plans like the travel ban 
of President Trump and the anti-Sharia legal initiatives.  
 Historically, such “politics of fear” have affected migrant groups who 
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did not share the dominant religious and political perspective. As such, 
Baptists, Catholics, Jews, Mormons and Quakers were targeted in the 
past. Today, politics of fear have affected specifically Muslim migrants. 
In this respect, Chapter Six has revealed that over the past few years, 
particularly in the aftermath of Muslim terrorist attacks, the outward 
appearance of Muslims–such as wearing headscarves, having beards, 
non-Hispanic brown, and Middle-Eastern posture–has played a major 
role in the racial profiling of Muslim migrants in the United States. 
Furthermore, such physical characteristics and stereotypes have formed 
the basis to treat the stranger as suspicious.   
 Chapter Six has also revealed that today racial and ethnic profiling 
of Muslims or travelers with a “Muslim name” or an “Islamic appearance” 
at airports has become a notorious phenomenon. Moreover, while racial 
profiling of Muslims at airports and other security-sensitive places has 
been considered necessary for security needs, Chapter Six has unveiled 
how in other areas, the Islamic background of people has been considered 
a serious threat to societal harmony and peaceful coexistence in diversity. 
 Chapter Six has concluded that racialization of Muslims and other 
people with an immigrant background in the United States contributes 
to the creation of parallel societies affecting equal access to basic liberties 
in society.   
 The Conclusion of this research is that religion should not be singled 
out in law qua religion for a favored treatment. Neither should religion 
qua religion be singled out in law for a disfavored treatment.  
 Favoring religion in law is problematic because the combination of 
other basic liberties, such as the freedoms of conscience, association and 
expression, guarantees free exercise of religion.  
 Disfavoring religion in law is problematic because liberal political 
philosophy does not provide a normative basis to justify measures 
attesting to religious animus and religious discrimination.  
 The Conclusion has drawn on these two general notes to reconsider 
the phenomenon of abstraction in the debate on law and religion, freedom 
of religion, the (un)lawfulness of ritual circumcisions and reinforcement 
of majoritarianism.  
 With regard to the phenomenon of abstraction, the Conclusion has 
posited that we can describe abstraction as a concept that tells us what 
liberal political philosophers say about the specialness of religion in law. 
This description of abstraction as a concept that contains normative ideas 
about the special legal solicitude toward religion, unveils that religion in 
liberal political philosophy is only considered protection-worthy in law, if 
its liberal substitutes are protection-worthy categories as such.  
 Thus, religion should only receive special protection via abstraction 
from the religious dimension. 
 But the Conclusion has showed that we can discern abstraction in 
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legal and political debates on for example religion, free exercise, religious 
accommodation, immigration and integration of minorities. At this point, 
abstraction has been used rhetorically to justify restrictive measures. 
 With regard to the need for a special right to freedom of religion, the 
Conclusion has defended the argument that we do not need religious 
freedom to have the ability to manifest our religious beliefs in freedom. 
The guarantees under other basic liberties, like freedoms of conscience, 
thought and expression provide enough protection to free exercise, i.e. 
the freedom to manifest religious beliefs. However, political concerns at 
this time urge us to be cautious. Hence, the Conclusion does not advocate 
for the removal of religious freedom in today’s anxious world, it only says 
that we do not have a normative liberal justification for favoring religion 
in law. 
 With regard to the admissibility of ritual circumcisions in law, the 
Conclusion has reaffirmed that the law should not single out for favored 
treatment religious practices qua religious. Thus, no toleration in law for 
female circumcision, although some of its variants show similarities with 
practices that are allowed, such as genital cosmetic surgeries and male 
circumcision. Furthermore, male circumcision should only be accepted as 
an exemption in law if certain criteria are met. This means that the law 
should not favor religious male circumcision qua religious, but allow for 
this practice if parental consent is present and the circumcision is carried 
out by skilled professionals and under appropriate conditions.  
  With regard to reinforcement of majoritarianism, we have said that 
two developments have contributed to this. On the one hand, the rise of 
measures that have singled out the Islamic faith qua Islam for disfavored 
treatment. This has downgraded Muslims to secondary class citizens for 
whom other criteria apply when it comes to free exercise of basic liberties. 
On the other hand, the religious freedom jurisprudence of Courts across 
liberal democracies is overtly tolerant toward majoritarian sensitivities 
and intolerant toward requests for exemptions coming from people who 
do not fit within the majoritarian and dominant culture.  
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 SAMENVATTING 
 De hoofdvraag van dit onderzoek, onderzoekt twee kwesties: (i) zou 
godsdienst binnen liberale democratieën uitgezonderd moeten worden 
voor speciale bescherming qua godsdienst? (ii) Zo niet, heeft het antwoord 
op de eerste vraag consequenties voor het uitzonderen van godsdienst 
voor nadelige behandeling qua godsdienst? 
 Dit onderzoek heeft antwoord gegeven op deze hoofdvraag door de 
uitkomsten van zes artikelen, ieder artikel staat voor een hoofdstuk, te 
combineren. De eerste vier hoofdstukken hebben betrekking op de vraag 
of godsdienst uitgezonderd dient te worden voor bijzondere bescherming. 
De laatste twee hoofdstukken hebben betrekking op de ontwikkeling die 
godsdienst uitzondert voor nadelige behandeling. 
 Hoewel ieder hoofdstuk een eigen onderzoeksmethode heeft, wordt 
de overkoepelende methode gekenmerkt door het reflectief evenwicht.  
 In de Introductie is verantwoording afgelegd over de aanleiding van 
dit onderzoek, welke rol onze inzichten hebben gespeeld bij aanvang van 
dit onderzoek en hoe wij tot onze conclusies zijn gekomen.  
 Dit project is begonnen als een reactie op ontwikkelingen binnen het 
juridische en politieke discours over godsdienst en claims voor excepties 
daarop gebaseerd. Hoewel de werkhypothese aanvankelijk suggereerde 
dat abstractie—normatief gezien—een problematische ontwikkeling is, 
leidde de confrontatie van deze werkhypothese met het debat binnen de 
liberale politieke filosofie over de beschermwaardigheid van godsdienst 
binnen het recht ertoe dat wij onze eerste ideeën over abstractie hebben 
herzien.  
 Wij concludeerden dat abstractie niet per definitie problematisch is. 
Wat wel problematisch bleek te zijn, was het gebruik van abstractie voor 
een nadelige behandeling van godsdienst qua godsdienst. De opkomst en 
toename van voorstellen en maatregelen die een ongunstige behandeling 
van godsdienst in de wet bevestigen, leidde ertoe dat wij onze eerdere 
conclusie over het fenomeen abstractie hebben heroverwogen. 
 Dit heen en weer gaan tussen onze eerste ideeën over abstractie, 
weloverwogen conclusies, concrete debatten, rechtsfilosofie en politieke 
filosofie heeft ons geholpen bij onze zoektocht naar reflectief evenwicht. 
 De overkoepelende onderzoeksstrategie bestond uit het testen van 
onze eerste ideeën, het herzien van onze conclusies en het uitbreiden van 
ons netwerk van professionals om de inhoud van ons werk te verbeteren. 
 Het Beoordelingskader van Rituele Jongensbesnijdenis (hoofdstuk 
één) heeft het juridisch-politieke debat binnen Nederland en de Raad van 
Europa over de toelaatbaarheid van jongensbesnijdenis geanalyseerd. De 
gebruikte methode was zowel doctrinair als normatief. Als zodanig heeft 
dit hoofdstuk de Nederlandse jurisprudentie, het positieve recht en de 
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juridische literatuur over de (on)toelaatbaarheid van jongensbesnijdenis 
geanalyseerd. Ook heeft dit hoofdstuk politieke debatten binnen de Raad 
van Europa over de toelaatbaarheid van jongensbesnijdenis onderzocht. 
 Hoofdstuk één heeft laten zien dat de Nederlandse (nationaal) en de 
regionale benadering (de Raad van Europa) van jongensbesnijdenis veel 
overeenkomsten vertonen. Beide beschouwen jongensbesnijdenis als een 
medische praktijk die onder bepaalde voorwaarden toelaatbaar is. 
 De toestemming van de ouders voor de besnijdenis is in dit opzicht 
het belangrijkste criterium. Maar de besnijdenis moet ook plaatsvinden 
onder medisch verantwoorde omstandigheden en zij dient uitgevoerd te 
worden door professionals.  
 Dit hoofdstuk heeft betoogd dat jongensbesnijdenis niet zou moeten 
worden toegelaten in het recht, omdat het een religieuze praktijk betreft. 
Deze normatieve stellingname is verankerd en verantwoord binnen het 
kader van de liberale politieke filosofie over de rechtvaardiging voor de 
bijzondere bescherming van godsdienst. Binnen dit kader is geen ruimte 
voor de bescherming van godsdienst qua godsdienst in het recht. 
 De Strafrechtelijke Aanpak van Meisjesbesnijdenis in een 
Rechtsvergelijkende Context (hoofdstuk twee) heeft juridische en 
politieke debatten over de strafwaardigheid van meisjesbesnijdenis 
nader onderzocht. Dit hoofdstuk heeft de grondslagen van deze praktijk 
geanalyseerd met nadruk op de vraag waarom jonge meisjes en vrouwen 
nog altijd onderworpen worden aan besnijdenis. Ook heeft dit hoofdstuk 
de juridische benadering van deze praktijk geanalyseerd met nadruk op 
de vraag waarom Frankrijk het enige land is dat succesvol zaken over 
meisjesbesnijdenis onder de aandacht van de strafrechter heeft gebracht. 
 Om te onderzoeken waarom veel landen falen in het bestrijden van 
meisjesbesnijdenis ondanks het feit dat deze praktijk als een misdaad en 
schending van de grondrechten wordt beschouwd, heeft hoofdstuk twee 
de aanpak van dit verschijnsel in Frankrijk, Nederland en het Verenigd 
Koninkrijk vergeleken. 
 In dit verband is gebruikgemaakt van literatuuronderzoek om te 
kijken of er een verband bestaat tussen burgerschapsmodellen die gelden 
in respectievelijk Frankrijk, Nederland en het Verenigd Koninkrijk en de 
strafrechtelijke benadering van meisjesbesnijdenis in die landen.  
 Deze analyse heeft geleid tot de conclusie dat wij het Franse succes 
in de strafrechtelijke aanpak van meisjesbesnijdenis kunnen koppelen 
aan het republikeinse model van burgerschap dat hamert op assimilatie 
van mensen met een niet-Franse achtergrond in de Franse samenleving. 
Het gebrek aan resultaten bij de strafrechtelijke handhaving ten aanzien 
van meisjesbesnijdenis in Nederland en het Verenigd Koninkrijk houdt 
verband met het multiculturele model van burgerschap dat in die landen 
lange tijd gold. 
 Abstractie van de Religieuze Dimensie (hoofdstuk drie) heeft nader 
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onderzoek gedaan naar de liberale theorieën van godsdienstvrijheid. Ook 
heeft dit hoofdstuk een conceptueel kader ontwikkeld over de bijzondere 
bescherming van de categorie godsdienst in het recht.  
 Dit raamwerk omvat argumentatiepatronen die nuttig zijn om de 
vraag te beantwoorden of liberale democratieën godsdienst behoren uit 
te zonderen voor bijzondere bescherming qua godsdienst. 
 Hoofdstuk drie heeft de liberale benadering van godsdienst als volgt 
gecategoriseerd. Verwerping: geen tolerantie voor godsdienst in het recht 
qua godsdienst. Vervanging: het is niet nodig godsdienst qua godsdienst 
speciaal te beschermen, want godsdienstvrijheid kan worden vervangen 
door andere rechten. Generalisatie: pleiten voor een andere interpretatie 
van godsdienst die verder reikt dan het theïsme. Vergelijking: geen reden 
om alleen godsdienst uit te zonderen voor bijzondere bescherming, want 
het recht zou diepe overtuigingen op dezelfde manier moeten beschermen 
en het recht moet ook de gelijke toegang tot grondrechten garanderen. 
Vertegenwoordiging: niet-godsdienstige waarden vormen de basis om de 
bijzondere bescherming van godsdienst te rechtvaardigen in het recht. 
 Deze classificatie van liberale posities, gebaseerd op een normatieve 
methode die het rechtsfilosofische debat over de rol van godsdienst in het 
recht heeft geanalyseerd, is de eerste stap om de vraag te beantwoorden 
of godsdienst qua godsdienst bijzondere bescherming nodig heeft binnen 
liberale democratieën.  
 Het antwoord op deze vraag is drieledig en de synthese ervan wordt 
gekenmerkt door abstractie van de religieuze dimensie, die geen ruimte 
biedt voor argumenten die godsdienstvrijheid willen rechtvaardigen met 
een appel op religieuze waarden. 
 De Gezondheidsrechtelijke Implicaties van Rituele Besnijdenissen 
(hoofdstuk vier) heeft de juridische verschillen in de toelaatbaarheid van 
relatief vergelijkbare praktijken, zoals jongensbesnijdenis, de lichtste 
variant van meisjesbesnijdenis en cosmetische ingrepen aan vrouwelijke 
genitaliën kritisch geanalyseerd. Dit hoofdstuk heeft verwezen naar het 
feit dat in veel landen meisjesbesnijdenis, beter bekend als vrouwelijke 
genitale verminking, in al zijn varianten verboden is, terwijl bijvoorbeeld 
jongensbesnijdenis en cosmetische ingrepen toegestaan zijn. 
 Dit getuigt van “dubbele standaarden” ten gunste van godsdienst en 
de cosmetische chirurgie-industrie. Om dit punt nader te onderzoeken, 
heeft dit hoofdstuk gekeken naar verschillen in de wijze waarop het recht 
omgaat met mannen- en vrouwenbesnijdenis.  
 Om de toelaatbaarheid van rituele besnijdenissen te onderzoeken, 
heeft hoofdstuk vier doctrinair en normatief onderzoek gecombineerd en 
tevens gebruik gemaakt van een gezondheidsrechtelijk kader.  
 Deze combinatie van verschillende benaderingen heeft ons in staat 
gesteld om te verklaren waarom het recht een uitzondering maakt voor 
jongensbesnijdenis. Niet omdat het een religieuze praktijk betreft. Maar 
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omdat jongensbesnijdenis een medische ingreep betreft. 
 Hoofdstuk vier heeft geconcludeerd dat religieuze praktijken niet 
zouden moeten worden toegelaten binnen het recht louter op basis van 
hun religieuze grondslagen.  
 De normatieve rechtvaardiging voor deze conclusie is dat excepties 
altijd op basis van algemeen aanvaarde waarden zouden moeten worden 
gerechtvaardigd. Dus: geen speciale bescherming voor godsdienst in het 
recht qua godsdienst.  
 Het gezondheidsrechtelijk kader heeft ons tevens geholpen om te 
verklaren waarom meisjesbesnijdenis strafbaar moet blijven: zij schaadt 
vrouwelijke lichamen aanzienlijk en zij heeft geen gezondheidsvoordelen. 
 Maar het “gezondheidsargument” zou ook gevolgen kunnen hebben 
voor de juridische toelaatbaarheid van jongensbesnijdenis, indien blijkt 
dat deze praktijk geen enkel medisch voordeel meer heeft. Dit geeft een 
onbevredigend gevoel, omdat het verbod op rituele besnijdenis geen 
denkbeeldige scenario is. Het verbod hangt als een zwaard van Damocles 
boven jongensbesnijdenis.  
 Om een oplossing te bieden voor deze uitdaging, heeft hoofdstuk vier 
argumentatiepatronen ontwikkeld die dichter bij de werkelijkheid staan: 
dus tegen het toelaten van vrouwenbesnijdenis en tegen een verbod op 
de rituele jongensbesnijdenis.  
 Dit kader stoelt op belangen van liberale democratieën in verband 
met internationale betrekkingen en de wijze waarop zij om horen te gaan 
met minderheden. 
 Godsdienstvrijheid en Samen Leven (hoofdstuk vijf) heeft betoogd 
dat ondanks het feit dat godsdienstvrijheid algemeen is erkend als een 
fundamenteel recht, ontwikkelingen binnen Verenigde Staten en Europa 
laten zien dat de islam wordt uitgezonderd voor nadelige behandeling. 
Dit hoofdstuk heeft de vraag opgeworpen of deze benadeling verenigbaar 
is met de wijze waarop binnen liberale politieke filosofie wordt gesproken 
over godsdienst. Het antwoord hierop is: nee. Dit antwoord is gebaseerd 
op een combinatie van doctrinair en normatief onderzoek. 
 Liberale politieke filosofie benadrukt gelijkheid en neutraliteit in de 
wijze waarop zij omgaat met godsdienst en hoewel dit kader geen ruimte 
biedt om godsdienst qua godsdienst bijzonder te beschermen, biedt het 
evenmin ruimte om godsdienst qua godsdienst bijzonder te benadelen.  
 Daarom zijn maatregelen en wetten die prima facie neutraal zijn, 
zoals het Franse boerkaverbod, de inreisverboden van President Trump 
en het anti-Sharia initiatief in de staat Oklahoma, maar die godsdienst 
in de kern raken, problematisch en als zodanig ontoelaatbaar.  
 Hoofdstuk vijf heeft laten zien hoe abstractie op twee manieren is 
gebruikt binnen het bredere debat over recht en religie. Abstractie heeft 
een eigen betekenis binnen het paradigma van liberale politieke filosofie 
over godsdienst. Binnen juridische en politieke debatten over godsdienst 
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in de openbare ruimte, het uitoefenen van godsdienst en het creëren van 
excepties voor gelovigen binnen liberale democratieën wordt zij retorisch 
toegepast.  
 Moslims en Mythes in het Immigratiebeleid van de Verenigde Staten 
(hoofdstuk zes) heeft een aantal mythes geïdentificeerd die de boventoon 
voeren in het immigratiedebat in de Verenigde Staten. Zij vormen tevens 
de basis voor maatregelen die moslims nadelig treffen op basis van hun 
godsdienst. Dit hoofdstuk heeft de inreisverboden van president Trump 
geanalyseerd, alsook het anti-Sharia initiatief in de staat Oklahoma.  
 Hoofdstuk zes heeft onthuld dat achter de façades van veiligheid en 
neutraliteit in het algemeen een vrees bestaat voor de vreemdeling en in 
het bijzonder de angst heerst over moslims. Angst heeft een belangrijke 
rol gespeeld bij het vinden van rechtvaardigingen voor maatregelen en 
voorstellen die moslims in het bijzonder nadelig treffen.  
 Maatregelen die gebaseerd zijn op gevoelens van angst hebben altijd 
mensen geraakt die niet passen binnen de heersende dominante cultuur. 
Als zodanig zijn baptisten, katholieken, joden, mormonen en quakers in 
het verleden een doelwit geweest van soortgelijke maatregelen.  
 Tegenwoordig heeft de politiek van angst vooral moslimmigranten 
nadelig getroffen. In dit verband heeft hoofdstuk zes verwezen naar het 
“moslimuiterlijk”, zoals het dragen van hoofddoeken, baarden, gekleurd 
zijn of Midden-Oosters eruit zien, dat in de afgelopen jaren, en met name 
in de nasleep van terroristische aanslagen, een cruciale rol heeft gespeeld 
in het raciaal profileren van moslimmigranten in de Verenigde Staten. 
 Hoofdstuk zes heeft tevens verwezen naar het feit dat tegenwoordig 
het raciaal en etnisch profileren van moslims of mensen die islamitische 
namen hebben een veel toegepaste methode is op vliegvelden. Maar de 
“islamitische achtergrond” wordt tegenwoordig ook gebruikt om allerlei 
restrictieve maatregelen en wetten te rechtvaardigen om de dominante 
cultuur aldus te beschermen. 
 De conclusie van dit hoofdstuk was dat racialisering van moslims en 
anderen met een achtergrond die afwijkt van de dominante cultuur in de 
Verenigde Staten bijdraagt aan het creëren van parallelle samenlevingen 
dat gelijke toegang tot fundamentele rechten bemoeilijkt. 
  De Conclusie is dat godsdienst geen speciale bescherming toe mag 
komen omdat het godsdienst betreft. Evenmin zou godsdienst een bron 
moeten zijn voor bijzonder nadelige aanpak. 
 Het uitzonderen van godsdienst voor bijzondere bescherming geeft 
vanuit een normatief oogpunt problemen omdat godsdienst vervangbaar 
is door andere categorieën die als zodanig beschermwaardig zijn, zoals 
het geweten. 
 Het uitzonderen van godsdienst voor nadelige behandeling is vanuit 
een normatief oogpunt bezien niet wenselijk, omdat het indruist tegen de 
basisprincipes van de liberale politieke filosofie: verbod op discriminatie 
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en neutraliteit van staatswege tegenover godsdienst.  
 In de Conclusie wordt ook nog teruggeblikt op vier onderwerpen die 
een belangrijke rol hebben gespeeld in dit onderzoek: het fenomeen van 
abstractie, het debat over de vrijheid van godsdienst, de toelaatbaarheid 
van rituele besnijdenissen en de versterking van het majoritarisme. 
 Met betrekking tot abstractie menen wij dat dit fenomeen als een 
concept met normatieve posities kan worden beschreven. Daarnaast is er 
sprake van abstractie binnen juridische en politieke debatten. 
 Ten aanzien van abstractie als een descriptief concept dat ons nader 
informeert over de bijzondere bescherming van godsdienst in het recht, 
laat ons onderzoek zien dat godsdienst alleen beschermwaardig is door 
abstractie van de religieuze dimensie.  
 Dus, godsdienst kan alleen als bijzonder worden beschouwd omdat 
zijn liberale substituten beschermwaardig zijn in het recht. 
 Ten aanzien van abstractie als een middel dat wordt toegepast om 
vergaande restricties op fundamentele rechten te rechtvaardigen, laten 
wij aan de hand van concrete politieke debatten zien hoe abstractie als 
een retorisch middel wordt gebruikt. 
 Met betrekking tot de noodzaak voor een bijzonder recht op vrijheid 
van godsdienst zegt dit onderzoek in de Conclusie dat voor de uitoefening 
van godsdienst een speciaal recht op godsdienstvrijheid geen must is. De 
garanties onder gewetensvrijheid, de vrijheid van meningsuiting en de 
vrijheid van vereniging bieden genoeg bescherming om in vrijheid uiting 
te geven aan religieuze overtuigen. Maar politieke ontwikkelingen op dit 
moment nopen tot voorzichtigheid.  
 Daarom pleiten wij niet voor afschaffing van godsdienstvrijheid, wij 
stellen uitsluitend vast dat er normatief gezien geen redenen bestaan om 
godsdienst uit te zonderen voor bijzondere bescherming in het recht qua 
godsdienst. 
  Met betrekking tot de toelaatbaarheid van rituele besnijdenissen, 
zijn wij tot de conclusie gekomen dat religieuze praktijken niet mogen 
worden bevoorrecht qua het religieuze. Dus geen bescherming voor een 
praktijk als meisjesbesnijdenis, hoewel sommige varianten hiervan veel 
overeenkomsten vertonen met jongensbesnijdenis.  
 Jongensbesnijdenis zou alleen mogen worden toegestaan onder een 
aantal voorwaarden, zoals ouderlijke toestemming, vakbekwaamheid en 
professionaliteit.  
 Met betrekking tot versterking van het majoritarisme hebben wij 
verwezen naar maatregelen die moslims in het bijzonder nadelig hebben 
getroffen. Wij hebben gewezen op het risico van parallelle samenlevingen 
die kunnen ontstaan als gevolg van zulke maatregelen. In dit verband 
hebben wij ook gekeken naar Amerikaanse en Europese rechtspraak die 
zeer gevoelig blijkt te zijn voor meerderheidszorgen. 
 Deze twee ontwikkelingen versterken het majoritarisme. 
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